Human Rights and the ASEAN Smart Cities Network: Covering Unaddressed Civic and Social Concerns

Introduction: The challenges faced by Southeast Asia’s cities

The ASCN is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) solution towards urbanization and city-based challenges. In 2018, Singapore led the initiative to establish the ASCN, perceiving that a ‘smart city’ conception of Southeast Asian states would assist Southeast Asian nations in countering urbanization-perpetuated challenges and the lack of development in larger ASEAN-located cities.¹ As Ludher argues, “Most of ASEAN’s growth has been and will continue to be driven by urban centers, with more people expected to urbanize by 2030”.² This policy brief perceives that throughout the process, the ASCN lacks proper consideration towards human rights and elements of sustainability in its plan to accelerate the growth of its member cities.

The ASCN started with 26 pilot cities across the ten ASEAN member states. As seen in Figure 1 below, these cities significantly differ based on the population, political systems, and current state of development. Nevertheless, the ASCN has emphasized that through the network, normative guidelines will act as the foundation for the member cities’ smart city development.^3,4 Perceiving the importance of city-level and scalable solutions, the ASCN was established at the 32^nd ASEAN Summit 2018 and determined 26 Pilot cities. As of 2024, this list has increased to 31 cities, including Sihanoukville City, Sumedang, Rayong, Khon Kaen, and Chiang Mai.

Figure 1. Member cities to the ASEAN Smart Cities Network.

Source: Ludher (2018).²

The ASCN’s smart city conceptions aim to achieve a high quality of life, a competitive economy, and a sustainable environment.⁴ ASCN would thus assist in establishing digital infrastructure, bridge partnerships, and provide funding to finance several of ASCN’s key development areas. Among the development key areas that this policy brief is concerned with is the ‘civic and social,’ comprising social cohesion, culture and heritage, tourism, public and municipal services, and governance.⁵

In recent years, city groupings have been aiming to counter issues that cities collectively encounter in their development. Several notable examples include the Local Governments for Sustainability, C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, the United Cities and Local Governments, WeGo, and the Strong Cities Network. These cities’ networks have been used to facilitate dialogue and the sharing of best practices concerning achieving sustainable smart cities. Several ASCN members are part of those city groupings, which shows that the sources of development practices that these members are informed of are divergent. Nevertheless, can the ASCN truly address the prevalent issues that local governments in Southeast Asia are confronted with?

This policy brief identifies two issues that arise from the ASCN. They include the negligence of human rights and imposing a ‘developing’ model from financing stakeholders. The ASCN is geared to establish ‘smart cities’ in Southeast Asia. However, this is a region consisting of states with significant disparities. The diverse social, economic, and political landscapes have already exacerbated human rights protection due to authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rules aiming to maintain their regime legitimacy through greater exertion of power. Introducing information and communication technologies in the ASCN member cities risks increased surveillance and control in the region’s less democratic settings. As past studies have argued, smart cities do not correlate directly to sustainability,^6,7 and the ASCN and the developed city master plans of the member cities are ambiguous in showing how the most disadvantaged would benefit through greater inclusivity from smart cities.^8–11 Therefore, it could represent what a study mentioned as evolving social practices restricting rights.¹²

A second concern identified in this policy brief is the imposing development models by external actors. The ASCN collaborates and links ASCN members’ projects with possible financing from vast stakeholders. The problem with this is that the ASCN eventually aims to achieve accelerated growth for profit, which includes broader privatization processes along the way. Observing the case of Phnom Penh’s forced privatized lands that disadvantaged people with low incomes,¹¹ a “top-down” approach thus risks the livelihood of ASEAN citizens.⁸

Strengthening the ASEAN Smart Cities Network: Two Possible Solutions

This section argues that to complement the deficiencies of the ASCN’s smart city conception, two recommendations can be adopted. The first recommendation is to acknowledge the vulnerability of the underprivileged, provide personal security, and promote social inclusion for governing smart cities. As seen in Table 1 below, a prominent problem with Southeast Asian states is the lack of democracy within their social and political landscapes. Consequently, when the ASCN echoed the importance of smart cities, there were fears that this would further derail democratic progress in the region. Studies in the past have shown how smart-city developments risk more substantial possibilities of violating privacy rights as high-tech companies have a stronger voice and role in the planning and financing of smart-city-related projects.^13–16 Half of the Southeast Asian states are authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states. Consequently, there is an intense fear of abuse of power and increased surveillance capacities that are feared would be the consequences of smart city conceptions.^7,17

Considering the vulnerability of the underprivileged in larger cities of Southeast Asia, it is essential to consider how past studies have concluded the risks of smart city developments to leave the poor and unemployed in isolation.^19,20 This policy brief acknowledges that smart city development is geared toward economic progress despite the civic and social elements emphasized in the ASCN. The problem with this is the strong possibility of social inclusion and participation of the people in governance being further hampered, as shown in the conclusions of past studies on this subject.^21–25 Therefore, this destination to a ‘smart city’ status must be made carefully to ensure that, in the process, local governments do not impede upon the fundamental human rights of its citizens in the name of development.

This policy recommendation has both positive and negative implications. The positive implication is that the ASCN can argue its consistency with ASEAN’s recent approach to respecting human rights in the region. The diversity of the political landscape of Southeast Asia is seen with military coups, decades-long rule, lack of political participation, and rigged elections all over the region.^26,27 Therefore, by acknowledging human rights elements in its smart city development plans, it is able to be consistent with the steps already taken to better human rights in the region.^28–30 The efforts include the 2012 ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). In recent years, ASEAN’s version of human rights and the AICHR have been protested due to their acknowledgment of human rights as dependent upon regional and national contexts. However, these small steps are the most feasible for a region as diverse as Southeast Asia. Studies have shown how ‘smart city’ conceptions have been a dominant theme within states’ urban planning in recent years.^31–34 Therefore, the best course of action is complementing what is lacking within the existing smart city conceptions of the ASCN.

Nevertheless, this recommendation also has negative implications. Among the most prominent is the possible violation of the ‘ASEAN Way.’ ASEAN was established on the importance of consensus-based decision-making, non-interference, non-intervention, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.^35,36 Despite the vast human rights concerns across the region, ASEAN has never acted as an intervening body and acknowledges that all Southeast Asian states are unique in their respect. Imposing the importance of specific human rights elements in the smart city development process could attract rejection by ASEAN member states that are sensitive towards human rights discourses, such as Lao PDR, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Brunei Darussalam.^37,38

The second recommendation is to have fellow ASEAN member states assist in providing essential public services. At its current model, the ASCN bridges the ASCN members with potential private financing or financing from ASEAN’s external patterns. The 2022 UN Human Development Index (HDI) in Table 2 below shows a significant disparity among ASEAN members. The HDI is measured based on several indicators, including health, knowledge, and standard of living.³⁹ In Southeast Asia, states like Singapore ranked one of the best globally in the 9^th position, and Cambodia and Myanmar ranked 148 and 144. In understanding the disparity of the rankings, the stability of the government and its capability to deliver basic needs for the people (through public services) are essential elements. Therefore, this policy brief perceives that to achieve sustainable smart city status, ASEAN member states need to incorporate within the development model direct assistance provided by higher-ranked states in the HDI (such as Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia) to ensure that ASCN cities don’t just attempt to achieve the smart city status without proper consideration towards the people’s welfare inclusively.

The problem identified with the ASCN’s current model is the acceleration of development under the financing stakeholder’s model. In the past, many of ASEAN’s external partners have partnered with the ASCN pilot cities.⁴⁰ Japan has been an active nation, aiming to adopt Japanese models of sustainability and smart city infrastructure through its Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which has increased its presence in Siem Reap, Phnom Penh, and Yangon City.^10,11 China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) has also financed many of Southeast Asia’s regional strategic infrastructures.⁴¹ Some have been under the framework of the BRI, while others have been through partnerships with China’s private and public industries. Huawei, for example, was reported to contribute to Thailand’s digital economy and technological updates.^8,42 The problem with this model is that the intention of constructing this smart city leads Southeast Asian states to be affected by the national interests of the foreign states, aiming to impose their development model on the ASCN members.^43,44 Consequently, it will be difficult for recipient cities of the financing to cater to the needs of their vulnerable groups, as attention would be diverted to accelerating the progress of the development in alignment with the interests of the financing stakeholder.

The proposed model, therefore, generates a possible favorable implication for the ASEAN organization. By assisting fellow members, this policy is in tune with ASEAN’s way of covering the gap in development among its members. In the past, when trade agreements between ASEAN and external partners are perceived as distortive for a member’s economy, the standard solution has been to provide distinct solutions for the less developed nations of ASEAN, known as the CMLV (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam).^45–47 Rather than forcing those nations to adopt free trade measures immediately, unique treatments are given through extended deadlines and excluding commodities deemed sensitive for the state.

Nevertheless, assistance from fellow ASEAN members also generates an adverse concern. Singapore is the only nation that has developed enough in human development categories to provide such assistance. Even with the following ranked nations (Brunei, Malaysia, and Thailand), the systems have not been the most stable and consistent in delivering essential basic public services to its people. In the case of Thailand, for example, the country has been a victim of undemocratic rules and coups in the past two decades.^48,49 Therefore, the question would be whether Singapore would be openly willing to assist all of its ASEAN counterparts in establishing a balance between smart city status and sustainable development.

Actionable recommendation: Moderate adoptions

Based on two policy recommendations in the previous section, the actionable recommendation is a moderate application of both policies. In the ASEAN context, it is crucial to consider its member states’ sensitivity to any notions that may impede the ASEAN Way. Therefore, in the first recommendation that acknowledges the vulnerability of the underprivileged, the terms used must ensure that it refrains from the languages of ‘enforcing’ or ‘must.’ An example of alternative terms that can be used includes ‘encourage’ or ‘strongly consider,’ which detaches any notion of forcing ASEAN member states, which in this case is represented by the ASCN members, to abide by human rights elements in their intention to achieve smart city status. Taking, for example, the AICHR, despite the mandate of the commission to engage in the protection and promotion of human rights in Southeast Asia, it is observed that the AICHR has focused more on the promotional mandates rather than the protection to ensure continued support from all of the ten member states.^50,51

With the second recommendation to have fellow ASEAN member states assist in providing essential public services, the moderate adoption of this policy is to identify key areas of public services that a member state can assist. Rather than choosing Singapore, for example, to take on the burden of helping ASEAN members alone, the ideal mechanism is to place the responsibility of a particular dimension towards public services assistance to one member state and other fields to another. For example, Malaysia can be entrusted with assisting the ASCN members with possible mechanisms to enhance the health of its citizens. Meanwhile, Singapore can be entrusted with the overall city planning to ensure that balanced human development can be maintained across health, education, and standard of living.

Conclusion

This policy brief considers several recent trends occurring from ASEAN’s ASCN, aiming to establish a smart city status among the ASCN members. Smart city status does not automatically lead to sustainability. Therefore, additional measures need to be taken by the ASCN members to ensure that it enhances its respect for civil and social needs, which may be neglected throughout the improved development process. Considering secondary data between 2018 and 2024, this study concludes that two possible recommendations can be adopted for more sustainable city-based development across the Southeast Asian region.

The recommendations include acknowledging the vulnerability of the underprivileged, personal security, and social inclusion for governing smart cities and having fellow ASEAN member states assist in providing essential public services. These recommendations consider several disparities and diversities seen among ASEAN member states, such as in the 2024 Democracy Index and 2022 Human Development Index. Furthermore, it considers several problems arising from the existing ASCN models for developing cities, including the risk of violating privacy rights, lack of social inclusivity in the development of cities, and external funders imposing development models. In conclusion, there is no clear linkage that the ASCN would consider sustainable measures while accelerating its member cities’ growth. Thus, this policy brief recommends that the ASCN take a step back and consider what is deficient within its development models to adopt more inclusive policies in its future development.

Ethical considerations

Ethical approval and consent were not required.