Revisiting the Role of Public Opinion in Foreign Policy: The Case of Brunei in the South China Sea

1. Introduction

In 2025, Brunei Darussalam and China decided to deepen their cooperation in oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea. As multiple sources reported, their cooperation marks the continuation of the joint venture set up between the Brunei National Petroleum Company and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, as well as the adoption of the terminology of ‘mutually agreed areas’ during Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah’s visit to Beijing (Bimo, 2025; Yilmaz, 2025; Zhou, 2025). To provide context, this joint venture is significant within the discourse of the South China Sea dispute. Brunei is a claimant state in the disputed waters, claiming parts of the Louisa Reef and several maritime features in the Spratly Islands (Espena & Uy, 2020; Hart, 2018; Jacques, 2018; Sands, 2026). Brunei’s rectangle-shaped Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (see Figure 1), however, has not been safeguarded with decisiveness by the Sultanate.

Figure 1. Comparison of China and Brunei’s Exclusive Economic Zones.

Source: Adapted from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI, 2023a).

In the past decade, there have been connections made between Brunei’s intentions of diversifying the state’s economy and the stance it takes in the South China Sea dispute (Druce & Julay, 2019; Elleman, 2017; Hart, 2018; Jacques, 2018; Putra, 2021; Slesman & Baha, 2023; Tisdell, 1998). As a means to reduce dependence on raw resource exports, Brunei has sought assistance from China and linked Brunei’s Wawasan Brunei 2035 (Brunei’s long-term grand strategy) to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with the hope that convergence in grand strategies will lead to a more economically sustainable Brunei (Bo, 2017). Therefore, for Brunei, the issue of the South China Sea involving China is not independent of other influential factors shaping Brunei’s South China Sea policy.

How has the existing literature understood Brunei’s stance in the South China Sea? As reported by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, there have been increasing instances of Chinese law enforcement vessels intruding into Brunei’s EEZ (AMTI, 2020). What is interesting, however, is how Brunei responds to these incursions. Unlike the other claimant states to the South China Sea that displays a heavy presence of coast guards, fishing militias, and fisheries surveillance vessels within their claimed EEZ in the South China Sea (Chubb, 2022; Ha, 2019; Hong Hiep, 2019; Lagniton, 2025; Sangtam, 2021; Simonette, 2023; Sulaiman, 2025; Zattullah et al., 2021), uniquely, Brunei has not taken a similar pathway. Brunei does not adopt a policy reflecting a heavy presence of its maritime constabulary forces within its claimed EEZ, which strikes as confusing compared to those of the other claimant states to the disputed waters. As shown in Figure 2 below, Brunei’s oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea is the only waterway it can exploit to boost its oil- and gas-dependent revenues. However, why does the Sultanate display a greater leaning towards collaborative efforts, rather than confrontational ones?

Figure 2. Claimed oil and gas blocks in the South China Sea between Brunei and China.

Source: Adapted from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI, 2023b).

The majority of studies in the past have claimed that Brunei Darussalam’s South China Sea policy is represented by ‘silence’ (Espena & Uy, 2020; Jacques, 2018; Kurniati et al., 2025; Putra, 2021, 2024; Sands, 2026). These studies have concluded that Brunei’s interests in the South China Sea exceed the considerations of sovereignty within its maritime borders. Instead, there is a thick economic discourse attached to its decision, leading Brunei to adopt a stance different from that of the other claimant states. However, this has been the primary interpretation for more than a decade. Is there another angle of interpretation that can be made that goes beyond the assertion that economic factors prevail?

To make sense of Brunei’s silence and relatively calm response to China’s challenges in the South China Sea, this article takes a different angle, highlighting the role of public opinion in foreign policy. It takes the task of measuring and delineating the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy decisions, bridging the conceptions introduced by Jean-Christophe Boucher in 2024. Two of Boucher’s ideas are bridged for this study: 1) The relevance of socio-demographic factors and conceptual schemes, as influencing factors in the public’s foreign policy attitudes; and 2) the applicability of the ‘top-down’ interpretation, in which elites shape the public’s preferences and opinions over foreign policy matters (Boucher, 2024).

In doing so, this qualitative study uses published data from the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia Report in 2024 and 2025 (Seah et al., 2024, 2025) and examines how Bruneians perceive China and the South China Sea. The 2025 survey included 2,023 respondents from the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, with citizens of Brunei accounting for 7.5% of the total. To isolate and reveal Brunei’s public opinion, only answers from Brunei citizens will be considered for this study, specifically in the sections on regional outlook on international developments, major power influences, US-China rivalry in Southeast Asia, and perceptions of trust. Meanwhile, the argument over the applicability of public opinions within the context of foreign policies has been argued in past studies, which shows the evolving role of public opinion and the vast dynamics related to it, with foreign policy decisions (Fearon, 1998; Rosenau, 1961; Snyder et al., 1954; Sprout & Sprout, 1956). Different, however, from past studies that draw upon the nexus between public opinion and foreign policy, this study tests those assumptions in the context of an absolute monarchy like Brunei Darussalam, where a top-down hierarchy has been apparent for decades and is centered on the authority of the Sultanate.

2. Brunei in the South China Sea: A literature review

Discussion on Brunei in the South China Sea is multidimensional and not confined to a single discourse. Consequently, this literature review section will explore the three most relevant discourses related to the discussions of this study. They include Brunei’s perceptions of the importance of the South China Sea, the emergence of the terms ‘silent’ and ‘vanishing’ claims in the disputed waters, and the nexus between the disputes and Brunei’s bilateral relations with China. Doing so allows readers to gain a glimpse of the factors that influence Brunei’s decision-making. It makes it possible to argue the potential applicability of public opinion discourses to make sense of Brunei’s puzzling stance in the South China Sea.

At the core, one of the central discourses concerns the significance of Brunei’s South China Sea claims over the Louisa Reef and several maritime features in the Spratly Islands. As Elleman’s 2017 study showed, the hydrocarbon resources that are starting to deplete have led Brunei’s leaders to seek alternative resources that could be exploited, and the maritime zones within its EEZ are among them (Elleman, 2017). Nevertheless, past studies have also argued differently. Although there is acknowledgement that this resource is significant, there are also arguments stating that Brunei’s South China Sea claims are not as substantial as those perceived by other claimant states (Espena & Uy, 2020; Hart, 2018; IMOA, 2020; Kurniati et al., 2025; Putra, 2021, 2024; Sands, 2026).

Based on that context, the second discourse on Brunei’s silent claims in the South China Sea becomes essential to evaluate. In several of the author’s past published studies (Putra, 2021, 2024), the argument is that China has adopted a silent claim in the disputed waters due to increasing dependence on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and expectations of expanding trade relations. These build on past arguments that have concluded that Brunei’s stance is unique, due to its policies that tend to run counter to the usual policies of Southeast Asia’s claimant states. Kurniati, Laksono, and Aulia’s study, for example, noted that the convergence of interests between Brunei and China has led Brunei, “[…] challenging ASEAN’s unified action on the South China Sea dispute” (Kurniati et al., 2025, p. 66). Observing this trend, Sands also argued that this has been the reason Brunei is the only claimant state in the South China Sea without a military presence in the Spratly Islands (Sands, 2026).

However, some argue that Brunei is adopting other approaches that do not quite fit the term ‘silent claim’. As these studies argue, the point is that Brunei is balancing between different approaches, including engaging with ASEAN to seek solutions and continuing to advocate for an international-law-based resolution to the tensions (Espena & Uy, 2020; IMOA, 2020; Wei, 2024). In Wei’s 2024 study, for example, he concluded that Brunei’s South China Sea policy is ‘calculated,’ by intentionally creating “[…] specific relationships with these major powers (the US and China); so long as its territorial waters remain undisturbed” (Wei, 2024).

As discussed, there appear to be other causal factors that determine Brunei’s unique stance in the South China Sea. This is why the third discourse on Brunei’s relations with China, specifically in the economic domain, is influential in making sense of the empirical anomaly. Past studies have interpreted the arrival of the BRI as a golden moment for Brunei, as the nation opens up to measures that allow Brunei to diversify the state’s revenue sources (CSPS, 2022; Koh, 2024; Loon, 2025; Sands, 2026; Slesman & Baha, 2023; Tisdell, 1998). The key point here is Brunei’s intention to diversify away from the oil and gas sector toward alternative sectors that allow the nation to develop (Hashim et al., 2025; C. Y. Hoon & Zhao, 2023). It is no surprise that Brunei has been connected with a favorable and receptive stance after the arrival of the BRI. As Lawrence mentioned in 2021, “The convergence between the Sultan’s Brunei Vision 2035 (Wawasan Brunei 2035) and Xi Jinping’s BRI has increased the political importance of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) to Brunei. Thus, embracing the BRI is key to the elite’s development-based performance legitimation” (Lawrence, 2021). Similarly, Lim, Hoon, and Zhao also argued in alignment with this by stating, “Faced with dwindling oil and gas reserves, Brunei has been hard-pressed to diversify its reliance on hydrocarbon […] China has emerged as an attractive prospect to the Brunei government” (Lim et al., 2023, p. 242).

Although it seems that, from an alignment perspective, Brunei aligns with China, this is in fact at odds with another body of studies on Brunei’s foreign policy. Perhaps related to all three discourses discussed, a large number of studies have used the term ‘hedging’ to explain Brunei’s foreign policy in contemporary times. Hedging, by definition, is a middle position between balancing and bandwagoning (Goh, 2016; Haacke, 2019; Jones & Jenne, 2022; Marston, 2023). Within the context of Southeast Asia, Brunei has often been associated with this term to signify the Sultan’s alignment with the interests of both the US and China, simultaneously (Dayant & Stanhope, 2025; Husseini, 2023; Kuik, 2021; Short, 2025; Tumala, 2025).

Nevertheless, a deficiency in these discourses is the lack of explanatory depth into why this empirical puzzle of Brunei’s unique stance in the South China Sea has surfaced. The conclusions drawn in past studies tend to be generalist about the economic sector, without delving deeply into the variables within the state that also holds great importance to understand Brunei’s South China Sea policy. To close the gap in this literature, the following section will explore the significance of public opinion in the context of foreign policy and introduce the two analytical frameworks that will be utilized.

3. The proposed analytical framework: Revealing influencing factors and measuring interactions of public opinions and foreign policy

The significance of public opinion within international relations is well documented in past studies. Realist scholars, for example, have argued that public opinion does affect a state’s foreign policy (Christensen, 1996; Schweller, 1998; Wolfers, 1952; Zakaria, 1998). Arguing for the significance of agents, studies labelled as constructivist have also pursued a similar research inquiry, examining the role of public opinion in the construction of norms and identities (Finnemore, 2013; Kahl, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996). Consequently, there may be different angles for interpreting the role of public opinion in foreign policy. For this study, the definition provided by Boucher in 2024 serves as a good starting point: “[…] public opinion represents views, beliefs, attitudes, or preferences found amongst the public […] such preferences can be widespread or specific to certain interest groups, learned or uninformed, mobilized or latent, a settled belief or volatile” (Boucher, 2024, p. 251). Looking beyond categorizing public opinion studies into one of the international relations camps or the other, studies in the past have differed according to the discourses asked about the public opinion’s role in foreign policy.

Several waves of studies in public opinion and foreign policy can be traced. The first, for example, is a group of studies that have concluded that public opinion is irrational and therefore rarely influences foreign policy (Carr, 1936; Converse, 1964; Lippmann, 1955). After the Vietnam War and the resurgence of public opinion’s role in shaping foreign policy, a new wave of inquiry emerged. This would later reveal that there are circumstances in which public opinion could be stable (Holsti, 1996; Mueller, 1973; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Shapiro & Page, 1988). The claim is, therefore, that public opinion is rational, and society has the capacity to make sound judgments on foreign affairs (Boucher, 2024; Neuman, 1986; Page, 1996; Powlick & Katz, 1998).

Against the backdrop of studies on public opinion in foreign policy, two of Boucher’s introduced analytical frameworks are utilized in the study of Brunei’s public opinion vis-à-vis the South China Sea. The first focuses on factors influencing foreign policy attitude. As Boucher mentions, this focuses on identifying the causal mechanisms that influence public opinion’s attitudes towards foreign policy, which could be based on several variables identified in past studies. These include socio-demographic factors, influence of political ideology, foreign policy beliefs/conceptual schemes, as well as micro-foundations (Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Domke et al., 1987; Eichenberg, 2019; Holsti, 1962; Holsti & Rosenau, 1996; Inglehart, 2000; Kertzer, 2017; Kleinberg & Fordham, 2018; Kreps & Maxey, 2018; Levi, 1970; Milner & Tingley, 2015; Paxton & Knack, 2012).

Nevertheless, in the context of Brunei’s foreign policies and the data available to the author, only several of Boucher’s specified variables can be utilized. Regarding the socio-demographic factors, the arguments introduced are based on respondents’ age and education. Therefore, although there is a considerable number of studies arguing that gender, for example, influences the view of respondents towards foreign policy (Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Eichenberg & Stoll, 2017; Kleinberg & Fordham, 2018; Togeby, 1994), the limitation of datasets limits the capacity of this study to argue that point. It is expected, however, that the data publicly available in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute allows this study to claim whether more educated respondents favor more exposure towards trade and internationalism or not, as was argued in past studies (Domke et al., 1987; Kleinberg & Fordham, 2018; Paxton & Knack, 2012).

The second influencing variable is conceptual schemes/belief systems and micro-foundations. It is argued that, as individuals, perceptions are directed toward making the world fit the perspectives of a particular individual (Boucher, 2024; Holsti, 1962). In the case of the surveys in 2024 and 2025, the available dataset can be understood as related to this variable through the lens that respondents’ institutional backgrounds tend to shape and isolate how the South China Sea issue is perceived. Similarly, the variable of micro-foundations can be understood as moral values embraced by individuals (Bayram, 2017; Goren et al., 2016; Kreps & Maxey, 2018; Rathbun et al., 2016; Schwartz, 1992). Meanwhile, several of Boucher’s identified influencing variables will be excluded: gender, political ideology, and micro-foundations (moral values). The reason for this is that the dataset does not make these variables clear; for example, the last two variables (political ideology and micro-foundations) were not asked in the surveys.

To understand the nexus between public opinion and foreign policy, a second analytical framework is introduced to identify and measure their interaction. Of the three models introduced in Boucher’s 2024 study (Boucher, 2024), the case of Brunei in the South China Sea is best suited to the first approach, the top-down model. The top-down model argues that public opinion is shaped by political elites, defined as “politicians, higher level of government officials, […] (and) experts and policy specialists” (Zaller, 1992, p. 6). Foreign policy issues are far beyond the reach of citizens; therefore, this model shows that the public relies on elites’ views as a heuristic shortcut to understanding foreign policy affairs (Boucher, 2024; Western, 2005; Wittkopf, 1994; Zaller, 1992).

In the context of the surveys utilized for this study, including academics, business actors, government, and non-government workers, do not fall under the category of elites within the definition of Boucher’s 2024 study, but are part of a group of informed individuals on international relations issues. Therefore, past discourses have also classified these backgrounds as part of public opinion (Harrison, 2022; Nyberg & Murray, 2023; Püttmann et al., 2022), providing a unique angle of perspective of matters being questioned. Being informed is part of the public, and this provides an advantage for the interpretations offered in this study, as uninformed opinions have been framed in past studies as unable to hold firm policy preferences and as easily being misled by misinformation (Mayeur et al., 2024; Panish, 2025; Schäfer & Schemer, 2024).

Why is the top-down approach most applicable in the case of Brunei in the South China Sea? Unlike many past studies on the role of public opinion in foreign policy, Brunei is not a democratic country. The absolute monarchy system adopted, therefore, entails a process in which the Sultanate is solely responsible for the major direction of Brunei Darussalam’s foreign policies. In the context of the South China Sea, which is understood as a high-profile case and one involving the interests of the Sultan to realize the Wawasan Brunei 2035 through the financial incentives offered by China, it is without a doubt that Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah is interested in shaping the perspectives of the Brunei society to control for potential negative perspectives towards China. Looking at the State of Southeast Asia reports in 2024 and 2025, this framework allows this study to conclude that there is convergence in perceptions between those held by the Sultan and those expressed in public opinion through the survey reports.

4. The alternative interpretation proposed: Brunei’s public opinions of the South China Sea and its impact on foreign policy

To reveal public opinion among Brunei citizens regarding the South China Sea, this section will be structured as follows. First, it provides information on the respondents in the 2025 survey report, including variables such as age and education, to provide background on them. Second, it elaborates on several key findings and opinions under the themes of regional outlook on international developments, major power influences, US-China rivalry in Southeast Asia, and perceptions of trust, which are correlated with the dynamics in the South China Sea. Third, through Boucher’s analytical frameworks that reveal factors influencing foreign policy attitude (age, education, and conceptual schemes/belief systems) and the form of interaction between the public’s foreign policy opinions and decision makers, this study explores how these two frameworks are applicable in understanding the position and role of public views in the context of Brunei’s South China Sea policy. Within this framework, this study measures and delineates the correlational relationship between public opinion and the eventual foreign policy direction taken by Brunei.

5. Conclusion

As a claimant state in the South China Sea, Brunei Darussalam’s policy is puzzling. Despite having a rectangular EEZ, the Sultanate’s claimed maritime zones are not decisively safeguarded, and the disputed waters are not populated. For decades, scholars have interpreted this silence in Brunei’s South China Sea policy as reflecting economic considerations, leading Brunei to adopt a stance different from that of other claimant states. Nevertheless, is there a different angle of interpretation beyond those considerations?

By examining Brunei’s South China Sea policy, this study argues that public opinion correlates with foreign policy. To understand what influences Brunei’s public opinion and the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, this study argues for the relevance of Boucher’s 2024 conceptions. At the first level, Brunei’s public opinion on the disputed waters can be understood through the lens of factors influencing public foreign policy attitudes, which are shaped by socio-demographic factors and people’s conceptual schemes. Meanwhile, to understand the interaction between Brunei’s public opinion and the adopted South China Sea policy, this study argues for the relevance of the top-down model, in which Brunei’s elites shape the public’s understanding and preferences regarding the South China Sea. Brunei’s public opinion in this study draws on the published 2024 and 2025 surveys on the ‘State of Southeast Asia,’ which examine the views of 2,023 respondents on pressing regional matters affecting Southeast Asia.

By isolating the voices of Brunei respondents, several unique insights can be obtained, which complement the top-down model assessed in this study. First, several variables are argued to affect the Brunei public’s perceptions of the South China Sea. The surveys indicated that the Brunei public is concerned about developments in the South China Sea, albeit not to the extent that it warrants emergency security responses. A look at the different socio-demographic factors at play shows that higher-educated respondents and the survey’s affiliations lead the public to adopt a more objective view of Brunei’s geopolitical challenges in Southeast Asia, which are not confined to those arising from the South China Sea alone. The balanced perspectives of the Brunei people can also be associated with Boucher’s conception of conceptual schemes/belief systems, as the public frames questions to fit their images and understanding of Southeast Asian regional dynamics. Therefore, the lens through which respondents see the South China Sea is much more complex than that through the security lens alone.

Furthermore, the interaction between public opinion and foreign policy is evident in the alignment of the Sultanate’s and Brunei’s public opinion. At the first level, Brunei’s public opinion expresses concern about developments in the South China Sea and often emphasizes the importance of ASEAN-centered solutions to manage tensions. This correlates with the Sultan’s perspectives, in which, although it adopts a relatively calm stance in the South China Sea, it continues to emphasize the importance of solutions and the need for all conflicting actors to refrain from excessive actions. Furthermore, there is a clear leaning towards China in public opinion on the economic powerhouse affecting Southeast Asia, and the most influential actor in terms of strategic and political significance. This perception potentially stems from the top, marked by the Sultan’s increasing alignment with China’s financial opportunities, which is seen as having the potential to diversify the state’s economy and align with Brunei’s grand strategy, Wawasan Brunei 2035.

Ethical statement

This article does not require an ethical approval as it does not gather primary data from the respondents directly, and this case study is a qualitative analysis of published data by another source. Questions on ethical procedures and informed consent of participants from the utilized published data (State of Southeast Asia survey report) can be obtained from the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.