A unique dynamic that has defined domestic strife in Myanmar over the past few decades is what Tin Shine Aung terms ‘saffron washing’ ( Aung, 2025a, 2025b). The term entails the process of the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) utilizing Buddhism as a means to exert political power. Having similarities to the term ‘greenswashing’ within the context of environmentalism, the Tatmadaw’s saffron washing looks to legitimize and place continuity towards the military’s authoritarian rule and gaining public legitimacy by depicting the group as the “[…] protector of dominant religion and national identity, often while abusing human rights and opposing democratic forces”.

Consequently, atrocities have prevailed in different parts of Myanmar. The controversial rule of the Myanmar military has led to several crimes against humanity to surface. As a result of the controversial 1982 Citizenship Law, for example, the Rohingya ethnic minorities have been at the center of prosecutions and neglect over political rights ( Islam, 2020; MSF, 2022). Attrocities seemed to escalate when the Myanmar people slowly demanded democratic transitions, as the Tatmadaw escalates its crackdowns and continuously imposes its authoritarian rule ( Huang, 2017; Motlagh et al., 2018). Nevertheless, under pressure from domestic and international fronts, the Myanmar military facilitated an attempted democratic transition starting in 2011 ( Lall & Win, 2013), which began to offer a glimpse of democratic hope for the Myanmar people. However, following the increased popularity of the democratically elected leaders of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw took back control of the state through the 2021 coup and placed the State Administration Council (SAC) in power between 2021 and 2025. Led by Min Aung Hlaing during the country’s extended state of emergency, the country’s democratic decline raises concerns about the state’s future trajectory.

Interestingly, China has emerged as a country that has been speculated to contribute to the junta’s continuity. Before the attempted democratic transition in 2011, China was undoubtedly one of the junta’s closest allies, with the vast economic initiatives agreed and access to arms trade ( Steinberg & Fan, 2012; Tun, 2015; Zhao & Yang, 2012). Economically, China is heavily invested in Myanmar. China’s shared border with Myanmar and Myanmar’s direct access to the Indian Ocean have led several of the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) to enhance connectivity with the conflict-torn state. To name a few of the large-scale initiatives, the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port and Special Economic Zone Project, Myanmar-China railway, oil and gas pipelines, economic cooperation zones, and many more ( Calabrese, 2025; CSIS, 2018; Irrawaddy, 2026; Oo & Dai, 2026; SGI, 2021). It is therefore expected that China would draw close to whoever held authority in Myanmar, given that strategic economic interests are at stake.

However, contrary to such a prediction, the relations between Myanmar and China have not always been warm. Following the 2021 coup, China remained muted on the matter, issuing a statement calling on all sides to handle differences constructively ( Chan, 2021; Cho, 2021; Tiezzi, 2021). Between 2021 and 2024, there were multiple efforts by senior Chinese diplomats to gain access to the democratically elected leaders who were ousted ( Moe, 2025). Within the two years after the coup, there was plenty of ambivalence in China’s shifting stance. As Tisdall mentions, China is playing a “[…] duplicitous game of divide-and-rule” ( Tisdall, 2024), marked with the backing of the Myanmar junta’s opposition armed forces following the coup. Several reports noted that Chinese artillery opened fire on the Junta in 2023 ( RFA, 2024a; Tisdall, 2024) and enabled the Three Brotherhood Alliance to launch an offensive in the North of Myanmar ( Ratcliffe, 2025).

Nevertheless, an empirical puzzle here is that the Myanmar junta sought its support to tighten relations with China. Despite several episodes of China displaying allegiances to the rebel groups and ethnic armed opposition (EAO) forces, the military junta after 2023 benefited from the reaffirmed diplomatic ties with the Myanmar military through enhanced armed supplies, the cutting of rebel supply lines in bordering areas, and negotiated the presence of private military corporations to secure China’s investments in Myanmar ( Abuza, 2024; ISP, 2024). China’s adjustment in how it approached contemporary Myanmar also led to the visit of China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, to Naypidaw in August 2024, as both nations solidified their ties ( Oo, 2024). The SAC ignored China’s past allegiances with the junta’s opposition forces and has strengthened ties as a bid to secure its authoritarian longevity. What explains such a dynamic?

In assessing the empirical puzzle of the junta’s disregard for China’s past allegiances with the opposition forces, this study argues for the applicability of neoclassical realism as the primary analytical framework for interpretation. This qualitative study, looking at contemporary developments of Myanmar and China’s ties between 2021 and 2026, adopts Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell’s conception of type II neoclassical realism, which argues the relevance of systemic stimuli (independent variables) and sub-unit level variables (intervening variables) to understand puzzling foreign policy responses displayed by Myanmar. In this case, Myanmar’s continued allegiance with China constitutes a foreign policy anomaly. Therefore, this study looks at the applicability of arguments introduced as systemic stimuli variables (power in international system, relative material capabilities, clarity of threat, strategic environment) and sub-unit level variables (leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, domestic institutions) as a means to reveal the unique processes that lead to the adoption of the Myanmar’s policies towards China. The combination of the independent and intervening variables allows this study to perceive that policies derive not from “[…] a direct product of systemic stimuli; instead, they pass through the prism of the state, which perceives and responds to them within the institutional constraints of its unique domestic circumstances” ( Ripsman et al., 2016, p.32).

How have existing studies assessed the unique ties between Myanmar and China? To portray how relevant studies have assessed the relations, this literature review is structured as follows. First, it examines interpretations of the ties from China’s perspective. Amid domestic strife, these studies have examined the vast economic interests that have led China to compromise amid the ongoing instability taking place in Myanmar. Second, several studies have examined ties from Myanmar’s perspective, taking into account variables such as legitimizing authoritarian rule through international support and the pragmatic importance of maintaining economic ties with China. Nevertheless, based on the assessment of existing studies and as described at the end of this section, there has been a lack of scholarly inquiry into the systemic and domestic determinants of foreign policy choices from the perspective of Myanmar policymakers. Ultimately, the neoclassical realism interpretation offered in this study aims to address such a deficiency within relevant existing discourses.

The majority of studies responding to the question of why China continues to maintain existing economic relations with Myanmar lean toward economic-interest-based arguments. Therefore, a group of studies argues that the slight leaning towards the junta’s opposition forces was taken as a means to keep all doors open and anticipate the potential rule of democratic forces in the future ( Ganesan, 2025; Han, 2025; Hazarika & Konwer, 2025). Han’s 2024 interpretation, for example, argues that China’s policies can be viewed as hedging practices between the junta and EAOs ( Han, 2025). In others, the unique policy orientation is understood as China’s ‘multipronged’ strategy, with the underlying aim of securing China’s existing economic investments in Myanmar ( Hazarika & Konwer, 2025, p. 113).

Nevertheless, in light of the 2021 coup, there has been an emerging body of studies highlighting the conduct of policy adjustments as a means to protect China’s economic interests in Myanmar. Studies in 2024, for example, highlighted how the Chinese Government had to make adjustments to localize its BRI approach in Myanmar due to the growing criticisms from the Myanmar people ( Mosyakov et al., 2024; Overland & Seah, 2024). Another element of China’s policy adjustments has been the continuation of BRI projects in Myanmar after the coup, given the large number of ongoing projects in the domestically unstable country ( Banerjee, 2022). These studies go to show that China’s national interests vis-à-vis China are dominated by discourses on economic relations, and the importance of securing existing investments and providing a shield against potential economic engagements in the near future.

Meanwhile, a look at studies on Myanmar-China ties from the perspective of Myanmar would reveal unique discussions that lean predominantly towards negative perceptions. As several studies have pointed out ( Oh, 2024; Tang, 2025; Zhu et al., 2025), there are concerns that Myanmar’s excessive alignment with China would (if not already) create overdependence. Zhu, Tan, and Li’s study, for example, showed how China’s economic engagements with Myanmar have not “[…] facilitated Myanmar’s economic and social advancement” ( Zhu et al., 2025, p.503). Yoon Ah Oh also pointed out that the newly established global value chains have only exacerbated Myanmar’s dependence on China ( Oh, 2024). As a result, it has also been argued that the increased dependency on China has led to Myanmar’s inability to hedge with other states, due to the state’s level of fragmentation and its limited capacity to hedge effectively ( Kobayashi & King, 2022). Similarly, several other studies have asserted that hedging has been difficult ( Passeri, 2025), considering that Myanmar has limited options for countries to hedge with.

Several studies also suggest that unique domestic perspectives are evident, with a strong view of China. In a 2023 study, a qualitative fieldwork revealed mixed feelings among the Myanmar respondents towards China, given the lack of social responsibility in China’s projects within the country and its role in Myanmar’s informal economic sectors ( Tritto & Huang, 2023). Skepticism towards the sustainability of China’s projects is also questioned, given the existing and clearly visible disruptions in Myanmar’s local ecologies and cultures ( Li et al., 2021). As a result, there is doubt that China’s economic presence in Myanmar yields positive impacts, with a dominant discourse evident that China aims to pursue relations only for the sake of its national interests, not for the betterment of the Myanmar people ( Peng, 2026; Saba & Akbarzadeh, 2026).

To build on the existing discourses assessing Myanmar’s ties with China, this study identifies several deficiencies in the existing scholarship. First, there has not been much scholarly work assessing the fluctuation of relations that occurred between 2021 and 2023. Consequently, the ups and downs of relations are taken for granted, and there is no assessment of the unique foreign policies undertaken by Myanmar. Second, the explanatory variables utilized tend to be reserved for economic-dominated interests, which, although correct to some degree, neglect the importance of other explanatory variables that allow for a more nuanced understanding of the ties.

This study takes a step back and offers an alternative interpretation of Myanmar’s alignment with China. In doing so, it explores the potential of systemic stimuli and sub-unit variables in explaining Myanmar’s continued allegiance with China, despite episodes of China’s support for the junta’s opposition forces. Only Enze Han’s 2018 study, which examined the influence of structural factors and domestic politics on the interpretation of Myanmar’s unique foreign policy, comes close to the inquiry in this study. Given recent fluctuations in bilateral relations following the coup, this study reassesses the influence of independent and intervening variables on foreign policy anomalies.

The type II neoclassical realism utilized in this study is a theoretical approach that acknowledges that systemic stimuli alone are insufficient in explaining foreign policy. This is the case in circumstances where the international environment does not present a clear threat, leaving state actors with a range of policy options. Therefore, a neoclassical realism approach in interpreting foreign policy anomalies acknowledges, “Policy choices are no longer conceived of as a direct product of systemic stimuli; instead, they pass through the prisms of the state, which perceives them within the institutional constraints of its unique domestic circumstances” ( Ripsman et al., 2016, pp.31–32).

This study acknowledges that systemic stimuli determine the foreign policy options available to a country, which are shaped by its position in the international system and relative material capabilities ( Foulon, 2015; Rose, 1998; Schweller, 2004). As the independent variable, however, following Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016) in their type II neoclassical realism, the understanding of system structure is broader than traditional conceptions, as it includes factors that determine the levels of interaction between actors. Therefore, they may fall under the category of systemic, even though outside the category of structure ( Ripsman et al., 2016). The following independent variables are explored for their suitability in explaining the contemporary relations. They include power and position in the international system, relative share of material capabilities, structural modifiers, clarity of threat, and strategic environment.

In the context of power and position in the international system and relative share of material capabilities, this study perceives that a state’s external behaviors are shaped first and mainly by its position in the international system, which leads to the limitation of strategic choices available to be undertaken ( Rathbun, 2008; Ripsman et al., 2016; Rose, 1998). Following the structural theories of international relations ( Guzzini, 2013; Kitchen, 2010; Kozub-Karkut, 2019), neoclassical realism’s independent variables also perceive that the system is hierarchical and anarchic. This situation ultimately shapes the level of interaction between the two nations being investigated. In the context of Myanmar and China, it is expected that an assessment of how the two nations’ positions in the international system differ will eventually influence how Myanmar reacts to China’s vast foreign policy decisions. If the international system is viewed through the lens of structure, it is clear that Myanmar is nowhere close to China’s material capabilities, which raises the level of interactions possible for Myanmar officials despite the vast challenges undermining the cohesiveness of bilateral ties. To compare the two nations, this study examines Myanmar and China, focusing on each nation’s key figures in defense and the military.

Meanwhile, the other independent variables of clarity of threat, structural modifiers, and strategic environment are also tested for their relevance in explaining Myanmar’s foreign policy outcomes. On the clarity variable, the focus is on identifying whether there is a clear threat to Myanmar, with less clarity leading to greater room to pursue unique solutions. Structural modifiers, matters of geography, and the offense-defense balance in military technologies are considered. The article proceeds to explain how significant these systemic stimuli are in shaping Myanmar’s unique foreign policy towards China, examining whether a variable helps explain the anomalies and to what extent they influence it.

Nevertheless, what makes it unique is the consideration of sub-unit-level variables. Acknowledging that systemic factors are filtered through the prism of the state, these variables are considered for their relevance to explaining foreign policy responses: leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions. Therefore, the argument is that, rather than interpreting the system as generating fixed signals, the foreign policy options available to a state actor are filtered by these sub-unit variables, which further limit those options ( Kitchen, 2010; Ripsman et al., 2016).

The variables of leader images and strategic culture look further into the state. Leader images here refer to how foreign policy executives of a state perceive a particular nation or a foreign policy matter ( Ripsman et al., 2016). Therefore, there could be considerations placed on the beliefs, values, personalities, images of enemies, and perceptions of power of the foreign policy executives, which may influence why certain policies are undertaken. Meanwhile, strategic culture considers the dominant norms and ideologies present within a state ( Ripsman et al., 2016). Such strategic cultures ultimately shape how leaders perceive certain challenges and influence how they adapt to systemic stimuli.

Bridging to the case study of Myanmar and China’s ties, this leader image considers the evolution of the Myanmar military and China’s relations over time. Despite the negative perceptions held towards China during the Cold War, it is argued that this perception has evolved favorably into positive sentiments, even after the 2021 coup. Furthermore, Myanmar’s increased reliance on lucrative BRI-related projects, which aim to be completed even after the coup, underscores China’s growing importance to Myanmar’s SAC and military junta for the nation’s economic development. Meanwhile, the sub-unit variables of strategic culture allow this study to delve into the discourse of ‘saffron washing,’ examining how the Tatmadaw has maintained power (and sustained it).

The prism of the state is also represented in the sub-unit variables of state-society relations and domestic institutions. In the former, the elements considered are the dynamics of coalition politics and the relations between the civil and the military. Meanwhile, the latter examines the formal institutions within the state and the actors with the capacity to contribute to policy formation. Unfortunately, in both sub-unit variables, given that Myanmar has technically fallen back into non-democratic rule, these variables seem to have less explanatory power in authoritarian settings like Myanmar. As the discussion section explores, the sub-unit variable of state-society relations is argued to have influenced foreign policy only during Myanmar’s attempted democratic transition (2011–2021), not during the Myanmar junta’s rule. Meanwhile, domestic institutions are also perceived as having insufficient influence over the selected foreign policy option, given the presumption of continuity in China’s controversial BRI projects in Myanmar.

To adopt the neoclassical realism analytical framework to the study of Myanmar and China’s ties, the following sections are structured as follows. First, it explores the role of systemic constraints in limiting the junta’s foreign policy options in its relations with China after the 2021 coup. Second, it examines neoclassical realism’s sub-unit variables as a prism of the state, aiming to determine whether these variables influenced the unique foreign policy options taken.

Despite fluctuating relations between Myanmar and China after the 2021 coup, the normality of its relations after 2023 requires investigation. This section examines several systemic factors that help explain the limitations of the foreign policies the Myanmar military could pursue in its ties with China. The variables of power and position in the international system, the relative share of material capabilities, and structural modifiers are argued to be the main independent variables affecting contemporary Myanmar-China ties. Meanwhile, the strategic environment and clarity provide a less accurate interpretation, considering that Myanmar and China are not actively engaged in open warfare. Furthermore, the instability in Myanmar has been driven by internal sources (opposition forces and rebel groups) ( Maizland, 2022; Mishra, 2026), rather than by foreign actors.

The power and position of China and Myanmar are inherently different. A look into the 2025 Lowy Power Index provides a clear depiction of how significant those differences are, which helps to explain why the junta decided not to neglect China’s siding with the opposition forces between 2021 and 2023. The Asia Power Index ranks states in the region based on their influence over other countries across the following dimensions: economic capability, military capability, resilience, future, resources, economic relationships, defense networks, diplomatic influence, and cultural influence ( Lowy, 2026). The 2025 ranking places China second out of the 27 assessed in overall comprehensive power, with a score of 73.7 out of 100; in contrast, Myanmar was ranked among the lowest, 23rd, with only a score of 7.1 ( Lowy, 2026). Myanmar has shown it is struggling to enhance its economic and military capacity, in contrast to China, which is currently ascending.

Comparison of the two countries’ military capabilities also shows unique patterns that can be considered in understanding the hierarchical relations. In the category of defense spending, China ranks only second to the US, while Myanmar is placed 12 ^th ( Lowy, 2026). Meanwhile, the military and paramilitary forces within the respective countries further highlight the power gap, with Myanmar’s military forces totaling approximately 204,000 in 2025, while China’s military forces are 12 times that number ( Lowy, 2026). Therefore, any relations between China and Myanmar are expected to be hierarchical, with one actor having considerably greater power than the other, enabling it to exert influence.

The discourse surrounding the two countries is also essential to consider. China is an emerging country, linked to discourses of great-power rivalry with the US ( Brooks & Wohlforth, 2016; Liping, 2001; Shambaugh, 2020; Zha, 2022). It is therefore no wonder that many studies have covered topics ranging from China’s global economic influence ( CIMB, 2018; Ho & Lee, 2025; Kuik, 2021; Tai & Soong, 2014), to how many states have had to hedge between China and the US due to the similarities in their power and potential to exert influence in Asia ( Dayant & Stanhope, 2025; Goh, 2016; Jones & Jenne, 2022). Meanwhile, the contrary exists in the context of Myanmar. The discourse that tends to be highlighted in Myanmar concerns domestic instability due to the junta’s authoritarian rule ( Amin & Chandni, 2021; Aung, 2025b; Turnell, 2011). Therefore, the dominant discourses surrounding its foreign policies have mainly focused on its continuous struggle to appease non-Western states such as Russia, India, and China ( Aswani, 2025; Naing, 2025; Tun, 2015) to survive amid ongoing domestic strife.

Having considered the fundamental differences between China and Myanmar, the variable of system structure suggests that Myanmar-China relations have been hierarchical, with Myanmar strongly dependent on China in the military sector. The dependency can be traced in several timeframes. First, when Western states imposed embargoes and sanctions on the military junta, the Tatmadaw was heavily reliant on states such as China to enhance its military capabilities before the 2011 attempted democratic transition ( Tun, 2015; Wong, 2021; Zhao & Yang, 2012). Meanwhile, after that slight episode of fluctuating relations post-2021, there have been clear indications that the military junta, through the SAC, has leaned back towards China to enhance its military capacities against the EAOs and other opposition forces within the country. After the ambivalence of China’s alignment preferences in the first two years after the coup, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledged USD 3 billion in assistance to the junta ( Reuters, 2024a). In general, despite the junta losing many grounds, China’s provision of military assistance continues to increase ( Abuza & Aung, 2025), displaying trust in the military rule.

There are several examples of existing military cooperation after the coup. China’s role has been detrimental in prolonging the SAC’s rule before the 2025 elections in Myanmar. In the information technology sector, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reported the continued sale of tools that enabled assisted societal repression and weakened guerrilla operations by opposition forces ( OHCHR, 2023). In a time of global condemnation and embargos, the transactions were pivotal, allowing the Tatmadaw to gain the upper hand in the vast domestic struggles it has encountered.

A look at transactions involving weaponry would also underscore the significance of China’s role in prolonging Myanmar’s authoritarian rule. Existing studies showed that China maintained a hedging and multipronged policy between 2021 and 2023, by engaging closely with the military junta’s opposition ( Ganesan, 2025; Hazarika & Konwer, 2025). However, the same reports published by the United Nations in 2023 also showed that the total weaponry transactions amounted to USD 267 million, with the weaponry including jet trainers, jet spare parts, helicopters, tanks, cargo planes, communication and interception technologies, as well as other military machinery tools ( OHCHR, 2023; SIPRI, 2026). This shows that despite several confusing policies in 2021 and 2023, China has maintained warm relations with the military junta, providing much-needed weaponry to support the Tatmadaw’s struggle for power.

Nevertheless, the weaponry itself provides the junta with important assets. Cooperation with China enabled the purchase of the FTC-2000G trainers in 2020, with the second and third batches delivered in August and December 2024, respectively ( Aye, 2024; CIR, 2025; Irrawaddy, 2022). With the junta increasing its airpower operations, the FTC-2000G trainers are a more cost-effective airpower option and are sufficient for civilian warfare, as in the case of Myanmar. Unfortunately, coinciding with such purchases has been the acceleration of air attacks, averaging 251 in 2024, with the highest in October 2024 (347 airstrikes) ( Abuza & Aung, 2025).

The continued military relationship between the SAC and China during the period of uncertainty in bilateral ties speaks volumes about the level of interaction. Myanmar acknowledges that China has a considerably larger military presence, and its influence is fundamental to prolonging the military junta’s rule. After the 2021 coup, the junta announced a prolonged state of emergency, with the SAC’s continued rule over the country. With the vast domestic instability that followed ( Michaels, 2023; Reuters, 2024b; Strangjo, 2024), the military junta struggled to maintain domestic stability and order. The presence of China’s military assistance speaks volumes for Myanmar’s military, as China was present during the time of crisis and fragility. Therefore, the military junta displayed trust in China, despite initial concerns that China might side with the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), the democratically elected leaders from the 2020 elections are currently in exile.

Neoclassical realism’s systemic stimulus variables reveal that Myanmar’s foreign policy options are severely limited. At the first level, the relative share of material capabilities already indicates that Myanmar would be acting more out of dependence than on an equal footing in negotiations. This is further exacerbated by the argument that the system structure has compelled Myanmar to remain confident in China’s goodwill and, by force, to neglect the slight leaning towards the Myanmar military’s opposition between 2021 and 2023. This is based on evolving relations, which see China as increasingly important to the junta as the Myanmar military increasingly relies on China’s weapons transactions. Furthermore, China’s continued willingness to proceed with weapons transactions after 2021, solidified by statements of commitment expressed by Chinese officials after 2023, further enhances Myanmar’s trust in China.

Systemic stimuli do not generate a fixed signal towards the states. The role is mainly defined by the limitations on the available foreign policy options. However, when it comes to the specific response to systemic stimuli, this section argues for the relevance of neoclassical realism’s sub-unit variables in understanding why the military junta places its faith in Myanmar-China ties despite fluctuating relations after the 2021 coup. This section will explore each of the sub-unit variables of leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions, and interpret them as variables that influence the SAC’s continued warm relations with China.

One of the intervening variables that explains the continued relations with China has been the evolution of the military junta’s leader images. In the past, the Myanmar military had always placed negative perceptions towards China, due to China’s past policy of backing the Burmese Communist Party troops ( Lintner, 2023; Oo, 2024). The leadership of Min Aung Hlaing was the third generation of the Myanmar junta’s dictatorship, with the previous generation of military leaders rising through the ranks during a period when the country struggled against rebels backed by China ( Moe, 2025). Therefore, a certain level of caution and suspicion is to be expected, given the historical animosity.

However, China’s policies of supporting the junta, which began after 1988 and intensified after 2023, laid the foundations for a favorable perception to be adopted. Despite the ambivalence of China’s alignment preferences after the coup, China expressed its support for the junta by inviting SAC leaders, including Min Aung Hlaing, Soe Win, and Tin Aung San, to visit China ( Head, 2024). Not only that, but the shift in the military’s perceptions can also be associated with changes in China’s policies aimed at compelling the junta’s opposition forces, as well as the vast expressed commitment to continue BRI-related projects in Myanmar.

Despite supporting EAOs and other opposition forces after the coup, the leader’s image shifted as soon as China began pressuring the opposition. For example, there has been several reports of China pressuring EAOs and opposition forces including the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, United Wa State Army, Arakan Army, and the Kachin Independence Army, to halt their operations, undertake peace talks with the junta, or pressure in general ( Abuza & Aung, 2025; Irrawaddy, 2024, 2025; Ko, 2025; Mizzima, 2024; MN, 2025; RFA, 2024b). Other policies favorable to the junta included the November 2024 Chinese regulation that blocked the export of dual-use technology to opposition groups. The policy, put in place following Lieutenant General Ni Lin Aung’s request to halt the flow of unmanned aerial vehicles to armed opposition forces ( Daye & Xijia, 2024), further solidified the shift in the leader’s image towards China as an ally rather than a threat.

One explanation for this shift in China’s policies has been the deployment of private security companies to operate and protect China’s investment interests in Myanmar ( EMG, 2024; Siow, 2024). The junta approved this plan in February 2025 ( MN, 2024) and, since the following month, has deployed approximately 30,000 conscripts ( Zan, 2024). This is a major shift in China’s Myanmar policy, as one of the reasons China leaned toward Myanmar’s opposition forces in the past was their promise to protect China’s economic interests in areas where the armed opposition operated ( Banerjee, 2024; Michaels, 2023). Ultimately, the vast shifts in China’s policies on the ground have allowed the military junta to adopt a more favorable leader image vis-à-vis China, enabling the Tatmadaw to shift its image to one that supports China’s initiatives to establish relative stability within the country.

Another contributor to the shift in leader images has been economic factors. China has always been an important ally in boosting Myanmar’s economy through its extensive investments, especially during the period when Myanmar suffered international isolation. Even during Myanmar’s period of attempted democratization since 2011, China continued to engage economically with democratically elected leaders, as evidenced by attempts to engage leaders such as Aung San Suu Kyi ( Stone, 2015; Xinhua, 2016). In 2020, for example, Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar led to the signing of 33 memoranda of understanding to enhance bilateral ties between the two nations ( Tan, 2021). However, things immediately shifted following the coup, with the lack of direct support ultimately raising questions about the continuity of BRI projects and other of China’s investments in Myanmar. However, a major turning point that has led the leaders’ images to lean toward positive perceptions has been the rhetoric of continued cooperation between China and the SAC, despite domestic instability.

The pledges for continued economic cooperation have taken several forms. Years after the coup, China pledged support to strengthen the Kyat currency by attracting more foreign investment to counter the soaring inflation ( Chau & Phyoe, 2024; IMF, 2026). Following the shift in China’s allegiances on the ground in 2025, Xi Jinping also urged SAC leaders to deepen cooperation and advance key projects for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (Head,2024; MOFAPRC, 2025). To further solidify China’s commitment to Myanmar leaders, Xi mentioned, “China will work with Myanmar to deepen the building of a community with a shared future, advance high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, and implement the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative, bringing greater benefits to the people of the two countries” ( SCIO, 2025).

Talks to presume key investment projects also fuel the shift in perceptions. For example, in 2026, China emphasized the importance of accelerating construction of the Mandalay-Muse line as part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which enhances connectivity between the two countries ( Irrawaddy, 2026). Officials from Myanmar have also expressed the need to accelerate development of the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone, which enables the export of Myanmar’s commodities in larger quantities ( Calabrese, 2025; ONM, 2025). Rather than completely abandoning its investments, China has shown that it is still much more than willing to preserve the investments already in place. For the SAC, having faced international isolation and embargoes, the continued presence of China’s investments speaks volumes about the trust placed in it and the prospects for economic development even under authoritarian rule.

Meanwhile, the other intervening variables in type II neoclassical realism offer limited explanations for why the military junta resumes relations with China. Strategic culture, domestic institutions, and state-society relations can influence foreign policy choices only in a democratic setting. In countries like Myanmar, therefore, these variables hold less explanatory power. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that connections and arguments can be made about their limited influence to make sense of the foreign policy anomaly.

Regarding the variable of strategic culture, for example, the Myanmar junta has always been associated with the discourse of protecting Buddhism. To a certain extent, this has led to success and gained popularity for sympathizers. The policies can be traced back to 1961, when U Nu enacted Myanmar’s State Religion Act, which declared Buddhism as the state’s religion ( Bo, 2023). During that time, many Buddhist Myanmar citizens supported the military, perceiving that the junta had the capacity to respond to instabilities caused by ethnic minorities ( Aung, 2025b). This certain identity of the junta would further be solidified with the 1982 Citizenship Law that restricted citizenship for those of Chinese descent and Myanmar Muslims ( Rhoads, 2023).

Against that backdrop, the military junta’s actions continue to be framed within the norms of protecting the Buddhist identity. Even after the 2021 coup, some elements of society continued to support the junta because of the norms they embraced. Ultranationalist Buddhist groups such as the ‘Ma Ba Tha’ continue to be among those that have expressed support for the military’s justifications for the coup ( Foxeus, 2023; Kyaw, 2019). As a result, Min Aung Hlaing, after the coup, continued to establish close ties with the monks, aiming to legitimize their actions through religious symbolism-i.e., Saffron Washing.

Therefore, to connect the dots on how this saffron washing relates to Myanmar’s ties with China, one can reveal the underlying interests from the SAC’s perspective. The Myanmar junta perceives that its operations within the country are pivotal to maintaining order and establishing stability, thereby reviving and sustaining this identity as a Buddhist nation. Therefore, when China reverted its allegiance to the junta by supplying arms, committed to presume with their investments in Myanmar, and limit the movement of the armed opposition forces, these forms of support allow the junta to presume their actions and policies of saffron washing and gain further support from the Buddhist societal elements within Myanmar.

Meanwhile, a look at the intervening variable of state-society relations would also reveal that it has less power to filter or impact foreign policy. In Myanmar, society has little power to influence foreign policy, let alone the much-needed domestic reforms. After the coup, for example, the SAC had the full authority to declare a state of emergency for six months, followed by multiple extensions of this period ( Aung, 2025b; Brenner, 2024; Ratcliffe, 2025). Even amid consistent opposition from various parts of society ( Brenner, 2024), the military rule prevailed.

It was only during that brief period of democracy between 2011 and 2021 that the state-society relations variable was considered relevant. This is marked, for example, by the significant rejection of certain China-financed projects, which led to their eventual halt or termination. Massive public backlash against the Myitsone dam eventually led to the project’s being halted, and continued throughout the attempted democratic transition period ( Kiik, 2023; Kim, 2025). However, with the return to authoritarian rule, little power has been placed in society’s hands. Therefore, there seems to be little to no burden on the military junta to facilitate the people’s voices, especially on matters related to China, where the junta has increased its dependency.

Similar to the intervening variable of state-society relations, the domestic institutions variable also shows limited capacity to influence the Myanmar junta’s foreign policy options. One simple explanation for this is the continuation of BRI projects within the country, despite ongoing discourse on the negative implications of China’s investments ( Aoyama, 2016; Banks, 2020; Yu, 2024). As mentioned previously in this section, the resumption of strategic projects such as the Kyauk Phyu Special Economic Zone, the Deep-Sea Port project, and the China-Myanmar railway indicates that the junta is disregarding negative discourse associated with the BRI. Within the neoclassical realism literature, the presence of domestic institutions is understood to limit the types of cooperation undertaken by the country, given the significance of differing opinions within them. However, in an authoritarian setting like Myanmar, the variable fails to make a considerable impact.

Despite past fluctuations in relations, Myanmar’s contemporary foreign policy views China as one of its most formidable allies. Just years before that, the two years after the 2021 coup, China was in a position of aiding and supporting the junta’s armed opposition forces in a bid to secure its vast economic interests in Myanmar. Not only did Chinese officials refrain from openly supporting the junta’s 2021 coup, but there was also doubt that the junta would retain its rule, out of fear that the Tatmadaw would not be able to effectively curb the growing opposition. However, the Myanmar junta continues to place its faith in China’s goodwill, aligning its interests and re-establishing the long ties that have helped maintain the military’s rule for decades. What explains such a foreign policy anomaly?

The continued readjustments in Myanmar’s foreign policy are framed in this study within the type II neoclassical realism analytical framework. At the first level, it acknowledges that the SAC’s foreign policy decision is influenced by systemic stimuli, which are filtered and shaped by several intervening variables (sub-unit variables). This study, therefore, examines each variable to explain Myanmar’s contemporary international relations after the 2021 coup and assesses its explanatory power for understanding the unique dynamics of Myanmar’s alignment options. A neoclassical realism’s interpretation, therefore, acknowledges that foreign policies are a product of a state responding to certain systemic stimuli, after passing through the prism of the state that perceives and responds to unique domestic circumstances.

The independent variable of systemic stimuli yields interesting insights that allow for a more nuanced understanding of Myanmar’s foreign policy toward China. The argument presented in this article is that a consideration of the variables of power and position in the international system, structural modifiers, and relative material capabilities reveals the limitations of the foreign policy interactions Myanmar can undertake with China. Comparing the military and defense figures between the two countries reveals a major disparity in defense capacity, shaped by distinct discourses of state identity. Myanmar is connected with the discourse of being domestically unstable due to decades of its authoritarian rule and domestic strife. Meanwhile, China has always been portrayed as having the economic capacity to exert influence over secondary nations. Therefore, as expected, a hierarchical relationship exists and defines bilateral ties, severely limiting Myanmar’s foreign policy options.

It is therefore no surprise to see that the level of interaction between the countries has been marked by military dependence on China. Under constant threat from the junta’s armed opposition forces, especially the EAOs, China has emerged as a dependable ally with vast procurements available for purchase. Ranging from surveillance technologies and unmanned systems to the enhancement of Myanmar’s air power, the relations between Myanmar and China have definitely evolved after 2023, allowing closer ties to be established. As a result, despite China’s ambivalence in its alignment preferences in the first two years after the 2021 coup, its shift back to the junta’s side speaks volumes about why the junta has sought to maintain relations with its neighbor.

In addition, several sub-unit-level variables are considered influential in shaping Myanmar’s decision. A look into the intervening variable of image leaders would reveal evolving shifts in the Myanmar junta’s perceptions of China, which went from historical animosity to hope and positive perceptions. The development of the perspective can be attributed to several factors, among them China’s opening to military and economic cooperation and its acceptance of the authoritarian rule of the SAC (even before the 2025 elections). With several of China’s strategic investments at stake, including the Kyak Phyu Special Economic Zone and Deep-Sea Port, and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the shift back to the junta has been perceived as an opportunity for the SAC to overlook past misalliances.

Meanwhile, given the authoritarian context of contemporary Myanmar, this study also reveals the limitations of other intervening variables in making sense of the foreign policy anomaly. The variable of strategic culture, for example, is influential in explaining the Tatmadaw’s confidence in undertaking its military operations, due to its continued rhetoric of protecting Myanmar’s Buddhist identity. The SAC, therefore, welcomes China’s continued support, as it enables the SAC to expand its operations. Meanwhile, the variables of state-society relations and domestic institutions had an impact only during Myanmar’s attempted democratic transition between 2011 and 2021. They showed little impact during SAC’s authoritarian rule after the coup.