[version 1; peer review: 2 approved with reservations]
No competing interests were disclosed.
Japanese philosopher Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) not only discussed religion in ways that were rooted in the fundamental claims of his writings, such as Shinran in
Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), a well-known Japanese philosopher, and Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962),
A particular characteristic of Tanabe’s philosophy is the appearance of religion at major points in his treatises, as in the case of Shinran in
The aim of this study is to examine Tanabe’s theory of religion, which is unique among Japanese philosophers, by first examining the absolute religion related to the second religious reformation as a keyword. However, the question arises as to how his unique absolute religion pursues a universal theory of religion. Therefore, we examine Tanabe’s world religion and investigate the elements that are underlying it. Through this process, this study helps clarify the uniqueness and significance of Tanabe’s theory of religion from the perspective of religious studies.
To achieve the aforementioned research objectives, we examine various documents by the Japanese philosopher Tanabe, from the perspective of religious studies. Although Tanabe has numerous writings, our chosen scripts are limited to later works containing relatively further developed theory of religion. This study first examines
The basis of this study is the textual interpretations, but the author also focuses on letters and recollections that clues the understanding of how Tanabe constructed his theory of religion. The literature that is referred to, comprise of papers focusing on Tanabe’s later works. The perspective of this study’s analysis is Tanabe’s view of Platonism. One reason for adopting this, is the author’s previous research on Plato and Neoplatonism. In addition, Platonism crucially bridges philosophy and religion in Tanabe’s work. To examine his theory of religion without limiting it to a specific religion, it is presumably insufficient to compare Tanabe’s views on a specific religion with its doctrines. Focusing on Platonism and analyzing its relation to religion, is a necessary process to find a theory of religion in Tanabe’s works, that is not limited to a specific religion.
Based on the above discussion, we explore how Tanabe’s contemplation of religion is also a practice of forming religion, by referring to Platonism as a model for bridging philosophy and religion in Tanabe.
Although religion has an important role in Tanabe’s thoughts, he states, “Since the principle of nothingness in the dialectic is the principle of philosophy, philosophy must come to it by negating itself, and must be restored to the philosophy of religion as an occasion of negation as religious faith” (THZ 9, p. 335). In other words, Tanabe’s thoughts focus on the philosophy of religion, not religion itself.
The word
There are several possible reasons why the theory of religion in Japanese philosophers has not been well studied. First, although both Nishida and Tanabe established their scholarly careers at a time when the concept of religion was still being formed in Japan, their use of the word “religion” does not seem very strange from a modern perspective. It is conceivable that this makes it unnecessary for us to be very aware of how their concept of religion was defined. Another possible factor is that Nishida and Tanabe both mainly focused on so-called world religions, such as Buddhism and Christianity, and less on folk religions and practices.
Concerning Tanabe, it seems significant today to consider the religion that he contemplated and attempted to form as part of his practice. This is because, while the religious intellectuals of his time were struggling to establish a new religion for a new era, Tanabe was seeking to do so from a different point of view. Tanabe’s discussion of religion is unlikely to be limited to the acceptance of the religious views of the time but is assumed to be unique. This is because Tanabe’s thoughts, expressed in the symbolic form of the vortex (
To examine Tanabe’s concept of “religion,” we acknowledge how strongly religion is considered in his theory. If Tanabe considered religion weakly, it would have been difficult to discuss his theory of religion alongside the arguments made by the religious intellectuals of his time.
One of Tanabe’s major characteristics as a philosopher is his emphasis on practice (
Tanabe’s thoughts are also oriented toward transforming society. During the war, his insistence on “the logic of species” was fraught with danger, as it could be interpreted as a message that the nation should be respected.
Tanabe’s vision is explicitly expressed in
This work develops from the question “Jesus or Paul?” by William Wrede (1859–1906). The argument that Christianity, Marxism, and Japanese Buddhism, which are dissimilar, mediate and unite as a dialectic is, from today’s perspective, a reflection of the world at the time. Since this study focuses on the development of religion in Tanabe, we begin with “Appendix: Christianity, Marxism and Japanese Buddhism,” in which the theme appears several times. Although
If Protestantism ends its protest halfway, it will naturally lose its life. It must first die to itself for its resurrection. It must live in nothingness with a thoroughgoing self-negation. This is Christianity, but no longer Christianity. But it is not Buddhism, of course, and it can only be called absolute religion or absolute faith. I believe that it is in this position that the second religious reformation is required to be carried out today. (THZ 10, p. 319)
Although the second religious reformation that Tanabe discusses has Protestantism in mind,
… I am sure that everyone is aware that the concept of absolute religion mentioned above is derived, of course, from Hegel. My use of it is the same as his, and while it involves historical mediation to a great extent, it must also exhibit the character of nothingness more thoroughly than it did in his case. If you think about it for a moment, absolute religion might seem to refer to a religion such as Zen, which absolutely denies any limitation and is universally free and flexible. Such universality, however, remains a so-called abstract universality, not a concrete universality. (THZ 10, p. 320)
Buddhism is not given sufficient significance in Hegel’s theory of religion in the
It must be said that only by including this can absolute religion truly become absolute. For without the occasion of nothingness, the absoluteness of religion cannot be realized
Tanabe advocates a thoroughgoing absolute religion from the standpoint of a philosophy of religion based on Hegel’s theory of religion by adding the Buddhist concept of nothingness to the dialectic of that philosophy. Tanabe’s absolute religion, with Christianity in mind and Buddhism added to it, differs from Hegel’s view of the history of religions. However, this reference to absolute religion, characteristic of Tanabe’s theory of religion, does not clarify what kind of a universal religion he aims for. Hence, we address Tanabe’s reference to “world religion(s)”
Absolute religion is used in Tanabe as if it were a synonym for world religion. In his lecture, “The Limits of Culture,” for example, Tanabe states, “The question of death forms the central problem in all religions, especially in Buddhism and Christianity, which are called absolute or world religions” (THZ 8, p. 281).
From these assertions, it would seem that Tanabe is simply defining world religions based on Christianity. Passages such as “there can be no religion apart from theology in world religions” (THZ 10, p. 255) seem to confirm this view. However, in his later work,
Pure Land Buddhism, which is included in Nāgārjuna and other branches of Mahāyāna Buddhism, shows that Buddhism as a religion cannot lack the occasion of salvation by Other-power (
It is not difficult to imagine that the absolute mediation of Zen, Pure Land Buddhism, and Christianity would result in the aforementioned absolute faith or religion, but one cannot deny the impression that the philosopher Tanabe is creating a religion by cherry picking. Tanabe’s attitude toward including religion in the philosophical discussion became more pronounced after the
I have already mentioned that I have come to feel a kinship with Christianity since I was converted to “philosophy as metanoetics.” Moreover, when I reflected on the dialectic of Platonism that I had adopted in the past, it became clear to me that I could no longer stop there. I then became aware that it was inevitable that I should go on to the position of paradoxical dialectics and come to faith in the gospel. In other words, the dialectic of good must now be turned into the dialectic of love. (THZ 10, pp. 11–12)
Here, “the dialectic of Platonism that I had adopted in the past” is a clear reference to the third article in
The third article in
In philosophy, we attain the wisdom of liberation through the path of nothingness. Its starting point is in accord with the criticism of science, and its point of return is in accord with religion as a standpoint for liberation and salvation…. To die, that Plato demanded of the true philosopher, must be to stand in such a standpoint of nothingness. (THZ 9, pp. 405–406)
The unity of the point of return of philosophy and religion is presented by Socrates. Then,
“Self-Transcendence in Platonism and Faith in Gospel,” which begins with the death of Socrates, discusses such themes as the development of Plato’s Idealism, the significance of matter as an occasion of self-negation in Plato’s philosophy, its similarity to Buddhism, and the fact that the existential philosophy of the time, including Karl Jaspers, became an overreach of Plato’s dialectics as well as Neoplatonism. Toward the end of the work in chapter six, “The Mediation of Zen of Learning Death in Nothingness as Love,” Tanabe refers to Suzuki Shōsan in the early Edo period to make practicing death possible even for ordinary people. This argument may seem rather far-fetched, but Tanabe sees in it a connection between philosophy and religion that transcends both East and West. Suzuki Shōsan was a Zen monk of samurai origin and was regarded as an advocate of economic ethics due to his insistence that daily life was a Buddhist practice. Tanabe contrasts Suzuki’s experience of constantly facing death with that of Socrates and interprets it as follows:
I find it very significant that on the method of learning death, we can recognize the process by which philosophers practice death, something that Socrates seems to have accomplished with almost superhuman innate gifts and training. … Therefore, if we learn death by dying in death, as Shōsan dōjin has shown, then true death, no longer an object of conception, becomes the inner occasion that makes us subject. This learning from death is the only way to practice death that is open to us ordinary people. (THZ 9, pp. 473–474)
Furthermore, Tanabe, referring to Suzuki Daisetsu, interprets the emphasis on knowing shame as a characteristic of Zen of learning death as “an emphasis on repentance not normally found in Zen” (THZ 9, p. 474). He praises Shōsan Zen as “deeply committed to the absolute state of religion, without any doubt” (THZ 9, p. 475). However, Zen was a standpoint pursuing absolute nothingness through self-power practice and treating others with love was thin and abstract (THZ 9, pp. 477–478). Here Tanabe states that by applying his dialectic principle to Zen, the Zen of self-power and the Nembutsu of Other-power go together to arrive at the original state of being.
In this way, the belief in self-power, a characteristic of Zen, becomes
In Tanabe, because repentance by Other-power is the essence of Shinran, Suzuki Shōsan’s Zen practiced by ordinary people who repent may be connected to Nembutsu (THZ 9, p. 476). Hence, with Socrates as a starting point, Zen and Nembutsu are strongly linked, and religious salvation is not limited to self-salvation but is also linked to social practice. This also corresponds to the fact that Plato’s dialectic, which began with Socrates, is oriented toward self-transcendence and necessarily leads to social practice, hence the claim that Platonism is completed by the Christian gospel.
In seeking a satisfactory and possible way to meet the inevitable demand of the Platonic dialectic to transcend the self through dialectical methods, I have taken up and interpreted, and critiqued ideas such as existential philosophy and Zen of learning death, which have much in common with Plato’s philosophy. I realized, however, that these are still one-dimensional abstractions and that we must demand the opposite positions of social liberation and Other-power return as an occasion, and that they must also be mutually combined through them. Thus, as a concrete religion that mediates and integrates these two or three opposing occasions, I have no choice but to take up faith in the gospel. (THZ 9, p. 481)
This statement also seems to be an assertion that world religions, including philosophies, are unified under Christianity as the standard. However, as discussed in
This insistence on moving from Platonism as a dialectic philosophy to a world religion that must include a dialectical occasion is also found in
In this discussion, we have seen that in the Japanese philosopher Tanabe’s theory of absolute dialectic, the way of absolute religion is envisioned for the second religious reformation, and that there is a discussion of world religions, though limited to Christianity and some sects of Buddhism. The religion of the new era as envisioned by Tanabe, is a universal one in which philosophy and religion are bridged through dialectics and where Platonism is presented as a model for realizing this. Tanabe’s discussion reveals the following aspects that have not received much attention so far. The Japanese philosopher who confronted Western philosophy with intensive contemplation made a “creative”
Tanabe’s conception of religion probably does not go beyond the scope of an intellectual’s religion. The scope of his discussion of world religions is narrow, and his attention to folk customs and practices is limited. This would indicate that even if Tanabe’s thoroughness in philosophy had led him to religion, he would not have escaped the limitations of a “religion” that is mainly based on doctrinal and speculative aspects. However, this does not mean that Tanabe’s inquiry was not directed toward practices such as folk customs that today’s religious studies would naturally include in the realm of religion, but rather that Tanabe was directed toward practices as a philosopher. Although it may appear to be an empty theory, for Tanabe, it was an existential practice and not an empty argument as shown in
The confrontation with Minoda also evidences the intensity of Tanabe’s determination to pursue his practice of philosophy. The fact that the thoroughness of his philosophy, on which he stakes his existence, is somewhat aligned with religion, may be considered a practice of retracing the path of Socrates, the founder of the dialectic, as Tanabe calls him. Platonism, which originates in the practice of death by Socrates, is, according to Tanabe, the driving force behind the development of Christianity into a world religion of humanity and a borderline position that may diverge into Neoplatonism as an overreach of Plato, which Tanabe criticizes.
Hatano Seiichi, whose lectures Tanabe also attended, wrote of Neoplatonism, including Plotinus, that “this school of philosophy sought to satisfy the truth-seeking mind on the one hand and the religious mind on the other. In a word, it is the religion of scholars,” in his
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Tanabe’s work referred to in this study is based on
It has also been pointed out that Nishida’s strong influence from Zen has not always been fully demonstrated (Sakamoto Shin-ichi, “Nishida Tetsugaku no Futatsu no Keishō: Kyōto Gakuha to Chisan Gakuha (Two Inheritances of Nishida Philosophy: Kyoto School and Chisan School),”
The new edition of the
In
Himi Kiyoshi,
The year of publication may mislead readers into thinking that this work was written in response to Japan’s defeat in World War II. However, it is based on a lecture titled “Metanoetics” (
Tanabe distinguishes between the conscious “
It should be noted that Tanabe’s dialectic is his theory, which he calls “absolute dialectic.” Therefore, when Tanabe uses the term “dialectic” to refer to Plato in particular, he includes many of his interpretations that depart from Plato’s text.
It is important to consider the division of Tanabe’s thoughts into periods, which differs among scholars. In this study, the main subject under consideration is Tanabe’s writings after his lecture “
It should be noted that Tanabe’s philosophy of religion has a different connotation compared to the philosophy of religion in general terms, such as Kant’s philosophy of religion, for example. Tanabe also refers to the philosophy of religion in philosophy in general, for example, in “Supplement III: Philosophy of Religion and ethics” in his
As works that thematically discuss Tanabe’s philosophy of religion, we can mention Himi,
For a study of these religious figures and their theories, see Hoshino Seiji,
The claims made by modern Japanese religious figures in Hoshino
In
Nakano Hajimu (ed.),
Tanabe’s consistent refusal to move to a warmer climate when advised by Karaki Junzō and others close to him are documented in letters to Karaki dated July and October 1947 (
Tanabe Hajime, “
Letters to Mutai Risaku and others (
For the discussions between Minoda and Tanabe, see Uemura Kazuhide,
As to why Tanabe responded to the debate, Ōshima Yasumasa speculates that one of the attackers, Matsuda Fukumatsu, may have once been a student of Tanabe (THZ 8, p. 466).
See Himi,
Itō,
Mutō Kazuo explains this as follows: “Tanabe did not advocate a new religion himself, so to speak, but rather sought a deep self-reflection of Christianity and Buddhism from the standpoint of philosophical demonstration and hoped for creative development originating from within them” (THZ 10, p. 333). Depending on one’s view of the distinction between philosophy and religion, it is difficult to say whether
When Tanabe was a high school student, discourses on (self-) cultivation (
The school was known as the predecessor of the Collage of Arts and Sciences at the University of Tokyo and others, with its dormitories being famous for their self-governing system. This spirit had already faded by the time Tanabe entered the school (THZ 10, p. 3).
Liao interprets this as a religious experience that occurred to Tanabe during this period. The author agrees with Tanabe’s description from the perspective of religious studies (Liao,
For a discussion of how absolute religion in Tanabe is constructed through his absolute dialectic, see Liao,
Protestantism “dynamically testifies to eternity insofar as it constantly renews itself in creative repetition and innovative circulation” (THZ 10, p. 322), but even in Hegel’s time, such a spirit was lost. Hence, the second religious reformation must restore its originality, as Tanabe suggests.
Liao,
A well-known study of world religions is the one by Masuzawa Tomoko (
This lecture was given to the national elite, First High School students, the year before Japan’s defeat in the war. It should be noted, therefore, that the “question of death” here was also given in the context of total war, a situation of urgency quite different from those in which philosophy and religion are discussed today.
See Himi,
Tanabe’s interpretation of this establishment is also based on his dialectic (THZ 10, p. 90).
The death and resurrection of Jesus is a strong manifestation of this element. In
In Tanabe, Pure Land Buddhism is the closest to Christianity as a religion of Other-power salvation (THZ 10, p. 33), and Zen Buddhism is considered to have the occasion of nothingness corresponding to the death of Jesus.
For Nembutsu-Zen in Tanabe’s context and its dialectic construction, see Liao,
Nakano,
Tanabe states that “Socrates was a hero and a superhuman, not a philosopher like Plato himself” and that “in philosophy, which is thoroughly concerned with the dialectic of consciousness of thought, he only taught its starting point and the direction it should go, but it cannot be said that he fully developed it” (THZ 9, p. 413), and that the dialectic was perfected by Plato who succeeded Socrates. He then positions the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and others as an “overreach” of Plato by transferring the negative occasion of nothingness to the position of life (THZ 9, pp. 92, 398–399, 432). This indicates that Tanabe regarded Socrates, Plato, and Plotinus as a continuous Platonism. Tanabe was referring to research trends in ancient Greek philosophy and was critical of the theory of the differences between the philosophies of Socrates and Plato (Burnet=Taylor theory) that was being proposed at the time (THZ 9, 411, pp. 414–415).
A similar statement is found in
The bracketed “creative” is because Tanabe’s argument is formed by including a misreading of Plato. An example is his interpretation of the “practice of death (Plato’s
“My demonstrations are inevitably criticized as philosophical fantasies by genuine Christians just as Buddhists call it an unserious argument, I must be willing to accept criticism from Christians that it is fanciful. I can only endure in despair but not despair, relying on the words, “he that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved” (Mark 13: 13). In that case, Paul’s conversion will be a great help to me. No, not only that. I believe that the truth of the dialectic is already being proven in the execution of this task, as it is an unavoidable philosophical demonstration for me, even if it is criticized by others” (THZ 10, pp. 92–93).
On the positive and negative influences from Plato and other Greek thought on Christianity as a world religion, see THZ 10, pp. 78–79.
After
Hatano Seiichi,
This paper focuses on the apparently inextricable relationship between philosophy and religion in the writing of Tanabe Hajime, centred upon his later works, in particular “Demonstration of Christianity” in which Tanabe’s notion of “absolute religion” is expounded. The author of this paper takes this concept as synonymous to “world religion”, whilst acknowledging the restriction of Tanabe’s discussion to Christianity and Buddhism. The author’s focus lies in interpreting this combination of Buddhism and Christianity with Platonism as the “bridge” between Tanabe’s theories of philosophy and religion. The author claims this “bridging” finds its basis in Tanabe’s indication that Plato is the founder of his dialectic. It is this dialectic which forms the fundamental mediation between philosophy and religion that defines Tanabe’s theory of the philosophy of religion. The author defines world religion, in an interpretation of Tanabe, based not only on Christianity but by the degree to which they reflect Tanabe’s Platonic dialectic, concluding that it is Platonism, despite the apparent Christocentrism in Tanabe’s work, that can ultimately therefore be considered the framework for Tanabe’s concept of world religion and, further, is itself a world religion.
This paper makes a unique and valuable contribution to the field by choosing to examine not merely Tanabe’s theory of religion in isolation but specifically acknowledging it within the context of Tanabe’s reading of Platonism and the inseparable connection to his wider philosophy. The author also engages in discussion of more specific concepts in Tanabe’s philosophy of religion that are, in fact, key to its understanding yet often overlooked, such as the notion of an “absolute” or “universal” religion and the “second religious reformation” discussed in Demonstration of Christianity. In general, Japanese philosophy, including Tanabe’s theory of religion is frequently examined in this comparative context between “east” and “west”, and other times, as the author points out, exclusively from the perspective of Japanese philosophy. Interestingly, however, this paper situates Tanabe’s theory of religion as grounded in his interpretation of Platonic theory. This arguably makes for a stronger foundation to both portray and discuss Tanabe’s theory, rather than evaluating Tanabe’s theory in reference to a particular religion or tradition, or being tempted by applying this to a comparison of eastern and western religion, which would fail to preserve Tanabe’s fundamental aim of establishing a universal theory of religion. Discussion and development of Tanabe’s theory of religion is a particularly welcome topic today, where the world is increasingly secular, yet many still yearn for faith and the societal and meaning-based role that religion plays in life in the way Tanabe describes through his work on the philosophy of religion.
Content Context and scope
I’m not entirely convinced whether the section on Tanabe as a “practitioner” adds much to the overall paper. The idea that Tanabe’s philosophy of religion required a certain “practice” is relevant but why this is was not entirely clear within this particular section. This section could be expanded in terms of what this practice entails and how the theories the author discusses should be employed in a wider societal, practical and ethical context, and/or condensed in terms of the background content.
The author mentions throughout this paper the fact that Tanabe’s theory of religion was not only extremely “unique” or “unusual”, but even radical and “aggressive”. It would be beneficial to draw on precisely why this was, through situating Tanabe’s work within some further discussion and analysis of the previous attitudes and views on the link between philosophy and religion before Tanabe’s new theory, to elucidate why it was considered so radically different. This may be limited to the attitudes of Japanese philosophers, or expand to explicate more generally those ideas in the east and west since the author does discuss that Tanabe’s theory is a combination of eastern and western ideas. It seems there is an ideal space to develop this within the section on the ‘Range of Tanabe’s discussion and religion in Japanese philosophers’.
Although this may have been beyond the remit of this paper, I would have enjoyed some engagement with some of Tanabe’s earlier theories on the philosophy of religion. The author acknowledges Tanabe as a dynamic practitioner, and in footnote 9 the importance of considering the division of Tanabe’s thoughts into various periods, but some discussion of his earlier attempts to define the philosophy of religion in
Structure References
In this same footnote, footnote 9, the author states that this paper assumes Himi’s position that “Tanabe maintains a consistent problematic awareness of religion, even though the subject matter he addresses changes over time (Himi, op. cit., pp. 19–20)”. Some further discussion of why the author holds this position within the main body of this paper may be beneficial, also because another citation referencing Himi in the main body mentions Tanabe’s philosophy as being “pure” and “thorough” which seems to confuse the author’s position. This critical position is mentioned within the conclusion and very briefly in the “Methods” section rather than having a dedicated place to evaluate this criticism in more depth.
Reference appears to be missing from the third paragraph in the section ‘Absolute religion in Tanabe’ (“is Christianity but is not Christianity”)
The comment made in the section “Absolute religion in Tanabe”, that the influence of Christian thinkers such as Uchimura Kanzo and Uemura Masahisa etc. was “more significant than those of Buddhist intellectuals such as Kiyozawa Manshi (1863–1903) and Chikazumi Jōkan (1870–1941).” should be more carefully rephrased or better referenced if the author is intending to represent some opinion by Tanabe that this was the case. The statement referenced, that “Christianity “responded even better to the humanist demands of the youth” from THZ 10 pg. 4 does not quite seem sufficient for such a sweeping statement.
Other comments
Finally, I would like to briefly draw attention to the general desire for philosophers to depart from what could be considered problematic usage of the “east” vs. “west” distinction, which is made a couple of times in the paper. Even though the author might disagree with these kinds of criticisms of characterising philosophy in this way often inspired by Said and McEvilley et al., this should still be acknowledged as a criticism that may crop up, and this distinction isn’t entirely necessary for or central to the fundamental arguments in this paper so can/should be easily avoided. What the author seems to want to say at various points in the paper can be said whilst avoiding this and simply referring to, for example, Buddhist vs. Christian tradition. Making more specific reference to, for example, the distinctions in Buddhist vs. Christian thought not only avoids this criticism of east/west essentialisation but would aid in the clarity, indicating precisely what the author is trying to draw our attention to about this difference. A further argument could be made specifically in the context of Tanabe that this distinction seems counterproductive to his aims and the idea propelled in this paper that Platonism connects “east and west”.
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Yes
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
Not applicable
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
No source data required
Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound?
Partly
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Yes
Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?
Yes
Reviewer Expertise:
Japanese philosophy, Tanabe Hajime and Watsuji Tetsuro, philosophy of death and dying, self and identity, world philosophy, community and ethics
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have significant reservations, as outlined above.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the many valuable suggestions given through an accurate peer review. My manuscript contained some narrow-minded descriptions, and your help in improving them was greatly appreciated. I would also like to apologize for the lengthy time interval taken to revise the manuscript after the review.
The author has been researching Tanabe’s interpretation and criticism of Neoplatonism concerning Plato, which Tanabe cites as his philosophical foundation. This is because the author’s original specialty was researching Neoplatonism from the standpoint of religious studies. In the process, I confirmed that Platonism (from Plato, via Plotinus and others, to Augustine and Eckhart) played a significant role in bridging religion and philosophy in Tanabe. In the manuscript, the author examines how Tanabe’s interpretation of Plato, which bridges philosophy and religion, is involved in the presentation of religion in the present and future, rather than in the past. Tanabe’s understanding of and discussion of Plato should also be examined, but since this is beyond the scope of this study it could be examined again later.
In the following response, the letters in parentheses is added for organization. The revised version of the manuscript may be made available after this response.
Tanabe’s practice and its role in his theory of religion are certainly significant issues in this manuscript. I added explanations on this point in Notes 16 and 17 and in the third paragraph of the section “4. Tanabe as a ‘practitioner’.” This agrees with the comments of Professor Hoshino, the other reviewer. As mentioned above, Tanabe’s theory of Plato provides clues on this theme.
Related to (b) below, the uniqueness of Tanabe’s thought is characterized by its emphasis on “practice.” For this reason, the section “4. Tanabe as a ‘practitioner’” was necessary. However, one problem is that it is difficult to understand what kind of practice Tanabe is seeking in the context of religion. He devoted himself to writing philosophic treatises. In general-interest magazines and published works, he addressed the cultured public. Some may not agree that this is Tanabe’s practice about religion, even though his logic would indicate so. However, behind Tanabe’s writing, his treatise as a philosopher was an intense practice that sometimes put him at risk (I have added an episode where he took hostile action against the Japanese government of the time to save K. T. Jaspers). It can be said that this itself is nothing more than a personal ethical practice, and that Tanabe’s understanding and perceptions of the real world are insufficient in some cases. Nevertheless, the author believes that Tanabe’s emphasis on the practice and presentation of his own theory of religion should not be taken lightly.
An explanation is added at the end of the section “3. The range of Tanabe’s discussion and religion in Japanese philosophers.” The discussion of Christianity, Marxism, and Japanese Buddhism in the
An addition was made at the end of Note 9. However, there is a certain distance between Tanabe’s philosophy of religion and his theory of religion based on philosophy; therefore, further study may be required.
This was added in the middle of Note 9. Even though Tanabe adheres to the dialectic of absolute negation, it seems inconsistent that the religion he highly evaluates would change, and it certainly is not easy to understand. As an example of how a change can occur as speculation deepens while maintaining the fundamental principles, I introduced the case of Plotinus and Neoplatonism. In this example, Tanabe was initially critical of Plotinus because he found no negative occasions in him. However, through his reading of W. R. Inge’s work, Tanabe found a negative occasion in Plotinus, leading to a somewhat more favorable interpretation of the latter. In this case, Tanabe’s fundamental principles have not changed either.
As pointed out, there was a fault which I have corrected. Tanabe’s translation in the main text is initially included in the quotation and corresponds to the same THZ 10, p. 319.
The points raised seem to be in common with the response to Professor Hoshino (8). The part indicated was a description based on Tanabe’s recollections; therefore, the sentence was corrected. Additionally, the explanation has been expanded in Note 29. Considering the influence of Chikazumi Jōkan on the Kyoto School philosophers, as Iwata points out, Tanabe’s description seems somewhat exaggerated.
The three places where “East and West” were mentioned, including in the abstract, were careless references. Therefore, I changed the text to “Buddhism and Christianity” to suit Tanabe’s context (Abstract and Conclusion), and replaced it with more appropriate explanations (7. Platonism as a framework for world religion in Tanabe). Tanabe does not entirely reject the framework of East versus West, but relying on this framework to discuss his work will likely lead to misinterpretations. This is because, in Tanabe’s works, it is thought that the degree to which dialectics is thoroughly applied is more important than the usual dichotomy of East or West.
I would like to thank you again for your appropriate and insightful suggestions for improving this manuscript.
This paper delves into Tanabe Hajime's evolving conception of "religion," particularly during his later years, mainly focusing on Existence, Love, and Practice (1947) and Demonstration of Christianity (1948). While Tanabe has been primarily identified as a philosopher, his philosophical inquiries frequently made references to religious traditions. Scholars have previously documented his shifting interest in historical religions from Shinran (Pure Land Buddhism) through Christianity to Zen Buddhism. The author, however, diverges by focusing on Tanabe's theoretical understanding of "religion" itself, examining Tanabe's use of key terms such as "second religious reformation," "absolute religion," and "world religion." Tanabe posited the notion of a universal religion, which he called "absolute religion," envisioning it as a dialectical synthesis of Christianity, incorporating elements of Pure Land and Zen Buddhism. While acknowledging that this may appear somewhat Christocentric, the author argues that it resulted from Tanabe's rigorous philosophical investigation, particularly his pursuit of the idea of "negation." More specifically, the paper contends that Tanabe's conception of "absolute religion" was deeply rooted in his understanding of Platonism. According to the author, Platonism is a philosophical tradition where the boundaries between philosophy and religion are not distinctly demarcated, and the author concludes that Tanabe's formulation of "absolute religion" emerged from Tanabe's creative interpretation of Platonism.
Japanese philosophy of religion has often been described and studied in the context of how it has incorporated Eastern thought into the vocabulary and thinking of Western philosophy. Intensive scholarly works exist on the relationship between Kyoto School philosophers and Buddhist thoughts; Tanabe's understanding of Shinran has been examined. However, this paper argues that Tanabe's conception of "religion" is drawn from his philosophical pursuit and his creative reading of Platonism. The argument makes an interesting case study of Tanabe's thought.
-Context
That being said, I am a bit wondering how this paper's argument could connect to a broader context. For example, how does Tanabe's conception of religion fit into the history of "religion" discourse in modern Japan? As the author noted that Tanabe's argument would be within "the scope of an intellectual's religion," what role did such an "intellectual's religion" play contemporarily?
I understand this is not the main issue the author attempted to address. However, the author could provide his own perspective on the context of Tanabe's "religion." (Perhaps the author could develop his reference to Tanabe's youth or the idea of "shūyō" mentioned in the conclusion.)
-Tanabe's scope
I want to make one more point. It is about the readers of Tanabe, or whom Tanabe tried to address; this relates to the question of Tanabe's scope. This paper argues that Tanabe's "absolute religion" involved a certain "practice," namely, a thorough pursuit of philosophical speculation.
At first glance, such a "practice" appears to be a personal ethics (for example, Tanabe's residence in Kita-Karuizawa and his attempt at dialogue with Minoda). However, providing that "social practice" and "social improvement" are repeatedly mentioned in the paper, Tanabe's "absolute religion" was, from what I understood, more than a personal ethics. Then, how did Tanabe think his "absolute religion" should be embodied in this world (or, more practically, how should it interact with the actual historical religious traditions of his time)? Of course, Tanabe was a philosopher, not a social scientist; thus, his arguments did not need to be directly connected to the real world. However, the readers might want to know Tanabe's vision regarding this.
- Regarding the section "Tanabe as a "practitioner"
Tanabe's "practice" explained in the section is difficult to understand at first read. To grasp the idea in this section, such that Tanabe's "thorough contemplation" was his (religious) "practice," readers need the author's explanation of Tanabe's understanding of Platonism provided before the conclusion. Thus, I suggest the main argument of this section could be moved after the "Platonism as a framework for world religion in Tanabe" section, though this revision requires some rewriting.
Also, as pointed out above, readers may need an explanation of the relation between Tanabe's "practice" with "social practice" and "transforming society" or of the practical goals of "social practice" in Tanabe's conception.
- Regarding Notes 12, 13
The author can provide more explanation regarding the differences between Tanabe's argument of religion and the arguments of the latter half of the 19th century.
- Regarding Notes 14 and Tanabe's attitude towards "folk religions and practices"
The author can elaborate on Tanabe's understanding of evolutionary views of religions. Tanabe's attitude towards "folk religions and practices" appears to be influenced by the idea of the evolution of religion. What did Tanabe think about the evolutionary views of religions prevalent in his time? Or was Tanabe's view different from the views of his contemporaries?
- Regarding the section "Absolute religion in Tanabe"
"This phenomenon was due to the influence of Christian intellectuals such as Uchimura Kanzō (1861–1930), Uemura Masahisa (1858–1925), and Ebina Danjō (1856–1937). Their influence was more significant than those of Buddhist intellectuals such as Kiyozawa Manshi (1863–1903) and Chikazumi Jōkan (1870–1941)."
I have some concerns in the author's description above, especially the evaluation of the influence of Buddhist figures because they were also very influential among young intellectuals at that time. If it is Tanabe's retrospect, it is understandable (apparently, those who were influenced by Kiyozawa or Chikazumi would look back differently). Please add citations or revise the description.
- Tanabe's mention of the second religious reformation
There is a quote on Tanabe's mention of the second religious reformation (THZ 10, p. 319). The author can elaborate on Tanabe's claim about what points in existing Christianity should be reformed (or negated).
- Tanabe's views of "religious studies"
The author cited Tanabe's brief phrase: "relying on today's developments in religious studies" (THZ 10, p. 323). Considering the theme of this paper, the author can explain Tanabe's views of the achievements of religious studies of his time.
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Yes
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
Not applicable
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
No source data required
Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound?
Partly
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Yes
Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?
Yes
Reviewer Expertise:
History of religions in modern Japan
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have significant reservations, as outlined above.
Through careful peer review, I received many valuable suggestions, for which I would like to express my sincere gratitude. I sincerely apologize for the lengthy manuscript revision. This manuscript discusses Japanese philosopher Tanabe Hajime in the field of religious studies, and considerable effort was required to connect different frameworks. Some interesting points were raised during the revision process; however, discussing them in an integrated manner is a future task.
The numbers in parentheses are for ease of organization. The revised version of the manuscript will be made available after this response.
This was added to the latter part of the introduction. In the latter half of the 19th century, Japanese religious figures with a background in Christianity or Buddhism presented various discourses on religion. Tanabe’s
This issue is discussed further in Note 51. The
I made some additions to the third paragraph of Section 4: Tanabe as a “practitioner.” This problem cannot be avoided when discussing Tanabe’s theory of religion involving practice. Unlike religious figures who called for the reform of their religion or engaged in missionary work, even if the Tanabe’s practice extended into the realm of religion, it is undeniable that Tanabe remained at the level of personal ethics. Even if there is a reason for his own mission as a philosopher, the question remains as to whether this practice has any effect, since he had not gone as far as to practice in society directly but has only stayed at the level of advocacy. This still poses a problem for scholars specializing in philosophy and thought regarding how they should engage in society.
As Mutō explains, it is thought that Tanabe’s absolute religion and the second religious reformation were intended to be a catalyst for change from within Christianity and Buddhism (THZ 10, pp. 332-334). However, Tanabe did not appear to have specific connections with religious figures. As mentioned in Note 32, he remained in the position of a philosopher, preparing to “wait for the appearance of a religious genius.” However, there are hints in his discussion of religion that Tanabe did not confine himself to a philosophical perspective. The issue of “myth” mentioned at the end of Note 32 may correspond to this; however, I could not fully examine this at this time.
I added explanations on this point in Notes 16 and 17 as well as in the third paragraph of Section 4. From the perspective of religious discourse in modern Japan, a comparison with Anesaki may be interesting; however, there are some issues regarding their relationship with religious figures and activities in society.
In addition, as pointed out, Plato is likely the key to approaching this question. It would have been better to discuss this point by reorganizing the sections, as suggested. However, it was difficult to include a sufficient discussion of Plato’s actual practice (rather than interpretations). In addition, because this would have significantly changed the flow of the argument, I avoided changing the structure.
The original Note 12 has been revised, and the original Note 13 has been deleted because its content was unclear. Although it is assumed that Tanabe’s involvement in Unitarianism was probably only through books, this is an interesting topic for future research.
This information has been added to Note 13 in the revised manuscript. Tanabe refers to arguments considered as evolutionary views of religion as theories of science and society. However, it seems he did not use them in a theory of religion. However, compared with Nishida, the question remains as to why Tanabe had no interest in religious studies despite his speculations about the future of religion. Although it may be beyond the scope of this study to consider this issue, it is worth investigating.
The part indicated was a description based on Tanabe’s recollections; therefore, the sentence has been revised. In addition, the explanation has been expanded in Note 29.
This information has been added to Note 32 in the revised manuscript. This is also partially related to point (4) above.
This has been added to Note 34 of the revised manuscript. It is assumed that the “religious studies” Tanabe mentions refer to individual studies in theology and Buddhist studies. As mentioned in point (7), it is thought that there is little awareness of “religious studies” corresponding to the current academic field. This suggests that Tanabe’s theory of religion has the problem of not taking folk religions into consideration and also has the characteristic of discussing future religions without being restricted by the framework of pursuing the essence of religion.
Again, I would like to express my gratitude for the detailed suggestions to improve this manuscript.