The majority of people are aware of the problem of climate change, feel concerned about its potential consequences and generally support the notion of mitigation ( Fairbrother, 2022). However, to mitigate impacts of climate change there is need for substantive economic and social transformation globally and within societies. This entails threat to those interests that are grounded, in particular, in fossil fuels and related industries ( Brügger, Morton and Dessai, 2015; Douenne and Fabre, 2020). When those material interests are made salient to the broader population, including via potential increases in taxation, public opposition increases, raising an electoral obstacle to urgent reform ( Fairbrother, 2022). In this instance, people are less likely to support measures that offer no short-term benefit, but which pose a threat to financial security via increases in tax or costs of goods. The foreshortening of interests in this context has been described by Botzen as ‘myopic bias’ ( Botzen, 2022). The author identifies a series of further biases that contribute to rejection of climate change policies including simplification of risks as low probability/high consequence, such as flooding ( Robinson and Botzen, 2019), availability of evidence, finite pool of worry against a number of other and more pressing crises and herding of views, each of which intersect with social inequalities and influence the way in which messages about climate risks are received and interpreted. These biases contribute to obstructive social norms that impede accurate assessment of climate risk ( Frederiks, Stenner and Hobman, 2015; Meyer and Kunreuther, 2017).

However, there is evidence of support for climate change policy when framed in terms of protecting financial security and predictability. This has an implicit element of redistribution baked into it, since as Newell et al. ( Newell et al., 2021, p. 2) remind us, such measures ‘account for and contest how climate change is having the most severe effects on those with the least responsibility for causing it, and who, at the same time, are often excluded from decision-making processes regarding responses to the problem’. Importantly, there are two distinct approaches that offer different impacts on citizens ( Füssel and Klein, 2006): i) mitigation of risk, which attempts to limit change at a global level over several decades with no immediate benefit to those bearing the cost and ii) adaptation to risk, which moderates the adverse effects of unavoidable climate change, whilst seizing new opportunities that arise, suggesting greater appeal to individuals where impact is localised and evident, offering a more immediate and tangible return on investment ( Brügger, Morton and Dessai, 2015).

A Green New Deal implies a combination of mitigation and adaptation and Brugger et al. suggest that redistributive strategies bridge the two frameworks and serve to enhance popularity by foregrounding the interests of those most vulnerable to climate change ( Brügger, Morton and Dessai, 2015). They argue that emphasising clearly the impact on workers’ interests of climate change risks and responses is particularly important. Moreover, there is evidence that, when policies are framed effectively by those who oppose them, narratives can overcome or reduce biases by making interests salient ( Johnson, Johnson and Nettle, 2022; Johnson et al., 2023). In what follows, we test perception of a Green New Deal designed in such a way as to redistribute and support economic interests of the vast majority of Britons.

The challenge of achieving net zero is considerable, but has clear economic and social rationale ( Millard, 2023). The UK’s economy is in its worst state since 1945 and requires large-scale public investment. Those jobs associated with fossil fuels are time limited, since the cost to society of using fossil fuels increases perpetually as its impacts are felt. Our programme starts from the premise that a whole of Government approach is required, such that departmental budgets ought to be seen as complementary and underpinned by the Treasury, rather than being at odds with one another’s priorities.

Fundamentally, we need to reorganise public investment so that improving sustainability is a central goal for all infrastructure projects. This bears a negligible cost. We then need to invest, as Labour promised in 2021, at least £28 billion a year in decarbonising the energy supply and reducing energy expenditure. This requires creation of a National Investment Bank out of the UK Infrastructure Bank and use of the tax system to incentivise investment in green projects alongside ending new licences for fossil fuel projects as well as removing licences for private energy and water companies in order to deprivatise utilities at low cost.

We need a National Building Service to retrofit and install heat pumps, solar panels and insulation in the housing stock, since the private sector has proven unable to do this on the scale required. The cost is consistent with Labour’s 10 year pledge to invest £60 billion in this area. Doing this trains a workforce and takes up much of the slack created by ending fossil fuel operations. However, given to guarantee security for the 260,000 workers ( Emden, Murphy and Gunson, 2020) in carbon intensive industries and avoid repeating the impacts on coalmining communities of the loss of that industry in the 1980s, we propose a ‘Quadruple Lock’: a) a job guarantee to ensure that those who lose jobs to decarbonisation are employed under the same or better conditions in their region; b) locating investment in areas affected by the shift; c) vocational training to upskill workers; d) providing funding to workers to set up businesses using their existing skills ( Common Sense Policy Group, 2024, pp. 72–73).

We then need to improve and enforce regulations on pollution, divert subsidies away from intensive agriculture toward regeneration at a cost of £5.6 billion per annum over 10 years (full use of a £56bn shortfall in regeneration investment) and protection of biodiversity and charge producers for waste at a cost of £1m per protected site. including via Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR). This raises £1bn per annum. To support such a programme, we require a carbon tax on producers that is progressively increased over time. To mitigate climate change contributing economic activity and achieve net zero we introduce a carbon tax of £55 to £60 per tonne in 2024, rising to £75 per tonne in 2030 and a permanent excess tax on fossil fuel companies combined with a redirection of current subsidies to fossil fuel producers ( Burke et al., 2020). This raises £13.7 bn per annum. We complement this by reversing the cut to fuel duty, effectively returning the UK to the level it would have had if Fuel Duty had risen in line with inflation since 2010 ( Office for Budget Responsibility, 2023). This raises £19.9bn.

Public investment carries with it a multiplier effect of 2.91. Each year of Labour’s original commitment to a £28 billion annual investment would create £77 billion. The US Inflation Reduction Act illustrates the basis of this impact, with 170,000 jobs created, renewable electricity generation increased, inflation reduced much more quickly and growth much higher than in the UK ( Milman, 2023). Given that a Green New Deal performs a similar function, and given that policymakers have focused on the economy as the basis for justifying policies, there is good reason to assess public opinion in terms of the policy’s instrumental value.

We conducted a 15-minute screening survey with 693 participants with Red Wall constituency postcodes or, due to platform limitations, area postcodes with a large proportion of Red Wall constituencies on Prolific, an online survey panel that provides researchers with access to participants for a fee. Prolific holds no licence over the data that those participants provide within surveys. We presented brief, bullet-point outlines of proposals for a Green New Deal and asked people to rate them on a 100-point sliding scale in which via a horizontal slider anchored with 0 = strongly disagree and 100 = strongly agree. This elicited very basic popularity data to enable identification of firm opponents of utilities reform for adversarial co-production of narratives. Participants received £2 in compensation.

We identified 10 Red Wall opponents (≤20 levels of support for a Green New Deal reform) from the screening survey and invited them to develop narratives that elicit features of the policies to persuade voters like them of its merits. Participants produced written narratives (minimum 150 words) that we standardised for language, style and length (150 words + 10 per cent max). We co-produced four narratives around the most cohesive ideas expressed, using the text provided by participants to organise prose around four specific justificatory elements: 1) absolute gains – the impact of reform on policy that affects all members of society; 2) relative gains – the impact of reform on improving the interests of low-middle income voters at the expense of wealth voters; 3) security – the impact of reform on securing society; 4) biodiversity.

Narrative 1: Absolute Gains: A Green New Deal just makes plain sense for all of us. By transitioning to renewable energy sources like solar, wind and hydro and curbing oil and gas extraction, we can safeguard our planet from the devastating impacts of pollution, extreme weather events, and rising sea levels. And going big in investing to build up renewable infrastructure could kickstart an economic renaissance across the country. This is a real chance to commit to an environmentally sustainable future, where we aren't threatening our shared future in Britain. I know change on this scale won't come easy or cheap for that matter. But looking at the shape we're in today, and thinking about the country and world I want my children and grandchildren to inhabit, pushing hard for renewables just feels like the right call. Communities and populations should own the energy companies. The energy created in Britain is our natural resource and should not be a burden on the shoulders of people.

Narrative 2: Relative Gains: A Green New Deal is about ensuring that energy and prosperity isn't hoarded by the wealthy few, but shared equitably. This policy not only addresses environmental concerns, but also stimulates economic growth, particularly in less wealthy regions. We can tax wealthy fossil fuel producers and use the funds to develop greener energy infrastructure and jobs on a massive scale, simultaneously reducing income inequality and controlling energy prices. We're talking about creating stable, good-paying jobs for those who need them most. This will ensure that our most vulnerable people and young children are not left behind in harmful environments. By reducing carbon emissions, we can reduce the impact of climate change globally and ensure more opportunities for countries around the world to expand their means of generating income and becoming wealthier, thereby allowing citizens of those countries to lead healthy and productive lives without having to move elsewhere to earn a living.

Narrative 3: Security: A Green New Deal would provide us with energy security and ensure we are not at the mercy of world events or foreign powers. Because the world only has a limited amount of fossil fuels, those countries that own them hold power over those that need them. As recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have shown, countries can use their ownership of fossil fuels against us for political gain, reducing supply and increasing prices. Owning our own renewable energy sources will secure us against international events and enable us to get ahead of other states. It will also enable us to develop greener energy production and infrastructure on a massive scale before the costs of non-renewables become prohibitive and cause supply problems which could lead to tensions between states and countries. Regeneration is needed not just for securing our future in an insecure world, but for securing future generations as well.

Narrative 4: Biodiversity: Climate change is real and we need to try our best to make changes to protect species on the planet. Nature is valuable on its own terms and our ecosystems are vulnerable and sensitive. When individual species die off, other species are affected. Threats to nature in Britain come from forms of intensive industry, agriculture and infrastructure that need to be regulated more effectively. We need safe spaces for natural British environments and species to regenerate. The Green New Deal is extremely important because there will be a massive shift in the numbers and diversity of animals surviving and thriving. We can reinvest savings and profits from transitioning to renewable sources of energy into regenerating natural environments in the countryside and at sea. By creating those safe spaces, a Green New Deal would enable populations to recover and ecosystems to become more resilient, ensuring that biodiversity and species are protected.

Participants received £5 remuneration for adversarial co-production.

A final, 30-minute public opinion survey was conducted between 20-26 January 2024 with 2,200 adult UK residents via Prolific. To ensure effective representation among Red Wall constituents, we first opened the survey to 916 residents with Red Wall postcodes or area postcodes with a large proportion of Red Wall constituencies. We then opened the survey to a further 1,305 participants across Britain. Participants were presented with a description of a series of areas of Green New Deal reform as one of ten policy areas (welfare reform, Green New Deal, public utilities, health and social care, childhood and early years, education, housing, transport, democratic reform, taxation) along with the impacts such reforms evidence indicates will follow from their implementation (see supplementary file). The description for a Green New Deal was:

A Green New Deal

A Green New Deal would restructure our economy by: •

converting our energy supply to renewable sources of electricity (wind, solar, nuclear, etc.) through publicly owned energy services

Evidence suggests that impacts of the policies include: •

Protecting all citizens from the worst effects of pollution, extreme weather events, including heat waves, flooding, drought and rising sea levels

Participants were asked to rate their opposition or support to those policies on a scale of 0-100. They were then shown a randomised adversarially co-produced narrative and asked to rate its persuasiveness on a scale of 0-100 and then to rate their opposition or support for the policy again on a scale of 0-100. Participants were then asked to provide basic demographic data, socioeconomic data, including self-rating status on the MacArthur ladder of subjective socioeconomic status ( Adler et al., 2000), and perceived risk of destitution on a 100-point sliding scale, health status, including Depression PHQ-8 ( Kroenke, Spitzer and Williams, 2001), Anxiety GAD7 ( Spitzer et al., 2006), single item life satisfaction ( Guney, Kalafat and Boysan, 2010; Mamani-Benito et al., 2022) political affiliation, voting intention and faith in politicians established by six items in prior project iterations ( Johnson et al., 2023). Participants received £4.50 in remuneration.

Data were analysed using Julia. Relative to General Election voting intention in January 2024, our sample overrepresented people who voted as compared with not voting, overrepresented Labour voters and underrepresented Conservative voters (see Table 1 below). In the statistical analyses that follow, we have therefore applied post-stratification weights that make our sample representative of age and contemporary voting intention as of 26 January 2024 ( Politico, 2024). The election result itself showed: Labour 33.7%, Conservatives 23.7%, Reform 14.3%, Lib Dems 12.2%, Greens 6.4%, SNP 2.5% and Plaid 0.7%.

Not included in the Politico polling were NI parties 2.5% and independents 2% ( Baker, Pollock and Cracknell, 2024). The final result reflected low turnout among those who indicated Labour as a voting intention, possibly because they were likely to be younger and younger people are less likely to vote overall and also because polling leads suggested a decisive Labour victory and reduced competitive pressure to avoid an alternative outcome.

Categorical variables were contrast coded, and continuous variables scaled. The distribution of residuals for all models was satisfactory. All p values are two sided. Our confirmatory predictions were that those who strongly rejected a Green New Deal would be homeowners, express low risk of destitution on scale of 0-100 (<30) and intend to vote Conservative in 2024. The rest of the analyses are considered exploratory.

We followed our established method ( Johnson et al., 2023) of structural equation modelling (SEM) in R package ‘lavaan’ ( Rosseel, 2012) to estimate covariance between socioeconomic position (measures above), mental health (measures above), faith in government and age and to regression relationships between those variables and support for a Green New Deal. On the basis of our prior studies ( Johnson, Johnson and Nettle, 2022), we hypothesised that the latent variables would directly affect support for a Green New Deal, with lower socioeconomic status, higher mental distress, younger age and greater faith in government associated with higher levels of support for the policy as a means of reducing financial insecurity (associated with lower socioeconomic status, higher mental distress, younger age) and as a possible means of improving society (associated with greater faith in government).

Our raw data, Julia scripts and R scripts are publicly available ( Johnson, 2024; E. Johnson et al., 2024; Stark, 2024).

Key demographic and socioeconomic sample characteristics are outlined in Table 1. The sample included 51% female, 48% male and 1% who described themselves in another way. 85% of respondents identified as white, slightly higher than in the 2021 England and Wales Census (81.7%), and 15% identified as belonging to other ethnic groups, slightly lower than the same Census (20.3%), while the median age was 48.00 (mean 47.96, s.d. 16.74), higher than in the 2021 England and Wales Census ( Office for National Statistics, 2022). The median annual non-equivalised household income was £34,000, higher than the national median income for the year ending 2023 of £32,500 ( Department for Work and Pension, 2024). Participants reported a mean score of 26.85 for risk of destitution, with 0 representing extremely low risk and 100 extremely high risk. The mean MacArthur ladder score was 5.30, with 1 representing the worst off in society and 10 the best off. The mean average control of life score was 61.41, where 0 means completely out of control and 100 means completely in control. The mean life satisfaction score was mean 61.63, where 0 means completely dissatisfied and 100 completely satisfied. The average GAD-7 score fell within the 5-9: Mild Anxiety category ( Sapra et al., 2020). The average PHQ-8 score fell below the minimum threshold for depression ( Kroenke et al., 2009).

Participants indicated that they sat broadly in the middle of a left-right 100-point ideological scale. As Table 1 indicates, the sample under-represented both Conservative and Labour 2019 voters, with the proportion of undecided 2024 voters much higher than in national polling. The sample showed a reduction in levels of support for both main political parties.

Pre-treatment level of support for a Green New Deal was high (mean 70.44, median 77.00, s.d. 25.97). A large proportion of respondents – whom we term lovers – expressed strong pre-treatment support (≥70, 58.33%). A small proportion – haters – expressed strong opposition (≤30, 8.27%). 15.13% chose 100 on the scale, while just 1.90% chose 0. There were statistically significant differences by voting intention. Taking Conservative voting intention, female and not working as reference categories (70.248, R ² = .137, p < .001, 95% CI [62.277, 78.219]), Labour (18.84, R ² = .137, p < .001, 95% CI [14.938, 22.731]), Liberal Democrats (19.39, R ² = .137, p < .001, 95% CI [12.622, 26.162]), Green/SNP/Plaid Cymru (26.740, R ² = .137, p < .001, 95% CI [21.572, 31.908]), Reform (13.291, R ² = .137, p < .001, 95% CI [5.625, 20.956]) or not intending to vote (6.062, R ² = .137, p = .002, 95% CI [2.170, 9.954]) voting intention associated with higher levels of support for a Green New Deal.

Associations for ethnicity, residency, employment status and household income were not statistically significant. However, older age (-0.206, R ² = .137, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.280, -0.133]) and male gender identity (-3.626, R ² = .137, p < .001, 95% CI [-5.683, -1.570]) were predictors of lower levels of support. Dissatisfaction with income (4.471, R ² = .005, p < .002, 95% CI [1.698, 7.244]), risk of destitution (0.095, R ² = .011, p < .001, 95% CI [0.055, 0.135]), high risk of destitution (((≥70, 5.072, R ² = .004, p < .001, 95% CI [1.677, 8.468]) were predictors of lower levels of support, while higher MacArthur ladder score (-0.991, R ² = .004, p = .004, 95% CI [-1.667, -0.315]), home ownership (-4.036, R ² = .006, p < .001, 95% CI [-6.286, -1.785]) and being mostly satisfied with income (-9.352, R ² = .010, p < .001, 95% CI [-14.291, -4.414]), were significant.

While there were differences in self-rated physical health were not significant, higher anxiety (0.402, R ² = .007, p < .001, 95% CI [0.193, 0.612]) and depression (0.449, R ² = .008, p < .001, 95% CI [0.231, 0.666]) scores were associated with higher support.

As discussed in the Methods section, we fitted the SEM shown in Figure 1 to the data, collapsing across narrative conditions. The full output is provided in Table 3.

The comparative fit index was 0.92; >0.90 is generally taken to indicate adequate model fit ( Bentler, 1990). The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) statistic was 0.07; < .05 is generally taken to indicate a very good fit and < .10 reasonable fit ( Fan et al., 1999).

Standardised model parameters are shown in Figure 1. The modelling strongly supports prior work asserting the relationship between socioeconomic status and anxiety and depression ( Parra-Mujica et al., 2023; Villadsen et al., 2023; Nettle et al., 2024) and policy preferences ( Howard et al., 2023, 2024; Johnson et al., 2023). Socioeconomic position affected support for a Green New Deal directly, with those with higher socioeconomic status producing lower support and then indirectly since higher socioeconomic status was associated with lower mental distress, which was also associated with lower support, while lower socioeconomic status was associated with higher levels of cynicism in government, which was associated with lower levels of support. When controlling for socioeconomic status, older age was also associated with lower levels of support. This is partially explained by the association between age and distress, such that older participants were less likely to be distressed.

As Figure 2 shows, there was evidence of a statistically significant narrative treatment effect on support for a Green New Deal on participants overall, which increased by 1.63 points (p < .05) on average. However, as 15.13% chose 100 at the pre stage, there was little room on the scale for improvement among a large proportion of respondents, with a non-statistically significant 0.09-point (p .033) increase in support among pre-treatment lovers, though the percentage choosing 100 at post-narrative stage increased to 17.35 points. There was a larger, but non-statistically significant increase in support among pre-treatment haters of 2.59 points (p.14).

The average change in support by narrative was 1.697 for absolute gains, 0.952 for relative gains, 3.138 for security and 0.648 for biodiversity. Taking absolute gains as the reference category (1.720, R ² = .0.009, p < .001, 95% CI [0.701, 2.739]), the security narrative produced a significantly larger change in support (1.441, R ² = .0.009, p = .030, 95% CI [0.141, 2.753]). The other narratives did not differ significantly from absolute gains. No other associations were statistically significant.

Table 4 sets out average levels of persuasiveness of narratives as rated by participants. There were statistically significant treatment differences in the impact of the narratives. Although the sample size is small and ought to be understood in that context, haters rated, for example, relative gains (mean 17.87, median 15.00) more highly than biodiversity (mean 11.23, median 7.57).

Levels of support for a Green New Deal were compared with levels of support for utilities reform – a policy with similar implications on energy security. The description of that policy was as follows:

Reforms to Public Utilities (energy and water) would return water and energy to public ownership: •

buying back the National Grid and British Gas

Evidence suggests that impacts of the policies include: •

Ensuring that all citizens are protected from power and water shortages

As Figure 3 shows, results suggest that the more individuals support clearly redistributive reforms to welfare and taxation, the more they support a Green New Deal. Support for a Green New Deal was moderately strongly correlated with support for utilities reform (r(1986) = .45, p < .001).

This study has been approved by the Faculty of Health and Life Sciences ethics committee, Northumbria University. The approval number is 5814 and the date of approval was 30 November 2023. This committee contains members who are internal to the Faculty. This study was reviewed by members of the committee, who must provide impartial advice and avoid significant conflicts of interests. Participants provided informed written consent. The study adheres to the Declaration of Helsinki.