[version 2; peer review: 2 approved with reservations, 1 not approved]
No competing interests were disclosed.
Recent urban planning in Southeast Asia has incorporated the theme of transforming cities to ‘smart city’ status. However, the central question raised in this study is whether the ASEAN’s conception of smart cities is genuinely sustainable. Based on the backdrop of Southeast Asia’s disparity in economic performances and diversity in its political, social, economic, and environmental dimensions, this study updates Crumpton’s 2021 study on the ‘quintuple helix model’ and argues that new observations but old patterns are found in the ASEAN Smart Cities Network’s way of developing cities in Southeast Asia. Through a qualitative document analysis, utilizing published secondary data on the ten ASEAN member states between 2020 and 2024, this study revisits and updates the current state of Southeast Asia and how this corresponds to the challenges of constructing smart cities in democratic, semi-authoritarian, and authoritarian settings.
The revisions clarify ASCN, the unique context of sustainability in Southeast Asia, and how the Helix Model is used in the study. The major revisions can be found in the presented data, which outlines the differences among Southeast Asian states in human rights, social conditions, economics, business, and press freedom. It also adds several empirical case studies that allow for a deeper understanding of how the smart city-based model leads state and local actors within a nation to neglect the provision of basic services and needs, for the provision of smart city-based needs that relate to information, technology, and transportation advancements.
Are smart cities sustainable? Past studies have questioned whether smart city approaches adopted by local governments lead to urban sustainability.
Among the regions that have actively adopted this smart city concept is Southeast Asia. Under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly during Singapore’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2018, member states agreed with a list of 26 pilot projects under the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN).
For ASEAN, the strategic outcomes of smart cities consist of a high quality of life, a competitive economy, and a sustainable environment.
Scholars have interpreted the ASCN in different ways. The most common discourse introduced is that of local governments’ active participation in offering and seeking partnerships as a representation of ‘paradiplomacy’, as non-central government actors engage in international relations.
This article seeks to update Charles David Crumpton’s ‘quintuple helix model’ to assess the nexus between the ASCN and sustainability. The approach is grounded in the ‘helix models’ that symbolize the interactions among different sectors.
In the ASCN’s development focus area of civic and social, for example, some countries, such as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Brunei Darussalam, still lack the basic features of democracy.
Through a qualitative document analysis, this study intends to provide an update on the ASCN under the ‘helix models.’ It considers several unique trends between 2020 and 2024 that contribute to the diversity of Southeast Asian states. These include the Myanmar military coup in 2021, Laos’ foreign debt surges, and Cambodia’s change of leadership after more than three decades, to name a few.
Recent developments since 2021 have revealed a more complex Southeast Asia, making it difficult to introduce sustainability measures. In its current form, most Southeast Asian states are sensitive to the notion of imposed regulations and systems, as the region is founded on the norm of non-interference.
Consequently, these changes within the political landscape of Southeast Asian states make the inquiry of sustainability in smart cities particularly interesting to re-explore. Inspired by Crumpton’s 2021 analysis, this study will provide the ‘helix model’s’ interpretation of the ASCN, with the following differences. First, the inclusion of more recent data (2020–2024) accounts for differences in the political, social, environmental, and economic landscapes of Southeast Asian states. Second is the exclusion of one of the proposed models of interactions among educational stakeholders, due to the inconclusive relationship between information and communication technology projects and high-ranked universities.
Against the backdrop of unique norms and differences among states, adopting sustainability measures in Southeast Asia poses challenges. The existing literature highlights these challenges well, focusing on the trajectory of sustainability among ASEAN member states over the past years. Nevertheless, not enough attention has been paid to ASEAN’s development pathway, especially given its recent emphasis on advancing it through the construction of smart cities across the region. This section provides a brief literature review of how Southeast Asia engages with sustainability demands. First, it examines the challenges of adopting sustainability across different regional sectors and the tendency in the literature to call for modified governance and policies to address these concerns. Second, this section examines how the ASCN has been one of ASEAN’s solutions to address urbanization issues in Southeast Asia’s larger cities, focusing on smart city initiatives as the basis for these solutions. Lastly, it will revisit recent studies on smart cities and sustainability in Southeast Asia and the novelty this study offers. These three discourses allow for a more nuanced understanding of the dominant discussions on smart cities and sustainability in Southeast Asia, and of the importance of revisiting more recent empirical case studies to strengthen or challenge past interpretations.
Perhaps the primary discourse relevant to this study is studies exploring the sustainability element of Southeast Asian states’ practices across time. Within this discourse, studies have been particularly critical in questioning whether Southeast Asian states have ensured sustainable measures are in place concerning the vast development projects. Based on evaluations across sectors, scholars agree that Southeast Asia still faces challenges in integrating sustainability measures into its development practices. Ruland, for example, argued that path dependencies and development practices are the reason Southeast Asia’s hydropower dams lack elements of environmental sustainability.
Although the highlight of challenges has been the dominant discourse, some studies have examined what the ideal solution could be. Studies have argued that policymakers should re-evaluate their good governance to ensure environmental sustainability.
Another discourse worth mentioning is the development gap between ASEAN member states. The challenges and potential solutions outlined in past studies are common problems all states face. Nevertheless, finding a balanced solution for ASEAN has been challenging for its member states due to disparities in capacity among Southeast Asian states. Past studies have highlighted the problem well.
Given the challenges of development and sustainability across much of Southeast Asia, the ASCN has been one of ASEAN’s solutions. One reason this has surfaced is urbanization-related challenges, with cities as the primary stakeholders who can make direct changes. Arfanuzzaman and Dahiya, for example, argue that urbanization in the region is uncontrollable due to its haphazard nature.
Nevertheless, the city-oriented solution is not solely due to urbanization. Studies have examined decentralization as a primary factor influencing urban resilience. Marks and Pulliat looked into how fragmented governance structures and “misaligned incentive structures” are causing uneven commitment among cities to tackle climate change.
Established in 2018, the ASCN has quickly attracted scholarly attention, prompting questions about whether it would contribute to the development of more sustainable cities. Most studies have concluded in favor of the initiative, arguing that the ASCN would catalyze partnerships and support the region’s digitization efforts.
Studies in the past have raised doubts about whether smart cities are indeed sustainable means of developing cities. As past studies have shown, there is unclear evidence that shows that the smart city approach indeed leads to urban sustainability.
Consequently, the disparity in economic capacity, social and human rights, and political systems between the Southeast Asian states is perceived as a barrier to achieving the ideal smart city status for ASCN participating cities. With the technologies proposed as the basis for a smart city, ASEAN is raising the potential for abuse and heightened cyber surveillance, which could be the case in many authoritarian nations in the region. As Crumpton’s-led study mentioned, “[…] authoritarian regimes and regimes with authoritarian tendencies seek new and better means for surveilling and controlling their populations”.
This study builds on the previous concerns on the nexus between smart cities and sustainability in Southeast Asia. Between 2020 and 2024, many developments have contributed to capacity disparities, political tensions, and infringements on social and human rights. Unfortunately, to balance development and sustainability, ASEAN has focused on the ASCN as one of the primary means of achieving balanced development for the region’s larger cities. The novelty of this study thus offers the opportunity to reveal the profound problems associated with the ASCN, which distances itself from actual sustainability measures as its primary aim and further impacts participatory and socio-ecological sustainable urban planning and governance. In doing so, it follows the 2019 framework and highlights how the region’s socio-political developments have contributed to the disparities.
The original plan of the ASCN is threefold: First, it will facilitate cooperation on smart city development, catalyze bankable projects, and secure funding from ASEAN’s external partners.
Cities incorporated into the ASCN have expanded. The pilot ASCN cities initially incorporated 26 cities from the ten ASEAN members. Since June 2024, the list has grown to include five new cities, including Chiang Mai (Thailand), Khon Kaen (Thailand), Rayong (Thailand), Sumedang (Indonesia), and Sihanoukville (Cambodia).
In recent years, Southeast Asian cities have actively engaged in paradiplomacy to secure funding from ASEAN’s external partners. Since 2018, members of the East Asia Summit (EAS) have expressed their support for ASEAN’s intentions to construct smart urbanization in the region.
Nevertheless, the expansion of ASCN membership and the involvement of business entities have not addressed the core sustainability concerns of smart cities. The following section will argue that the diverse economic, social, political, and environmental indicators across Southeast Asian states raise questions and concerns about sustainability within ASEAN’s conceptions of smart cities.
When the Charles David Crumpton-led ‘quintuple helix model’ article was published, the study made interesting observations. Smart city conceptualizations under the ASCN did not correspond directly to sustainability measures. Therefore, the ideal state is that “urban planning, management, and policy processes must be designed and operated with sustainability objectives in mind and supported by globally recognized dimensions of good governance, including responsiveness, accountability, transparency, and inclusiveness”.
The basis of the ASCN’s problem is diversity across systems. The smart city approach becomes complex when applied to governments with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian settings, which could lead to further control over populations.
What has changed in the past four years regarding the diversities of the political, social, environmental, and economic landscape of Southeast Asian states? As shown in
| Country | GDP Growth % | HDI/1 | HDI global rank | EIU/10 | EIU global rank | WPFI/100 | WPFI global rank | EPI/100 | EPI global rank | EoDB global rank |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brunei | 2.4 | 0,823 | 55 | NA | NA | 50.09 | 117 | 48.3 | 69 | 66 |
| Cambodia | 5.5 | 0,600 | 148 | 3.05 | 121 | 34.28 | 151 | 31.2 | 169 | 144 |
| Indonesia | 5 | 0,713 | 112 | 6.53 | 56 | 51.15 | 111 | 33.6 | 162 | 73 |
| Lao PDR | 4.1 | 0,620 | 139 | 1.71 | 159 | 33.76 | 153 | 26.3 | 177 | 154 |
| Malaysia | 4.8 | 0,807 | 63 | 7.29 | 40 | 52.07 | 107 | 41 | 118 | 12 |
| Myanmar | 1 | 0,608 | 144 | 0.85 | 166 | 24.41 | 171 | 27.1 | 176 | 165 |
| Philippines | 5.8 | 0,710 | 113 | 6.66 | 53 | 43.46 | 134 | 32.1 | 168 | 95 |
| Singapore | 2.6 | 0,949 | 9 | 6.18 | 69 | 47.19 | 126 | 53 | 47 | 2 |
| Thailand | 2.8 | 0,803 | 66 | 6.35 | 63 | 58.12 | 87 | 45.7 | 90 | 21 |
| Vietnam | 6.1 | 0,726 | 107 | 2.62 | 136 | 22.31 | 174 | 24.6 | 179 | 70 |
Source: UN Development Index (2024), International Monetary Fund (2024), Economist Intelligence Unit (2024), Reporters Without Borders (2023), Environmental Performance Index (2024).
The EIU and WPFI figures show that it is equally difficult to establish a smart city in Southeast Asia. As seen in
Meanwhile, the global rankings on EPI and EoDB reveal unique developments in Southeast Asian states’ environmental and business landscapes. Again, the disparities can be seen in countries like Singapore, ranked 47
th in the EPI, and Vietnam, ranked 179
th, showing that ASEAN member states have different environmental priorities. Furthermore, the EoDB figures shown in
How about the diversity of the cities of ASCN?
| GaWC 2024 categorization | ASCN City | Completed and Ongoing ASCN Smart City Projects (as of September 2024) |
|---|---|---|
| Alpha+ | Singapore | E-Payments (completed), National Digital Identity (completed), Smart Nation 1.0 Initiatives (completed), Punggol Digital District (ongoing), Woodlands North Coast (ongoing) |
| Alpha | Jakarta, Indonesia | JakPreneur (ongoing), JakLingko (ongoing), JAKI (ongoing), Jakarta Smart City Goes to School (ongoing) |
| Alpha | Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia | Kuala Lumpur Urban Observatory (ongoing), OSC 3.0 Plus Online (ongoing), GoKL Journey Planner (ongoing), Smart Bin (ongoing), Bicycle Friendly City (ongoing) |
| Alpha | Bangkok, Thailand | Bang Sue Smart City (ongoing), Bang Sue Grand Station (ongoing) |
| Beta+ | Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam | Intelligent Operation Centre (ongoing), Integrated and Unified Emergency Response Centre (ongoing) |
| Beta | Hanoi, Vietnam | Intelligent Operation Centre (ongoing), Transport Operation and Surveillance Centre (ongoing) |
| Beta | Manila, Philippines | Command Center Upgrade (ongoing), E-Government Services (ongoing) |
| Gamma | Phnom Penh, Cambodia | Smart City Strategic Planning (completed), Phnom Penh Walk Way (ongoing), Phnom Penh Public Bus Service (ongoing), Phnom Penh Smart City Hub (ongoing), Build4People (ongoing) |
| Sufficiency | Cebu City, Philippines | Cebu City Bus Rapid Transit (ongoing), Automated Citywide Traffic Control System (ongoing) |
| Sufficiency | Johor Bahru, Malaysia | Iskandar Malaysia Integrated Urban Services Program (completed), Iskandar Malaysia Analytics Centre (ongoing), Management of Water Resources and Distribution (ongoing), Integrated Smart Mobility Programs (ongoing) |
| Sufficiency | Vientiane, Laos | Smart Environment Development (ongoing), Vientiane Sustainable Urban Transport (ongoing) |
| Sufficiency | Yangon, Myanmar | Conservation of Downtown Yangon (ongoing), Transit Oriented Development in Hlaing Thar Yar Township (ongoing), One Map Yangon (ongoing) |
Source: ASEAN Smart Cities Network (2024), Globalization and World Cities (2024).
However, what is puzzling is the rising significance of cities in less democratic settings such as Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, and Myanmar. In the past four years, these four cities have struggled to ensure greater civic rights are maintained. As the ASCN is focused on accelerating the efforts to make these cities ‘smart,’ there seems to be a profound neglect of the political issues in those cities due to this dominant discourse of ‘smart’ development. This raises a substantial concern, as these cities would focus solely on consistency with the ASCN smart city framework, thereby further neglecting fundamental urban services. In Vientiane and other large cities in Laos, the concern remains the restriction of civil and political rights, including cases of unfair criminal trials and judicial corruption. Meanwhile, in Jakarta, opponents of democratic rule have been met with harsh measures to suppress negative sentiment toward the president. These cases go to show that accelerating development that leans towards being ‘smart’ does not automatically translate into the provision of basic political and human rights services. It also shows a strong linkage between state-level political concerns and local-level appreciation towards human rights.
The ASCN does not consider these capacity disparities. The focus has been on accelerating the ‘smart city’ development of the ASCN’s pilot city projects and on leveraging AI and technology to deliver better public services to the city’s population. However, the complexity is that cities in countries without democratic systems show less appreciation for the environment and lack proper prospects for human development. The updated data from the 2020 study show that the same conclusions have been reached. The disparities will only lead to greater differences among ASCN members, given the absence of sustainability measures in ASCN projects. Perhaps two case studies of concern are in Yangon and Phnom Penh. In Yangon, prosecutions continue amid the military junta’s crackdown on democratic voices. Meanwhile, despite the acceleration of development in Phnom Penh, this has been met with an increase in money laundering, concerns over foreign debt, and rising unemployment, indicating that smart cities’ focus on transportation services remains unbalanced with other essential services.
Therefore, the ‘smart city’ of ASCN may not be the best development course for Southeast Asian states. Past studies have noted that the characteristics of smart cities are often referenced in contemporary urban planning.
The problem with diverse landscapes such as ASEAN is that everything ‘smart’ can easily deepen authoritarian tendencies and undermine sustainability objectives.
Combined, the presented case studies from different ASEAN cities align with Crumpton’s concerns about the lack of consideration for inter-contextual differences. By imposing the ASCN provisions and focusing on targeted smart city elements, this risks the region falling further from sustainability practices that ensure basic services are provided to people.
The ‘quintuple helix model’ provided the basis for assessing the nexus between the ASCN and sustainability. Interactions among actors within the state are what establish and strengthen innovation systems, which are essential for generating balanced development approaches. The 2021 study concluded that the vast disparities among Southeast Asian states had severely impeded efforts in sustainable urban planning and governance, affecting the ASCN’s ability to balance development interests with sustainable measures. This study aims to build on past narratives by updating data on the political, social, environmental, and economic landscape of Southeast Asian states between 2020 and 2024, which has severely affected how the region’s ASCN participating cities can incorporate sustainable measures. In terms of the emphasis on economic disparity, additional data on the EoDB among ASEAN member states is also considered.
As predicted, smart city approaches are challenging to adopt in regions with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian settings. Consistent with the conclusions of the previous study, this updated research finds a lack of good governance, accountability, inclusiveness, and transparency among many participating ASCN members. Consequently, no direct correlation is seen between achieving the smart city status and sustainability. As shown by the EIU and WPFI figures presented in this study, democracy and state protection of press freedom remain lacking in many Southeast Asian states. The concern, therefore, is that cities such as Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, and Yangon are geared toward achieving smart city status despite lacking the foundational civic and people-to-people relations, raising concerns about the trajectory of their development. The disparity among ASEAN member states is also evident in the global rankings of the EPI and EoDB, with some countries, such as Singapore, ranked among the highest globally. In contrast, others, such as Cambodia, ranked among the lowest in terms of environmental and business landscapes. Unfortunately, the issue found at the state level among ASEAN member states also applies to the participating ASCN cities. The case is clear: Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, and Myanmar, based on the Globalization and World Cities ranking, have struggled to show greater care for civic rights. Therefore, rather than focusing on addressing such profound neglect of political rights, the focus, as instructed in the ASCN, has been on adopting smart city measures. The fear is that cities will neglect fundamental urban services.
The findings of this study extend the existing discourse on the lack of connection between smart city development programs and sustainability. The term “smart city” is commonly used in contemporary urban planning. However, this severely undermines the long process a city needs to develop. It is as if cities can simply be updated with state-of-the-art technologies. In the case of the ASCN participating cities, the concerns include disparities in capacity, a lack of fundamental civic and human rights, and different problems within the cities. These disparities lead to differences in participation, governance, and socio-ecological sustainable planning, which are not precisely captured by the ASCN’s smart city concept. In the case of ASCN cities in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian settings, there is a tendency for authoritarian systems to deepen amid calls from the central government for greater surveillance and movement control. Amid recent progress in Southeast Asia, a deterioration in sustainability norms is observed, and this trend is likely to continue if the primary narrative driving city-based development is smart city conceptions.
No Generative AI or AI-assisted technologies were used in the writing of this manuscript.
The data that support the findings of this study can be accessed below:
World Economic Outlook 2024 (IMF):
Human Development Index 2022 (UNDP):
Democracy Index 2024 (Economist Intelligence):
World Press Freedom 2024 (Reporters Without Borders):
Environmental Performance Index 2024 (Yale University):
Ease of Doing Business 2020 (World Bank):
World Cities 2024 (Globalization and World Cities):
The manuscript has improved in terms of structure and contextual clarity, and the author has addressed most of our comments. However, the central analytical concern remains only partially addressed. While the paper presents relevant descriptive evidence on disparities among ASEAN member states, it still requires a stronger analytical lens to connect these disparities to ASCN smart city implementation and sustainability outcomes.
For example, the author writes:
A similar issue appears in the following paragraph:
The author’s point is reasonable and relevant, but this paragraph would benefit from a clearer analytical link between the examples provided and the broader argument about ASCN, sustainability, and smart city development. In particular, the discussion should explain more explicitly how the cases of Yangon and Phnom Penh illustrate the absence of sustainability measures in ASCN projects, and how these examples demonstrate the risk of widening disparities among ASCN members.
In addition, claims such as
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Yes
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
Not applicable
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
Yes
Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound?
Partly
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Partly
Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?
Partly
Reviewer Expertise:
Transport and traffic engineering
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have significant reservations, as outlined above.
We find several major problems with this paper.
The authors state: “smart cities consist of a high quality of life, a competitive economy, and a sustainable environment”. Why are cities that exhibit these qualities smart, and not simply advancing in terms of their sustainability? What is the definition of ‘smartness’ beyond ‘sustainability’? This high-level perspective is important before we get to the specifics and metrics.
The ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN) is introduced, but the authors have failed to articulate thoroughly what its purpose is (beyond sharing thinking), or what metrics define its success. A more thorough exploration of a common basis for assessment and evaluation of smart initiatives would improve understanding. The same applies to the helix model and its relationship to ASEAN goals. Diagrams may help here in synthesizing the ideas and goals.
We don’t disagree with any of the quotations from the work on the Helix Model, but it is the attempt to apply it to the ASEAN context that is problematic. Indeed, the authors state: “The basis of the ASCN’s problem is diversity across systems. The smart city approach becomes complex when applied to governments with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian settings, which could lead to further control over populations”.
Sustainability is determined locally – local conditions set local priorities – and yet here the authors present an amalgam of ten highly variable sets of local conditions and attempts to draw learning from across them. This is in itself highly problematic. Put another way, context is all important and is needed – for example, geographical context to understand the complexities and influences of location in relation to any one smart initiative. This information exists in fragments, but it's scattered and not systematic enough for a wider audience to understand. This extends to their governance systems - an essential aspect of the context.
More generally, the methodology is not sufficiently clear to provide a robust comparison between smartness and sustainability. Overall, the paper needs a rigorous structure; as it is the paper approaches its task in too general a manner (perhaps because of the very severe challenges it faces) and does not explicitly explain how smartness contributes to the journey towards sustainability (and sustainability is a journey, not an absolute state) metrics for smartness, and why smartness is of value when the goal is sustainability (as discerned from the arguments advocated in the paper), should be crystal clear.
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Partly
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
Not applicable
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
Partly
Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound?
No
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Partly
Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?
No
Reviewer Expertise:
Sustainability, Liveability and Resilience of Cities
We confirm that we have read this submission and believe that we have an appropriate level of expertise to state that we do not consider it to be of an acceptable scientific standard, for reasons outlined above.
The paper argues that smart city development under the ASEAN Smart Cities Network does not necessarily produce sustainability. Instead, regional inequalities and differences in political and governance systems often limit its ability to deliver inclusive and sustainable urban outcomes.
Is the work clearly and accurately presented, and does it cite the current literature? partly
Overall, the paper cites current literature, including several recent sources published after 2020, with some references from 2023–2025. This indicates that the manuscript is adequately engaged with recent scholarship. However, these points should be addressed by the author:
Fourth, the interpretation of Table 1 is not yet fully convincing. While the table does demonstrate substantial disparities across ASEAN member states in terms of human development, democracy, press freedom, environmental performance, and ease of doing business, the discussion tends to move too quickly from descriptive rankings to broader causal conclusions. For example, low scores in the Democracy Index and World Press Freedom Index are used to suggest that ASCN-related smart city development may accelerate surveillance and state control, but this relationship is asserted rather than empirically demonstrated in the analysis presented here. Similarly, differences in EPI and Ease of Doing Business rankings show variation across national contexts, but the link between these indicators and the sustainability or governance outcomes of specific smart city projects requires clearer justification.
Overall, the section would benefit from a more cautious interpretation of the table, a clearer explanation of why these particular indicators was selected, and a stronger analytical bridge between national-level disparities and claims about city-level smart development.
The conclusion addresses an important issue and clearly restates the paper’s critical position. However, it is somewhat repetitive and at times more assertive than the analysis supports. In particular, claims about authoritarian deepening, surveillance, neglect of civic rights, and declining sustainability norms should be framed more cautiously unless supported by stronger evidence. The conclusion would be stronger with a more precise synthesis of the main findings, a clearer statement of the paper’s contribution, and a better distinction between findings, interpretation, and broader concerns.
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Yes
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
Not applicable
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
Yes
Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound?
Partly
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Partly
Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?
Partly
Reviewer Expertise:
Transport and traffic engineering
We confirm that we have read this submission and believe that we have an appropriate level of expertise to state that we do not consider it to be of an acceptable scientific standard, for reasons outlined above.
Recent urban planning in Southeast Asia has incorporated the theme of transforming cities to ‘smart city’ status. However, the central question raised in this study is whether the ASEAN’s conception of smart cities is genuinely sustainable. Based on the backdrop of Southeast Asia’s disparity in economic performances and diversity in its political, social, economic, and environmental dimensions, this study updates Crumpton’s 2021 study on the ‘quintuple helix model’ and argues that new observations but old patterns are found in the ASEAN Smart Cities Network’s way of developing cities in Southeast Asia. Through a qualitative document analysis, utilizing published secondary data on the ten ASEAN member states between 2020 and 2024, this study revisits and updates the current state of Southeast Asia and how this corresponds to the challenges of constructing smart cities in democratic, semi-authoritarian, and authoritarian settings.
Introduction: The framing would benefit from clearer structure and stronger connections between points. The manuscript currently assumes too much prior knowledge from the reader, particularly regarding the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN), Crumpton’s 2021 study, and the helix model. More clarity is needed on what ASCN is, what the earlier helix model argued, and why this framework is important for the present study. These concepts should be briefly introduced and linked more clearly to the paper’s overall argument.
Response 1: The revisions to the introduction section can be traced to the first two pages, where the focus is on clarifying what ASCN and Crumpton’s 2021 study consisted of. On the first point on ASCN, the second, third, and fourth paragraphs of page 2 provide several basic pieces of information for readers as to what ASCN is, and the expectations once a city becomes a pilot project city. It traces the history (since 2018), the cities incorporated into the current status quo, and the ASCN's expectations for catalyzing bankable projects to solve urban problems through technology. The third paragraph, on the other hand, looks at the strategic outcomes of the ASCN, which focus on a high quality of life, a competitive economy, and a sustainable environment. The following are the complete paragraphs explaining this point: Among the regions that have actively adopted this smart city concept is Southeast Asia. Under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly during Singapore’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2018, member states agreed with a list of 26 pilot projects under the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN). 6 The growth of cities in ASEAN is unique, as they will “continue to be driven by urban centers, with more people expected to urbanize by 2030 and ‘middleweight’ cities of between 200,000 and 2 million residents forecast to drive 40% of the region’s growth”. 7 The role of ASCN is thus to act as a normative guideline for ASEAN member states on smart city development, sharing best practices, and linking partnerships to accelerate growth. 6, 8 The expectation is that the ASCN will act as a facilitator, linking city government officials and business entities to “catalyze bankable projects to solve urban problems by utilizing technology and innovation opportunities provided by the private sector”. 9 ; For ASEAN, the strategic outcomes of smart cities consist of a high quality of life, a competitive economy, and a sustainable environment. 6 To achieve them, several development focus areas have been determined: civic and social, health and well-being, safety and security, quality environment, built infrastructure, and industry and innovations. The determined development areas are enabled through ASEAN’s encouragement of digital infrastructure and applications, and partnership and funding schemes under the ASCN. 10
Response 2: I have revised the introduction towards Crumpton’s 2021 study by elaborating what were the main findings of this study. First, it looks at how the diversities found in the ASEAN member states increasingly impede the ASEAN member state’s capacity to balance between technological developments, and the provision of basic urban needs/facilities. In the last paragraph of page 2, the additional narratives highlights how inter-contextual differences leads states to struggle to provide the balanced sustainability measures in dimensions of governance, environment, and human rights. Therefore, the key take away of this is that this study enhances the previous finding to show that the disparities among ASEAN member states have continued to take place between 2020 and 2024, and looking at specific case studies of cities in the ASCN, would show how the disparity of the state’s capacities leads to heightened concerns and doubts that local governments prioritize sustainable measures. The revised paragraph (last paragraph page 2): “In the ASCN’s development focus area of civic and social, for example, some countries, such as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Brunei Darussalam, still lack the basic features of democracy. 24– 26 Thus, the intention of its cities to transform into smart cities is seen as a potential policy to further impinge upon participatory and socio-ecological sustainable urban planning and governance. 20 Therefore, as seen in the case of the ASCN in recent years, Crumpton highlights the emergence of the state under-prioritizing the environment and the lack of initiatives in improving basic services. This lack of adequate consideration of the inter-contextual differences among ASEAN member states means that members would struggle to achieve this smart city status, due to the underlying issue of unmet urban service requirements.”
Literature Review: This literature review is more clearly structured than the earlier framing section, and the subsection organization helps guide the reader through the discussion. However, the overall argument still requires stronger logical connection between points. The section moves across ASEAN norms, sustainability debates, urbanization, ASCN, smart city critiques, and the helix-model framework without always making clear how these elements build on one another. In addition, the manuscript continues to assume prior familiarity with key concepts and prior studies. More clarity is needed on what the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN) is, how it functions, what the earlier helix-model approach argued, and why that framework is important for the present study. Similarly, Crumpton’s 2021 study should be introduced more fully so that readers can understand its main findings and how the current paper extends it. Overall, the section is relevant and well referenced, but it would benefit from clearer definitions, stronger transitions, and a more precise articulation of the study’s novelty.
Response: I make the revisions in the first paragraph of section 2, and the last paragraph of the same section. In the first paragraph (page 3), the focus of the revisions is to highlight why these three introduced themes in the literature review is important for this study, and in what way does the article contribute towards these vast discussions on matters of smart cities and sustainability in the context of Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the last paragraph of section 2 (page 6) emphasizes the novelty offered, which includes the covering of more empirical case studies that occurred between 2020 and 2024, to showcase whether Crumpton’s assumpions in 2021 is still valid in Southeast Asia.
1. Revision 1 (paragraph 1 of page 3): Against the backdrop of unique norms and differences among states, adopting sustainability measures in Southeast Asia poses challenges. The existing literature highlights these challenges well, focusing on the trajectory of sustainability among ASEAN member states over the past years. Nevertheless, not enough attention has been paid to ASEAN’s development pathway, especially given its recent emphasis on advancing it through the construction of smart cities across the region. This section provides a brief literature review of how Southeast Asia engages with sustainability demands. First, it examines the challenges of adopting sustainability across different regional sectors and the tendency in the literature to call for modified governance and policies to address these concerns. Second, this section examines how the ASCN has been one of ASEAN’s solutions to address urbanization issues in Southeast Asia’s larger cities, focusing on smart city initiatives as the basis for these solutions. Lastly, it will revisit recent studies on smart cities and sustainability in Southeast Asia and the novelty this study offers. These three discourses allow for a more nuanced understanding of the dominant discussions on smart cities and sustainability in Southeast Asia, and of the importance of revisiting more recent empirical case studies to strengthen or challenge past interpretations.
2. Revision 2 (last paragraph of section 2, page 6): This study builds on the previous concerns on the nexus between smart cities and sustainability in Southeast Asia. Between 2020 and 2024, many developments have occurred that have contributed to capacity disparities, political tensions, and the infringement on social and human rights. Unfortunately, to balance development and sustainability, ASEAN has focused on the ASCN as one of the primary means of achieving balanced development for the region’s larger cities. The novelty of this study thus offers the opportunity to reveal the profound problems associated with the ASCN, which distances itself from actual sustainability measures as its primary aim and further impacts participatory and socio-ecological sustainable urban planning and governance. In doing so, it follows the 2019 framework and highlights how the region’s socio-political developments have contributed to the disparities.
The ‘Helix Model’ of the ASCN: New Observations, Old Patterns: First, the section still relies too heavily on prior knowledge. Even though subsection 3.2 is called “Revisiting the ‘Helix Model’,” the explanation remains too brief. The reader still needs a clearer account of what the earlier model actually examined, what its dimensions were, what it found, and why it is being reused here. Second, the manuscript repeatedly returns to the same general point: Southeast Asia is diverse, authoritarian settings are problematic, and ASCN may not align with sustainability. Third, phrases such as “what is puzzling,” “profound neglect,” and “may not be the best development course” sound more general and argumentative than rigorously evidenced.
Response: Revisions can be seen in paragraphs 2 and 3 in the section ‘3.2. Revisiting the ‘Helix Model’’. In the first paragraph, I clarify that one of the elements of Crumpton’s 2021 study is that the Helix Model adopted results based on the assumption of diversity across political, social, and economic dimensions among ASEAN member states. As a consequence, there are different capacities to comply with the ASCN provisions, and a deep concern that, because half of ASEAN members are non-democratic nations, the idea of establishing smart cities would exacerbate human rights conditions in those cities. The argument, therefore, is that the tables presented show this concern over human rights and politics, and argue why there is a lack of care towards sustainability measures in those particular cities. The revised paragraph: “The basis of the ASCN's problem is diversity across systems. The smart city approach becomes complex when applied to governments with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian settings, which could lead to further control over populations. 76 For the more democratic nations of Southeast Asia, the problem then becomes to what extent state policymakers consider environmental costs as exceeding development targets. This section argues that old patterns are emerging, with a lack of relationship between citizens and the smart city developments taking place in Southeast Asia. In doing so, the following will explain several indicators that show the diversity between states and cities in Southeast Asia, indicating different starting points among the ASCN members, which risks exacerbating disparities in the delivery of basic urban services. Similar to Crumpton’s 2021 point, the updated empirical data presented between 2020 and 2024 in the two tables below show that concern over non-democratic practices has the potential to negatively affect urban planning and governance, underplay environmental concerns, and neglect improvements in the quality of life of the city’s population. ”
1. Response 1: I make the connection between variation across national contexts, with the issue of sustainability in the smart city projects. In doing this, explanations in pages 10 and 11 emphasizes how in several case studies, the focus on smart city status (mainly transportation and technological developments within the cities) have neglected the basic services and human rights issues that the cities and state actors are suppose to focus on in the first place. The revised paragraphs, and the insertion of case studies in section 3:
(paragraph 1 page 10): However, what is puzzling is the rising significance of cities in less democratic settings such as Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, and Myanmar. In the past four years, these four cities have struggled to ensure greater civic rights are maintained. As the ASCN is focused on accelerating the efforts to make these cities ‘smart,’ there seems to be a profound neglect of the political issues in those cities due to this dominant discourse of ‘smart’ development. This raises a substantial concern, as these cities would focus solely on consistency with the ASCN smart city framework, thereby further neglecting fundamental urban services. In Vientiane and large cities in Laos, the concern still lies on the issue of restricted civil and political rights, which includes cases of unfair criminal trials, and judicial corruption in the cities (HRW, 2017; OHCHR, 2024). Meanwhile, in Jakarta, opponents of democratic rule have been met with harsh measures to suppress negative sentiment toward the president (Raditio and Yeremia, 2022; BBC, 2026). These cases go to show that accelerating development that leans to being ‘smart’ does not automatically translate into the provision of basic political and human rights services being delivered. It also shows a strong linkage between state-level political concerns and local-level appreciation towards human rights.
(paragraph 1, page 11): The ASCN does not consider these capacity disparities. The focus has been on accelerating the ‘smart city’ development of the ASCN’s pilot city projects and on leveraging AI and technology to deliver better public services to the city’s population. However, the complexity is that cities in countries without democratic systems show less appreciation for the environment and lack proper prospects for human development. The updated data from the 2020 study show that the same conclusions have been reached. The disparities will only lead to greater differences among ASCN members, given the absence of sustainability measures in ASCN projects. Perhaps two case studies of concern is in Yangon and Phnom Penh. In Yangon, prosecutions continue amid the military junta’s crackdown on democratic voices (Oponio Juris, 2022; Reuters, 2022). Meanwhile, despite the acceleration of development in Phnom Penh, this has been met with an increase in money laundering, concerns over foreign debt, and rising unemployment, indicating that smart cities’ focus on transportation services remains unbalanced with other essential services.
(paragraph 3, page 11): The problem with diverse landscapes such as ASEAN is that ‘smart’ solutions can easily deepen authoritarian tendencies and undermine sustainability objectives. 20 Another issue is the lack of acknowledgment that the starting points of these cities are different, with some already building the foundations of smart cities since the 1960s. 90 As a consequence, it is expected that, after observing recent data in the past four years, poor cities would most likely see a more substantial deterioration of sustainability norms, as anticipated in past studies. 92– 94 The case of Hanoi, Vietnam, is interesting, given the numerous criticisms citizens have expressed about the increased number of surveillance cameras in the city. Although intended to protect and maintain order on public roads, there have been concerns that images are being misused to monitor private lives and steal private data (Dan, 2026).
(paragraph 4, page 11): Combined together, the presented case studies from different ASEAN cities shows an alignment with Crumpton’s concerns over the lack of consideration towards inter-contextual differences. By imposing the ASCN provisions and focusing on targeted smart city elements, this risks the region falling further from sustainability practices that ensure basic services are provided to people.
2. Response 2: On the point of national-level disparities and claims about city-level smart development, I have argued in paragraph 3 of section 3.2, that because of there is a strong linkage with the social issues faced in the national level, to the social realities in local and regional levels (especially in non-democratic states). The revised paragraph: “Table 1 below shows how diverse Southeast Asian countries are, showing more significant disparity in the past years. Although the presented data pertain to state actors, there is a strong likelihood that the patterns of democracy, GDP growth, human development, press freedom, ease of doing business, and environmental performance at the state level are also of concern to local and regional governments. This considers that half of Southeast Asian states are non-democratic, suggesting that a hierarchical system will apply to the concerns that government officials focus on. The indicators consider several dimensions pivotal to the construction of smart cities. First is the 2024 GDP growth, published by the International Monetary Fund, and considers the total value of goods and services produced within the country. 77 Second is the 2022 UN Human Development Index (HDI), which considers education, health, and standard of living. 78 Third is the 2024 Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index (EIU), which considers civil liberties, the electoral process, political participation & culture, and the functioning of the government. 79 Fourth is the 2024 Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index (WPFI), which ranks states based on assessments by non-governmental organizations of journalists' and media freedom. 80 Fifth is the 2024 Yale University’s Environmental Performance Index (EPI), which considers the state of sustainability (climate change performance, environmental health, ecosystem vitality). 81 Last, which differs from the datasets used in the 2021 study helix model assessment on ASCN, is the 2020 World Bank’s EoDB ranks, which rate the difficulty of starting a business, obtaining construction permits, accessing electricity, registering property, and obtaining credit. 82 ”
The manuscript’s narrative objective is clearly delineated in both the abstract and introduction: it seeks to "revisit and update" a prior critique of the helix model concerning ASCN sustainability by integrating recent regional developments. This study references a combination of foundational critiques of smart cities and discussions on region-specific governance and human rights, which is appropriate for the subject and indicates an effort to engage with both historical and contemporary scholarship.
Major numeric and source inconsistencies are listed in Table 1 (critical The paper labels "Ease of Doing Business 2024 (World Bank)" and this reflects the current (2021–2024) context. However, the World Bank’s Doing Business "rankings" page indicates that the rankings are benchmarked to May 2019, with the archive explicitly containing "complete historical data up to Doing Business 2020." This discrepancy is not a minor naming issue: if an indicator is based on 2019/2020, it cannot validly support claims about "the past four years" without strong justification and careful wording. More importantly, at least two entries in Table 1 are demonstrably incorrect when compared to the official Doing Business 2020 ranking table: the manuscript reports an "EoDB global rank" of 187 for Cambodia and 187 for Vietnam. The Doing Business 2020 ranking table lists Cambodia at 144 and Vietnam at 70. This is a direct data error that undermines the subsequent interpretation of "ease of doing business" disparities and any argument built on those values.
Missing HDI value for Vietnam (critical) The manuscript lists Vietnam’s HDI as "NA." However, UNDP’s own country communication reporting the 2022 HDI states that Vietnam’s 2022 HDI value is 0.726 with a rank of 107/193. This indicates a data extraction, transcription, or table-construction error that should be corrected and documented transparently.
Conceptual clarity gap: "qualitative and quantitative methods" without description. While the manuscript frequently describes itself as using mixed approaches, it does not provide a clear, explicit methods section that explains the qualitative component (e.g., document analysis, case material selection, coding approach) and how it is integrated with the quantitative component. This makes the "presentation" less transparent, even if the prose is readable.
Adopting methodological and measurement standards is advisable to enhance the positioning of the literature. Given that the primary argument of the manuscript hinges on the sustainability of "smart city" initiatives, incorporating established indicator standards and measurement frameworks specific to urban contexts, rather than those applicable solely to countries, would be advantageous. Examples of such standards include the ISO standards for city services and quality of life, as well as smart cities (ISO 37120:2018 and ISO 37122:2019), and global KPI frameworks for SSCs, such as the ITU-U4SSC KPIs. Although their absence is not necessarily detrimental, it contributes to the uncertainty regarding the operational definition of "sustainability" within the paper.
Using a cross-national, indicator-based comparative methodology is technically appropriate for a scoping or diagnostic paper that aims to map differences across countries and highlight governance or sustainability issues within regional policy frameworks. In this context, comparing governance, development, environmental factors, and press freedom is a reasonable descriptive approach. However, several design choices compromise the technical robustness of the paper’s primary question—“Are smart cities sustainable?”—and the proposed helix-model framework:
Construct-to-measurement mismatch (critical). The conclusions of this study on sustainability are primarily derived from country-level indices (HDI, democracy, press freedom, EPI, etc.) and lists of ASCN projects. This approach risks ecological inference problems, where relationships observed at the country level may not apply to city-level patterns or project-level sustainability outcomes. This risk of “ecological fallacy” is well-known in aggregate-level inference work and should be explicitly addressed through design, limitations, and ideally, multi-level data.
Helix-model integrity problem: Excluding the education helix while retaining the “quintuple helix” language (critical). The article mentions excluding the education stakeholder helix due to an “inconclusive relationship” between ICT projects and top-ranked universities. However, foundational descriptions of the Quintuple Helix model consider the education system as one of the five helices; removing it alters the theoretical framework and necessitates re-specification and justification. If the paper employs a modified helix model, it should be renamed (e.g., “modified quadruple helix” or “adapted helix framework”) and explicitly linked to indicators (construct a diagram and a table that associate each helix with its respective indicator(s), data source, and projected relationship to sustainability). If the education helix is limited, the framework is renamed and the theoretical implications are elucidated, referencing the definitions of the Quintuple Helix).
The unit of analysis is under-specified. The manuscript shifts between discussing: - ASEAN member states (country-level governance, environmental performance, and development), - ASCN cities (GaWC categorization and project lists), and - “smart city sustainability” as an outcome concept. This could be coherent, but only if the design clearly specifies: (a) the primary unit of analysis, (b) the linking logic between country indices and city/project outcomes, and (c) how alternative explanations are addressed.
The interaction with the ASEAN Smart Cities Network normative framework is limited. The ASEAN Smart Cities Framework equates an ASEAN smart city with a smart sustainable city, emphasizing a balance among economic, environmental, and quality of life considerations while committing to an inclusive approach that respects human rights and fundamental freedoms. A robust critique of ASCN’s sustainability would benefit from a clear contrast between the framework’s stated commitments and evidence of implementation gaps, such as those found in project design features, governance mechanisms, and monitoring indicators. The current manuscript alludes to this gap but does not systematically address it.
Engagement with the normative framework of the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN) is limited. The ASEAN Smart Cities Framework equates an ASEAN smart city with a sustainable smart city. However, a clear data-processing pathway is absent. The methods by which raw data from each source were extracted (whether through a web interface or downloadable tables), cleaned, standardized across different year baselines, and converted into the reported values (scores and ranks) are not elucidated. The evident errors in Table 1 further underscore the need for a transparent verification pipeline.
Additionally, no explicit strategy exists for addressing missing data. Values labeled as “NA” (such as Vietnam HDI and Brunei democracy in Table 1) lack accompanying rules regarding whether countries are excluded from certain analyses, whether the absence is due to unavailable metrics, or if it indicates a data-handling error. Furthermore, there is no description of the qualitative method (it is imperative to publish a "Table 1 & Table 2 dataset" file (in CSV/XLSX format) alongside a code script capable of regenerating the tables from raw data whenever feasible). This is particularly significant because the paper focuses on derived tabular results, addressing issues such as the reasons for missing data, its impact, and management strategies, including corrections for instances where "missing" data is actually an error (e.g., Vietnam HDI).
If the manuscript employs qualitative evidence (as claimed), replicability necessitates at least the following: criteria for corpus selection (which documents/events and why), the analytic procedure (coding, thematic analysis, narrative synthesis), and how qualitative insights were utilized to interpret quantitative patterns. Reporting guidance for qualitative work (SRQR/COREQ, depending on the method) highlights the types of details required by readers to critically evaluate and replicate the analytic logic. (incorporating the study design label, units of analysis, inclusion and exclusion criteria, specific dataset editions or years, extraction dates, variable definitions, and a comprehensive step-by-step guide for constructing tables is essential. Reporting guideline structures, such as STROBE for observational quantitative studies, SRQR/COREQ for qualitative research, and GRAMMS for mixed methods, are employed as practical checklists.
It is imperative to either eliminate the use of correlation terminology and clearly present the findings as descriptive or interpretive or to include a well-defined statistical analysis plan, such as Spearman correlations on ranks with appropriate caveats, discussion of uncertainty, and sensitivity analyses. The chosen approach should be consistent with the evidence presented in the manuscript.
Provide an operational definition of "smart city status," which is critical. If this status is represented by GaWC categorization, ASCN project counts, project maturity, or another metric, it should be precisely specified and its use justified.
Incorporate robustness checks to demonstrate how conclusions vary if (a) business environment data are substituted (e.g., Doing Business vs BREADY), (b) ranks versus scores are employed, and (c) alternative sustainability measures are used, such as city-level sustainability KPIs where applicable.
The paper includes a data availability statement that details the public web sources employed for each index, which is a commendable step toward transparency.
However, full reproducibility, particularly on an open research platform, is not entirely achieved. The primary issue is that the dataset compiled by the authors, which provides the specific values in Tables 1 and 2, is not stored in a repository with a persistent identifier, and the computational methods used to generate the tables are not disclosed.
Even when the primary sources are from third parties, the dataset derived by the authors (which is cleaned, harmonized, and compiled from various sources) constitutes a research output that should be shared to facilitate verification, especially given the identified errors in the tables.
Additionally, some sources may not be readily reusable (for example, accessing the Democracy Index might require submitting a request form), and some indices are updated annually. Therefore, ensuring reproducibility necessitates versioning, recording extraction dates, and archiving specific dataset editions.
The descriptive aspect of the argument—“ASEAN is diverse, and governance/environmental baselines differ substantially among member states”—is well aligned with the comparative indices presented in the paper. The claim that authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governance contexts can influence the adoption of “smart” technologies is credible and substantiated by the cited literature.
However, there is a critical overreach beyond the evidence presented (the assertion that “no direct correlation is seen” between smart city status and sustainability implies an empirical examination of this relationship, yet the manuscript neither conducts such an examination nor defines the necessary variables). Similarly, the claim that a “deterioration of sustainability norms is observed” an empirical trend, but the paper lacks time-series evidence of changing norms.
There is an insufficient linkage between ASCN projects and sustainability outcomes (although the manuscript lists projects and city classifications (GaWC), it does not evaluate project outcomes against sustainability criteria (e.g., emissions, service equity, resilience, governance safeguards). Without these outcome measures, the conclusion that ASCN “may not be the best development course” remains a reasoned hypothesis rather than a substantiated result.
It is necessary to address ASCN’s stated principles. The ASEAN Smart Cities Framework explicitly advocates an inclusive approach that respects human rights and defines a “smart city” as a “smart sustainable city.” A conclusion that the ASCN’s concept is not sustainable would be more compelling if it explicitly demonstrated a divergence between these stated principles and observed implementation patterns (e.g., whether “city surveillance” projects include rights protections or whether “quality environment” projects measurably improve environmental outcomes).
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Partly
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
No
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
Partly
Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound?
Partly
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Partly
Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?
No
Reviewer Expertise:
border areas (borderland), ASEAN, European Union-ASEAN relations,
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have significant reservations, as outlined above.
Major numeric and source inconsistencies are listed in Table 1 (critical The paper labels "Ease of Doing Business 2024 (World Bank)" and this reflects the current (2021–2024) context. However, the World Bank’s Doing Business "rankings" page indicates that the rankings are benchmarked to May 2019, with the archive explicitly containing "complete historical data up to Doing Business 2020." This discrepancy is not a minor naming issue: if an indicator is based on 2019/2020, it cannot validly support claims about "the past four years" without strong justification and careful wording. More importantly, at least two entries in Table 1 are demonstrably incorrect when compared to the official Doing Business 2020 ranking table: the manuscript reports an "EoDB global rank" of 187 for Cambodia and 187 for Vietnam. The Doing Business 2020 ranking table lists Cambodia at 144 and Vietnam at 70. This is a direct data error that undermines the subsequent interpretation of "ease of doing business" disparities and any argument built on those values.
1. Rather than stating that the sources are taken between 2021-2024, the beginning of the last paragraph of page 7 explains that the data displays disparity in recent years: “Table 1 below shows how diverse Southeast Asian countries are, showing more significant disparity in the past years.”
2. Correction of the EoDB’s year of publication becoming 2020 (last sentence of the last paragraph, page 7): “Last, which differs from the datasets used in the 2021 study helix model assessment on ASCN, is the 2020 World Bank’s EoDB ranks, which rate the difficulty of starting a business, obtaining construction permits, accessing electricity, registering property, and obtaining credit”
3. EoDB Global rank data: Cambodia ranked 144, and Vietnam ranked 70
4. Narrative in the first paragraph of page 9: “Furthermore, the EoDB figures shown in Table 1 indicate the role of political and government systems in the ease of doing business in ASEAN countries. Singapore is the second-best country in the world to do business, but its ASEAN counterpart, Cambodia, is ranked 144th, among the lowest”
Missing HDI value for Vietnam (critical) The manuscript lists Vietnam’s HDI as "NA." However, UNDP’s own country communication reporting the 2022 HDI states that Vietnam’s 2022 HDI value is 0.726 with a rank of 107/193. This indicates a data extraction, transcription, or table-construction error that should be corrected and documented transparently.
Response: I have corrected the data entry for Vietnam’s HDI value in 2022: HDI value 0,726, ranked 107/193. The revisions can be seen in table 1
Conceptual clarity gap: "qualitative and quantitative methods" without description. While the manuscript frequently describes itself as using mixed approaches, it does not provide a clear, explicit methods section that explains the qualitative component (e.g., document analysis, case material selection, coding approach) and how it is integrated with the quantitative component. This makes the "presentation" less transparent, even if the prose is readable.
Response: Several sections of the study has been revised to make clear that the qualitative component of the study is through the use of document analysis:
1. Abstract: “Recent urban planning in Southeast Asia has incorporated the theme of transforming cities to ‘smart city’ status. However, the central question raised in this study is whether the ASEAN’s conception of smart cities is genuinely sustainable. Based on the backdrop of Southeast Asia’s disparity in economic performances and diversity in its political, social, economic, and environmental dimensions, this study updates Crumpton’s 2021 study on the ‘quintuple helix model’ and argues that new observations but old patterns are found in the ASEAN Smart Cities Network’s way of developing cities in Southeast Asia. Through a qualitative document analysis, utilizing published secondary data on the ten ASEAN member states between 2020 and 2024, this study revisits and updates the current state of Southeast Asia and how this corresponds to the challenges of constructing smart cities in democratic, semi-authoritarian, and authoritarian settings.
2. Pages 2-3: “Through quantitative and qualitative approaches (document analysis), this study intends to provide an update on the ASCN under the ‘helix models.’ It considers several unique trends between 2020 and 2024 that contribute to the diversity of Southeast Asian states. These include the Myanmar military coup in 2021, Laos’ foreign debt surges, and Cambodia’s change of leadership after more than three decades, to name a few. 27– 33
Adopting methodological and measurement standards is advisable to enhance the positioning of the literature. Given that the primary argument of the manuscript hinges on the sustainability of "smart city" initiatives, incorporating established indicator standards and measurement frameworks specific to urban contexts, rather than those applicable solely to countries, would be advantageous. Examples of such standards include the ISO standards for city services and quality of life, as well as smart cities (ISO 37120:2018 and ISO 37122:2019), and global KPI frameworks for SSCs, such as the ITU-U4SSC KPIs. Although their absence is not necessarily detrimental, it contributes to the uncertainty regarding the operational definition of "sustainability" within the paper.
Response: I do agree that the term sustainability of smart city initiatives deserves closer examination regarding its operationalization. I, however, disagree that the article would benefit from a standardized definition, as proposed (ISO 37120:2018 and ISO 37122:2019). As clearly stated in the following two paragraphs (pages 5-6), the term sustainability in the context of Southeast Asian states is different. The highlight is on the character of governance introduced, as well as heightened concerns about surveillance and control. This follows up on earlier studies on the unique challenges of sustainability in Southeast Asia, and the plan of this study is to build on those findings:
1. Paragraph 1: “Studies in the past have captured the doubt that smart cities are indeed sustainable means of developing cities. As past studies have shown, there is unclear evidence that shows that the smart city approach indeed leads to urban sustainability. 1, 3, 5, 63, 64 In building up such an assumption, Charles David Crumpton, Supawatanarkorn Wongthanavasau, Peerasit Kamnuansilpa, John Draper, and Eva Bialobrzeski specifically analyzed this in the context of the ASCN. Adopting the ‘helix models,’ the study looks into specific city plans in Southeast Asia, the ASCN, and experiences with the smart city initiative. 20 The study highlights the disparities in social, economic, and political rights among Southeast Asian states and argues that the presence of states with authoritarian settings generates a more significant challenge for the ASCN. It is then proposed that the smart city conceptualization to be within a ‘system of systems’ framework. 20 In this, “the complex socio-ecological interaction between society and nature and the multi-layered character of governance are acknowledged”. 20
2. Paragraph 2: “Consequently, the disparity in economic capacity, social and human rights, and political systems between the Southeast Asian states is perceived as a barrier to achieving the ideal smart city status for ASCN participating cities. With the advancement of technologies proposed as the basis of a smart city, ASEAN is bridging the potential control abuses and heightened cyber surveillance that could be the case in many of the authoritarian nations in the region. As Crumpton’s-led study mentioned, “[…] authoritarian regimes and regimes with authoritarian tendencies seek new and better means for surveilling and controlling their populations”. 20 And that such state systems would impact “[…] participatory and therefore socio-ecologically sustainable urban planning and governance”. 20
Several design choices compromise the technical robustness of the paper’s primary question—“Are smart cities sustainable?”—and the proposed helix-model framework:
Construct-to-measurement mismatch (critical). The conclusions of this study on sustainability are primarily derived from country-level indices (HDI, democracy, press freedom, EPI, etc.) and lists of ASCN projects. This approach risks ecological inference problems, where relationships observed at the country level may not apply to city-level patterns or project-level sustainability outcomes. This risk of “ecological fallacy” is well-known in aggregate-level inference work and should be explicitly addressed through design, limitations, and ideally, multi-level data.
Helix-model integrity problem: Excluding the education helix while retaining the “quintuple helix” language (critical). The article mentions excluding the education stakeholder helix due to an “inconclusive relationship” between ICT projects and top-ranked universities. However, foundational descriptions of the Quintuple Helix model consider the education system as one of the five helices; removing it alters the theoretical framework and necessitates re-specification and justification. If the paper employs a modified helix model, it should be renamed (e.g., “modified quadruple helix” or “adapted helix framework”) and explicitly linked to indicators (construct a diagram and a table that associate each helix with its respective indicator(s), data source, and projected relationship to sustainability). If the education helix is limited, the framework is renamed and the theoretical implications are elucidated, referencing the definitions of the Quintuple Helix).
The unit of analysis is under-specified. The manuscript shifts between discussing: - ASEAN member states (country-level governance, environmental performance, and development), - ASCN cities (GaWC categorization and project lists), and - “smart city sustainability” as an outcome concept. This could be coherent, but only if the design clearly specifies: (a) the primary unit of analysis, (b) the linking logic between country indices and city/project outcomes, and (c) how alternative explanations are addressed.
Responses:
1. Response 1: I justify in page 7, last paragraph, how the state-level differences and comparisons are applicable in the context of the ASCN cities: “Table 1 below shows how diverse Southeast Asian countries are, showing more significant disparity in the past years. Although the presented data pertain to state actors, there is a strong likelihood that the patterns of democracy, GDP growth, human development, press freedom, ease of doing business, and environmental performance at the state level are also of concern to local and regional governments. This considers that half of Southeast Asian states are non-democratic, suggesting that a hierarchical system will apply to the concerns that government officials focus on. The indicators consider several dimensions pivotal to the construction of smart cities. First is the 2024 GDP growth, published by the International Monetary Fund, and considers the total value of goods and services produced within the country. 77 Second is the 2022 UN Human Development Index (HDI), which considers education, health, and standard of living. 78 Third is the 2024 Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index (EIU), which considers civil liberties, the electoral process, political participation & culture, and the functioning of the government. 79 Fourth is the 2024 Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index (WPFI), which ranks states based on assessments by non-governmental organizations of journalists' and media freedom. 80 Fifth is the 2024 Yale University’s Environmental Performance Index (EPI), which considers the state of sustainability (climate change performance, environmental health, ecosystem vitality). 81 Last, which differs from the datasets used in the 2021 study helix model assessment on ASCN, is the 2020 World Bank’s EoDB ranks, which rate the difficulty of starting a business, obtaining construction permits, accessing electricity, registering property, and obtaining credit. 82
2. Response 2: I introduce several empirical case studies to showcase how the concerns are located in the city level. The following revisions also responds to the comment on the unit of analysis:
(paragraph 1 page 10): However, what is puzzling is the rising significance of cities in less democratic settings such as Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, and Myanmar. In the past four years, these four cities have struggled to ensure greater civic rights are maintained. As the ASCN is focused on accelerating the efforts to make these cities ‘smart,’ there seems to be a profound neglect of the political issues in those cities due to this dominant discourse of ‘smart’ development. This raises a substantial concern, as these cities would focus solely on consistency with the ASCN smart city framework and further neglect fundamental urban services. In Vientiane and large cities in Laos, the concern still lies on the issue of restricted civil and political rights, which includes cases of unfair criminal trials, and judicial corruption in the cities (HRW, 2017; OHCHR, 2024). Meanwhile, in Jakarta, those opposing democratic rule have been met with harsh measures to suppress negative sentiments directed at the president (Raditio and Yeremia, 2022; BBC, 2026). These cases go to show that accelerating development that leans to being ‘smart’ does not automatically translate into the provision of basic political and human rights services being delivered. It also shows a strong linkage between state-level political concerns and local-level appreciation towards human rights.
(paragraph 1, page 11): The ASCN does not consider these capacity disparities. The focus has been on accelerating the ‘smart city’ development of the ASCN’s pilot city projects and on leveraging AI and technology to deliver better public services to the city’s population. However, the complexity is that cities in countries without democratic systems show less appreciation for the environment and lack proper prospects for human development. The updated data from the 2020 study show that the same conclusions have been reached. The disparities will only lead to greater differences among ASCN members, given the absence of sustainability measures in ASCN projects. Perhaps two case studies of concern is in Yangon and Phnom Penh. In Yangon, prosecutions continue amid the military junta’s crackdown on democratic voices (Oponio Juris, 2022; Reuters, 2022). Meanwhile, despite the acceleration of developments in Phnom Penh, this has been met with an increase in money laundering, concerns over foreign debt, and rising unemployment, which shows that smart cities’ focus on transportation services remains unbalanced with more essential services.
(paragraph 3, page 11): The problem with diverse landscapes such as ASEAN is that everything ‘smart’ can easily deepen authoritarian tendencies and undermine sustainability objectives. 20 Another issue is the lack of acknowledgment that the starting points of these cities are different, with some already building the foundations of smart cities since the 1960s. 90 As a consequence, it is expected that, after observing recent data in the past four years, poor cities would most likely see a more substantial deterioration of sustainability norms, as anticipated in past studies. 92– 94 The case of Hanoi, Vietnam, is interesting, given the numerous criticisms citizens have expressed about the increased number of surveillance cameras in the city. Although intended to protect and maintain order on public roads, there have been concerns that images are being misused to monitor private lives and steal private data (Dan, 2026).
(paragraph 4, page 11): Combined together, the presented case studies from different ASEAN cities shows an alignment with Crumpton’s concerns over the lack of consideration towards inter-contextual differences. By imposing the ASCN provisions and focusing on targeted smart city elements, this risks the region falling further from sustainability practices that ensure basic services are provided to people.
3. Response 3: I disagree that a name is required, as the article follows up using more recent empirical case studies and data on Crumpton’s helix model. To emphasize this point, I explain in section 3.2 that the focus of the argument taken from the 2021 study is the idea that disparities in capacities leads to insufficient efforts in promoting sustainability measures in cities. The revised paragraph in parapraph 2 of section 3.2: “The basis of the ASCN's problem is diversity across systems. The smart city approach becomes complex when applied to governments with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian settings, which could lead to further control over populations. 76 For the more democratic nations of Southeast Asia, the problem then becomes to what extent state policymakers consider environmental costs as exceeding development targets. This section argues that old patterns are emerging, with a lack of relationship between citizens and the smart city developments taking place in Southeast Asia. In doing so, the following will explain several indicators that show the diversity between states and cities in Southeast Asia, indicating different starting points among the ASCN members, which risks exacerbating disparities in the delivery of basic urban services. Similar to Crumpton’s 2021 point, the updated empirical data presented between 2020 and 2024 in the two tables below show that concern over non-democratic practices has the potential to negatively affect urban planning and governance, underplay environmental concerns, and neglect improvements in the quality of life of the city’s population. ”
Response 1: I have revised table 1, and no values are labelled as ‘NA.’
Response 2: Regarding the data, the values and information are publicly available, as stated in the data declaration. Therefore, there is no need to put the data in a separate file and upload the files, as the copyright is retained by the institutions.