Keywords
Tech Support Fraud, Technical Support Scam, Elders, Older Adults, Computer Security, aging, behavioural intentions, patterns
Older adults often fall victim to technology (tech) support fraud, with criminals leveraging on psychological manipulation and perceived authority to exploit victims. Often unfamiliar with evolving digital threats, they may be particularly susceptible due to cognitive aging, social isolation, and trust in perceived authoritative figures. Despite growing awareness of cyber fraud, there are insufficient tailored fraud preventive strategies that address the specific vulnerabilities of older victims. This study investigates how psychological manipulation tactics influence compliance and reporting behavior among elderly victims of tech support fraud, filling a critical gap in fraud prevention research.
The authors conducted a literature search on Google’s scholar to identify research papers related to elderly fraud and tech support scams. In addition, using qualitative analysis, the authors analyzed tech support fraud cases sourced from the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) to identify recurring themes in victim experiences. Three dominant themes emerged: emotional manipulation, perceived authority, and barriers to reporting. Scammers exploit fear and legitimacy, posing as trusted entities to gain compliance.
Findings reveal that financial loss, shame, and family support affect victims’ likelihood of reporting these incidents. Victims who do not suffer monetary harm often refrain from reporting due to shame, embarrassment, or skepticism about law enforcement response. Family involvement appears to positively influence reporting behavior, reinforcing the importance of social networks in fraud prevention.
This study underscores the urgent need for targeted education programs that equip elderly individuals to recognize fraud tactics and report incidents irrespective of financial impact. It calls for fraud prevention strategies that incorporate accessible training materials, social network engagement, and multi-channel awareness campaigns. Future research should incorporate diverse data sources to expand and refine these findings and explore intervention strategies that mitigate psychological barriers to report fraud among elderly victims.
Tech Support Fraud, Technical Support Scam, Elders, Older Adults, Computer Security, aging, behavioural intentions, patterns
As technology permeates every facet of our daily lives, elderly people face a growing threat: fraud exploitation. In 2023 in the US, there were over 100,000 complaints of individuals over 60years of age falling victim to fraudulent schemes, highlighting a troubling trend.1
Tech support fraud has emerged as a threatening scam for the elderly in the US, accounting for nearly 17,700 complaints in 2023 - an alarming 27% increase from 2021. These scams cost the elderly community nearly $590 million, more than double the financial losses reported just two years prior.1
The nature of the scam is that it deceives victims into granting access to their electronic devices under the pretense of providing technical support from a genuine and well established company.2
Several factors exacerbate the elderly’s susceptibility to fraud, including the rapid pace of technological change, cognitive decline, and physical isolation, which hinder their ability to recognize or manage complex fraud scenarios.3 While some researchers have called for stricter legislation to combat elderly fraud, these efforts are often hampered by vague legal language, and an inability to encompass the full range of fraudulent tactics.4 Other studies emphasize the critical role of security awareness, proposing automated training tools for the elderly.5 However, such solutions face limitations due to varying levels of digital skill among the elderly.6 One of the key observations is that elderly fraud is underreported.7 Despite the increasing body of research on elder fraud, there is a noticeable gap in understanding the psychological barriers that prevent older victims from reporting tech support fraud. This study seeks to address this gap by exploring how psychological manipulation, perceived authority, and emotional responses impact victims’ reporting behavior. Furthermore, it aims to identify key barriers to reporting and examine how family involvement can affect victims’ willingness to act. The research is guided by the following questions.
RQ1. What specific psychological levers do scammers use to exploit the elderly victims in tech support fraud cases?
RQ2. How do emotional responses and family involvement impact the likelihood of elderly victims reporting tech support fraud incidents?
RQ3. What are the barriers preventing elderly victims from reporting fraud, and how these can be addressed in preventing strategies?
RQ4. How does perceived authority increase the success rate of tech support fraud targeting the elderly?
By answering these questions, this research aims to uncover how barriers to reporting can be dismantled, thereby encouraging better reporting practices and informing more effective preventive strategies. This study is particularly timely and crucial, as it seeks to empower both the elderly and those who care for them, enhancing fraud prevention efforts tailored to this vulnerable demographic. The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature, Section 3 outlines the research methodology, Section 4 presents the study’s findings, Section 5 discusses the results along with their limitations, and direction for future research, and Section 6 presents the concluding remarks.
The assessment of financial capacity among elderly individuals engaging with digital financial technologies has gained significant attention in recent studies. Tools such as Electronic Financial Instrument Screening Tool (EFIST) helps clinicians identify the risk of financial exploitation among elderly individuals. Additionally, the Financial Capacity Assessment Tool (FCAT), provides a structured evaluation on decision - making and financial knowledge.4 Despite their usefulness, these tools have their limitations, including the subjective nature of assessing financial capacity and the complexity of digital financial tasks.4 Importantly, impairments in digital financial skills should not automatically indicate an inability to manage finances.4 Additionally, elderly individuals often use technology for social engagement or leisure activities inadvertently increasing their exposure to risks like tech support scams and phishing attempts, underscoring the need for protective measures.
A comprehensive model for fraud prevention has been proposed across three key levels: individuals, communities, and companies.8 At the individual level, the model advocates educating elderly users on fraud risks and enhancing their digital security. Community level actions include identifying vulnerable individuals, mapping risks, and fostering social support networks, while the corporate level involves detecting fraud risks in transactions, interactions, and vendors.8 However, a gap remains in addressing the specific psychological barriers of the elderly reporting tech support fraud and the critical need for tailored prevention strategies that consider these unique challenges.
Machine learning has been applied to detect Tech Support Scam (TSS) by identifying fraudulent patterns on malicious websites. The AI@TSS detection model achieves this by analyzing the host and code-based features, providing a sophisticated method to combat online scams.2 However its current limitations - restricted applicability and reliance on specific dataset means that it may not be adaptable to emerging scam tactics, particularly for elderly users with varying degree of familiarity with digital technology.2 Expanding the dataset and field testing could improve the model’s ability to protect vulnerable elderly populations.
Social engineering is central to TSS, with scammers using persuasive tactics to manipulate victims. Scammers build credibility through persuasive communication, often as part of organized call centers, to manipulate victims into compliance.9 These systematic approaches make it difficult for elderly victims to identify scams and report them. Unfortunately, current research on TSS fails to focus on elderly-specific vulnerabilities, such as reluctance to report incidents.
Several psychological barriers prevent the elderly from reporting fraud with shame, lack of knowledge, and perceived ineffectiveness of reporting as common obstacles.10,11 Studies have identified four key themes deterring victims from reporting cybercrimes (1) Shame and fear of repercussions, (2) Perceived ineffectiveness of reporting in achieving emotional and financial recovery, (3) Lack of awareness about scams and available support resources, and (4) the influence of social support in encouraging reporting.12
These barriers, compounded by emotional and social factors prevent many elderly victims from acting.13 However, substantial evidence of financial loss or support from strong social networks significantly increases the likelihood of reporting.13
A key limitation in these studies is the inconsistency in self-reporting of financial losses, which complicates efforts to verify and address the problem effectively. Moreover, cognitive health and the perceived credibility of victims influence reporting willingness.14 Victims who believe they will be taken seriously when supported by credible witnesses are more likely to report fraud.
In this study, we expand on these findings by incorporating data from the United States providing a cross-cultural comparison of elderly fraud reporting behavior.
To investigate the unique features of tech support fraud targeting older adults, this study employed a two-prong approach: a comprehensive literature review and a qualitative analysis of real-world fraud cases. For the literature review, the authors focused on reviewing research papers on Google Scholar relating to fraud schemes affecting the elderly, with an emphasis on tech support scams.
For the qualitative analysis, data was sourced from the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) fraud tracking map. We copied and pasted the URL (https://www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/tracking-map/) into google chrome. This was accessed on 26th August 2024. This resource was selected for its rich database of fraud complaints, offering raw data unavailable from alternative sources like Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reports, which only provide processed summaries. We inserted the Washington DC zip code 20,000, in the search for a location box. On the right-hand side of the page is a view filter icon. The available filter options included keyword, scam type, contact method, amount lost, payment methods, and date scam occurred. We applied the “date scam occurred” filter, selecting the following date ranges: January-December 2021, January-December 2022, January-December 2023, January-August 2024. For each selected year, we clicked “View Report” to retrieve datasets covering various scam types (e.g. romance scams, online scams, identity theft scams, business imposter scam etc.) across the United States. The data for each year was copied into an excel sheet and filters were applied to isolate cases related specifically to tech support scam yielding a total of 16 cases. While the sample size was small, it allowed for in depth qualitative analysis.
The dataset included detailed information on the type of scam, date reported, scam channel, a description of the incident, and the financial loss categorized into predefined ranges. Incident descriptions revealed varied tactics, such as alarm pop-ups on computers and fake antivirus subscription alerts. Interestingly, some cases labeled as tech support scams were misclassified, indicating the victim’s lack of awareness about different types of fraud.
Each case was systematically coded using MAXQDA, a qualitative analysis tool, to identify recurrent patterns and themes. Guided by deductive analysis and shaped by established concepts, we systematically coded each of the 16 victims’ report into predefined categories: trigger event, initial victim response, scammers tactics and claims, method of financial extraction, realization and aftermath, scam outcome- using different colours to distinguish between them. The data was further organized into analytical categories such as emotional manipulation, authority exploitation, and barriers to reporting aftermath, scam outcome.
However, the studies have several limitations. The reliance on self-reported AARP complaints introduces potential bias, as victims may omit critical details or hesitate to report incidents. The small sample size of 16 cases limits the generalizability of findings. Furthermore, the absence of cross-validation with alternative data sources, such as IC3 complaints, restricts the scope of this analysis. Future research could address these limitations by incorporating diverse datasets and expanding the sample size to enhance the robustness of findings.
Our analysis used a six-theme coding framework to categorize each report. The themes were designed to capture essential elements of the scam process and victim experience, as follows:
1. Trigger event: Initial factors that initiated the scam, including pop-up warnings or alerts, spoofed platforms or services, and specific sound or visual elements.
2. Initial victim response: Actions taken by the victim upon encountering the trigger event, such as calling a provided phone number or displaying resistance.
3. Scammer tactics and claims: Tactics and false claims made by scammers, including use of fake identities and credentials, threats of serious consequences, trust-building techniques, and psychological manipulation.
4. Method of financial extraction: Techniques used to obtain money from victims, such as gift card purchases, cryptocurrency transfers, or ATM withdrawals.
5. Realization and aftermath: The point at which victims realized they were scammed, their emotional responses, and whether they reported the incident to authorities.
6. Scam outcome: The consequences of the scam, including financial loss and any precautionary measures taken by the victims afterward.
This structured coding approach enabled a systematic comparison of each case to identify common tactics, psychological triggers, and potential preventative measures. The data were further organized into analytical categories such as Modus Operandi, Emotional Manipulation, Barriers to Reporting, and Perceptions of Trust and Authority.
Once coded, the data underwent sentiment analysis. Sentiment analysis provided a deeper understanding of victims’ emotional states at different stages of the fraud process, highlighting moments of vulnerability and identifying potential psychological barriers to reporting.
The analysis of 16 tech support fraud cases revealed distinct patterns in scammers strategies:
• Initial contact method: Scammers primarily initiated contact through pop-up alerts on computers, accounting for 87.5% (14/16) cases. Email and web links each accounted for 6.3% of cases (1/16).
• Victim response: A significant majority 81.3% (13/16) of victims responded by calling the phone number provided by the scammer.
• Monetary loss: Only 12.5% (2/16) of victims reported monetary losses.
• Impersonation of authorities: In 68.8% cases (11/16) cases, scammers impersonated representatives from reputable companies such as Amazon, Microsoft, or banks.
• Threats and coercions: Scammers issued threats of serious consequences in 56.3% (9/16) of cases to pressure victims into compliance.
• Fraud reporting: Only 31.3% (5/16) of victims reported the fraud to authorities, highlighting a significant gap in reporting behavior.
Scammers utilize fear-based tactics to manipulate victims. Pop up alerts and alarming visual or auditory cues were frequently employed to compel victims to act urgently, with 81.3% of victims responding by calling the provided number. Victims’ accounts emphasized the aggressive nature of scammer’s interactions. For instance, one victim shared, “that dude on the line got pissed off … I’m not giving him access to my device,” highlighting their resistance in response to mounting pressure. Another victim described receiving a pop-up alert warning of a “system wide security breach” created a sense of urgency that led to compliance. These findings underscore how emotional manipulation - especially fear - is a central tactic in tech support fraud. Increasing awareness of these strategies through fraud prevention education could perhaps mitigate the success of such manipulations.
Several psychological and contextual barriers hindered victims from reporting fraud:
• Perceived Insignificance: Many victims believed that fraud without monetary loss did not warrant reporting. For example, one victim remarked, “I did not lose any money, but I want to report the number.”
• Emotional Impact: Feelings of shame and embarrassment discouraged reporting. One victim expressed, “It was shameful at some level to see what I got into” illustrating how emotional repercussions impact reporting behavior.
• Family support: Victims with strong personal networks were more likely to report fraud. For Example, a victim stated “After 4 hours on the phone, and then speaking with my husband, I then realized I had been scammed and was out over $5,000. I contacted my bank ASAP”.
These barriers highlight the importance of addressing emotional and social obstacles in promoting fraud reporting among elderly victims.
Scammers frequently leverage the perceived authority of reputable organizations to gain the victim’s trust. Many victims complied with the request, believing they were interacting with trusted entities. One victim recounted “Pretended to be from Apple support. I allowed access to screen share”. Another victim, whose father sent a scammer over $4,000, noted how easily the scammer established trust through a perceived association with legitimate companies.
These findings emphasize the need to educate elderly individuals about recognizing and verifying authority claims to reduce susceptibility to fraud.
By integrating these findings with existing literature, this discussion emphasizes their implications for fraud prevention and highlights directions for future research. These results align with8 suggesting that a holistic approach to fraud prevention should prioritize educating elderly users on fraud risks and strengthening their digital security measures. Scammers predominantly use pop-up alerts accompanied by urgent visual and auditory cues to provoke fear, triggering victims to call the provided numbers. This resonates with9 which expressed that scammers use aggressive tactics such as fabricated threats of system breaches to exploit victim’s emotional vulnerabilities, fostering compliance.
An essential insight is the reluctance of victims to report fraud when no financial loss occurs, corroborating findings from other studies suggesting that crimes perceived as less severe go unreported.12,13 Emotional barriers such as shame and stigma were prominent deterrents, reflecting the profound psychological impact of fraud, even in cases without monetary consequences. Addressing these barriers requires creating supportive reporting environments where victims feel encouraged to report fraud regardless of financial impact. Educational initiatives should include narratives emphasizing the importance of reporting to track and mitigate scams effectively as a social good, helping others.
The role of family involvement emerged as a significant factor in overcoming psychological barriers to reporting. Victims with supportive networks were more likely to recognize scams and take appropriate action. These findings echo previous research emphasizing the influence of social networks in enhancing fraud resilience.12 Fraud prevention strategies should integrate family focused interventions, encouraging open communication about scams and equipping family members with resources to assist potential victims.
One of the most significant contributions of this study is highlighting the role of perceived authority in fostering compliance—a factor not sufficiently emphasized in existing literature. Scammers’ ability to impersonate trusted entities, such as banks or tech companies, leverages the inherent trust many older adults place in these institutions.
RQ1: Psychological triggers, such as emotional manipulation through fear and the exploitation of trust in authority were prominently identified as specific levers used by scammers.
RQ2: Emotional responses, including shame and embarrassment, deterred victims from reporting, while family involvement positively influenced reporting behavior. Although qualitative insights were rich, additional quantitative data could better illustrate the broader impact of emotional responses and family support on reporting rates.
RQ3: Barriers to reporting, including perceptions of insignificance, lack of awareness, and emotional barriers were identified. Educational campaigns aimed at destigmatizing fraud reporting and enhancing its importance- irrespective of financial loss emerged as viable prevention strategies. Existing literature also suggests that tailoring these campaigns to accommodate cognitive and educational diversity among older adults can enhance their effectiveness.15
RQ4: The findings emphasize the significant role of perceived authority in scammers’ success rates, suggesting that interventions must address authority exploitation. Practical recommendations include training programs that demystify authority claims and encourage verification of unsolicited communications.
These findings of this study underscore the critical role of educational and training initiatives in equipping older adults with skills to recognize emotional manipulation, authority exploitation tactics, and the importance of reporting of tech support fraud. However, our results also highlight the importance of tailoring these programs to the diverse needs and preferences of older adults, leveraging insights from previous research to optimize their effectiveness.
The method of information dissemination is crucial for reaching specific demographics. For example, radio campaigns might resonate more effectively with male audiences, while internet based strategies may not adequately serve populations with limited digital literacy, such as nursing home residents or certain ethnic groups like Hispanics.15 This underscores the need for localized, culturally sensitive approaches, including community workshops, printed materials, and broadcast in areas with limited internet penetration. These methods ensure inclusivity and accessibility, particularly for vulnerable populations.
In addition to dissemination methods,16 propose innovative, non-digital educational tools, such as tabletop games and comics, which can stimulate fraud scenarios and teach countermeasures. These tools are particularly effective for older adults with low digital literacy, offering an interactive, hands-on-learning experience that fosters deeper engagement. Unlike digital or fast-paced formats, such as animations and films, these tools accommodate slower learning speeds and encourage active participation, enhancing retention and comprehension.
However, the limitations of some formats must be acknowledged. While films and animations can captivate audiences, they often promote passive consumption and may be too complex or fast paced for elderly learners. In contrast, non-digital tools and simplified materials, such as tabletop games, provide a more active learning environment, bridging the gap for those less comfortable with technology.16
This study has limitations, primarily that all data were sourced from AARP, which may restrict the diversity of victim perspectives represented. Including a broader array of data, such as community interviews or additional fraud reports, could offer more varied insights and strengthen the generalizability of these findings. Future research should prioritize pilot studies to assess the efficacy of diverse educational media, such as radio broadcasts, tabletop games, and culturally relevant printed materials. Such studies could identify best practices for designing and disseminating prevention of tech support fraud affecting the elderly that effectively address the emotional, cognitive, and contextual barriers to reporting identified in this research.
This study provides critical insights into the psychological manipulation tactics and perceived authorities that scammers employ to exploit elderly individuals in tech support fraud cases. By analyzing qualitative data from 16 tech support fraud cases, the research identified key themes- emotional manipulation, perceived authority, and barriers to reporting- that underline the complexity of these fraudulent schemes. Scammers leverage fear, urgency, and a facade of legitimacy to exploit victims’ trust, with financial loss, shame, and lack of family support emerging as significant barriers to reporting fraud.
Importantly, this research highlights a critical gap in existing fraud prevention efforts: the role of perceived authority in increasing the success rate of scams. While much of the existing literature emphasizes technical interventions, our findings point to the urgent need for targeted education that addresses the psychological and social dynamics of tech support fraud.
By prioritizing awareness programs tailored to the elderly - emphasizing how to identify manipulation tactics and the importance of reporting scams - this study contributes to the development of more effective preventive strategies. Future research should expand the data sources and incorporate diverse perspectives, such as interviews with victims and law enforcement professionals, to further enrich our understanding and refine intervention methods. Ultimately, addressing these gaps can empower elderly individuals, reduce fraud prevalence, and strengthen societal resilience against exploitation.
The data used in this study consist of publicly available tech support fraud complaints registered by victims and sourced from the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). These reports can be accessed by the public through https://www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/tracking-map/ in google chrome. The analysis and findings presented in this study are based on qualitative assessments of these complaints. The data is publicly accessible and does not require any credentials, permissions, licensing agreements, or terms of use for access. It can be retrieved by following the steps outlined in the method section.
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