F1000Research F1000Research 2046-1402 F1000 Research Limited London, UK 10.12688/f1000research.169813.1 Research Article Articles Converging Dynamics of Urban Land Lease Systems, State-Controlled Land Ownership, and Neo-patrimonial Governance: Exploring Contradictions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

[version 1; peer review: 2 not approved]

 Amare Moges Conceptualization Data Curation Formal Analysis Investigation Methodology Writing – Original Draft Preparation https://orcid.org/0009-0003-3718-0228 a 1 Abeje Wondimu Supervision https://orcid.org/0009-0006-3644-4908 1 2 Mengistu Frew Supervision 3 Mamo Dejene Supervision 4 Geography and Environmental Studies, Addis Ababa University College of Social Sciences, Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa, 1000, Ethiopia Rural, Regional and Local Development Studies, Addis Ababa University College of Social Sciences, Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa, 1000, Ethiopia Rural, Regional and Local Development Studies, Addis Ababa University College of Social Sciences, Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa, 1000, Ethiopia Accounting and Finance, Ethiopian Civil Service University, Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa, 1000, Ethiopia moges.amare@aau.edu.et

No competing interests were disclosed.

 23 9 2025 2025 14 970 9 9 2025 Copyright: © 2025 Amare M et al. 2025 This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

This paper examines the complex interplay between urban land lease policy, state ownership, and neo-patrimonial practices in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. While Ethiopia’s urban land lease policy aims for equitable development, state ownership exacerbates neo-patrimonial dynamics, leading to distorted resource allocation and limited access for marginalized communities. Through key informant interviews and policy analysis, this study reveals how ethnic alignment and political loyalty influence land access, undermining the policy’s stated objectives. The findings highlight a disconnection between formal regulations and the lived experiences of urban residents, particularly those lacking political connections. Despite constitutional guarantees, a centralized decision-making process and limited accountability perpetuate inequality. The study concludes that institutional reforms are needed to decentralize power, enhance transparency, and integrate marginalized voices into land governance to realize equitable and sustainable urban development in Addis Ababa. This research contributes to a broader understanding of the challenges facing urban land management in neo-patrimonial contexts.

 Urban land Lease Policy Neo-patrimonialism Land Ownership Equity Ethiopia/Addis Ababa The author(s) declared that no grants were involved in supporting this work. 1. Introduction

Land serves as the foundation for urban existence and sustainable development ( Home, 2021; OECD, 2017). Its effective management is critical in developing nations, where it remains a contested socioeconomic resource ( Gemeda et al., 2021; Zhang & Kockelman, 2015). Historically, land ownership has been equated with freedom and power ( Pirenne, 1937), shaping individual liberty and urban functionality ( Aalbers & Haila, 2018; Foster & Warren, 2021). However, political dynamics often distort land governance, enabling elites to exploit resources for patronage rather than public welfare ( Bryan et al., 2020; Milonakis & Fine, 2009). Misuse of scarce public resources like urban land has become ubiquitous in third world countries, particularly in Africa.

Neo-patrimonialism, widespread in developing economies, fuels these challenges by constraining resource allocation—including urban land—to political loyalty ( Soest, 2021; Trantidis, 2016). While colonial legacies are often cited as a root cause, Ethiopia’s non-colonial history demonstrates that weak institutions and concentrated state power perpetuate such systems ( Bach & Gazibo, 2012; Fukuyama, 2013, 2015). This paper examines how Ethiopia’s urban land lease policy, framed within state ownership, intersects with neo-patrimonial practices in Addis Ababa, a gap underexplored in existing studies ( Beza, 2021; Davies, 2008; Rithmire, 2013).

Officeholders increasingly exploit urban land as an instrument for political patronage, distributing benefits derived from it to cultivate support ( Bonga, 2021; Gray & Whitfield, 2014). Maintaining power within a neo-patrimonial system requires resources to ensure the loyalty of individuals and groups ( Wolfe & Muller, 2018), and urban land, generating significant resources and revenue, becomes central to sustaining the political order. Consequently, urban land policy in the developing world reflects the neo-patrimonial political economy ingrained in its urban geography.

Urban land is land employed or planned to be used for urban functions. It encompasses not only the physical terrain designated for urban functions but also the structures and resources attached to it, such as buildings, vegetation, and subterranean assets (water, minerals, oil and so) ( Hubacek & Bergh, 2002; Qadeer, 1981). Even vertical spaces in high-rise buildings qualify as urban land, reflecting its evolution from natural territory to constructed environments.

Historically, land ownership philosophies have shifted dramatically. In pre-modern societies, land was viewed as a communal resource, akin to natural phenomena like air or celestial bodies, with no individual claims ( Aalbers & Haila, 2018; Haila, 2016). Feudalism introduced hierarchical ownership, where landlords extracted rent—in labor or produce—from tenants ( Benditt, 2015). Capitalism later commodified land, enabling market transactions, while modern financialization transformed it into a tradable asset via title deeds and real estate markets, generating “derivative rents” ( Haila, 2016). The certificate of ownership can be exchanged in the stock market like any asset. These transitions underscore land’s dual role as both a social foundation and an economic instrument.

To address the identified problem or gap, this study employed key informant interviews, policy document analysis, and a review of existing empirical literature.

 2. Literature review 2.1 Urban land lease, land ownership, and neo-patrimonial system

Urban land lease is a policy instrument rooted in the political economy of a state ( Post, 2018), designed to allocate land resources by granting temporary use rights, rather than full ownership, to residents ( Yusuf et al., 2009). This contractual arrangement transfers usufruct rights from the government (as the landlord) to lessees (as tenants), enabling flexible land utilization for housing, infrastructure, commerce, and environmental sustainability ( Peterson, 2006; Slangen & Polman, 2008). When implemented effectively, land leasing can promote affordable housing, social inclusion, and state revenue generation ( Haimanot-Woldgbrial, 2009). However, challenges such as bureaucratic inefficiencies and inequitable access often undermine its potential ( Tefera-Beyera, 2017).

Under the leasehold system, the state retains ultimate ownership of urban land while granting temporary usage rights to lessees, as stipulated in contractual agreements governed by legal frameworks ( Zelalem-Yirga, 2014). This policy aims to reconcile public welfare objectives—such as equitable access—with market-driven efficiency. However, centralized state control often inadvertently fosters neo-patrimonial networks, where political elites prioritize loyalists over broader societal needs, undermining the lease system’s intended equity and development goals. Consequently, state ownership creates a paradox: while designed to prevent land concentration, it entrenches patronage systems that disproportionately benefit politically connected actors, marginalizing vulnerable groups like the urban poor.

The absence of robust private sector and civil society oversight exacerbates this imbalance, amplifying state officials’ discretionary power over land allocation ( Fukuyama, 2013). In such contexts, land distribution becomes contingent on political allegiance rather than merit or need. Clients of the regime—those aligned with ruling elites—gain preferential access to residential plots, commercial spaces, and subsidized housing, while ordinary citizens face exclusion. This clientelism transforms urban land into a tool for consolidating political power, reinforcing inequalities. Ultimately, state ownership does not neutralize elite influence; instead, it institutionalizes their dominance over urban resource distribution, perpetuating cycles of exclusion and inequity. Here elaborating concepts associated with ownership seems right.

Ownership is traditionally understood as conferring a “bundle of rights” over a resource, including the rights to use, profit from, sell, lease, or exclude others ( Benditt, 2015). However, these rights are not absolute; legal or cultural constraints often limit their exercise. For instance, Ethiopia’s 1960 Civil Code defines ownership as the “widest right” over a corporeal or incorporeal entity (Art. 1204(1)), yet simultaneously restricts it by law (Art. 1204(2)). This paradox is exemplified by land ownership: while individuals may hold land, the state retains ultimate control, prohibiting sales to prevent concentration of resources ( Zelalem-Yirga, 2014). Such limitations underscore that ownership is not merely a relationship between an owner and an object but a socially negotiated construct, dependent on recognition by others ( Benditt, 2015).

Philosophers have long debated the ethical foundations of ownership of land. John Locke posited that labor—such as cultivating land—justifies private property rights, framing ownership as a reward for effort ( Aalbers & Haila, 2018; Haila, 2016). Critics like Hume, Rousseau, and Kant, however, argued that ownership requires societal consent, as rights derive from collective norms rather than individual action ( Haila, 2016). Kant, in particular, emphasized that property claims necessitate public acknowledgment to balance private interests with communal welfare.

This tension between individual and collective rights underpins modern debates over land governance. Proponents of state ownership argue that centralized control enables equitable distribution, prevents speculative land grabs, and advances long-term urban planning ( Burroughs, 1966; Kivell & McKay, 1988). Conversely, privatization advocates contend that market-driven systems incentivize investment, enhance efficiency, and protect individual freedoms ( Krutilla et al., 1983; Teshome-Chala, 2016). Hybrid models, blending state oversight with private incentives, are increasingly proposed to reconcile these goals.

Thus, while state ownership seeks to balance public and private interests, its implementation often reproduces the inequalities it aims to resolve. Addressing this requires institutional reforms that decentralize power, strengthen accountability, and integrate marginalized voices into land governance.

 2.2 Urban land policy in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, land is governed by a multi-layered legal framework: the federal constitution, federal proclamations for urban and rural land administration, state constitutions, and other land-related legislations ( Ubink, Hoekema, and Assies, 2009). The continued public ownership of land, with only usufruct rights transferable through inheritance, highlights the enduring influence of state control. Given the federal constitution’s status as the supreme law of the land—rendering any contradictory law or decision null (art. 9, FDRE constitution)—land’s inclusion underscores its perceived significance as a vital resource. All subsequent legal instruments, including proclamations, regulations, directives, and manuals, must align with the constitutional principles.

Land in Ethiopia transcends mere economic value, embodying profound social and ancestral significance—a sentiment shared by many cultures globally. For Ethiopians, land is a legacy tied to identity and heritage; losing ancestral land is perceived not only as a personal loss but as a breach of familial duty and social honor ( Degefa et al., 2003; Kassahun & Tiwari, 2012; Lavers, 2018). This deep attachment often compels individuals to fiercely defend their land, viewing its preservation as a moral obligation to past and future generations. As one of the world’s oldest nations, Ethiopia’s history is inextricably linked to land politics, with policies under successive regimes—from Emperor Menelik II and Haile Selassie I to the Derg and current government—shaping societal structures and conflicts. Understanding these historical land policies is essential to grasp their enduring impact on Ethiopia’s socio-political landscape.

2.2.1 Imperial Regimes (Pre-1974): Centralization, privatization, and patrimonialism

Emperor Menelik II, (1889–1913) a pivotal figure in Ethiopian state-building, consolidated fragmented territories into a centralized monarchy and established Addis Ababa as the permanent capital in 1886 ( Larsen & Yeshitela, 2021; Pankhurst, 1961). Prior to this, Ethiopia lacked a stable urban center; Gondar, the 17th-century capital under Emperor Fasiledes, operated under unwritten customary land rules, permitting private transactions but lacking formal governance ( Pankhurst, 1961). Menelik’s reign marked Ethiopia’s entry into modernity, with urbanization accelerating post-1886 as nobles, foreign investors, and residents competed for land in Addis Ababa.

To regulate this demand, Menelik enacted the Land Decree of 1907; Ethiopia’s first codified urban land policy ( Munro-Hay & Pankhurst, 1995). The decree institutionalized private ownership, allowing Ethiopians and foreigners to buy, sell, inherit, and lease urban land. However, the state retained expropriation rights for public purposes, often compensating elites disproportionately ( Zelalem-Yirga, 2014). This policy entrenched a dual system: a free market for urban land coexisted with royal prerogatives, enabling elites to amass large holdings while marginalizing smallholders.

Emperor Haile Selassie’s reign (1930–1974) saw the formalization of land tenure through legal instruments that reinforced state authority. The 1931 Constitution (Art. 27) and 1955 Revised Constitution (Art. 44) enshrined private land ownership, while the 1960 Civil Code systematized property rights. Article 1195 defined ownership as the “widest right” over immovable assets, requiring title deeds issued by the state ( Gebremichael, 2017). Provisions in Articles 2875–2895 governed sales and leases, creating a bureaucratic framework for urban land markets.

Despite this overarching policy, rural land tenure remained regionally diverse. Northern Ethiopia’s rist (communal) system gave descendants usufruct rights, limiting landlessness but causing fragmentation and disputes ( Zerfu-Haile, 2016). Southern Ethiopia, however, maintained a feudal system where nobles and the state owned vast estates, extracting up to two-thirds of tenants’ harvests as gult (tribute) for absentee landlords ( Mathias-Tesfaye & Tebarek-Tlika, 2016).

Urban land, though privatized, remained subject to imperial control. Haile Selassie distributed rural and urban holdings to loyalists—military officers, nobles, and administrators—to consolidate power ( Gabrihet & Pillay, 2021). This patronage network transformed land into a political currency, foreshadowing the systemic inequities that later regimes would grapple with.

2.2.2 The Derg regime (1974–1991): State ownership and radical equity experiments

The 1974 overthrow of Haile Selassie ushered in the Marxist Derg regime, which nationalized all land under Proclamation No. 47/1975, abolishing private ownership and markets (Shimelis-Bonsa, 2012). Rural land was redistributed to households (≤10 hectares), while urban excess holdings were confiscated. The Derg framed this as rectifying historical injustices, declaring “land to the tiller” to dismantle feudal hierarchies ( Crewett and Korf 2008).

Proclamation No. 31/1975 justified state ownership as essential for equity, industrialization, and peasant empowerment ( Teshome-Chala, 2016). Urban land administration shifted to residents’ associations, mirroring rural peasant councils ( Tesfaye et al., 2023). Transactions (sales, leases, mortgages) were criminalized, except inheritance, forcing informal markets underground.

Despite egalitarian rhetoric, the Derg’s uniform tenure system ignored Ethiopia’s regional diversity, eroding traditional systems like rist. Central planning stifled investment, while land allocations often rewarded political loyalty ( Solomon-Dessalegn, 2020). Urban associations, intended to ensure equity, became sites of bureaucratic corruption, echoing the imperial-era patronage they sought to dismantle.

2.2.3 Post-1991 reforms: Ethnic federalism and the persistence of state control

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which ousted the Derg in 1991, adopted ethnic federalism under the 1995 Constitution (FDRE, 1995). Article 40(3) retained state ownership of land, delegating management to regional governments acting for “Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples.” Peasants and pastoralists received free usufruct rights, while investors leased land for fixed terms, a policy aiming to promote private investment which was ignored in Derg era.

Despite expectations of privatization, the EPRDF and its successor, the Prosperity Party (PP), upheld state control, citing risks of speculative dispossession ( Teshome-Chala, 2016). In practice, urban land allocations favored political allies, exacerbating inequality. The 2014–2018 Oromia-Amhara protests against the Addis Ababa “Master Plan”—a state-led expansion displacing farmers—highlighted land’s enduring political salience ( Lavers, 2018). The protests culminated in the EPRDF’s dissolution and the PP’s rise, underscoring land’s role as both a catalyst for upheaval and a tool of elite consolidation.

 3. Methods and materials

The study employed key informant interviews, an analysis of lease policies, particularly Lease Proclamation No. 721/2011, and an extensive review of existing literature to examine how the neo-patrimonial political system interacts with state land ownership. Interviews were conducted with land officials, land experts, and representatives from Civil Society Organizations, involving a total of 17 participants. Oral consent was obtained from all interviewees, in line with common practice at the University. This approach was chosen to safeguard politicians and experts whose views may involve sensitive political issues, and to ensure practicality and efficiency, as it avoids the need to collect written signatures that may not be easily obtainable. The process of obtaining informed consent was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the College of Development Studies, Addis Ababa University (Reference No. 092/11/2024).

 4. Results and discussion

Ethiopia formulated its first urban land lease law in 1993 under Proclamation No. 80/1993, marking a historic shift in land management (Weldesilassie & Gebrehiwot, 2017). Over time, this law was revised twice—through Proclamations 271/2002 and 721/2011—to address emerging socio-economic needs and governance gaps. The primary objective of these policies has been to promote equitable urban development by transferring state-owned land to tenants via transparent, accountable leasing mechanisms. By doing so, the government aimed to optimize land use efficiency and stimulate economic growth across cities.

Contrary to common perception, urban land leasing in Ethiopia predates Proclamation No. 80/1993. For instance, the 1960 Civil Code under the imperial regime included provisions (e.g., Article 2896 and following) regulating land leases between private individuals ( Haimanot-Woldgbrial, 2009; Tefera-Beyera, 2017). However, unlike modern lease laws, these frameworks did not govern state-to-citizen transactions, leaving a legal void in public land administration until the post-1993 reforms ( Table 1).

Key Informant Interview (KII) result.
Theme Frequency Representative quote
State Ownership 88%
(n = 15/17) “Increase officials influence”-Land Expert A
Urban land lease 82%
(n = 14/17) “Grant wider discretionary power” - Land Official B
Ethnic Alignment 71%
(n = 12/17) “Affect land access and Service” - CSO Representative C

Source: (KII, 2025), Note, CSO = Civil Society Organization.

Proclamation No. 80/1993, despite its pioneering role, faced criticism for limiting land transfers to tender-based modalities, excluding alternative approaches like allotment. To address these limitations, Proclamation 271/2002 introduced three transfer mechanisms: allotment, negotiation, and auction ( Belete & Wudu, 2017). However, the negotiation clause inadvertently enabled corruption, as officials exploited loopholes to allocate land to bribing parties. Consequently, Proclamation 721/2011 eliminated negotiation, retaining only auction and allotment to curb malpractice and enhance transparency.

Despite the urban lease system’s stated goal of equitable land access, marginalized groups—particularly the poor—remain excluded ( Digafe et al., 2023). In Addis Ababa, for example, corruption, inflated market-driven lease prices, and political favoritism disproportionately hinder low-income residents from securing land for housing or businesses (Weldesilassie & Gebrehiwot, 2017). Furthermore, speculators and brokers dominate tender processes, sidelining those without political connections—a stark contradiction of the policy’s equity objectives. Even Article 4(2) of Proclamation 721/2011, which mandates transparent tender operations, has failed to materialize in practice.

Faced with systemic barriers, many urban poor resort to informal settlements or squatting to access land ( Belete, 2017; Y. Zhang et al., 2019). Compounding this issue, bureaucratic inefficiencies and underdeveloped infrastructure limit the supply of serviced land, creating a mismatch between demand and availability. This scarcity not only fuels informality but also stifles investment and urban development, as investors face prolonged delays—sometimes exceeding two years—to secure plots.

The preamble of Proclamation 721/2011 emphasizes “effective urban land governance” to advance communal interests and sustainable development. Specifically, Article 4(1) justifies leasing as a tool to balance public welfare with national progress, while Article 4(4) mandates equitable distribution aligned with urban planning goals. In theory, these provisions aim to harmonize individual, municipal, and national interests—yet their implementation remains fraught with challenges.

Under Article 5(1), urban land use rights are restricted to leaseholds, with limited exceptions for pre-existing holdings. Notably, Article 6(1) requires even these legacy holdings to convert to leaseholds, ensuring uniformity in land administration. Additionally, Article 5(4) grants regional cabinets authority to exempt certain cities from the proclamation for up to five years—a flexibility clause that risks inconsistent enforcement.

Article 8(1) outlines prerequisites for leasing land, including legal clarity, infrastructure readiness, and alignment with urban plans. Moreover, Article 8(2) mandates transparent tender processes to secure fair land prices. Meanwhile, Article 12(1) permits limited allotments for public institutions, housing programs, and strategic projects, with lease durations varying by land use—for example, 99 years for residential plots versus 15 years for urban agriculture.

To standardize pricing, Article 18 requires city administrations to set benchmark lease rates, updated biennially to reflect market shifts. Once approved, lessees must sign contracts specifying construction timelines, payment schedules, and obligations before receiving leasehold certificates. These measures, however, struggle to counterbalance systemic political interference in land allocation.

The broader legal framework, including Proclamation 721/2011 and the constitution, entrenches political control over urban land. As a result, city and regional cabinets—not independent bodies—oversee implementation, often prioritizing patronage over equity. This centralized control enables elites to weaponize land as a political tool, rewarding loyalists with housing, compensation, or commercial plots while excluding dissenting voices ( Davies, 2008; Soest, 2021). Consequently, urban land becomes a “currency” in neo-patrimonial networks, perpetuating rent-seeking and consolidating ruling-party dominance.

The Ministry of Urban Development and Construction nominally oversees policy enforcement, yet Proclamation 721/2011 lacks mechanisms to ensure federal-regional alignment or accountability. This ambiguity allows regional authorities to bypass constitutional mandates, exacerbating disparities between federal cities (e.g., Addis Ababa) and regional hubs. Furthermore, bureaucratic delays, overlapping claims, and under-resourced land agencies undermine efficiency, deterring investors and prolonging disputes.

In theory, public land ownership should curb rent extraction and promote equity through value-capture mechanisms ( Ryan-Collins et al., 2017). In practice, Ethiopia’s neo-patrimonial governance distorts this ideal, as officials exploit land for personal or political gain. Rather than serving communal interests, state-controlled leasing entrenches inequality, disproportionately benefiting connected elites while leaving the poor landless—a paradox that mirrors pre-reform injustices despite constitutional guarantees.

Qualitative data, vial key informant interview, among public officials, urban land experts, and experts from the Civil Society Organization, was collected and analyzed to add insight and strengthen the literature view and policy analysis. The data was collected from the 17 informants who work on urban land.

Table 1 clearly illustrates that a substantial majority of informants (88%, n = 15/17) describe state ownership of urban land significantly enhances the ability of land officials to influence allocation. This influence, they contend, is often wielded to benefit loyal and politically connected individuals, thereby disadvantaging the wider urban community. This perspective is exemplified by Land Expert A, who elaborates:

State ownership of land allows officials to exercise unchecked power, making land decisions based on favoritism rather than the law. Officials can arbitrarily displace landholders, manipulate compensation during expropriation and grant or deny access based on personal relationships and political loyalty. In essence, access to urban land and related services for most citizens is determined not by legal frameworks but by the arbitrary decisions of authorities and the extent of their personal networks.

Neo-patrimonial systems enable elites to treat urban land as a political currency. In Ethiopia, Soest (2021) documents how lease negotiation modalities (pre-2011) allowed officials to extract bribes, diverting land from public to private interests. Similarly, Wolfe & Muller (2018) argue that urban land in neo-patrimonial regimes becomes a “rent competition arena,” where access depends on bribes rather than merit. Davies (2008) adds that land leases in Addis Ababa sustain patron-client networks, with loyalists receiving prime plots while marginalized groups face exclusion.

Haimanot-Woldgbrial (2009) traces this dynamic to weak institutional check, noting that Ethiopia’s lease proclamations (e.g., No. 721/2011) lack mechanisms to hold officials accountable. Ryan-Collins et al. (2017) theorize that state ownership, intended to curb rent-seeking, instead fuels it in neo-patrimonial contexts, as elites capture land value through informal deals.

Furthermore, the data shown in Table 1 confirms that a significant majority of informants (82%, n=14/17) explain the urban lease policy as granting top-level officials broad discretionary power, effectively excluding urban communities and experts from meaningful participation. This centralization of land allocation and management is further illuminated by the remarks of Official B:

A key challenge in accessing urban land in Addis Ababa is the centralized decision-making process, where all permissions and transfers require approval from the City Mayor or cabinet. Urban land governance structures at the sub-city and Woreda (district) levels are relegated to implementing decisions from above, without the authority to independently conduct auctions or allotments. One potential solution is to empower these lower-level institutions to make land decisions within their respective jurisdictions, fostering greater local autonomy and responsiveness. One who connects with these top structures has a great potential to gain access to land or other benefits related.

This finding aligns with a robust body of empirical research ( Belete & Wudu, 2017; Goodfellow, 2017; Rudel, 2013; Wolfe & Muller, 2018), which collectively underscores how neo-patrimonial governance structures distort urban land allocation processes. Under such systems, personalistic power supersedes formal institutional rules, creating a hierarchy where resource distribution—particularly urban land—is contingent on political loyalty rather than merit, equity, or transparent policy frameworks. At its core, neo-patrimonialism enables top-tier officials, such as city cabinet members or regional administrators, to wield near-absolute discretionary authority over land leases. These actors function as gatekeepers of urban land, determining not only who receives access but also how and when land benefits are dispensed.

For instance, Belete and Wudu (2017) demonstrate this dynamic in Ethiopia’s urban lease system, where politically connected individuals and entities consistently secure prime land through opaque negotiation processes, despite legal reforms aimed at promoting transparency. Similarly, Wolfe and Muller (2018) identify a pattern of “rent competition” in Sub-Saharan African cities, where land allocation becomes a transactional process: elites exchange leases for bribes, campaign support, or other forms of political patronage, effectively privatizing public land for personal or partisan gain. This clientelist logic, as Goodfellow (2017) observes in Kampala and Kigali, entrenches exclusionary practices, sidelining marginalized groups—such as low-income residents or informal traders—who lack the political networks to navigate bureaucratic gatekeepers.

The third key finding, as demonstrated in Table 1, highlights systemic disparities in urban land lease policy tied to ethnic alignment. Interview data reveal that 71% of respondents (12 of 17) affirmed the absence of institutional mechanisms to safeguard equitable land access and services for individuals across ethnic categories. This systemic gap exacerbates, reinforcing patronage networks that disproportionately favor individuals whose political affiliations align with official identities, while marginalizing others who don’t have political and ethnic linkage.

A Civil Society Organization Representative (C) contextualized this dynamic, noting:

Ethnic identity profoundly shapes urban land access under current policies. The FDRE constitution’s emphasis on collective ethnic rights (Articles 9, 39, 47) entrenches political recognition through an ethnic lens, rather than individual citizenship. Consequently, land is framed as ethnic territory, disadvantaging those residing outside their lineage. Addis Ababa natives, for instance, particularly those who reject or lack strong ethnic affiliations, face heightened barriers to securing land rights.

These findings align with research from Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Cameroon, demonstrating that ethnic factors impede equitable access to urban land ( Dafe, 2017; Gbaguidi, 2022; Majid & Memon, 2019; Ndi et al., 2021; Obala & Mattingly, 2014). These studies reveal that ethnic-based land allocation, political patronage intertwined with ethnicity, and ethnic networks all contribute to unequal access and perpetuate disadvantages for marginalized groups.

 5. Conclusion

This analysis of the urban land lease policy in Addis Ababa highlights a fundamental conflict between its stated aim of promoting sustainable urban development and the practical outcomes shaped by a neo-patrimonial framework. Although state control over land is intended to curb private monopolies and advance public interests, it often enables authorities to favor political allies over broader societal needs, deepening inequities and obstructing effective resource (land) distribution. To address this discrepancy, future initiatives should prioritize structural reforms that distribute decision-making power, strengthen transparency and accountability mechanisms, and meaningfully involve underrepresented groups in land governance processes, paving the way for a more just and sustainable urban environment.

 Ethical approval statement

On November 1, 2024, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the College of Development Studies, Addis Ababa University, granted ethical clearance for this study (Reference No. 092/11/2024). The approval was issued after the IRB reviewed and confirmed that the research complies with the University’s academic standards, including the study design, data collection instruments, content, and the process of obtaining informed consent from participants. The authors also confirm that this study was performed in accordance with the principles stated in the “Declaration of Helsinki”.

 Data availability

Data is available at zenodo repository, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.16939619. It can be cited as Amare, M. (2025). Table and interview data [Data set]. In F11000. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.16939619.

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Competing interests: No competing interests were disclosed.

 2 1 2026 Copyright: © 2026 Georgieva V 2026 This is an open access peer review report distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. recommendation reject

Review

The article examines how the urban land leasing system works in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and how it is influenced by neo-patrimonial practices in governance. Although the official land leasing policy aims for equitable development, in reality state ownership of land leads to distortions - access to land depends on political connections and ethnicity rather than transparent rules.

The authors conducted interviews with 17 people - officials, experts and civil society representatives. They also analysed the main land leasing law (Proclamation 721/2011), as well as the history of land use in Ethiopia from imperial times to the present day.

The results show three main problems: first, that state ownership gives excessive power to officials (88% of respondents); second, that the leasing system concentrates decisions at the top, excluding experts and communities (82%); and third, that ethnicity plays a role in access to land (71%).

The authors conclude that whilst the policy appears fair on paper, in practice it reinforces inequalities. They propose the need for reforms - decentralisation of power, greater transparency and inclusion of marginalised groups in land governance.

In essence - a good idea for research, but poorly executed methodologically.

Detailed responses to the review questions

Is the work presented clearly and accurately and does it cite contemporary literature?

Partially

Contemporary literature is used, but a comparative perspective is lacking. There is no discussion of how the leasing system works in other countries and whether there are similar problems. The introduction mixes theoretical, contextual and methodological elements, which makes it difficult to follow the main research problem. Sections 2.2.1-2.2.3 (pages 4-5) provide an extensive history of Ethiopian land policy from Menelik II to the present. This is informative, but is too lengthy for a literature review. Some claims in the literature review are not supported by citations. For example on page 3: "Misuse of scarce public resources like urban land has become ubiquitous in third world countries, particularly in Africa" - this is a strong claim that needs solid support.

Is the research design appropriate and does the work have academic value?

No

The methodology section is underdeveloped and confusing. Three approaches are described - interviews, policy analysis and literature review, but the overall analytical logic is not outlined. I recommend creating a new subsection (3.1) called "Research Framework" or "Conceptual Framework", which visually shows how the three methods relate to the research question. A diagram or scheme could be used.

Seventeen interviews were conducted, but it is not clear how participants were selected. There is verbal consent, it is clear that the topic is sensitive - but how did the conversations themselves proceed, how were the questions structured, how long did the interview last?

As for the analysis of Proclamation 721/2011 - the analytical approach is unclear - legal interpretation, discourse analysis, simply reading and commenting.

My greatest concern is the lack of analytical connection between the three data sources - interviews, policy analysis and literature review. We have rather three parallel mini-studies, rather than an integrated analysis of urban land governance in Addis Ababa.

Are sufficient details provided for the methods and analysis to allow their replication by others?

No

If another researcher wants to replicate this study, there is no way. Information is missing on what questions were asked, whether there were follow-up questions, how they were recorded - audio or notes.

The selection criteria for interviewees are also unclear. The most serious problem is the analysis. In the Results section, three themes suddenly appear, presented through percentages (88%, 82%, 71%), but there is no information about where these numbers come from and how the thematic structure was extracted. There is no analytical process described that connects the raw interview data with the final themes.

In its current form, the analysis of Proclamation 721/2011 is predominantly descriptive: articles from the law are quoted and their content is paraphrased. This is useful as context, but does not show how the policy text has been subjected to analytical investigation to reveal the mechanisms of neo-patrimonial power, i.e. a stronger analytical link between the policy documents and the empirical findings is needed.

If applicable, are the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?

Not applicable

The study is qualitative, which is perfectly fine for the topic. But the percentages in Table 1 do not look good given the small number of respondents. It is much more honest and adequate for this type of data to write "15 of 17", "14 of 17" and so on.

Moreover, the table itself is so simplified that it almost loses meaning. In qualitative research it should show nuances - different viewpoints, hesitations, contradictions. Hardly all 15 people said the same thing about state ownership in the same way. It would be good for these differences to be visible, rather than being "crushed" down to a single percentage.

Are all the source data upon which the results are based available to ensure full reproducibility?

Partially

A Zenodo repository is indicated (doi: 10.5281/zenodo.16939619), which is very good practice and a strong plus for the article. However, it remains unclear exactly what this resource includes - full or partial transcripts, anonymised interview excerpts, coding scheme, code dictionary, etc. It would be good to indicate in the text what type of materials have been uploaded and to what extent they allow one to trace the path from the data to the themes and conclusions.

I fully understand the ethical constraints and the sensitivity of the political context, so I do not expect full transcripts to be public. But a brief clarification in the article - for example, that anonymised excerpts and a code dictionary are presented, but not full interviews, increases the sense of transparency without compromising the protection of participants.

The policy documents are public - this is not a problem. The problem is in the transparency of analytical decisions.

Are the conclusions made adequately supported by the results?

Partially

The conclusions follow from the results. The call for "structural reforms" is too general. It would be good to specify what reforms are meant - privatisation of part of urban land, stronger decentralisation, more transparent and formalised procedures, stricter accountability and control mechanisms, etc. The question also remains open as to how politically feasible such changes are in the Ethiopian context, which deserves at least brief comment.

Here there is an opportunity to connect the conclusions with broader theory. Ethiopia's non-colonial history in my view deserves more attention - this is an important peculiarity compared to other African cases. The conclusion also mentions "inclusion of underrepresented groups", but does not specify who they are.

General comments:

The article has potential, but needs serious reworking. The methodology must be completely rewritten - not as a formal section, but as a transparent description of what has actually been done. The results would benefit from a more nuanced presentation. And the conclusions - from boldness.

The topic is important and topical, especially in the context of rapid urbanisation in Africa. But to have academic value, the study must be methodologically sound and intellectually ambitious.

Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?

Partly

If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?

Not applicable

Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?

Partly

Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound?

No

Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?

Partly

Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?

No

Reviewer Expertise:

Agriculture; Financial sustainability; Tax policy; Environmental investments; Carbon footprint; Waste management; Economic and environmental interrelationships.

I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to state that I do not consider it to be of an acceptable scientific standard, for reasons outlined above.

Amare Moges

Competing interests: No competing interests were disclosed.

 5 1 2026

Dear Professor Vanya Georgieva,

We sincerely appreciate the valuable, insightful, and highly constructive comments you have provided on our manuscript. Your detailed feedback has been instrumental in identifying key areas for improvement and will significantly enhance the overall quality of the article.

We fully recognize the critical nature of your suggestions, particularly regarding the need for aggressive revision of the introduction, literature review, methods, analysis, and conclusion sections. We take these recommendations very seriously and will work diligently to address each point thoroughly in the revised version, ensuring that all concerns are met to strengthen the rigor, clarity, and contribution of the paper.

Thank you for your thoughtful review.

 10.5256/f1000research.187190.r420977 Reviewer response for version 1 Puente-Sotomayor Fernando 1 Referee Universidad Central del Ecuador, Quito, Ecuador

Competing interests: No competing interests were disclosed.

 24 10 2025 Copyright: © 2025 Puente-Sotomayor F 2025 This is an open access peer review report distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. recommendation reject

Major Comments

1. Conceptual Framing and Problem Definition

The article addresses a relevant and timely issue, yet the research problem is not clearly formulated. The introduction blends conceptual, contextual, and methodological aspects, which blurs the motivation of the study. The authors should explicitly identify the research gap and formulate a clear, focused research question.

Furthermore, the association between neo-patrimonialism and leasehold systems requires deeper conceptual justification. It would be useful to explain why the analysis emphasizes leasehold rather than freehold systems, and how the Ethiopian case compares to other regions where land tenure systems differ.

2. Literature Review

The literature review is insufficiently developed to support the article’s core hypothesis. Several affirmations lack references or appear as general statements. The reviewer suggests including comparative cases (e.g., Latin America, the UK, Sweden, or The Netherlands) to provide a balanced perspective on how leasehold and freehold systems shape urban inequalities.

Some sections of the historical review could be shortened or reorganized to strengthen the analytical focus and to avoid redundancy.

3. Methodology and Data Transparency

The methodological description lacks clarity. The paper would benefit from a more explicit link between the research question, data sources, and analytical procedures.

Recommended improvements include:

Presenting the questionnaire or guiding interview prompts used with the 17 informants.

Providing a synoptic chart or diagram that connects the three main data sources (policy analysis, interviews, and literature review) with the operationalization of the research question.

Explaining the sampling rationale and how representativeness or bias were addressed.

The reviewer also suggests disaggregating the results by strata or interviewee type (officials, experts, CSO members).

Minor Comments

4. Results and Data Presentation

While the results are rich in content, their presentation is repetitive and could benefit from visual summarization. The inclusion of CAQDAS visualizations (e.g., coding diagrams, bubble charts, or thematic clusters) would make qualitative patterns more transparent.

In addition, the article only presents a subset of the data. The reviewer recommends showing the full dataset, the coding workflow, and examples of actor-based or theme-based analysis.

5. Integration of Findings with Literature

The discussion should better link the findings to the theoretical framework. Certain empirical insights—such as those concerning ethnic alignment and political patronage—could be discussed in light of comparative studies or previous scholarship. Contextual paragraphs that are descriptive could instead be integrated into the literature review.

6. Terminology, Style, and Editorial Remarks

Replace “third world countries” with updated terminology, such as  developing countries,  Global South, or  low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).

Correct syntax issues (e.g., “water, minerals, oil and so” → “water, minerals, oil, and so on”).

Avoid redundancy between sections and clarify some reference citations.

Ensure consistent numbering of tables and subheadings.

7. Conclusion

The conclusion restates rather than synthesizes results. It should briefly connect the empirical findings to the theoretical debate on state-led land systems and neo-patrimonial governance, emphasizing the implications for policy reform and institutional design.

Overall Assessment

The manuscript makes a potentially valuable contribution to debates on urban land governance in African contexts, especially regarding the tensions between state control and neo-patrimonial practices. However, before it can be considered for publication, the article requires substantial revision in its conceptual framing, methodological articulation, and analytical rigor.

Improving the integration between empirical data and theoretical insights, expanding the methodological transparency, and enhancing the clarity of presentation will significantly strengthen its scholarly contribution.

Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?

Partly

If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?

Not applicable

Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?

Partly

Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound?

No

Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?

Partly

Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?

No

Reviewer Expertise:

Urban Centralities, Land Management, Disaster Risk Reduction

I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to state that I do not consider it to be of an acceptable scientific standard, for reasons outlined above.

Amare Moges

Competing interests: No competing interests were disclosed.

 5 1 2026

Dear Professor Puente-Sotomayor,

We sincerely appreciate the valuable and insightful comments you have provided. Your feedback has significantly enhanced the quality of our manuscript.

We find all your suggestions highly relevant and will incorporate them fully into the revised version.

Thank you once again for your thorough and constructive review.