Past studies suggest that elite cues heavily influence citizens’ perceptions of politics ( Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Brader and Tucker, 2012; Samuels and Zucco, 2014). Specified to cases of foreign policy matters, several findings in the past have argued that the public’s preferences and perceptions can be interpreted as in alignment to those embraced by leaders, suggesting that there is an alignment between what is being perceived by the public and that in the policymaking seats ( Page and Shapiro, 1992; Powlick and Katz, 1998; Foyle, 1999; Boucher, 2024). Rightfully, being the actors directly involved with the foreign policy and political dynamics of decision-making, political actors are then viewed as ‘information shortcuts,’ with the public effectively responding to the cues based on the suitability of the message, as well as trustworthiness of the opinions ( Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). However, should we expect leaders’ opinions on foreign policy matters to remain aligned with the public’s perceptions?

Looking at the Philippine public’s perception of the US and China’s exertion of influence in the Southeast Asian region, an interesting case of non-compliance with elite cues is evident. As the Philippines’ President between 2016 and 2022, Rodrigo Roa Duterte took several puzzling turns in the Philippines’ foreign policy trajectory and alignment. Despite strong political, historical, and cultural linkages, Duterte’s presidency took a rather unique stance vis-à-vis the US by undermining the US’s role and expressing pessimism about the US’s ability to protect the region ( Parameswaran, 2016; You, 2018; De Castro, 2019; Heydarian, 2020). Unfortunately, the introduced rhetoric was harsh, with Duterte himself threatening to withdraw the Philippines from the Mutual Defense Treaty and undermining the US role in the global economy ( PCO, 2016; Castro, 2022a).

In contrast, interestingly, such a stance is not introduced vis-à-vis China. With some scholars looking at the significance of Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative as influencing Duterte’s soft stance, the arguments put forward were that Duterte’s growing alignment with China was due to the need of the Philippines to secure economic benefits ( Lema, 2017; TAP, 2019; Baviera and Arugay, 2021). Indeed, compared to the legal approaches taken in the past ( Reuters, 2016; Heydarian, 2018; Castro, 2021), Duterte was known to sideline the importance of the South China Sea agenda for the Philippines, and decided that issues on the disputed waters should be tackled through peaceful and cooperative means ( Hendler, 2018; Rosca, 2018; Wong, 2020; AJ, 2021). Given that China’s law enforcement vessels’ incursions between 2016 and 2022 reached their peak ( AMTI, 2020, 2022, 2023, 2024), the expectation was that the Philippines would counter China’s presence through assertive and decisive measures to increase the nation’s presence within its maritime zones. However, although the Philippines’ law enforcement vessels are present, Duterte has not, during his six-year term, openly challenged China’s Nine-Dash Line claim.

With the unique foreign policy trajectories undertaken under Duterte’s leadership, however, public perceptions have shown non-compliance with the elite’s cues. In the ‘State of Southeast Asia’ survey report approaching the end of Duterte’s presidential term (2021), the Philippines’ public perception expressed different views on the Philippines’ relations with the US and China. When asked about their views on the political and strategic influence of the US and China on the Philippines, a staggering 73.1% welcomed US influence. In comparison, 95.0% reported worrying about China ( Seah et al., 2021). In this context, it is important to note that this perception of a lack of trustworthiness towards China is among the highest in Southeast Asia, ranking second to Vietnam at 97.7% ( Seah et al., 2021). Similarly, when asked who the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should side with if they had to choose between the US and China, the majority of Philippine respondents chose the US (86.6%) over China (13.4%) ( Seah et al., 2021). The public’s positive perceptions of the US and rather negative views of China are puzzling, given that elite cues would generally lead to alignment of preferences between the public and the elite. What can explain such anomalies?

This study argues for the relevance of discourses on the psychology of cue-taking. Richard Petty and John Cacioppo’s ‘Elaboration Likelihood Model’ defined paths towards persuasion as ‘central’ and ‘peripheral’ processing ( Petty and Cacioppo, 1982, 1986). The central route acknowledges substantive content as the primary determinant of persuasion; meanwhile, the peripheral route mainly looks at external factors to the message’s content (credibility and attractiveness) ( Petty and Cacioppo, 1982, 1986; Gilens and Murakawa, 2002). In understanding the non-compliance in the Philippine public’s perceptions towards the US and China, this study posits that the relationship between the people’s and elite’s perceptions is best described by the central-route persuasion. Several underlying arguments are presented: people’s perceptions of the US and China as more stable, and respondents’ greater involvement and concern regarding the issues inquired about. These conditions align with the explanations of the analytical framework ( Chaiken, 1980; Petty and Cacioppo, 1982, 1986), which allows this study to make sense of the non-compliance with elite cues evident in the Philippines’ public perceptions of the US and China.

In revealing the views of the Philippines’ public during Duterte’s presidency, this qualitative study uses the 2021 State of Southeast Asia survey report. Within the document, some questionnaires compare answer percentages with those from the 2020 survey report, which allows a stronger claim about the dominant psychological factors in the cue-taking process. The selection of the 2021 survey is also deemed important for two reasons. First, the 2021 survey captures emerging perceptions among the Philippine public after Duterte had held power for 5 years (sufficient time for perception formation). Second, the year 2022 was not selected because there is an overlap between Duterte and Marcos’ leadership, as the Philippines’ general election in that year was scheduled for May. In this regard, perceptions in 2022 would most likely be dominated by discourses related to the general election, as political campaigns intensify, making it difficult to determine whether perceptions vis-à-vis China and the US are genuine or tied to the upcoming general election.

There are a limited number of studies on the discourse of Duterte and the Philippines’ public perception of China. However, as this study seeks to make sense of elite cues’ role in shaping public perceptions, among the most important discourses to cover in this literature review is how the Philippine public perceived Duterte as a leader in the past. This is followed by a discussion of discourses on the Philippines’ perceptions of the US and China, as well as studies on Duterte’s foreign policies in general. In combination, these covered discourses would reveal where the novelty lies within the discourses related to this study and allow for scholarly contributions utilizing the proposed analytical framework.

The Philippines’ public perceptions are important for this study’s discussion. As it presents an interpretation of central and peripheral processing relevant to the psychology of cue-taking, it is worthwhile to explore the general perceptions held by society. The majority agrees that several dominant features of Duterte have led to favorable perceptions in the past, including personality, decisive rhetoric, and reflections of a ‘strongman’ leader ( You, 2018; Malmgren, 2019; Kreuzer, 2020; Dano, 2024). These variables were subsequently deepened by examining explanatory variables that have led to favorable perceptions, with some non-mainstream explanations centred on Duterte’s decisiveness in countering the war on drugs in the Philippines and the populist messaging he often conveys to the Filipino people ( Malmgren, 2019; Dano, 2024). You’s 2018 study, exploring perceptions after Duterte’s second year holding the presidential position, also concluded that his drug policies eventually increased his popularity among people with low incomes, due to “[…] the rising nationalist sentiment, and his enthusiasm for federalism” ( You, 2018, p.53).

Nevertheless, the vast list of studies arguing in favor of Duterte’s favorability should not downplay the discourses that have been against those rhetorics. Miwa’s 2023 study, for example, states that this popularity narrative is highly inflated due to “[…] social desirability bias among survey respondents (in the past)” ( Kasuya and Miwa, 2023, p.411). Similarly, although Kreuzer’s study generally confirms Duterte’s popularity, he noted that the limitations of strongman leaders available during the elections were the main reason Duterte was elected ( Kreuzer, 2020).

Having understood the variables that help explain the dynamics of the Philippine public’s perceptions of Duterte, it is also worthwhile to explore the discourse on the Philippines’ people’s perceptions of the US and China. On the former, there have been numerous scholarly inquiries concluding that a favorable perception is evident due to the extensive historical and cultural ties between the Philippines and the US ( Poushter and Caldwell, 2017; Aguilar, 2023). Meanwhile, many studies have also documented the struggles in the Philippines-China bilateral relations during the Duterte period, marked by several contributing factors. Some studies examined the negative implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative programs in the Philippines, leading to a negative perception of China ( Chao, 2021; Delina et al., 2024; Wijaya and Camba, 2025).

Nevertheless, undoubtedly, the issue of the South China Sea has been the main contributing factor towards the rather negative sentiments that the Philippines’ public holds towards China. Recognizing the incursions made by Chinese officials into the Philippines’ maritime zones, studies in the past have concluded that the Philippines’ negative perceptions have been formed due to this decreasing trust towards China ( Chang, 2021; Yeo and Gloria, 2023; Pernia and Rye, 2025; Wei et al., 2025). The variables utilized have varied, ranging from national identities and context to the empirical cases of China’s incursions, as the explanatory variables that have led to the negative perceptions ( Yeo and Gloria, 2023; Pernia and Rye, 2025; Wei et al., 2025).

Lastly, another discourse that helps provide context for this study’s discussions is research on Duterte’s foreign policy in relation to the US-China contestation in Southeast Asia. By this point, there has been a considerable number of studies supporting the claims made in the introduction to this study. First, it is clear that there is a puzzling foreign policy evident with Duterte slightly siding towards China and following along China’s preferences in a vast number of foreign policy agendas ( Petty and Morales, 2017; Heydarian, 2018; Castro, 2021, 2022b; Tan, 2021; Sae-Phoo and Agojo, 2025). Second, an equal number of studies have attempted to make sense of the puzzling actions by Duterte to defy the US and undertake harsh rhetoric to criticize its policies ( Gomez, 2016; Parameswaran, 2016; Smith, 2016; Heydarian, 2017, 2018, 2020; You, 2018; Winger, 2021). Even in the context of the South China Sea dispute, for example, where the Philippines struggles with its claims and capacity to defend its sovereignty, studies in the past have explored the idea that Duterte remains soft in its South China Sea policies, represented by the lack of reference towards the arbitral tribunal ruling and the conduct of appeasement policies ( Heydarian, 2018; Tan, 2021; De Castro, 2023).

One area that remains less explored is what explains people’s perceptions of the US and China’s presence in Southeast Asia. Although there are a considerable number of survey reports and some scholarly inquiries in the past, the empirical puzzle of non-compliance and non-convergence between the views of the Philippines’ elites and the public remains unexplored. To make sense of why there seems to be a different view among the Philippines’ public on foreign policy preferences, this study is centered on the analytical framework of the ‘Elaboration Likelihood Model’ ( Petty and Cacioppo, 1982, 1986) to seek answers.

Elite cue-taking in forming the public’s perceptions is not a new scholarly inquiry. In the past, studies have argued that perceptions of a state’s elites serve as “[…] informational shortcuts or heuristics,” enabling citizens to be more knowledgeable about political matters ( Gilens and Murakawa, 2002, p. 16). As Dickson and Hobolt argued, there is also a tendency for citizens to follow their preferred party or politicians’ views, especially during periods of political opinion polarization ( Dickson and Hobolt, 2025). Although there is a considerable number of studies on the influence of elite cues on people’s perceptions ( Lupia, 1994; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Brader and Tucker, 2012), this idea has also been applied to the study of people’s perceptions of foreign policy matters. The argument is that the elite’s perceptions heavily influence public perceptions, forming a top-down model of what factors shape public perceptions ( Guisinger and Saunders, 2017; Kim, 2019; Boucher, 2024).

Therefore, this study’s stance aligns with this large body of literature, arguing that elite cues have significant impacts on the public’s perceptions. Past studies have examined different numbers of empirical cases to support this claim ( Arceneaux, 2008, 2013; Tesler, 2012; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). However, the unique case of Duterte and the Philippine public’s relations, as potentially forming a non-compliance, warrants a deeper exploration of other explanatory variables that help make sense of the empirical puzzle. For this, the work of Petty and Cacioppo is considered suitable for making sense of the disconvergence between elite cues and public perceptions in the case of the Philippines.

The analytical framework that is utilized for this study is therefore structured as follows. In alignment with Petty and Cacioppo’s ‘Elaboration Likelihood Model’ ( Petty and Cacioppo, 1982, 1986), it agrees that understanding cue taking needs a bridging from psychological discourses that focus on central and peripheral processing. In an interpretation centered on the central route, the theory posits that people consider substantive content, which includes “[…] evidence and the soundness of an argument’s logic” ( Gilens and Murakawa, 2002, p. 17). Because people embrace certain opinions based on the perceived strengths of the argument, it is expected that this attitude would be stable and enduring ( Petty and Cacioppo, 1982, 1986).

But why is it that several attitudes and opinions are less stable and superficial? The theory posits that the peripheral route explains this, in which people’s perceptions are formed by factors “[…] external to message content, such as the credibility and attractiveness of the message source” ( Gilens and Murakawa, 2002, p. 17). Therefore, it is argued that there is no active thinking in place, leading to perceptions being less stable than those considered in the case of central routes.

The involvement of individuals in the issue being addressed is also argued to be a contributing factor in determining whether the central or peripheral processing route dominates the psychology of cue taking. As suggested by several past studies ( Chaiken, 1980; Petty and Cacioppo, 1982, 1986; Gilens and Murakawa, 2002), those more involved with the issue are predicted to use the central-route processing. However, if the issue is known to be too complex for the individual, there is a high likelihood that they will rely on peripheral cues.

How is this idea bridged to help understand the non-compliance of the Philippine public’s perceptions towards the elite cues? Looking at the case studies between 2016 and 2022 during Duterte’s leadership, the argument is based on several levels. First, looking at the State of Southeast Asia 2021 survey report respondents, one would see that the Philippine respondents’ voices considered are those from professional backgrounds that have a clear understanding of the great power tensions between the US and China. Therefore, it fulfils the criteria for potential dominance of the central processing route, in which those directly involved in a given issue tend to weigh the arguments of different options and understand them before deciding on their attitudes and perceptions.

Second, this study identifies inconsistencies with several past studies, arguing that the general Philippine public favors Duterte due to his personality, decisive rhetoric, and strongman leadership characteristics ( You, 2018; Malmgren, 2019; Kreuzer, 2020; Dano, 2024). In contrast, the non-compliance between the leader’s perceptions of the elite cues can be understood as the respondents not prioritizing their peripheral processing route in answering how they perceive the presence of China and the US in the Southeast Asian region. In contrast, these non-substantive factors are left out of the determination of whether China should be perceived positively or negatively, and the same question applies to perceptions of the US.

Third, the time frame considered in this study (2016 and 2022) allows for a better conclusion of why inconsistencies occurred between the Philippines’ public perceptions and those of the elites (Duterte). As early as 2017 (one year into Duterte’s presidential term), Poushter and Caldwell (2017) noted that the Philippine public was less enthusiastic about China than about the US. However, this study goes beyond that by considering a longer time frame, giving ample room to understand Duterte’s foreign policy towards the US and China, as well as where the Philippines’ public opinion lies as we approach the end of Duterte’s term. By doing so, it is much more justifiable if this study claims that there is a stronger alignment between Duterte and China, rather than with the US, as well as the consistency seen in the people’s perceptions (as some comparisons are made between the State of Southeast Asia survey report of 2020 and 2021 results).

The following section is structured as follows. To make the case for non-compliance between the Philippines’ public opinion and elite cues (Duterte), this paper first explores public perceptions from the 2021 State of Southeast Asia survey report. Doing so explores perceptions of the US and China across different regional challenges, including economic power, issues in the South China Sea, strategic influence, maintenance of the rules-based order, and perceptions of alignment. The argument is that non-compliance takes the form of Philippine public opinion leaning toward a favorable perception of the US and distrust of China; meanwhile, Duterte embraces the opposite perceptions. Last, in making sense of the non-compliance, this section explores whether the public considered central or peripheral routes in forming their attitudes.

The State of Southeast Asia survey report provides a valuable avenue for examining how the public perceives both great powers during Duterte’s leadership. In the 2021 survey, respondents from the Philippines constituted a total of 6.5% out of the overall ASEAN member state respondents, with affiliations ranging from academia (59.7%), business (1.5%), non-government organizations (6.0%), government (19.4%), and regional/international organizations (13.4%) ( Seah et al., 2021). Understanding the people’s perspectives on the great power contestation is significant. As one of the survey questions asked about what the Philippine respondents perceived as the main challenge encountered by ASEAN, the majority (76.1%) voted that ASEAN could become an arena of major power contestation, with its member states heavily influenced by those powers ( Seah et al., 2021).

Nevertheless, there is a clear pattern indicating that perceptions towards China are rather negative. This is based on a number of questions asked, ranging from the respondent’s perceptions across economic, political, and alignment preferences. On the question of perceived economic power house’s influence towards the Philippines, the majority of respondents in 2021 chose the option of being worried towards China’s growing influence in the Philippines with 77.5% (slightly decrease from the 2020 figure: 82.1%), and only a minority expressing that they welcome China’s economic influence (22.5%) ( Seah et al., 2021). Similarly, when it comes to the question of how much influence China has on the Philippines from a political and strategic perspective, the majority of Philippine respondents chose to be worried about China, with 95.0% of votes in 2021 ( Seah et al., 2021). Similar to the latter question, a unique finding was that when asked who the respondents perceived as able to uphold rules-based order, no respondents chose China in that year.

Several other questions help to solidify the rather negative perception of the public towards China. Respondents expressed doubt that China would do the right thing when it comes to the context of global peace and security, with 34.3% choosing ‘no confidence’ and 47.8% of respondents choosing ‘little confidence’ ( Seah et al., 2021, p.42). When respondents were asked what could worsen their impression of China, the two most voted options were China’s growing economic and political influence in the Philippines (50.05%) and the use of economic tools to affect the Philippines’ foreign policy (35.7%) ( Seah et al., 2021). These conditions shed light on what the Philippine public perceives of China, showing that the rather negative perceptions are not only based on the maritime disputes in the South China Sea but also on economic discourses that began to increase in the state by 2021.

Meanwhile, favorable perceptions of the US are evident in the question of whom ASEAN should align with if it had to choose between China and the US. Although the minority of respondents chose China (2020: 17.5%, 2021: 13.4%), the majority selected the US (2020: 82.5%, 2021: 86.6%) ( Seah et al., 2021). Looking back at several of the asked questions on China, perceptions towards the US by the Philippine respondents are positive, as expected in the existing literature, albeit at odds with the external outlook of Duterte. When asked, for example, the Philippine respondents’ view of the economic power influence of the US towards the Philippines, the majority of voters chose ‘I welcome its growing regional economic influence’ (85.7%), with its percentage increasing from the previous year (60.0%) ( Seah et al., 2021, p.15).

There were also favorable perceptions regarding political influence and the Philippine respondents’ confidence in the US’s leadership in maintaining a rules-based order. Regarding the former question, the majority of Philippine respondents selected the option of welcoming the US’s political and strategic influence in the Philippines, with 73.1% in 2021 ( Seah et al., 2021). Meanwhile, on the latter, the US secured the second most votes with 29.9%, after the European Union with 38.8% ( Seah et al., 2021). On this question, the answers are impactful. Besides the fact that China received 0 votes for confidence in maintaining the rules-based order, the third most favorable option was ASEAN with 19.4%, which is significantly lower than the confidence expressed for the US.

How is the US perceived in the context of providing regional security and confidence that it would do the right thing? On the question of confidence that the US is able to provide regional security, the majority of the Philippine respondents (77.6%) chose the option of ‘some confidence’ or ‘full confidence,’ which in total shows the highest ranked ASEAN member to express such a level of confidence towards the US ( Seah et al., 2021, p.40). Similarly, when the respondents are asked how much confidence they believe that the US would do the right thing, a total of 66.6% of votes went to the US with expressions of’confident’ or ‘very confident’ ( Seah et al., 2021, p.50). Similar to the previous inquiry, the expression of confidence in the US on this question is the highest among all ASEAN member states.

Based on several highlighted questions in the 2021 State of Southeast Asia survey report, it is clear that the Philippine public’s stance is rather clear. There are trust issues expressed towards China, as consistency is observed in how the Philippine public perceives negatively several of its security and economic influences towards the Philippines and the Southeast Asian region in general. In contrast, public perceptions towards the US have clearly been favorable. Looking at consistencies in the 2020 and 2021 figures and percentages, the Philippine public has no doubts that the US was a trustworthy actor in the provision of international public goods.

The non-compliance of the elite cues can thus be argued for by looking back at how Duterte responded to these two great powers. A benefit of taking Duterte into account in this study’s analysis is that it allows a long time period (six years) to observe Duterte’s external outlook and preferences, which should clearly show where Duterte’s foreign policy priorities lie. In general, the six years that Duterte has led the country have been marked by domestic expectations that he would accelerate development and growth for his people ( Lema, 2017; TAP, 2019; Baviera and Arugay, 2021). For this reason, many of the state’s poorer populations favored Duterte, due to his down-to-earth focus on the Philippine people ( Curato, 2016; Smith, 2016; You, 2018; Kenny and Holmes, 2020; Kasuya and Miwa, 2023; Sae-Phoo and Agojo, 2025).

In relation to China, for example, Duterte has often emphasized the importance of maintaining warm relations to accelerate bilateral relations between the Philippines and China ( Hendler, 2018; De Castro, 2019; Baviera and Arugay, 2021). One clear observation is that Duterte was willing to grow closer to China, considering the vast economic opportunities available under Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, which Duterte perceived as the solution for the job of accelerating growth within the country ( Baviera and Arugay, 2021). Besides that, Duterte’s leaning towards China is also evident in several cases involving the South China Sea dispute. Compared to Aquino, who advanced international legal resolution mechanisms, or Marcos, who emphasized the importance of maritime posturing policies ( Heydarian, 2018; Castro, 2021; De Castro, 2024; Fan, 2024), Duterte took a different route. He perceived that friendship should prevail; thus, the resolution towards the South China Sea should be based on friendship ( RFA, 2017; TG, 2017). Even in 2017, Duterte mentioned that the arbitral tribunal should not be a concern for ASEAN ( Castro, 2022a; De Castro, 2022), causing considerable domestic backlash. Although there were episodes in which Duterte reiterated the importance of his predecessor’s South China Sea resolutions, notably during his 75 ^th United Nations General Assembly speech ( Wong, 2020; Castro, 2022a), this pattern in his foreign policy was not consistent. As seen between 2020 and 2021, for example, it was clear that the remarks were due to the rather slow realization of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Philippines, which was a stance abandoned after Duterte undermined the ruling’s significance by claiming it was “[…] just a paper” ( Dancel, 2021; Morales, 2021).

Meanwhile, relations with the US during Duterte’s presidential term were tense. On a couple of occasions, Duterte has named the US with harsh words that strained the bilateral relations between the US and the Philippines. Besides the possible consideration that Duterte’s intentions to align with China could have fueled such actions, there was also the perception that Duterte did not want to align with the US due to that nation’s perceived unclear commitment in the region. In his first year leading the Philippines, for example, Duterte mentioned that the Philippines was no longer a US colony and that we had doubts the US would be able to provide international public goods for the region ( Glang, 2016; Smith, 2016).

In making sense of the non-compliances in the public’s perceptions of elite cues, the psychology of cue-taking leads to two possible explanations under the ‘Elaboration Likelihood Model’: the central or peripheral processing route ( Petty and Cacioppo, 1982, 1986). Three arguments are presented, which indicate greater consistency with the assumption that the central processing route dominated the psychology of the Philippine public’s attitudes towards the US and China. Despite the strong likelihood that the peripheral route drives respondents’ preferences, as past discourses linked Duterte’s leadership to his characteristics, the analytical framework shows that respondents consider much more than that.

First, the central route was dominant because the respondents were highly critical of China. As the theory posits, persuasion cues that do not require active thinking tend to lead to the perception of relevance, thereby favoring the peripheral processing route ( Petty and Cacioppo, 1982). In a scenario where the peripheral processing route dominated, it is expected that the Philippine respondents would place greater emphasis on the fact that Duterte was a populist, charismatic, decisive, and strongman leader, where the general public should follow all of his decisions. However, the opposite has occurred, and the peripheral processing route has not been taken as a favor by the public. As seen in the disagreements between the elite and the Philippine public, there is consistency and stability in the perception that China would not provide greater public goods to the Philippines than those provided by the US.

One potential explanation is that the respondents themselves are directly involved in discourses on China. As the survey report shows, the respondents are not a random sample. The respondents’ affiliations indicate that the discourse over China-US contestations in the region somewhat intersects with their line of work, suggesting they are not distanced from the issue. Therefore, consistent with the central processing route’s explanations, perceptions are stable over a long period of time and not temporary (as with the expectation under peripheral processing) ( Petty and Cacioppo, 1982, 1986; Gilens and Murakawa, 2002). As Gilens and Murakawa mentioned, those who are directly involved or have strong concerns over the issue would display “[…] greater cognitive effort than cue-based peripheral processing” ( Gilens and Murakawa, 2002, p.17). There is, however, an expectation that the peripheral route would be dominant when the topic at hand requires specialized knowledge ( Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). However, this is something the respondents have, which leads them to form their beliefs about China and the US, as they are informed by alternative sources that weigh more heavily than elite cues.

In cases such as Cambodia and Laos, the peripheral processing route can be interpreted as dominant. In both nations between 2016 and 2022, there has been a steady stream of investments and economic initiatives given to their leaders, which has allowed the Belt and Road Initiative image to flourish for both decision-makers and the general public ( Pheakdey, 2015; Kuik, 2021; Lim, 2023; Sayalath, 2024; Watanabe and Sovannroeun, 2024). Consequently, citizens’ perceptions are most likely shaped by elite cues on this matter, as there are few credible sources of information beyond their leaders’ perspectives. However, in the case of the Philippines, media coverage of the South China Sea, as well as negative perceptions towards the Belt and Road Initiative, have also fuelled trends in public perceptions.

Second, regarding people’s perspectives on the US, it is difficult to see this perception as a peripheral processing route, given two factors: the US’s cultural closeness to Filipinos and the negative consequences of Duterte’s strongman leadership. On the former, it is clear, as past studies suggest, that the cultural and historical ties between the US and the Philippines have positively affected how Filipinos perceive the US ( Thahoor, 2016; Malmgren, 2019). Therefore, Duterte’s decision to adopt harsh rhetoric towards the US is a foreign policy stance that is difficult for the general Philippine public to embrace, given that the shift in Philippine-US policy is sudden and baseless. If, for example, there was a clear international event that led to a long-term bilateral relations crisis, the Elaboration Likelihood Model would expect the Philippine public opinion to align with elite cues. However, considering that this tension with the US between 2016 and 2022 was a rhetoric introduced without a strong basis, non-compliance towards elite cues formed.

On the latter consideration, despite many parts of Philippine society embracing the peripheral processing route in relation to Duterte, between 2016 and 2022, the Philippine public began to realize what the policy manifestation has been under Duterte’s strongman leadership and unique characteristics. Duterte, during his leadership time, was known to be an individual who undertook extreme measures to counter the spread of illicit drugs in the Philippines ( Reyes, 2016; Bautista, 2017; Ravanilla, Secton, and Haim, 2022). Although the intentions are correct, the policy manifestations have led to many criticisms within the nation ( Kenny and Holmes, 2020; Ratcliffe, 2021; Utama, 2021; Ochoa and Ong, 2022), considering the many who have lost their lives or have been subject to injustice ruling concerning Duterte’s counter-drug policies. Therefore, the Philippine public is beginning to realize that it is wrong to judge Duterte solely on his characteristics. Despite his attractive leadership rhetoric and style, this is not aligned with policies that would automatically represent the interests of the Philippine public.

Given the expressed Philippine public’s opinions on the US and China, it is clear that non-compliance with elite cues stems from the critical assessment of Philippine respondents, rather than peripheral processing. As Petty and Cacioppo argued (1979), another contributing factor to the dominant use of the peripheral processing route is context, such as time pressure or distractions. Fortunately, this is not a variable the Philippine respondents encountered, as they were able to make firm, rational judgments about whether Duterte’s alignment with China and distancing from the US are foreign policy orientations worth following or abandoning.

In relation to the issue of context in the psychology of elite cue-taking, the third element of this study is the significance of long-term patterns. In determining whether the central or peripheral processing route best explains the Philippines’ public perceptions of the US and China, an important element to consider is that this study examines six years of data to understand how the general public perceives the great power contestations between the great powers exerting influence in the region. As covered in the literature review section, some studies have examined consistency between public perceptions of the Philippines and the actual foreign policy pursued by the Philippines’ president. In a 2017 study, for example, the study claimed that the Philippine public had low perceptions of China, but it was able to observe perceptions only over a one-to two-year period of Duterte’s leadership ( Poushter and Caldwell, 2017).

A benefit of considering a longer time period in this matter is the opportunity to examine different empirical events in the Philippines over the six years of Duterte’s leadership. As a means of demonstrating that the central processing route was dominant in understanding foreign policy attitudes, one can observe the continuity of China’s maritime law enforcement vessels challenging Philippine officials year after year. As documented, for example, by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, the presence of Chinese Coast Guards and other Chinese maritime vessels has been constant during Duterte’s leadership period ( AMTI, 2020, 2022, 2023, 2024). Despite Duterte’s stance that tends to undermine the significance of these events, these are real-time crises that continue to shape the minds of the Philippine people regarding the Philippines’ relations with China. This would therefore explain that, in some of the questions that compare 2020 and 2021 figures, there is always consistency in the stance of opposing China and favoring the US ( Seah et al., 2021). The reason for this, as predicted by the theory, is that public opinions that go through the central processing route are more powerful. Consequently, the opinions themselves would be enduring and relatively stable, despite elite cues aimed at changing the orientation of the attitudes.

This study examines non-compliance with elite cues observed in the Philippine public’s attitudes towards the US and China, as evidenced by the 2021 State of Southeast Asia survey. On one side of the spectrum, the leadership of Duterte between 2016 and 2022 has yielded a unique foreign policy outlook that has been inconsistent with the Philippines’ foreign policy orientation during Aquino’s and Marcos’ presidencies. It has embraced China despite tensions in the South China Sea and has adopted a more distant relationship with the US through harsh rhetoric from US leadership regarding its role in international public goods. Nevertheless, the Philippines’ public has not embraced such a position. As the survey shows, there is a clear preference for the US over China across questions of trustworthiness, likelihood of doing the right thing, and influence on the Philippines. What explains the non-compliance with elite cues in the Philippines?

To address the empirical puzzle posed above, this study argues that Petty and Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model helps explain the non-compliance with elite cues. To understand the psychology of cue taking, it argues that only two scenarios are possible: central and peripheral processing routes. In central, the expectation is that people’s perceptions of political matters are primarily shaped by substantive content, as they weigh the strengths of different arguments’ logic. Meanwhile, in the peripheral processing route, people consider non-substantive elements, such as external factors in message content (credibility and attractiveness), as the basis for alignment or disalignment with cues.

Looking at the empirical puzzles and the applicability of the two models of cue-taking psychology, this study argues that the non-compliance with elite cues in the Philippine public’s perceptions of Duterte’s foreign policy orientation can be explained by the central-route persuasion. The stance held by the Philippines’ public is consistently different from that of Duterte: favourable perceptions towards the US and scepticism towards China’s intentions in the Philippines. In making sense of these perceptions, the arguments presented that indicate the dominance of the central processing route are based on three assertions: Philippine respondents’ criticism of China, the hard-moved stance towards the US due to historical and cultural ties, as well as the long-term pattern considered in shaping perceptions towards the US and China.

The study perceives that non-compliance with elite cues can be understood in terms of the respondent’s critical awareness of China’s presence in the Philippines. When understanding elite cues aligned with the Philippine public’s perceptions and attitudes, one can easily be drawn to the peripheral processing route, given Duterte’s strong, populist, and charismatic personality. However, these persuasion cues are sidelined, as the respondents themselves actively think about the issue in light of the US-China contestations within their fields of work. Therefore, the central processing route was dominant, as the respondents in the State of Southeast Asia survey were directly involved in the questions asked, allowing them to consider many more factors than the elite cues themselves.

Specifically looking at the US, this study also finds that the cultural and historical ties between the Philippines and the US are unshakable. Duterte did make attempts throughout his leadership period to undermine bilateral relations; however, this stance was not one the Philippine public favored. Therefore, it is argued that the public perceives allegations towards the US as baseless and that Duterte’s voice should not be taken for granted. The events leading to the extrajudicial killings in the Philippines related to drug-related accusations teach the Philippine public to be more critical of Duterte’s policies, which should not only be based on following Duterte’s perspectives due to his attractive features as a leader. This also aligns with the last argument presented in this study, in which the Philippine public considers events in the South China Sea as contributing to their rather sceptical perceptions of China, leading them to intend not to align with Duterte’s foreign policy preferences.

This article does not require an ethical approval as it does not gather primary data from the respondents directly, and this case study is a qualitative analysis of published data by another source. Questions on ethical procedures and informed consent of participants from the utilized published data (State of Southeast Asia survey report) can be obtained from the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.