[version 1; peer review: 2 approved with reservations]
No competing interests were disclosed.
How do state actors act in regional organizations? For decades, international relations scholars assessing Southeast Asia have examined the agency of middle powers in the region, exerting influence and shaping the introduction of regional norms. However, less has been assessed in the context of smaller states such as Laos, which has displayed some unique traits in its foreign policy. Among the empirical anomalies is Laos’ display of neutrality, despite growing closer to China’s lucrative economic opportunities in the past decades. As a means to understand why Laos’s chairmanship roles have displayed neutrality, this study bridges the relevance of neoclassical realism’s theoretical framework to make sense of foreign policies that are out of the ordinary. Drawing on primary and secondary data on Laos’ ASEAN chairmanships in 2016 and 2024, this study argues that domestic considerations (the growing negative sentiment towards economic ties with China) and external determinants (power relations with China and ASEAN regionalism) affect Laos’ external outlook.
Laos has held the chairmanship role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) three times since its membership in the organization in 1997. ASEAN is a unique regional organization, prioritizing the importance of what scholars and observers name as the ‘ASEAN Way,’ with its diplomatic conduct geared to the non-coercive resolution of conflicts, consensus-based decision-making, and non-interference of the domestic politics of its member states (
Concerning China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the expectation is that Laos would side with China in ASEAN. Studies have already concluded that Laos is a ‘vassal’ or ‘satellite’ nation to China (
This opinion article argues that consultation is needed for the international relations theory of neoclassical realism to make sense of such an empirical anomaly. Neoclassical realism aims to make sense of foreign policy choices that are out of the ordinary (
Currently, no study has examined Laos’ engagement with ASEAN. The dominant discourse assessing Laos’ external outlook has focused on interpreting Laos’ growing ties with China in the economic domain. The discourse itself is divided into two groups, with those arguing that Laos adopts a balancing strategy vis-à-vis China (
Neoclassical realism bridged to this study argues the relevance of two variables. First, the ‘systemic stimuli’ is its independent variable. The argument is that states are primarily influenced by their external environment, limiting the number of foreign policy options a state can take (
The intervening variable is understood as the unit and sub-unit level variables that are influential in informing a state’s foreign policy. These include perception, decision-making, and policy implementation processes, which are constructed by leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions (
The case of Laos is particularly interesting for this assessment, as Laos’ governance is confined and limited to the authority of the LPRP as the dominant and only political party of Laos. As one of the few states that openly endorse communism and adopt authoritarian rule, its actions in ASEAN could, with ease, represent the national interests of China to secure more funding for its ambitious development plans (
Laos’ ASEAN chairmanship in 2016 and 2024 faced several challenges that had its roots with China’s involvement in the region. By 2016, China’s maritime diplomatic strategies had evolved to a level that was perceived as assertive by claimant states to the South China Sea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia (
In 2016, Laos displayed neutrality amid tensions between the Philippines and China over the language used for the 2016 Joint Statement of ASEAN Foreign Ministers and China. The Philippines, being a victim of China’s assertive claiming within its Exclusive Economic Zone, demanded the chair to include legal phrases in the joint statement; meanwhile, China preferred the adoption of vague languages (
Meanwhile, Laos’ chairmanship in 2024 emphasized the importance of ASEAN centrality vis-à-vis the tensions in the Indo-Pacific. As stated in the 44
th and 45
th ASEAN Summit Chairman’s Statement, Laos reiterated the relevance of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) for the region by reaffirming “ASEAN’s commitment to promote an enabling environment for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region by leading the evolving regional architecture including through ASEAN-led mechanisms and managing the impact of geopolitical and geostrategic shifts …” (
The international system does not generate a fixed signal. China’s rise in the Asia Pacific exerts pressure on smaller states like Laos to align with China to secure economic benefits. However, this is not an automatic process. Based on the strategic environment of Laos, there is still a special perception reserved for Thailand and Vietnam (
Structural modifiers are another systemic stimuli variable relevant to Laos’ actions in its ASEAN chairmanships. Laos is a landlocked country, which ultimately means that its options for development are severely limited. Laos perceives that it is pivotal to diversify its economic relations with the Southeast Asian states by displaying good faith in ASEAN, as it helps accelerate Laos’ integration into the Southeast Asian markets. In its current form, Laos is categorized into the CMLV (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam) category, a list of the least-developed economies in Southeast Asia (
What can the independent variables of neoclassical realism explain concerning Laos’ neutrality in its 2016 and 2024 ASEAN chairmanship? China’s investments in Laos have started to generate negative responses from the Lao people. The practices of shoddy constructions, forced land grabbing, granting of land and mining concessions, an increase in debt, and a larger presence of Chinese working migrants have all contributed to the rise of this negative perspective (
Nevertheless, accommodating the growing voices to distance Laos from a dependent economic tie with China is heard for the LPRP. As studies in the past have shown, even autocratic states consider the voices of their opposition. As seen in the case of Cambodia, Hun Sen’s nearly three-decade rule had to start accommodating the concerns of opposition movements with the rise of Cambodia’s opposition political party’s popularity (
Therefore, in the case of the LPRP, the state-society relations sub-unit variable under neoclassical realism is influential in understanding Laos’ accommodation of the negative sentiment opinions within Laos. If the LPRP were to take the option of siding with China, as Cambodia did during its ASEAN chairmanship of 2012, it would risk the perception of growing dependent ties with China. The Lao people are increasingly cautious of China’s investments within the state, so this would not be a strategic policy for the LPRP. Practically all of China’s BRI projects in Laos have received backlash from the public. With the Vientiane-Boten railway project, for example, citizens questioned whether Laos was truly becoming the ‘hub’ of mainland Southeast Asian trade due to insufficient commodities to export (
No data are associated with this article.
The author correctly identifies the current academic tension between those viewing Laos as a "vassal state" and those seeing a "balancing strategy". However, the literature review could be improved by more explicitly linking the ASEAN Way to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) as a proactive geopolitical tool rather than just a set of procedural norms
Are all factual statements correct and adequately supported by citations?
Assessment: Partially Yes.
Detail: Key factual claims, such as the total volume of Chinese investment in Laos (USD 16.5 billion) and the country's debt-to-GDP ratio (over 100%), are well-supported by credible citations from the American Enterprise Institute and various regional reports but would differs significantly with the report from IMF, Fitch, AMRO, and Statista which put the debt to GDP ratio below 100%. Their is need to put the contrasting result on the manuscript while kept the main argument.
Are arguments sufficiently supported by evidence from the published literature
Assessment: Partially.
Detail: The use of the neoclassical realism framework is well-grounded in foundational texts by Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell. However, the argument that "state-society relations" (public sentiment) significantly drive foreign policy in a one-party autocratic state like the LPRP requires more robust evidence of the specific mechanism through which this sentiment influences the elite decision-makers.
Additional Recommendation:
1. Synthesize the "AOIP as a Shield": The author should more clearly argue that the AOIP is the geopolitical manifestation of the ASEAN Way. It is the tool Laos uses to translate "neutrality" into a functional regional architecture that resists being pulled into either the US or Chinese orbit.
2. Put the highlight of how the intensification of the US-China rivalry is what forced the evolution of the AOIP to protect the "ASEAN Way".
3 consider the idea that by using the AOIP, Laos isn't just "staying out of it," but is actively shaping a regional order where ASEAN remains the central manager of great power competition.
Is the topic of the opinion article discussed accurately in the context of the current literature?
Yes
Are arguments sufficiently supported by evidence from the published literature?
Partly
Are all factual statements correct and adequately supported by citations?
Partly
Are the conclusions drawn balanced and justified on the basis of the presented arguments?
Yes
Reviewer Expertise:
Area of the research: Security Studies, Cybersecurity, Geopolitic in Indo-Pacific
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have significant reservations, as outlined above.
COMMENT 1
The author correctly identifies the current academic tension between those viewing Laos as a "vassal state" and those who see a "balancing strategy". However, the literature review could be improved by more explicitly linking the ASEAN Way to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) as a proactive geopolitical tool rather than just a set of procedural norms
Response
: I agree that the AOIP should be recognized as a proactive geopolitical tool introduced by ASEAN, which are consistent to the ASEAN Way. The literature review of this comment article focuses on the subject of Laos, and how it has navigated around the great power rivalries occurring within the region. Therefore, rather than place an explanation on the AOIP and how scholars have interpreted this as related to the ASEAN Way, this discourse is introduced after the literature review (page 3, first paragraph of section 3):
“Laos’ ASEAN chairmanship in 2016 and 2024 faced several challenges rooted in China’s involvement in the region. By 2016, China’s maritime diplomatic strategies had evolved to a level that was perceived as assertive by claimant states to the South China Sea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia ( Reuters, 2016; Yu, 2016; Basawantara, 2020; Chubb, 2022; Putra and Cangara, 2022; Putra, 2023a). The deepened great power politics in the Indo-Pacific also brought into question the possible fading role of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific region as great powers started to establish their groupings to define, in their terms, the geopolitical significance of the region ( Chacko and Willis, 2018; Scott, 2019; Singh and Tsjeng, 2020; Tan, 2020; Hall, Lee-Brown and Strating, 2024). However, as noted in several other past studies, there is a discourse showing that recently introduced initiatives such as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) have served as ASEAN’s proactive geopolitical tool to shape Southeast Asia’s responses towards uncertainties deriving from great power tensions in alignment to the ASEAN Way (Acharya, 2019; Anwar, 2020; Singh and Tsjeng, 2020; Putra, Cangara and Darwis, 2024).f”
COMMENT 2
Are all factual statements correct and adequately supported by citations?
Assessment: Partially Yes.
Detail: Key factual claims, such as the total volume of Chinese investment in Laos (USD 16.5 billion) and the country's debt-to-GDP ratio (over 100%), are well-supported by credible citations from the American Enterprise Institute and various regional reports but would differs significantly with the report from IMF, Fitch, AMRO, and Statista which put the debt to GDP ratio below 100%. Their is need to put the contrasting result on the manuscript while kept the main argument.
Response: On the point of Laos’ debt-to-GDP ratio, I am having contrasting results to those conveyed by the reviewer. Looking at AMRO and Statista, for example, I see that the figures are consistent with what I claim in the article (above 100%). Therefore, rather than introducing new figures into the argument, I chose to add a sentence at the end of page 4’s second last paragraph, which states that the exact figures are still debated. The revised paragraph:
“Structural modifiers are another systemic-stimuli variable relevant to Laos’ actions during its ASEAN chairmanships. Laos is a landlocked country, which ultimately means that its options for development are severely limited. Laos perceives it as pivotal to diversify its economic relations with Southeast Asian states by demonstrating good faith in ASEAN, as this helps accelerate Laos’ integration into Southeast Asian markets. In its current form, Laos is categorized as part of the CMLV (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam) group, which comprises the least-developed economies in Southeast Asia (Chirathivat, 2002; Narjoko and Amri, 2007; Cuyvers, 2019). A display of commitment to the ASEAN Way allows Laos to explore alternative avenues of cooperation. The economic ties between Laos and China have negatively affected Laos’ foreign debt, which is currently higher than 100% of its GDP (Macan-Markar, 2022; Tiwari, 2024; Walker, 2024). Although the exact figures have been debated, there is still a strong acknowledgement that Laos’ debts is concerning.”
COMMENT 3
Are arguments sufficiently supported by evidence from the published literature
Assessment: Partially.
Detail: The use of the neoclassical realism framework is well-grounded in foundational texts by Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell. However, the argument that "state-society relations" (public sentiment) significantly drive foreign policy in a one-party autocratic state like the LPRP requires more robust evidence of the specific mechanism through which this sentiment influences the elite decision-makers.
Response: There are multiple angles to respond to this inquiry. At the first level, I make clear that the neoclassical realism framework places importance on autocratic leaders having strong control over their state. However, I go on to explain that, as in the case of Cambodia, even in undemocratic settings, there is an immense potential for the people’s voices to be accommodated as a means to preserve power and ensure regime survival. I therefore conclude that although the LPRP has the means to exert power over its people, it does so in a way that still tries to accommodate the people's concerns, in order to preserve the regime and its survival. These three paragraphs below explain my point (revised):
Point 1 in paragraph 1, page 5: “Assessing the unit and sub-unit variables of neoclassical realism poses one main challenge. Unlike in democratic settings, there is virtually no room for other voices of opposition to effect change within Laos’ governance due to its autocratic rule. Therefore, the LPRP holds the ultimate rule in the perception, decision-making, and policy implementation of its foreign policies.”
Point 2 in paragraph 2, page 5: “Nevertheless, there is a chance for the LPRP to accommodate the growing voices calling for a distance from China's economic dependence. For example, as a comparison, studies have shown that even autocratic states consider the voices of their opposition. As seen in Cambodia, Hun Sen’s nearly three-decade rule had to start accommodating the concerns of opposition movements as the popularity of Cambodia’s opposition political party rose (Blanchard, 2017; Morgenbesser, 2019; Thul, 2023). Bader found that autocratic nations must display strong economic performance to compensate for deficiencies in political participation (Bader, 2015). However, if a growing opposition movement or voices are observed, the risks could be detrimental to a regime's survival.”
Point 3 in paragraph 3, page 5: “Therefore, in the case of the LPRP, the state-society relations sub-unit variable under neoclassical realism is influential in understanding Laos’ accommodation of the negative sentiment opinions within Laos. If the LPRP were to choose to side with China, as Cambodia did during its ASEAN chairmanship in 2012, it would risk the perception of growing dependence on China. The Lao people are increasingly cautious of China’s investments within the state, so this would not be a strategic policy for the LPRP. Practically all of China’s BRI projects in Laos have faced public backlash. With the Vientiane-Boten railway project, for example, citizens questioned whether Laos was truly becoming the ‘hub’ of mainland Southeast Asian trade due to insufficient commodities to export ( Freeman, 2019; Seneviratne, 2024) and the fact that mining concessions were used as collateral in case the railway did not generate enough return for China’s investments ( Pang, 2017; SIIS, 2017; Albert, 2019; Walker, 2024). By taking the side of the ASEAN Way, the LPRP benefits by distancing itself from the discourse of being overly attached to China, thereby satisfying the Lao people’s concerns about injustices associated with the BRI projects in Laos.”
COMMENT 4:
Synthesize the "AOIP as a Shield": The author should more clearly argue that the AOIP is the geopolitical manifestation of the ASEAN Way. It is the tool Laos uses to translate "neutrality" into a functional regional architecture that resists being pulled into either the US or Chinese orbit. It highlights that the intensification of the US-China rivalry forced the evolution of the AOIP to protect the "ASEAN Way".
Response:
I agree that the AOIP’s significance can be elevated in the texts. The revisions can be seen in page 3, paragraph 1 of section 3: “Laos’ ASEAN chairmanship in 2016 and 2024 faced several challenges rooted in China’s involvement in the region. By 2016, China’s maritime diplomatic strategies had evolved to a level that was perceived as assertive by claimant states to the South China Sea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia ( Reuters, 2016; Yu, 2016; Basawantara, 2020; Chubb, 2022; Putra and Cangara, 2022; Putra, 2023a). The deepened great power politics in the Indo-Pacific also brought into question the possible fading role of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific region as great powers started to establish their groupings to define, in their terms, the geopolitical significance of the region ( Chacko and Willis, 2018; Scott, 2019; Singh and Tsjeng, 2020; Tan, 2020; Hall, Lee-Brown and Strating, 2024). However, as noted in several other past studies, there is a discourse showing that recently introduced initiatives such as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) have served as ASEAN’s proactive geopolitical tool to shape Southeast Asia’s responses towards uncertainties deriving from great power tensions in alignment to the ASEAN Way (Acharya, 2019; Anwar, 2020; Singh and Tsjeng, 2020; Putra, Cangara and Darwis, 2024). The AOIP, therefore, has served as a shield for ASEAN, protecting the regional organization from the intensification of the US-China rivalry through measures consistent with ASEAN’s principles.”
COMMENT 5
3 consider the idea that by using the AOIP, Laos isn't just "staying out of it," but is actively shaping a regional order where ASEAN remains the central manager of great power competition.
Response: I refrained from using the words ‘actively shaping a regional order’ in the context of Laos’ chairmanship role in ASEAN. I argue that, regarding the AOIP, Indonesia displayed the most agency in establishing the document among ASEAN member states. Therefore, Laos’ chairmanship in 2024 was simply to continue asserting the importance of abiding by the AOIP, rather than create new initiatives to shape the regional response through initiating new methods. I would use these words, if, for example, Indonesia contributed directly to the formation of the AOIP or forums/partnerships that were born from the AOIP (for example, the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum).
1. General Assessment
The article addresses a highly compelling research problem with significant practical value: decoding Laos' "neutral" policy during its ASEAN Chairmanship (2016, 2024) despite the country’s profound economic dependence on China. The author successfully employs the Neoclassical Realism framework to challenge the prevailing view that Laos is merely a "vassal state."
2. Key Strengths
Appropriate Theoretical Framework: The application of Neoclassical Realism is a highly pertinent choice. It allows for an analysis of how "domestic filters" (intervening variables)—such as leadership perceptions and state-society relations—mediate and calibrate systemic pressures from the international environment.
Sharp Insight into Internal Politics: The paper correctly identifies that even within a single-party system like Laos, the LPRP must account for public dissatisfaction regarding public debt and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects to maintain political legitimacy.
Empirical Evidence: The author provides concrete examples of how Laos coordinated ASEAN joint statements to avoid overt side-taking, thereby preserving the "ASEAN Way" and diversifying its foreign relations.
3. Limitations and Areas for Improvement
Despite these contributions, several points require further clarification and strengthening:
Primary Data Gap: While the theoretical framework emphasizes "decision-maker perceptions," the article relies heavily on third-party surveys (e.g., ISEAS) and media reports. The author should incorporate more primary sources or a deeper analysis of official statements from Lao leadership to demonstrate how this "filtering" mechanism operates in practice.
Weight of Variables: The paper does not clearly decouple the influence of historical factors (the special relationship with Vietnam) from current economic pressures from China. Clarifying which variable carries more weight at specific junctures would make the argument more persuasive.
Insufficient Comparative Analysis: The comparison with Cambodia’s 2012 chairmanship remains somewhat superficial. Laos is a landlocked nation, which creates structural constraints in security and economic logistics that are vastly different from Cambodia's. The author should delve deeper into these geopolitical nuances.
Monolithic View of Leadership: The article treats the LPRP as a monolithic entity in decision-making. A comprehensive Neoclassical Realist analysis should consider whether there are diverging views or factions within the elite regarding dependency on China.
4. Conclusion
This is a high-quality study that offers a fresh perspective on the foreign policy of small states in the region. The paper would gain significantly more weight if the author strengthens the empirical data regarding internal decision-making processes and deepens the comparative geopolitical analysis.
Is the topic of the opinion article discussed accurately in the context of the current literature?
Yes
Are arguments sufficiently supported by evidence from the published literature?
Partly
Are all factual statements correct and adequately supported by citations?
Partly
Are the conclusions drawn balanced and justified on the basis of the presented arguments?
Partly
Reviewer Expertise:
International Relations, Political Science, Historical Sciences
I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have significant reservations, as outlined above.
COMMENT 1
Primary Data Gap: While the theoretical framework emphasizes "decision-maker perceptions," the article relies heavily on third-party surveys (e.g., ISEAS) and media reports. The author should incorporate more primary sources or a deeper analysis of official statements from Lao leadership to demonstrate how this "filtering" mechanism operates in practice.
Response:
Several primary sources are utilized in this comment article. Most notably, as the intention is to display the neutrality of Laos during its ASEAN chairmanships, the referenced sources are those that have been expresse during ASEAN forums, which includes in the 2016 and 2024 chairmanships. Several changes can be seen in page 3 (last paragraph) and 4 (first paragraph):
Quote 1: As one of the joint statement’s operative clauses mentioned: “The parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law” ( ASEAN, 2016, p.2).
Quote 2: As stated in the 44 th and 45 th ASEAN Summit Chairman’s Statement, Laos reiterated the relevance of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) for the region by reaffirming “ASEAN’s commitment to promote an enabling environment for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region by leading the evolving regional architecture including through ASEAN-led mechanisms and managing the impact of geopolitical and geostrategic shifts …” ( ASEAN, 2024, p.10).
Quote 3: With regards to the South China Sea dispute, Laos again refrained from siding with China by emphasizing the importance of an ASEAN-centered solution and parties to avoid confrontational actions: “We emphasized the importance of self-restraint in the conduct of all activities by claimants and all other states […] and thus welcomed practical measures that could reduce tensions and the risks of accidents, misunderstandings, and miscalculations” ( ASEAN, 2024, p.41).
COMMENT 2
Weight of Variables: The paper does not clearly decouple the influence of historical factors (the special relationship with Vietnam) from current economic pressures from China. Clarifying which variable carries more weight at specific junctures would make the argument more persuasive.
Response: In page 4, paragraph 2, I have clarified what I mean on the point of significant historical factors that shape the Laos-Vietnam bilateral relations. Nevertheless, I refrain from using the terms ‘weighing’ as the neoclassical realism framework does not delve deep into comparing the significance of alliance relations as a response to systemic stimuli. The revised paragraph within the text:
“The international system does not generate a fixed signal. China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific exerts pressure on smaller states like Laos to align with it to secure economic benefits. However, this is not an automatic process. Given the strategic environment of Laos, there remains a special perception reserved for Thailand and Vietnam (Thayer, 1982; Giang and Phuong, 2024; Phoonphongphiphat, 2024) due to historical attachments, convergence of political views, and mutual economic benefits. With Vietnam, for example, the special relationship can be attributed to the shared communist ideology and close ties that were earlier established during the Cold War. Fully siding with China will expose Laos to self-isolation and an overly dependent foreign policy. For Laos, over-dependence on a great power is dangerous to the state's stability, as seen in Laos’ struggle during the Cold War after the weakening and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union (Meng, 1987; Evans, 1998; Rathie, 2017; Leon, 2024).”
COMMENT 3
Insufficient Comparative Analysis: The comparison with Cambodia’s 2012 chairmanship remains somewhat superficial. Laos is a landlocked nation, which creates structural constraints in security and economic logistics that are vastly different from Cambodia's. The author should delve deeper into these geopolitical nuances.
Response: The introduction of Cambodia into the analysis has the function of showing readers how another new member of ASEAN has shown that it can deviate away from the ASEAN Way when there are economic pressures that the state faces. In the context of Cambodia, as explained in the texts, the primary concern lies on the issue that both Cambodia and Laos are facing significant economic hardships, and this is somewhat contributed by the increasing debt incurred from China. As pointed, therefore in the analysis, the expectation is that Laos would display similar foreign policies to Cambodia during its chairmanships, due to the similarities of challenges encountered. This point is emphasized continuously:
Page 2 paragraph 2: “Regarding China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the expectation is that Laos would align with China within ASEAN. Studies have already concluded that Laos is a ‘vassal’ or ‘satellite’ nation to China ( Hunt, 2016; Kuik, 2021; Macan-Markar, 2022; Lin, 2023a; Mahtani and Huiying, 2024). China’s total investment in Laos from 2005 to 2024 amounts to USD 16.5 billion (AEI, 2024). Several large-scale infrastructure development projects that Chinese investments have helped build since the launch of the BRI in 2013 include the Vientiane-Boten railway, special economic zones, and hydropower dams (Kuik, 2021; LMOFA, 2021; Seneviratne, 2024). Consequently, scholars have argued for a strong connection between China’s BRI and the survival of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) regime (Lampton, Ho and Kuik, 2020; Kuik, 2021; Kuik and Rosli, 2023). In contrast to Laos’ position, Cambodia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2012 aligned with China’s national interests regarding ASEAN’s response to the South China Sea (Minh Vu, 2019; Dunst, 2021; Pich, 2021). So why doesn’t Laos display a similar gesture?”
Page 2, paragraph 3: “Therefore, in the case of the LPRP, the state-society relations sub-unit variable under neoclassical realism is influential in understanding Laos’ accommodation of the negative sentiment opinions within Laos. If the LPRP were to choose to side with China, as Cambodia did during its ASEAN chairmanship in 2012, it would risk the perception of growing dependence on China”
COMMENT 4
Monolithic View of Leadership: The article treats the LPRP as a monolithic entity in decision-making. A comprehensive Neoclassical Realist analysis should consider whether there are diverging views or factions within the elite regarding dependency on China.
Response: I agree that this is a potential argument/interpretation in regards to Laos’ foreign policy. However, I have pre-emptively responded to this, as I explain the patterns of foreign policies in states that have questioned democratic practices in place. Most notably this is responded to in paragraph 2, page 5:
“Nevertheless, accommodating the growing voices calling for a distance from China's economic dependence is heard within the LPRP. As studies have shown, even autocratic states consider the voices of their opposition. As seen in Cambodia, Hun Sen’s nearly three-decade rule had to start accommodating the concerns of opposition movements as the popularity of Cambodia’s opposition political party rose (Blanchard, 2017; Morgenbesser, 2019; Thul, 2023). Bader found that autocratic nations must display strong economic performance to compensate for deficiencies in political participation (Bader, 2015). However, if a growing opposition movement or voices are observed, the risks could be detrimental to a regime's survival.”