Keywords
Synthetic Cells, Environmental Bioremediation, Biosecurity, Emerging technologies, Governance, Risk assessment and Mitigation
This article is included in the Public Health and Environmental Health collection.
Synthetic cells have emerged as promising tools for targeted, efficient, and sustainable environmental cleanup, and there is a growing need to understand not only their technical potential but also the biosafety, biosecurity, and governance implications of their deployment in natural ecosystems. Despite their innovative promise, there are currently no standardized global frameworks to assess and manage their risks, particularly those concerning ecological disruption, misuse, and public acceptance. Therefore, this study explored the dual nature of synthetic cells as a tool for ecological restoration.
This study conducted stakeholder perception analysis through seven expert interviews and surveys involving 70 respondents, primarily from academia and the environmental policy sector. Thematic analysis was used to extract the key concerns.
Stakeholders highlighted the strong support for the potential of technology in pollutant degradation and climate mitigation. However, major concerns have emerged regarding unintended gene transfer, containment failure, dual-use risks, and a lack of international regulation. The thematic analysis revealed the need for risk assessment strategies, containment measures, and regulatory oversight.
Recommendations include the development of standardized risk assessment protocols, lifecycle containment strategies, transparent public engagement, and international collaboration. Policymakers must act early to ensure that the environmental benefits of this emerging technology can be realized while mitigating the associated risks.
Synthetic Cells, Environmental Bioremediation, Biosecurity, Emerging technologies, Governance, Risk assessment and Mitigation
Emerging Synthetic biology technology Synthetic cells offer great solutions to environmental problems, such as environmental remediation, but there is a great need to assess the potential consequences of their release (Warner et al., 2020). Synthetic cells have already shown promise for environmental remediation, including the degradation of toxic chemicals, sequestration of heavy metals, and restoration of the nutrient balance in polluted ecosystems (Rylott & Bruce, 2020; Webster et al., 2024).
Synthetic cells are supramolecular chemical systems designed to mimic the behavior, function, and structure of living cells (Noireaux et al., 2011). The first synthetic cell coming to life will be the only organism on Earth that has not been shaped by evolution over the last 4 billion years (Frischmon et al., 2021). Being man-made organisms, they are designed to replicate the design and function of natural biological cells, are made up of inert molecular parts, and are able to carry out life-like activities such as metabolism, replication, and adaptive response (Elani, 2021). They constitute a novel class of biological organisms with programmable features that provide enhanced control and predictability for biotechnological processes than natural organisms (Adamala et al., 2017). In contrast to genetically modified organisms (GMOs), synthetic cells are not taken from living organisms, but are created de novo from bottom-up strategies, such as through the utilization of lipid vesicles, genetic circuits, and minimal genomes (Göpfrich et al., 2018; Schwille, 2011).
Synthetic cells can provide researchers with more control over the desired properties of a biological system; thus, they can be used in various applications, such as environmental remediation (Guindani et al., 2022). This involves significant biosafety and biosecurity concerns, as artificial cells have the potential to introduce new traits or molecular mechanisms into the environment that could evolve in unpredictable ways or become integrated into resident organisms (Anyshchenko & Yarnold, 2021; Dana et al., 2012). Furthermore, widening access to synthetic biology components amplifies the dual-use threat possibility, where the technology created for positive applications can also be exploited for malicious objectives (Trump et al., 2020).
Therefore, it raises biosecurity and biosafety concerns that can potentially cause ecological disruptions or transfer engineered genes to native species. Thus, there is a need for researchers to address this proactively before full applications of such living cells can be realized (Frischmon et al., 2021). Thus, the need for “anticipatory governance,” a concept about the management of emerging technologies in their early stages of development, through the use of such mechanisms as foresight, engagement, integration, feedback, and adaptation (Guston, 2014). Despite these promising uses, there is a pressing need to examine the possible unintended effects of their deliberate or accidental release into natural ecosystems (Warner et al., 2020). These concerns include unplanned ecological interactions, competition with native organisms, horizontal gene transfer, and disruption of microbial community dynamics (Coyte et al., 2022; Yang et al., 2024). Assessing emerging technologies such as synthetic cell applications in the environment is crucial for anticipatory governance. However, the main challenge is the limited quantitative information on the risks and benefits (Bates et al., 2016). Risk evaluation of synthetic cells remains particularly challenging owing to the lack of empirical and long-term ecological information (Tait, 2009; Trump, 2020).
Therefore, this study used a survey and thematic analysis of various stakeholder interviews to provide a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) (Government Analysis Function, 2024). MCDA is an important tool for evaluating emerging technologies because of the scarcity of data, thus allowing the proper integration of quantitative and qualitative data for better expert judgment and policy-making due to limited data (Bates et al., 2016). This enhances the transparency and inclusiveness of decision-making processes (Kiker et al., 2005; Linkov & Moberg, 2011) because this technology is so new that anticipatory governance is required. Anticipatory governance is the governance of new technologies from the beginning through processes such as foresight, public engagement, interdisciplinary integration, feedback, and policy revisions to ensure responsible innovation (Stilgoe et al., 2013).
It aims to align innovation with societal values and environmental sustainability before its widespread deployment. In addition to expert judgment, this risk assessment can best be achieved through predictive modeling and simulations of the applications of these synthetic organisms in natural ecosystems to help identify potential risks and benefits. To enhance the robustness of risk assessments, methods such as predictive ecological modeling, agent-based modeling, and scenario analysis have been explored to assess the environmental dynamics around the release of synthetic cells (Aditya et al., 2022; Zomorrodi & Segrè, 2016). These methods are key to delineating likely risk hotspots, informing containment strategies, and establishing agendas for further research.
Finally, the evaluation of synthetic cell applications in environmental remediation needs to incorporate ethical, regulatory, and societal factors because public trust and acceptability are the foundations of their correct development and usage (Jimenez et al., 2022; Quinlan et al., 2016; Torgersen & Schmidt, 2013). Scientists, policymakers, environmentalists, and ethicists should collaborate to ensure that the advancement of synthetic cell technology is within a framework capable of anticipating possible dangers, ensuring sustainability, and being of societal benefit.
This study used a mixed-methods approach with quantitative and qualitative data gathering. An online survey questionnaire was crafted and dispatched to 70 respondents with backgrounds in academia, bioscience, and environmental policy. The survey questionnaire consisted of a blend of Likert-scale, multiple-choice, and open-ended questions, intended to gather stakeholders’ opinions regarding synthetic cell technology for environmental remediation. The survey was accessible for four weeks and advertised through professional networks, academic discussion groups, and iGEM-related messaging channels.
Simultaneously, seven in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with experts selected on the basis of their professional expertise in synthetic biology, environmental remediation, science policy, and biosecurity. These were conducted for 45–60 min using video conferencing tools. Interviewees were selected to span a broad range of geographical locations and institutional affiliations in order to achieve a broader policy perspective. The collected information was analyzed using thematic analysis.
The responses were coded and categorized under key themes, including risk perception, governance gaps, biosafety issues, and regulatory suggestions. Qualitative observations were triangulated using survey responses to examine whether there was convergence or divergence in stakeholder views. No specialized qualitative analysis software was used, but the theme generation conformed to the qualitative research standards. With the help of GPT-4o, we were able to extract and refine recurrent themes and points from the interviewee reports and survey insights. Informed consent was obtained from all the participants before participation. Research was approved by the iGEM Community Policy Research Team and conformed to ethical requirements such as anonymity, voluntariness, and freedom to withdraw at any moment.
This study polled a diverse group of actors involved with or familiar with environmental remediation, synthetic biology, and related policy areas. The present data collection amounted to approximately 70 survey responses that were obtained through a combination of age groups (18-56+ years) and geographic locations throughout the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia. The survey results are complemented by the visual summaries presented in Figures 1–6.
Participant Profile. Most participants represented the academic community, followed by international organizations, government and international government agencies, NGOs, and industry. This allows for a diverse platform to gather multiple perspectives on the risks and opportunities inherent in synthetic cell technologies. Attendees indicated moderate to significant familiarity with the challenges inherent in environmental remediation, bioremediation, and synthetic biology. However, familiarity with the specific applications of synthetic cell technologies varied, with answers ranging from “very familiar” to “not at all familiar.”
Perceptions of Synthetic Cell Technology. When asked if the use of synthetic cell technology for environmental remediation is a “good idea,” the majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed. However, some participants responded neutrally or negatively, reflecting ongoing uncertainty or concern about associated risks.
Respondents identified several key advantages of synthetic cells over traditional remediation methods. Their ability to target specific environmental pollutants with precision is the most commonly mentioned advantage, which would facilitate targeted and efficient treatment. Numerous participants have also highlighted the increased control that synthetic cells provide over biological processes, which would enable better flexibility in response to a variety of pollutants and environmental conditions. Additionally, several responses also indicated the potential of synthetic cells to usher in more efficient and scalable remediation processes, noting their potential to accelerate clean-up processes, reduce long-term operating costs, and minimize the environmental footprint as compared to conventional chemical or mechanical approaches.
Perceived Risk and Concerns. The respondents also indicated a range of concerns regarding the use of synthetic cell technologies in environmental contexts. The top risk cited by approximately 65–70% of the participants was the potential for unanticipated ecological interactions, such as interference with native microbial communities and the inadvertent spread of engineered genes. Others have expressed concerns regarding the impracticalities of sustaining effective containment and extended monitoring of synthetic cells once released into nature. In addition, some respondents pointed out the dual-use nature of this technology and reported that without proper regulation, synthetic cells could be used for nefarious ends. In light of this, the general consensus was in favor of creating extensive risk mitigation. These were complemented by the application of biocontainment practices, such as kill switches programmed into cells or environmental sensitivity triggers, to prevent uncontrolled proliferation and the design of continuous surveillance systems to track ecological impacts over time.
Additionally, most participants highlighted the lack of comprehensive international governance structures, advocating the establishment of standardized risk assessment protocols and ethical regulation mechanisms tailored for synthetic cell applications.
This study provides timely insights into stakeholders’ attitudes towards synthetic cell technologies in terms of environmental remediation. While the technology is in an embryonic stage, findings are marked by cautious optimism among stakeholders and experts, who generally embrace its potential to offer more efficient, targeted, and sustainable solutions for remediation than traditional methods. However, there are concerns about ecological risks, biosecurity, and inadequate, well-established governance frameworks.
Respondents reiterated the benefits of synthetic cells to include precision targeting of contaminants, better control of biological processes, and greater scalability and efficiency. These findings are in accordance with the existing literature that places synthetic cells in a future toolkit that can effectively address intricate environmental issues where the conventional method cannot hold (Aminian-Dehkordi et al., 2023). More challenging environmental remediation is becoming, and such abilities can lead to breakthrough revolutions in ecological reconstruction.
However, the survey results also identified deep-seated anxieties—namely, about unforeseen ecological effects, such as gene transfer to native organisms or microbial ecosystem disruption. This anxiety has been well documented in previous research on new biotechnologies, (Stirling et al., 2018; Warner et al., 2020) and our evidence confirms the importance of anticipatory governance (Guston, 2014). Stakeholders have also questioned the long-term containment of synthetic cells, echoing concerns in the regulation of other synthetic biology products (Millett & Alexanian, 2021). These risks necessitate the implementation of strict biosafety measures such as programmed cell deactivation and continuous environmental surveillance.
The most glaring theme that emerged was the dual-use capacity of synthetic-cell technologies. While they offer clear environmental benefits, experts warned that, if not properly regulated, such tools could be diverted to aid malicious purposes. This highlights the need to incorporate DNA synthesis screening, biosecurity training, and export control into governance structures. Furthermore, the absence of international harmonization in regulations was deemed a significant vulnerability. They strongly supported the establishment of internationally accepted science-based protocols for synthetic cells, separate from, but supplementing, existing GMO regulations.
Although synthetic cell technology is still under research and development, it has great potential for applications in various sectors, including environmental monitoring and remediation (Cameron et al., 2014). However, these applications raise concerns about the need to proactively address governance, biosafety, and biosecurity. For a better understanding of this technology, this policy research was guided by the following questions.
• What are the differing and overlapping perceptions of stakeholders regarding the potential risks, benefits, and technological preparedness of synthetic cell technologies in environmental remediation?
• What are the key emerging risks associated with synthetic cell technology in environmental remediation and how can we effectively identify, prioritize, and assess them?
• What are the key regulatory gaps and major technical limitations involved in the deployment of synthetic cells for environmental remediation?
Synthetic cell technology is still in the early stages of development. However, most participants, most of whom were from academia, had a positive perception of this as a promising and good approach due to more promising advantages and capabilities for addressing environmental remediation (Aminian-Dehkordi et al., 2023). From the survey results, 67% of the participants supported the use of synthetic cells for targeted pollutant degradation, noting the advantages over traditional chemical or mechanical remediation methods. The main applications include the following.
• Pollutant Degradation: This method could be very effective for degrading various environmental pollutants, such as industrial wastes with hydrocarbons and heavy metals, into less harmful substances (Cameron et al., 2014). Among the experts interviewed, one noted that “ this capability could revolutionize industrial cleanup processes, especially in high-risk zones where traditional methods fall short .”
• Nutrient Recovery and Recycling: This method is also recommended for wastewater treatment and agricultural runoff, as it could reduce environmental harm and promote sustainability (Cameron et al., 2014). However, a few interviewees predicted the dual benefit of mitigating pollution and contributing to circular economy goals, describing synthetic cells as “ multi-functional tools with both environmental and economic advantages. ”
• Carbon Sequestration: Some experts predict that synthetic cells could be used to capture and store carbon dioxide, describing them as “ a next-generation approach to climate change mitigation. ”
Advances in synthetic cell capabilities offer significant potential benefits for medicine, industrial economic development, and the environmental sector. However, this brings about risks that need to be mitigated through proper risk-mitigation measures (Millett & Alexanian, 2021). Expert interviews and survey results emphasize the need for proactive measures. These advances also raise important questions regarding unintended ecosystem interactions and potential misuse.
Key questions guide this discussion:
❖ Potential for misuse: Like any other emerging technology, synthetic cells also present dual-use concerns that could be taken advantage of by malicious people. Survey participants highlighted that easier access to synthetic cells without proper oversight could lead to their misuse of bioterrorism. This can be easily mitigated through strong DNA synthesis screening for research laboratories carrying out synthetic cell research to prevent bioweapon development. An expert mentioned that, “ The dual-use nature of synthetic cells requires strict controls to prevent their weaponization, even in low-tech settings .” Therefore, this topic discussion highlighted the establishment of a robust oversight of this technology, which is essential for the mitigation of foreseen misuse risks.
❖ Lifecycle management and containment. This is another key strategy for biocontainment. Expertise recommended that researchers in the field look at biocontainment using synthetic genes developed to act as “ kill switches ” for the cell that triggers deactivation and/or self-destruction. This ensures that cells become inactive after fulfilling their intended purpose or after a specific period. Therefore, this triggerion has encouraged policymakers and synthetic cell researchers to mandate lifecycle management plans in every research study protocol for environmental release.
❖ Unintended ecological interactions: There can be unintended negative consequences of deploying synthetic cells in any environmental medium. The policy survey results showed that 68% of participants identified potential ecological disruption as the most significant risk factor. In addition, the expert interviewees expressed more concerns about the need to prevent unintentional transfer of engineered genes to native species, as this can lead to unpredicted changes in ecosystems. One expert remarked, “ The possibility of synthetic cells integrating into natural microbial communities could fundamentally alter ecological balances in unforeseen ways .” Therefore, this discussion suggests prioritizing the need to understand gene transfer dynamics and to manage synthetic cell persistence in various ecosystems.
❖ Uncontrolled Proliferation: This study finds this to be a major concern for stakeholders if these cells are released without any in-built mechanisms. Most participants expressed concerns about containment measures and the management of proliferation in the environment. Experts have shown concern about synthetic cells having greater adaptability due to a lack of evolutionary constraints compared to biologically engineered microbes. This discussion presented built-in bio-containment strategies, such as programmed deactivation or environmental sensitivity, as the main means for establishing a controlled deployment of synthetic cells for their specific role for a specific period without any proliferation that can increase environmental persistence.
❖ Standardized Risk Assessment Protocols: This been of great concern even to the current engineered microbes, as mentioned by an expert who noted, “ Current frameworks are ill-equipped to evaluate the dynamic nature of engineered cells in real-world environments. ” This shows that such standardized protocols are needed because they can make modifications for specific related technologies, such as synthetic cells, much easier. Protocols ranging from computational models and simulations to field trials and ongoing monitoring, especially for early stage research, are crucial in the evaluation of short- and long-term biosafety impacts.
❖ Integration with existing biosafety frameworks: With current regulations focusing mainly on the evaluation of similar but different technologies, updated and specific regulations are required. Participants emphasized the need to tailor the existing GMO regulations to include specifics for microbe engineering and synthetic cells to address the unique risks they present. Therefore, a key action item is to regularly update existing biosafety frameworks to ensure consistency in regulatory approaches while avoiding regulatory redundancies.
With the good perception expressed, advantages highlighted, and positive feedback expressed by the study participants, research and advancements in bioremediation worldwide will shift from the current use of chemical, physical, or engineered microbes to the use of synthetic cells. Therefore, the study participants called for quick action by governments and bio-risk management organizations to act now by establish preventive measures that will enable proper use of benefits while mitigating any risks. As one expert noted, “ Biosecurity risks are not hypothetical; they are inevitable without proper governance. ”
In conclusion, the discussion around biosecurity and biosafety risks generated insights into global collaboration through organizations, promotion of research into bio-containment strategies, and adapting exciting frameworks to include synthetic cell technology’s specific concerns.
Emerging technologies, such as synthetic cells, require the development of regulatory and governance frameworks to address biosecurity and biosafety risks that arise from their applications (Committees, n.d.). Therefore, this study highlights the critical need for proactive policy development to ensure that the safe use of benefits mitigates risks. The main questions explored in this section are as follows:
❖ The establishment of standardized protocols based on the uses and areas of application was key to the study findings. One expert mentioned “ comprehensive risk assessment frameworks addressing environmental and health impacts ,” while another suggested “ tiered risk assessments based on the complexity and potential exposure of each application.” To make this easier, a point that came up was the need for adaptive governance structures that involve making changes to include new technologies, such as basing existing GMOs’ regulations on synthetic cell regulations, thus enabling timely updates to regulatory measures.
❖ Monitoring and bio-containment strategies. Participants and experts highlighted the need for monitoring systems to track post-release consequences over time and have corrective actions based on testing results in laboratory-controlled environments. This is evidenced by the 60% survey responses emphasizing such, with one expert recommendation of “ tracking systems for synthetic cells post-release and accessible disclosure of testing data. ”
❖ The lack of international frameworks for synthetic cell governance can be a significant barrier to achieving global standards (Cameron et al., 2014). One expert advocated for “ an international treaty governing synthetic cell technology interventions ,” while another suggested “ standardization of monitoring protocols under international norms. ” This will harmonize risk assessment while balancing local ecological concerns.
❖ Export controls have also been proposed for synthetic cell-related products, particularly for those integrated into ecosystems. These controls could ensure that use is restricted to countries whose biosafety norms accept and can thus manage them.
❖ Future-proofing governance measures must therefore be able to anticipate future challenges and remain adaptable, but immediate policy actions must start with establishing baseline regulations, especially at the research level, as well as on bio-containment and monitoring while looking at the development of internationally standardized protocols and frameworks.
Although a great deal of helpful information was gleaned, this study has some limitations. The sample, although diverse, was populated largely by academic stakeholders, potentially skewing the favor of technical and governance orientations over social or economic ones. Second, while perceptions were satisfactorily represented in this study, none of the hypothesized risk reduction measures were experimentally validated, which leaves an arena for further confirmation through computational modeling, controlled experimentation, or ecological simulations.
Therefore, a cooperative and multidisciplinary approach is required. Scientists, policymakers, and public stakeholders must collaborate to co-design governance mechanisms that are adaptive, inclusive, and responsive to the evolving synthetic biology dynamics. As global interest in environmental biotechnologies grows, integration of stakeholder-involved risk assessment procedures within international oversight frameworks, such as those promoted by the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), will be essential to ensuring responsible innovation.
In summary, this study confirmed both the promise and complexity of the application of synthetic cell technologies for environmental remediation. With anticipatory, inclusive governance and international cooperation, these technologies can be powerful tools in addressing the environmental crises of the future—if, and only if, their development is followed by strict ethical and safety protocols.
These findings represent the perceptions, capabilities, and potential concerns regarding the use of synthetic cell technology in the environmental sector, which will evolve with time to replace the current use of engineered microbes and physical and chemical methods with advancements in synthetic biology.
• With more research directed towards environmental remediation, synthetic cell technology has great capabilities for the degradation of various environmental pollutants. Based on the current use of engineered microbes for bioremediation, it is easier to use synthetic cells that can be more effective for targeted bioremediation applications than existing methods.
• The main biosafety concerns raised were unintended ecological impacts, containment failure, disruption of native microbial populations, and difficulty in monitoring long-term effects. This is also found to have dual-use potential, that is, the potential for positive applications such as environmental remediation, while posing negative applications such as bioterrorism or the creation of hazardous synthetic cells within the ecosystem, thus necessitating biosecurity measures.
• Misinformation regarding emerging technologies has always been a significant barrier to societal acceptance. Thus, a significant number of survey participants supported the continuous, transparent communication and inclusive public engagement strategies needed to build trust.
• Currently, there are no formal guidelines for international oversight of synthetic cell technology. There is only voluntary regulation and governance by synthetic cell researchers, such as Build A Cell, which implies the need for collaboration by biosecurity boards to work on a risk assessment framework for this technology in this early stage before applications increase (Frischmon et al., 2021).
To support the development of anticipatory governance for future applications of synthetic cell technology in environmental remediation applications, this policy research project provides the following recommendations based on the findings of this report. The findings of this report were based on extensive research, survey results, and expert interviews with policymakers and environmental remediation scientists. However, the final recommendations were developed by the authors alone and slightly represented a consensus of project participants in the survey, as well as thematic analysis of the expert interview reports.
❖ Developing a written comprehensive framework that clearly outlines a standardized protocol of risk assessment in order to evaluate synthetic cell applications based on specific intended use.
• This should be science-informed, involving experts in synthetic cell research and environmental remediation, as well as policymakers. The priority should be containment, lifecycle management, and post-deployment monitoring.
• To make this faster, there is a need to modify the existing GMO regulatory framework to include aspects of synthetic biology, especially emerging technologies. of synthetic cells in this case (Committees, n.d.). More specific to synthetic cell regulation are policies that need to address issues such as gene transfer and ecological interactions.
❖ For safe application of synthetic cells that mitigates any biosecurity and biosafety concerns raised in this report, there is a need for robust ecological safety protocols that need to be developed by biosafety officials.
• A key aspect of ecological concerns is cell guardrails, especially programmed deactivation after a standard period of time to ensure that there is no proliferation or persistence beyond their intended use period. The use of advanced techniques that enable genetic confinement, such as kill switches and terminator genes, can affect this outcome.
• Robust monitoring systems must be developed for easy tracking after deployment in a specific area.
• As this also presents dual-use concerns, the establishment of a dedicated biosecurity board in countries that use technology is needed to assess dual-use concerns and enforce safeguards against the misuse of synthetic cell technologies.
❖ Early and inclusive communication as well as engagement strategies are key for building trust that will enable public acceptance once the application becomes feasible.
• As emerging technologies and applications are disclosed, they often face misinformation about various aspects; thus clear and clear evidence-based science communication to engage diverse audiences by the government enables acceptance by citizens.
• First, there is a need for industries in this sector to engage local communities in the planning processes. This can generate significant insights from communities for better and acceptable application practices (Stirling et al., 2018).
• Before any application is made, there is a great need for scientists to publicly disclose risk assessment data, clear deployment plans, monitoring results, and safety measures established for building societal trust (Normandin et al., 2022).
❖ To support the development of this synthetic cell technology, better applications and risk assessment studies, prioritization of its research to optimize that raised concerns and make the better innovations possible.
• Research institutions should consider conducting more computational modeling and simulation research on ecological modeling to predict synthetic cell behavior and interactions in complex ecosystems, thereby reducing experimental uncertainties.
• Incorporating AI-driven simulations into this type of research is crucial for predicting long-term ecological effects and behavioral changes in ecosystems (Stirling et al., 2018).
• Private funders, such as philanthropic organizations and synthetic biology venture capital firms, should encourage research funding in environmental projects to ensure better innovation and risk assessment studies.
• Partnerships between synthetic biologists, ecologists, and computational scientists are also needed to develop holistic solutions to environmental challenges.
• Research institutions are required to conduct controlled, small-scale deployments of synthetic cells in well-controlled laboratory environments to minimize the accidental release of potentially wrongly designed cells. This will also enable the refinement of risk mitigation strategies before large-scale implementation.
❖ International collaboration through organizations, such as the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), to promote global biosecurity measures for synthetic cell technology and ensure an international oversight approach.
• Through global efforts, the development of standardized regulations has become cheaper and more comprehensive, owing to diverse perspectives.
• The main organizations concerned with the environment, such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), should establish an advisory board on synthetic cell technology for more in-depth discussions.
This study did not receive formal ethical approval from an institutional review board (IRB) or independent ethics committee. However, the data collection was approved and overseen by the iGEM Policy Research Project Head, who confirmed that the study aligned with iGEM Community guidelines for policy research. The study involved minimal risk, and participation was entirely voluntary.
This study was approved by the iGEM Community Policy Research Team. All survey participants had to acknowledge the purpose, procedures, and voluntary nature of the study and agree to proceed before submitting any responses.
Participation in this study was voluntary, and all participants were adults. Informed consent was stated for all participants prior to participation. Due to the online nature of the survey and interviews, written consent was not collected; instead, participants were provided with detailed information about the study, including its purpose, procedures, and data handling, and were required to indicate their agreement before proceeding.
All data underlying the results presented in this article are openly available in the Zenodo repository: https://zenodo.org/records/16418760 (Anguzu, S., et al., 2025), and are accessible under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY 4.0) license. The dataset includes: fully anonymized survey responses, expert interview summaries, values supporting all statistical results, graphs, and figures and extended data such as the original survey questionnaire. These materials are provided to ensure transparency and to enable further study and analysis for more insights.
The authors of this article acknowledge the full support of those who were instrumental in the entire development of the project, including the interviewees in policy, synthetic biology, and environmental remediation expertise, who generously shared their knowledge and gave time and expertise to the project.
The iGEM Community Policy Research Project Head, Jo Yi Chow, and iGEM Community Program Coordinator Yorgo El Moubayed contributed to the review of each step of the study. We are grateful to the iGEM Community for supporting this project.
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