For decades, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been a cornerstone of Brunei Darussalam’s foreign policy. Brunei officially became the sixth ASEAN member on 07 January 1984, and has since then been active in a number of ASEAN’s regional mechanisms ( MFA, 2026). Despite its small size, Brunei has blended well with the regional organization’s norms, which adhere to the ‘ASEAN Way.’ In the five times that it acted as the ASEAN chair, most recently in 2021, Brunei’s leadership did not yield disappointing responses from fellow ASEAN members ( Bukit & Sworn, 2021, 2022; Chongkittavorn, 2021; IRSEA, 2021; Piri, 2021).

Past discourses on the nexus between Brunei and ASEAN have primarily examined it through the lens of the Brunei elite’s challenges and interests in ASEAN. Following the Brunei ASEAN chair in 2021, for example, the raised theme of ‘We Care, We Prepare, We Prosper’ highlighted Brunei’s unique challenges to respond to the COVID-19 challenge, the military coup in Myanmar, as well as manage the divisions arising from the South China Sea ( Hayat, 2021; IRSEA, 2021; Parameswaran, 2021). As Parameswaran stated, Brunei’s 2021 chair acted as testimony as to how it managed “[…] key foreign relationships, and its capabilities to manage a full plate at home and abroad” ( Parameswaran, 2021). For Brunei, one of the highlights of its challenges was how it would manage relations with China, which, at the time, was approaching the 30th anniversary of China-Brunei bilateral relations. The vast projects and alignment of interests between China and Brunei, marked with the establishment of cooperation in the Sultan Haji Omar Ali Saifuddien Bridge, the Brunei-Guangxi Economic Corridor, and other visible Chinese investment projects in the country, were predicted to cause a dilemma for Brunei elites ( Chongkittavorn, 2021; IRSEA, 2021; Piri, 2021).

Nevertheless, the fear of potentially unfair leadership never materialized. Brunei remained consistent and true to the ASEAN Way during its 2021 ASEAN chairmanship and ensured that its national interests vis-à-vis China did not stand in the way of regional cooperation. Previously, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah in 2015 stated on the significance of ASEAN for Brunei: “It is hoped that ASEAN can continue to develop a community that is more dynamic, based on the principles that have shaped the region today” ( Yean, 2016, p. 57). Five years later, Brunei stayed true to this by acting as ASEAN chair to counter several of ASEAN’s most challenging circumstances. As Chongkittavorn mentioned, “[…] Brunei epitomizes the true spirit of ASEAN-standing firm and adhering to the founding father’s principles, without compromising ASEAN centrality” ( Chongkittavorn, 2021). As also argued by Bukit and Sworn, analyzing the performance of Brunei’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2021, the exercise of entrepreneurial leadership has allowed Brunei to uphold the significance of ASEAN centrality and ensure that policies taken on behalf of ASEAN are carefully deliberated and formulated not to violate the ASEAN Way ( Bukit & Sworn, 2022).

The success of Brunei’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2021 is a continuation of its success in similar roles in 1989, 1995, 2001, and 2013. It shows that, from the Brunei elite’s perspective, ASEAN is of great importance to Brunei’s foreign policy. However, there are still many elements left unexplored in relation to the discourse of ASEAN’s significance in the eyes of Brunei. More specifically, one can examine whether the Brunei public also holds this favorable perception, or whether the contrary view prevails.

Interestingly, a past study documents some recognition of the lack of exploration of public opinion on ASEAN within the ASEAN member states. In a 2020 study by Lee and Lim, they argued, “[…] most studies on ASEAN take a state-centric and elite-oriented viewpoint” ( Lee & Lim, 2020, p. 803). Against the backdrop of the vast development related to the Brunei and ASEAN relations, this study, therefore, is interested in moving the research agenda in alignment with what Lee and Lim mentioned as “[…] bringing the people of ASEAN into the center of analysis” ( Lee & Lim, 2020, p. 803). Rightfully so, for an absolute monarchy like Brunei, it is difficult to explore the question of public views due to the hierarchical nature of the state system. However, as existing discourses have already made clear the importance of ASEAN to the Brunei elites, an investigation into the public views is also necessary.

In doing so, this qualitative study argues the relevance of the analytical framework introduced in Jean-Christophe Boucher’s 2024 study: ‘Public Opinion, News, Digital Media, and Foreign Policy.’ At the core of the argument, this study emphasizes the importance of public opinion in foreign policy, acknowledging past studies that argue the public makes rational judgments on foreign policy matters ( Aldrich et al., 2006; Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Neuman, 1986; Page, 1996). Therefore, it is pivotal to explore the relationship between public opinion and a state’s foreign policy conduct, delving deeper into the variable of people’s perspectives on pressing foreign policy matters. On this view, Boucher’s ‘top-down’ model, which argues that elites’ views shape the public’s preferences and opinions ( Boucher, 2024), is relevant to Brunei’s public views on ASEAN. This allows a focus on what has been argued in the past: “[…] identifying and measuring the interaction between the public’s foreign policy attitudes and policy elites” ( Boucher, 2024, p. 253).

To claim that the elites shape Brunei’s public opinions, this study utilizes the publicly available data from the ‘State of Southeast Asia 2025’ survey report, published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. The survey provides answers to how Brunei respondents view ASEAN in general, ASEAN’s role in contemporary regional challenges, questions on ASEAN’s potential alignment, and the way forward for the regional organization ( Seah et al., 2025). Using this dataset, this study is able to isolate how Brunei respondents view the regional organization in 2025 and connect this to the potential influence that Brunei elites had in shaping those preferences, based on Brunei’s ASEAN policies during and after its ASEAN chairmanship in 2021.

When discussing public opinion in Brunei Darussalam, there are only a few studies directly addressing Brunei’s public opinion on ASEAN. In Yean’s 2016 study, which asked, ‘What does ASEAN mean to ASEAN Peoples?’ Yean’s online survey provided unique insights into how 19–25-year-old respondents view ASEAN awareness, identification as an ASEAN citizen, perception of Brunei’s ASEAN membership, and future concerns about potential challenges encountered by ASEAN (Yean, 2016). Meanwhile, in a broader context, scholars have examined public perceptions of ASEAN member states; however, this excludes Brunei citizens. Benny and Abdullah’s 2011 study, for example, looked at Indonesian citizens’ perceptions of the ASEAN Community ( Benny & Abdullah, 2011). Similarly, Benny undertook a research inquiry into perceptions of the ASEAN Community, examining differences in perceptions among Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean citizens ( Benny, 2015; Benny et al., 2015). The limited number of studies available shows the severely limited understanding of academia regarding the dynamics of Brunei’s public opinion.

Nevertheless, alternative themes can be explored regarding Brunei and ASEAN. Sidelining for the moment the variable of public opinions, several minor discourses still relate to the discussions put forward in this study: Brunei’s placing of ASEAN as its foreign policy cornerstone, Brunei’s use of ASEAN to counter great power rivalries, as well as discussions specific to Brunei’s ASEAN chairmanships. Revealing how existing studies have interpreted and framed Brunei’s foreign policy in relation to ASEAN enables this study to identify potential variables that influence the Brunei public’s foreign policy perceptions.

The first discourse focuses the discussion on ASEAN’s role as Brunei’s foreign policy cornerstone. As Weatherbee and Thambipillai argued prior to Brunei’s ASEAN membership in 1984, there were already numerous studies suggesting a potential alignment of interests between the small state of Brunei and the largest regional grouping in Southeast Asia, ASEAN ( Thambipillai, 1982; Weatherbee, 1983). Rightfully so, after Brunei became the sixth ASEAN member, scholars have argued that being integrated into a web of regional cooperation has brought success in advancing Brunei’s economy, security, and generally raised Brunei’s global profile ( Bukit & Sworn, 2022; Druce, 2023; Koh, 2013; Li, 2025; Loon, 2025). More specifically, Mateev’s study showed that a significant advantage for Brunei is the elevation of its status to equal that of the larger ASEAN member states, despite its relatively smaller size ( Mateev, 2022).

Meanwhile, scholars have also interpreted differently the reasons why Brunei has placed great importance on its engagements with ASEAN over the past couple of decades. A 2024 study examined ASEAN’s favorable non-interference policy and how it reflects Brunei’s political identity ( Wei, 2024). Yuhong Li’s 2025 examined the variable of trust, arguing that it could establish greater integration among member states and align interests ( Li, 2025).

Delving deeper into the discourse on Brunei’s relations with ASEAN, several studies have zoomed in on how Brunei perceives ASEAN’s long-standing role in countering great-power rivalries ( Hashim, 2020; Tumala, 2025). Hayat’s 2021 study, for example, argued how ASEAN provides “[…] a unique forum for Brunei to pursue this policy (balancing powers) as a means of stabilizing the regional balance-of-power system in support of a favorable status quo” ( Hayat, 2021). Similarly, Hashim’s 2020 study also stated, “ASEAN became central in managing both intra-Southeast Asian transitions and external relations with great powers” ( Hashim, 2020). These studies acknowledge that the Southeast Asian region is vulnerable to great-power rivalries, as seen in the broader Asia-Pacific context ( Alano, 2023; Ciorciari, 2009; Zha, 2022). Consequently, for smaller states like Brunei (which has a limited capacity to exert influence), engaging closer with ASEAN allows Brunei to actively be involved in the process of managing great power relations directed to cooperative norms and the ASEAN Way in general ( Aminuddin & Purnomo, 2017; Beeson, 2009; Cuyvers, 2019; Tekunan, 2015).

Because of ASEAN’s perceived importance across sectors, Brunei has taken its responsibilities as ASEAN chair seriously. Scholars’ interpretations offer a better understanding of Brunei’s agency in this regional role granted by ASEAN. Bukit and Sworn argued that Brunei exercised “[…] entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership on three key issues confronting the body in 2021” (Myanmar, South China Sea, and COVID-19) ( Bukit & Sworn, 2022, p. 48). Meanwhile, a 2022 study examined the unique tools Brunei used to navigate its chairmanship responsibilities ( Salleh, 2021).

Although existing scholarship documents an evolving discourse seeking to make sense of Brunei’s agency and active participation in ASEAN, the role of public opinion remains unexplored in these studies. Therefore, to better our understanding of how Brunei citizens perceive ASEAN’s importance (and related issues), this study zooms in on Brunei’s perceptions of the regional organization and identifies potential variables that could influence these perceptions. Arguing specifically for a top-down model (public opinion influenced by elite perceptions/foreign policy conduct), this study will be the first to examine how public opinion is formed in Brunei, measuring the interactive relationship between public opinion and regional foreign policy.

For decades, international relations scholars have argued for the significance of public opinion in foreign policy. Within the realism camp, for example, studies (primarily from neoclassical realism) have explored the importance of public opinion in shaping state behaviors ( Schweller, 1998; Waltz, 1979; Wolfers, 1952; Zakaria, 1998). Arguing how public opinions shape the state’s norms, several other studies within the constructivism and English School have argued how public opinions correlate directly to the formation of preferences among the society, including the state’s identity construction ( Browning, 2006; Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012; Finnemore, 2013; Katzenstein, 2003; Steele, 2014; Wehner & Thies, 2014).

Nevertheless, there remains significant debate over the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. By the definition of Key’s 1964 study, public opinion can be understood as “[…] those opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed” ( Key, 1964, p. 14). Similarly, Boucher argued that public opinion may reflect the particular beliefs, views, and attitudes held by the public ( Boucher, 2024). Therefore, the debate primarily centers on the impact of public opinion, which some have argued is irrational, while others claim it is sound and rational ( Carr, 1936; Holsti, 1996; Lippmann, 1955; Page, 1996; Powlick & Katz, 1998). Without delving into this complex debate, the assertion in this study is limited to understanding the potential relevance of a variable in making sense of contemporary perceptions of a state’s foreign policy.

In doing so, Boucher’s ‘top-down’ model serves as a good starting point to better understand the relations between the Brunei public and foreign policy decisions. As Boucher suggests, there is a clear gap between what political elites know and what the public understands ( Boucher, 2024). Consequently, it is expected that public opinions would use the views of the elites as “[…] a heuristic shortcut for them (the public) to form an opinion” ( Boucher, 2024, p. 254). This point has been repeatedly argued by past scholars who fall under the broad category of the top-down model, believing that the interactive relationship between the two variables is best described as shaped by the elite’s views ( Boucher, 2024; Druckman, 2001; Western, 2005; Zaller, 1992).

Bridged to the context of Brunei’s public opinions in matters related to ASEAN, one can conclude that their embraced opinions are formed by how Brunei’s political elites view the regional organization. As perhaps clear by this point, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah has a favorable perception of ASEAN, and this is evident throughout Brunei’s ASEAN chairmanships. Therefore, the argument proposed is that Brunei’s past active engagements continue to effectively shape policy preferences and public views of Brunei’s external outlook in relation to the Southeast Asian region and ASEAN.

Nevertheless, by measuring the interaction between foreign policy attitudes and the state’s actual foreign policy, one can also infer that an interactive relationship exists between public opinion and the elite, influencing one another. Perhaps out of the three models explored by Boucher, the least possible to be relevant in the case of an absolute monarchy like Brunei is the bottom-down model, in which the people influence the elite’s perception towards foreign policy matters ( Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Moravcsik, 1997; Owen, 1994; Russett & Oneal, 2001; M. Tomz et al., 2020; M. R. Tomz & Weeks, 2013). However, another body of literature argues that public opinion and the elite’s views influence one another soroka wlezien 2004, sobel 2001), described by Boucher as, “A third position (that) tries to reconcile the previous two (bottom-up, top-down models) by observing that political elites and public opinion have developed an interactive relationship, thus influencing each other” ( Boucher, 2024, p. 254).

Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this study to assert which model would be most favorable for explaining the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy in the context of Brunei vis-à-vis ASEAN. The discussions, therefore, will first focus on explaining how the top-down model is most likely the one that allows the public to embrace certain perceptions. However, it will also acknowledge the potential for citizens’ views to influence the Brunei elite’s perceptions of ASEAN.

In doing so, this discussion section below will be structured as follows. First, it aims to reveal how the Bruneian people perceive the significance of ASEAN across different questions and elements related to Southeast Asian regional dynamics. Understanding Brunei’s public perceptions is done through the use of published data from the State of Southeast Asia survey report 2025, specifically focusing on Brunei respondents’ answers. Several of the questions focus on the Brunei respondent’s perceptions of ASEAN amid international developments, how ASEAN responds to major powers’ regional influence, and ASEAN’s position in the US-China rivalry. After that, it continues by offering a top-down model that focuses on the thesis that Brunei’s elites’ foreign policies shape the perceptions of the Brunei public, primarily through events during Brunei’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2021. Elite perceptions, in the context of Brunei, are defined as the policies undertaken by the nation as a whole, without distinguishing between those of different ministries. As an absolute monarchy, the expectation is that differences of opinion are near non-existent, and that Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah is the driving force of how Brunei should act in relation to ASEAN.

It is without a doubt that Brunei elites view ASEAN with great importance; however, does a similar perception exist among the Brunei public? This section first examines Brunei’s public perceptions, focusing on the dataset of Brunei respondents that this study retrieved from the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia survey report 2025. After revealing those insights, the analytical framework of Boucher’s interactive relationship between public opinion and foreign policy is adopted to decipher what causes the Brunei public to embrace certain perceptions of ASEAN.

One of the gaps in the study of Brunei Darussalam and ASEAN has been the lack of exploration of public opinion as a variable. Although Brunei is an absolute monarchy ruled by the Sultan, this study shows that some levels of analysis can be applied to understand the nexus of public opinion and foreign policy that suit the unique political context of Brunei. By doing so, it avoids being caught up in the general state-centric, elite-oriented viewpoint and brings citizens’ perspectives to the center of analysis.

In doing so, Boucher’s 2024 analytical framework of the ‘top-down’ model serves this study’s intentions well. In understanding the nexus between public opinion and foreign policy, Boucher’s study argues that elites’ views shape the public’s preferences and opinions. Utilizing data from the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey report, this study bridges the analytical framework by means of identifying consistency between the Sultanate’s ASEAN policies and perceptions towards the regional organization (primarily during Brunei’s 2021 ASEAN chairmanship), with the public perceptions of Brunei respondents towards ASEAN (seen through respondents’ answers in the 2025 survey).

This study reveals the public opinions of the Brunei people and shows a strong alignment between the Sultan’s past ASEAN perspectives and approaches and the actual perceptions embraced by the general public. Regarding how Brunei respondents perceived several international developments, for example, Brunei identified that one area it should focus on is intra-regional trade and investment. This means that correlations are made between the Sultan’s recent efforts to diversify Brunei’s economy and how the Brunei public perceives areas where ASEAN can benefit from further expansion. Furthermore, the Sultan’s 2021 engagements with Myanmar, which led to the eventual ‘Five-Point Consensus’ in the same year, have also been embraced in public perceptions, which called for the establishment of active dialogue with all relevant stakeholders in Myanmar’s internal conflicts, including the NUG.

Similarly, alignment between Brunei’s public opinion and the Sultanate’s ASEAN policy is evident in how they perceive ASEAN’s role in the South China Sea. Given the Sultan’s past approach of adopting a silent claimant status in the disputed waters, public opinion has leaned towards the need for ASEAN to uphold relevant international laws and support actions that deter aggression. These views are consistent with Brunei’s past policies, which, although it has not pursued maritime power projection, have indeed consistently called for ASEAN’s relevance in managing tensions, including through the conclusion of the CoC.

Meanwhile, when Brunei respondents were asked how they viewed the major power contestations in Southeast Asia, they expressed trust in ASEAN and a slight alignment with China. In the question of political and strategic influence, and the actor trusted to champion the global free trade agenda, China claimed the first position from the perspective of the Brunei public. This is consistent with the Sultan’s foreign policy over the past decade, in which the long-term grand strategy of diversifying the economy has received a positive response from Chinese officials, leading to the convergence of Wawasan Brunei 2035 and the Belt and Road Initiative. Nevertheless, the importance of ASEAN has remained relevant in both inquiries, ranking significantly higher than those of the other major powers. When respondents were asked what ASEAN should do vis-à-vis the US-China quest for influence, the Brunei public chose to focus on the within, by enhancing ASEAN’s resilience and unity to counter any pressure from the main powers. This is again consistent with the Sultanate’s foreign policy, which resembles hedging with the US and China, as well as continuing to support ASEAN-introduced measures that would enhance the regional organization’s capacity to address uncertainties to come.