Construing Uncommon Patterns in Foreign Policy Attitudes: The Case of Cambodia’s Public Perceptions on China

1. Introduction

More than a decade after the Belt and Road Initiative’s (BRI) announcement, projects in Cambodia continue to face increasing scrutiny from the Cambodian public. Despite the impressive constructions taking place, notably in the coastal city of Sihanoukville, these projects have continued to cause problems that relate to foreign workers being employed, increasing exploitation, abandoned construction sites, and, in general, unsustainable long-term development models (Minea, 2023; Rim, 2023; Hope, 2024; Lim and Donnellon-May, 2025). Even in projects aimed at providing sufficient alternative energy, such as the Sesan 2 hydropower dam, it was reported that thousands of indigenous communities were relocated, along with the destruction of the dam’s surrounding ecosystems (Amarthalingham and Tola, 2021; Strangjo, 2021). It is no wonder that many elements of the Cambodian society have expressed negative views of growing closer to China’s investment opportunities (Nikkei, 2021; Watanabe and Samreth, 2024).

Nevertheless, this seemingly negative view has not always been the case. From the perspective of Cambodian leaders, a closer alignment with China has established new breath into the Cambodian economy, allowing the construction of highways, bridges, and special economic zones to take place with the help of Chinese funding (Pheakdey, 2015; GGTN, 2023; Lim, 2023; Mit, 2024; H. S et al., 2025). The Cambodian leader’s close alignment has led many scholars to conclude that Cambodia is by far the most pro-China country in Southeast Asia (Jeldres, 2012; Po and Primiano, 2020; Amarthalingam, 2024; Watanabe and Samreth, 2024). As Tan, Inderjit, Liaw, and Wen concluded, Cambodia’s allegiance to China is reflected through Cambodia’s “[…] support of ‘One China’ policy, active involvement in China’s BRI and denying ASEAN consensus to fight against China’s claim in the South China Sea” (H.S et al., 2025, p. 440).

Interestingly, recent years (2024–2025) have shown a growing likelihood that the earlier negative sentiments held by the Cambodian people toward China are shifting. Although the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey report showed that people in Cambodia are divided in their opinions of China, several positive perspectives are held (Seah et al., 2025). Take, for example, the question of how the Cambodian respondents perceived Cambodian-Chinese bilateral relations over the next three years: the majority chose the option of ‘improve’, with a minority (9.4%) choosing ‘worsening significantly’ or ‘worsening’ (Seah et al., 2025, p. 48). This serves as an empirical puzzle. Given the clear leaning towards negative sentiments in the past, what has influenced the Cambodian public to show signs of positive sentiment towards China?

This study seeks to understand the structure of public opinion that has shaped the evolution of the Cambodian public’s perceptions of China. It argues that this unique alignment between Cambodian leaders and the general public’s perceptions of China is not a common occurrence and that the foreign policy attitude must be understood within the nexus between public opinion and foreign policy. During the 20^th century, there was not much interest in understanding the role of public opinion in the context of foreign policy, mainly due to the assumption that the public’s opinions are uninformed and disconnected from the actual foreign policy conduct of political elites (Kennan, 1951; Lippmann, 1955; Rosenau, 1961; Boucher, 2024). However, there have been considerable shifts away from such a perspective, as scholars started to assess that public opinions are more measured and calculated than predicted in earlier studies (Mueller, 1973; Jentleson, 1992; Page and Shapiro, 1992), which has caused increasing scholarly inquiry as to how public opinion affects foreign policies and vice versa.

As this study is interested in understanding the structure of public opinion formed in the context of Cambodian public’s perceptions on China, a unique scholarly development that has taken place is the increasing linkages made to better our understanding of how public opinion on foreign affairs are formed (Tomz and Weeks, 2013; Oktay, 2018; Tomz, Weeks and Yarhi-Milo, 2020; Boucher, 2024). Therefore, to develop this discourse, this qualitative study uses published data from the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey report to show that the Cambodian public’s views on China are primarily top-down, heavily influenced by the elite’s perceptions. Two conceptual frameworks are bridged from relevant discourses. First is Kertzer’s ‘elite cues,’ which examines the political information environment that citizens inhabit and concludes that the significant distance between the public’s lives and foreign policy matters has led the public to embrace elite cues (Kertzer, 2023). Second is the top-down model, which Boucher (2024) concluded, observing that elites’ perceptions of foreign policy matters serve as a ‘heuristic shortcut’ in shaping the people’s foreign policy opinions (Boucher, 2024, p. 254).

Taken together, the top-down approach proposed in this study enables a more nuanced understanding of what informs and shapes the Cambodian public’s perceptions of China. Despite the strong negative views held regarding the development of BRI-related funding in Cambodia, this evolving positive view is argued in this study to be shaped primarily by elite cues, with the Cambodian elite’s perspectives being used as a heuristic shortcut in assessing the pros and cons of engaging more closely economically with China. In doing so, the implementation of this analytical framework will discuss the issue through several means. First, perceptions of Cambodians vis-à-vis China are examined through the Cambodian respondents’ views on China, as reflected in several questions on emerging challenges in the region and on perceptions of trustworthy actors affecting Southeast Asia. Second, to display an alignment between the people’s and the Cambodian elite’s perspectives, it goes on to explain how Hun Sen and Hun Manet have aligned Cambodia’s foreign policy with China, and how this resonates with the expressed foreign policy attitudes of the Cambodian public in 2025.

2. Cambodia and china: a literature review on the public’s perceptions and undertaken foreign policy approach

To reveal the Cambodian public’s opinion of China, this section presents two related discourses. First, it aims to make sense of the Cambodian public’s unique perceptions of China. The second relates to Cambodia’s China policies in the past decade, and how scholars have interpreted the alignment with China. Lastly, this literature review concludes by examining the novelty of the analytical frameworks proposed for this study.

In the first discourse, there is a notable number of studies inquiring into the Cambodian public’s perceptions of China. Interestingly, however, the views cannot be clearly classified as falling within the positive and negative spectrum. As found in two studies in 2022 and 2024, the Cambodian public holds mixed views on China (Chheang, 2022; Watanabe and Samreth, 2024). In Watanabe and Samreth’s study, for example, drawing on samples from the capital city and 11 provinces, people’s perceptions of Chinese investments have been shaped by a range of factors (Watanabe and Samreth, 2024). Similarly, the 100 responses collected in Chheang’s 2022 study showed that although the majority (52 respondents) favored China’s economic initiatives in Cambodia, a significant number expressed the opposite (Chheang, 2022). Such a conclusion is also found in Tong Ly’s 2023 study, which, although it concluded that the majority of his online survey respondents expressed a preference for economic cooperation with China, also found a strong presence of negative perceptions among the people (Ly, 2023). Therefore, as these studies focus on the polarity of the voices, there is less effort to understand why, amid the increasing negative discourses about the BRI in Cambodia, the general public has expressed significant positive sentiment.

A look into the discourse on Cambodia’s China policies would also reveal interesting patterns in how the elite perceive China (a major element of the proposed analytical framework of this study). The dominant discussion within the discourse has been the alignment of interests between Chinese policymakers and Cambodia’s elites (Chheang, 2021; Lim, 2023; H.S et al., 2025). In Lim’s 2023 study, for example, it is argued that the ruling elites in Cambodia perceive China as an important tool to maintain regime legitimacy, as it enables the acceleration of development projects in Cambodia (Lim, 2023). On a similar note, Chheang in 2021 argued that aligning with China allows Cambodian elites in “[…] maximizing their authority internally through legitimation, co-option, and coercion” (Chheang, 2021, p. 375). Therefore, these studies clearly show that this unique embrace of China by Cambodian elites is closely related to the regime’s survival, given that the nation is, in practice, dominated by the Cambodian People’s Party, with former Prime Minister Hun Sen serving for four decades.

Related to such a discourse is the scholarly argument that Cambodia’s China policies fall neatly into the alignment literature of bandwagoning with China. Studies have shown that Cambodia’s alignment strategies are more straightforward than those of other Southeast Asian countries. Scholars have concluded that Southeast Asian states in general have adopted hedging practices, aiming to blur their alignment between the US and China (Kuik, 2008; Goh, 2016; Haacke, 2019; Jones and Jenne, 2022; Marston, 2023; Dayant and Stanhope, 2025). However, in the case of Cambodia, the majority of scholars have pointed out that there is a stronger leaning to bandwagoning practices being shown, as Cambodia is not shy to express its positive sentiments towards China in national and regional platforms (through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations/ASEAN) (Po and Primiano, 2020; Tung, 2023; Pu, 2025).

Several studies have argued that Cambodia’s alignment preferences are consistent with bandwagoning. Po and Primiano’s 2020 study, for example, looked at several variables that have influenced Cambodia’s bandwagoning policies towards China during Hun Sen’s rule (Po and Primiano, 2020). Connecting systemic and domestic factors, Strangio, Li, and Li asserted that Cambodia’s alignment with China is due to “[…] (a) convergence of challenges posed by Cambodia’s domestic opposition forces and international democratic pressures” (Strangio, Li, and Li, 2025). These add up to the vast number of other studies claiming closer alignment between Cambodia and China due to economic factors (Po and Primiano, 2020; Doung, Kang, and Kim, 2022; Pu, 2025). Therefore, although a study has argued that Cambodia’s alignment decision has been a mixture of alignment with China and the US (Doung, Kang, and Kim, 2022), this has not been a persistent view expressed within academia.

A review of the two relevant discourses to this study reveals a major gap in the existing literature regarding the Cambodian public’s foreign policy attitudes. As introduced in the previous section, there are considerable negative implications of the BRI in Cambodia, which have shaped negative perceptions within the community. Nevertheless, the question of why positive sentiments have emerged remains an empirical puzzle that is yet to be explored in detail. Although several studies have aimed to assess this through multifaceted variables, there is still more to explain to make sense of the structure of the Cambodian public’s foreign policy preferences. Through the analytical frameworks proposed in the following section, the intention is to conceptualize the Cambodian public’s foreign policy attitudes as deriving from a top-down structure, with elites actively shaping the public’s preferences.

3. Analytical framework: The role of elite cues and elite perceptions as heuristic shortcuts

In deciphering the structure of foreign policy attitudes, this study takes the position that the public rationally shapes its opinions on foreign policy matters through elite cues and elite perceptions, using them as a heuristic shortcut. As past studies have shown, there is a strong case to be made that public opinions on foreign policy matters are not baseless (McGuire, 1989; Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017; Boucher, 2024). Therefore, to support the argument that public opinion is formed within a top-down structure, the following analytical frameworks are considered relevant to Cambodia’s public perceptions of China.

First is Kertzer’s conception of elite cues. The argument is that the structure of public opinion is shaped by the information and recommendations of trusted partisan elites (Berinsky, 2009; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017). Therefore, the use of this conceptual framework is based on assessing the people’s political information environment, which inevitably leads the public to align their views with those of their leaders.

There have been several past studies that equally argue the significance of elite cues. Most have argued that foreign policy matters are complex and too distant from the ordinary lives of the public (Rosenau, 1961; Hiscox, 2006; Guisinger, 2017; Rho and Tomz, 2017; Kertzer, 2023). Therefore, as a means to understand these complex topics, the general public relies on elite cues to inform them how best to perceive an occurring issue within the realms of foreign policy, based on the trust that they have towards their leaders, as well as the expectation that leaders are the ones that experience and deal directly with the big questions of foreign policy matters.

Bridged to the case study of Cambodia’s public opinion toward China, the proposed analytical framework is used to understand the structure of public opinion within the context of foreign policy attitudes. First, it is argued that the general public generally ignores foreign policy matters and that the Cambodian public forms its views on foreign policy based on the perceptions of partisan elites. In doing so, it acknowledges that foreign policy matters are far from the lives of ordinary citizens, leading them to embrace similar perceptions held by their leaders. This also means that the focus of analysis is on the political information environment of the Cambodian people, which is heavily influenced by the leaders, due to the unique dominant political rule of the political party in Cambodia. As a result, the expectation is that, although there are clear negative consequences of the BRI in Cambodia, these are strongly offset by other influential factors that help shape the public’s positive sentiments towards China.

The second analytical framework bridged into this study is Boucher’s top-down model, which argues that the public’s foreign policy attitudes are shaped by the elite’s preferences, which serve as heuristic shortcuts. The line of inquiry covered here relates to the idea that the relationship and flow of influence between public opinion and foreign policy can be understood as public opinion being organized around the thoughts of its elites. Indeed, past studies have shown a clear link between the elite’s perspectives and the eventual perspectives embraced by the general public, indicating that the elite’s views are dependable heuristic shortcuts for the public (Zaller, 1992; Wittkopf, 1994; Druckman, 2001; Western, 2005). Similar to the first analytical framework, the public’s tendency to embrace their leader’s opinions stems from limited public involvement in foreign policy matters (Zaller, 1992). Therefore, elites are expected to be perceived as experts and policy specialists, allowing the public to understand complex matters from the perspective of political elites.

Bridging to the case study of the Cambodian public’s perceptions of China, the expected conclusion is that positive sentiments are formed through the public’s embrace of the elite’s perspectives as a heuristic shortcut. Therefore, rather than going against the elite’s views, the better option for the public is to embrace similar views, given that foreign policy issues are far removed from people’s lives.

To understand the Cambodian public’s views on China, this study uses the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey report. Introduced by the Yusof Ishak Institute, the survey gathers the perspectives of opinion-makers representing Southeast Asian states. Of the overall 2,023 respondents, 8.5% are from Cambodia, with the majority (51.7%) holding a Bachelor’s Degree (Seah et al., 2025). The Cambodian respondents mainly originate from academia/research institutions and the private sector (35.5% and 34.9%, respectively), with the majority falling within the 22–25 age group (40.1%) (Seah et al., 2025). To build up the assumption that Cambodian people have positive sentiments towards China in 2025, several of the questions asked are highlighted in the following section. This includes Cambodian respondents’ perceptions of those they considered most influential in the region, which countries they considered significant in terms of political and strategic influence, and their general perceptions of China. After that, the top-down analytical frameworks are applied to the case study, concluding that the alignment between the elite’s perceptions of China and the public’s perceptions can be understood as formed by elite cues and elite perceptions used as heuristic shortcuts.

4. Cambodia and the public’s perceptions on china: A top-down interpretation

To establish the foundation that the Cambodian elite’s perspectives primarily shape the Cambodian public’s perceptions of China, this discussion section will be structured as follows. First, it examines the Cambodian respondents’ responses in the State of Southeast Asia survey report 2025 to support the claim that there is a unique foreign policy attitude toward China, characterized by positive sentiments. Second, it discusses the unique bandwagoning and alignment strategies adopted by Cambodian elites over the past decade, thereby affirming the author’s position in this study and supporting the assumption that Cambodia bandwagons with China. Lastly, this study examines the explanatory variables of elite cues and elite perceptions, used as heuristic shortcuts, to argue that the main structures of the Cambodian public’s perceptions of China.

In mapping the Cambodian public’s perceptions of China, two discourses are traced from the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey report. First is the perception of China’s influence (economic, political, and strategic) towards Southeast Asia and Cambodia. Second, through the perception of relations in the coming years. Although these two discourses cannot fully represent the multifaceted elements and complexities of the people’s perceptions, they do provide a starting point for interpreting the Cambodian respondents’ embrace of a unique position toward China.

When asked about their views on the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia, the majority of respondents (45.9%) chose China (Seah et al., 2025). The second-ranked country/regional organization perceived as having an impactful economic influence was the US, with 20.3%, followed by ASEAN, with 11.0% (Seah et al., 2025). Meanwhile, other nations such as Australia, the European Union, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the UK only managed to secure not more than 10%. Therefore, when viewed through the lens of economic influence, it is clear that the Cambodian respondents position China as exerting considerably greater influence in the region, with the US securing only half as many votes as China. In Cambodia, this should be predictable. Compared to the US, China has been much more involved in the region through the vast number of BRI-related projects (Gong, 2020; Kuik, 2021; Zheng, 2022; Yu, 2024). For Cambodians, this is evident in the Sihanoukville special economic zones and large-scale infrastructure projects that have involved Chinese contractors and/or financing in the past decade (Warr and Menon, 2016; Ellis-Petersen, 2018; Po and Heng, 2019; Rim, 2023).

More specifically, when asked about their views on China’s economic power influence on Cambodia, the majority of respondents, surprisingly, expressed a sense of welcoming China’s influence. In 2025, 62.0% of votes went to the option of ‘I welcome its growing regional economic influence,’ which significantly rose from 40.7% the previous year (Seah et al., 2024, 2025). Meanwhile, those choosing the option ‘I am worried about its growing regional economic influence’ accounted for 38.0% of respondents (Seah et al., 2025). The Cambodian public’s answers to this question come as quite surprising. As previously introduced in this study, there is a strong sentiment among the Cambodian public regarding China’s economic influence in the nation, particularly regarding the BRI. Concerns about employment, sustainability, and debt can easily push the narrative in society toward the assumption that China’s economic influence is severely negative. However, this does not seem to be the case, as most respondents express a willingness to welcome China’s economic influence, indicating a contrasting opinion among the people.

Another question asked, ‘In your view, which country/regional organization has the most political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia’ (Seah et al., 2025, p. 35)? Interestingly, the majority of Cambodian respondents to this question chose China, with 35.5% of votes, with the US (31.4%) in second place (Seah et al., 2025). The results are unique, given that political and strategic influence are not issues that the general Cambodian public can directly feel or understand. Rather, this is an issue primarily related to geopolitics and can be understood by those following great-power politics in Southeast Asia. However, the respondents clearly show that China remains the state with the most significant political influence.

The last question asks how people perceive Cambodia and China’s bilateral relations evolving over the next three years. For this question, the majority of Cambodian respondents chose “improve” (38.4%) and “improve significantly” (20.9%) (Seah et al., 2025), indicating that a positive sentiment is starting to evolve within the Cambodian public. As mentioned in the introduction, there are many grounds to believe that the Cambodian public may harbor negative sentiments toward China, mainly due to the BRI’s negative implications for the general public. However, a closer look at people’s perspectives shows that this is not always the case. By refraining from answering that relations would worsen over the next couple of years, it is clear that a positive sentiment is evolving, if not yet forming, in the people’s perceptions of China.

Based on questions about China and Cambodia’s bilateral relations and the Cambodian public’s perceptions of China’s political, strategic, and economic influence on Cambodia, it is clear that the people’s views are positive. Despite the vast challenges that society encounters due to BRI-related projects in Cambodia, this has not affected how China is perceived in a broader context. Furthermore, the perception of welcoming China’s economic influence into Cambodia, and the positive hopes for the China and Cambodian bilateral relations to evolve significantly, indicate that the positive sentiments are fundamental and grounded by positive hopes for the relations. Having concluded that the Cambodian public perceives China positively, how have the Cambodian government and elites perceived China?

To make the argument that Cambodia is clearly aligning with China, whether through bandwagoning or other similar alignment terms, tracing China’s influence since Hun Sen’s leadership is pivotal to the analysis. As Putra stated, one area that has mainly influenced Cambodia’s leaning towards China has been the latter’s support for the Cambodian People’s Party, which has held power in Cambodia for decades (Putra, 2025a). More specifically, with the ousting of Norodom Ranariddh, China continued to offer support for the party to maintain its rule, which has allowed Hun Sen in the past to solidify the legitimacy of his leadership (Storey, 2006; Chheang and Pheakdey, 2019; Nikkei, 2021; Menon, 2023; Watanabe and Samreth, 2024). Therefore, this past academic discourse on elite legitimacy and elite cooperation with China is not baseless (Jeldres, 2012; Pheakdey, 2012; Lim, 2023). If it were not for China’s earlier and continued support for the political party’s rule, it would have been difficult for Hun Sen to sustain his rule and grow the support of his followers domestically.

With that fundamental support offered by China, Hun Sen made intensive efforts to align with China. Within the context of the BRI, for example, Cambodia’s openness and the large number of agreed-upon projects have led many to conclude that Cambodia is the most pro-China country in Southeast Asia (Pheakdey, 2012; Hutt, 2016; Chong, 2017; Po and Primiano, 2020; Tung, 2025). Therefore, it is not difficult for past studies to make the claim that Cambodia is bandwagoning with China (Chheang, 2016; Doung, Kang and Kim, 2022), which considers this unique conception of an ‘ironclad relationship’ maintained between the two states based on many observed pro-China foreign policies that Hun Sen conducted throughout his four-decade rule (Chum and Chum, 2021; Amarthalingam, 2024; Putra, 2025b).

In the context of geopolitics, observers have noted Cambodia’s support for China during its ASEAN chairmanships in 2012 and 2022. In the former, Cambodia refrained from using the ASEAN platform to discuss and resolve tensions related to the South China Sea, which they perceived as amenable to resolution through bilateral means (Chheang and Pheakdey, 2019; Dunst, 2021; Pich, 2021). This was seen as the start of Cambodia’s pro-China stance, as the policy itself made Cambodia be perceived as a nation that neglects the importance of the ASEAN Way in favor of securing funding through China’s BRI in the future. This is confusing for Cambodia’s foreign policy because, as the 10^th member of ASEAN, Cambodia is expected to undertake more collective action to integrate its foreign policy with ASEAN’s approach to regional diplomacy and initiatives. However, the opposite has occurred: Hun Sen has, in the past, realigned Cambodia’s foreign policy to be consistent with China’s national interests.

After Hun Manet was appointed prime minister in 2023, a similar pattern emerged in Cambodia’s foreign policy. Rather than redefining Cambodia’s foreign policy, Hun Manet opted to continue his father’s foreign policy trajectory by intensifying efforts to secure financial benefits through closer Cambodia-China cooperation (Guarascio, 2024, 2025; Liu, 2024). In recent years, the bilateral relations have led to several strategic infrastructural developments, including the construction of the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone and the Siem Reap Angkor International airport, in addition to the vast number of constructed bridges and roads as a result of intensified economic relations with China (Pheakdey, 2015; Xinhua, 2018; Mit, 2024; Sok, 2024; Yalirozy, 2024).

Through several of the provided examples of Cambodia’s contemporary China policies, it is clear why bandwagoning with China is not a difficult point to prove. With aligned interests on geopolitical matters and the opening of Cambodia’s borders to China’s construction projects, it is clear that the Cambodian elites favor China’s economic influence in Cambodia. Despite growing negative narratives about incurred debt and concerns over Chinese-funded projects nationwide, the construction of intensive projects in Cambodia has not stopped. With that, an alignment of perspectives can be drawn in this study. On the one hand, the Cambodian people have a rather favorable view of China’s presence in Cambodia. On the other hand, the Cambodian Government has perceived the need to align with China, despite regional organizations such as ASEAN emphasizing the importance of non-alignment for Southeast Asian states. However, such regional norms and expectations have not slowed Hun Sen and Hun Manet’s intentions to accelerate growth by working hand in hand with Chinese partners.

Returning to the main question raised in this study, where does this public opinion structure come from? Through the analytical framework of elite cues, the focus of inquiry is on the political information environment to which citizens are exposed. As in the case of China’s presence in Cambodia, although there are deep concerns over employment, sustainability, and debts incurred from cooperating with China, the Cambodian People’s Party has ensured that the narrative is focused on the positive rather than the negative (Luo and Un, 2021; Lim, 2023; Vannarith, 2023). After intensive economic cooperation with China, Hun Sen and Hun Manet realized that the Cambodian public is wary of these potential negative implications, and have not let these presumptions continue to loom within the community. Rather, the focus has been to ensure that citizens are provided with balanced information on the current status and prospects of these projects (Aun, 2023; KT, 2023; Cheang, 2025; Son, 2025), thereby allowing an interpretation of the costs and benefits to lean towards the positive.

Cambodia, unfortunately, is not the most democratic nation in Southeast Asia. Although this has clear negative consequences for the people, state elites benefit, as they can control the information gathered by the general public and shape the perceptions held by the public. As seen in the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey report, even across questions that do not directly relate to the community (China perceived as having political and strategic influence on Cambodia), there are still more favorable perceptions of China than of the US or ASEAN. This goes to show that the alignment of opinions vis-à-vis China between the general Cambodian public and elites can be achieved through a top-down hierarchy, due to the elite cues presented to the community that China’s presence brings about more benefits than harm. As shown in past studies, this particular political information environment controlled by the Cambodian People’s Party has allowed the shaping of the people’s perspectives in a semi-authoritarian setting like Cambodia, and shows that the people still hold dependency over the perceptions held by leaders (Berinsky, 2009; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017; Kertzer, 2023).

Meanwhile, in the second analytical framework, to what extent can we suggest that Cambodian elites’ perspectives have been used as a heuristic shortcut for the public? As many have opined in the discourse of public opinion and foreign policy, there is a view that the public lacks a structured view of foreign policy (Carmines and Stimson, 1980; Hiscox, 2006; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017; Rho and Tomz, 2017). The idea is that foreign policy matters are too complex to comprehend and are far too removed from the lives of the general public to be truly understood.

But there is room to interpret and suggest that, because of such considerations, the public tends to lean towards the perceptions of the state’s elites to shape their own preferences over foreign policy matters. As suggested in Boucher’s and other relevant studies on this topic (Zaller, 1992; Wittkopf, 1994; Druckman, 2001; Boucher, 2024), the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy in a top-down model can be understood as the elites actively shaping the perspectives of the public on foreign policy matters. Looking back at the questions asked in the State of Southeast Asia survey report 2025, this can be done by tracing the elite’s perceptions of China as an economic and political power, as well as the prospects for future cooperation between China and Cambodia.

On the point of economic relations, Hun Sen, Hun Manet, and the Cambodian People’s Party have continued to reiterate, in simple terms, the benefits of cooperating with China. Setting aside the potential negative implications of deepened economic relations, several Cambodian elites have pointed out the long-term benefits of expanding its infrastructure with Chinese assistance. On the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone, for example, despite the presence of negative perceptions of its construction, the discourses that these elites have brought to life has been the establishment of thousands of jobs for locals, and the success of establishing economic activities in a region that would be rather passive if Chinese investments were not present (Franceschini and Ry, 2024; Harsono, 2025; Wenbin, 2026). Therefore, this simplistic discourse has been disseminated to the Cambodian public in the hope that the public would see the positive side of the construction, rather than focus on the discourse of gambling, illegal activities, or unsustainable economic practices arising from the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone. Interestingly, a similar discourse has been used to justify other infrastructure projects across Cambodia, as Hun Sen and now Hun Manet aim to maintain China’s economic influence in Cambodia (Luo and Un, 2021; Aun, 2023; KT, 2023; Harsono, 2025).

Meanwhile, when it comes to political and strategic influence, a distinct discourse has also been echoed by Cambodian elites. The elites have justified the alignment with China’s national interests across several different case studies. Looking at the Cambodian position in the South China Sea, for example, Hun Sen and Hun Manet has been bold in expressing why Cambodia took this position that reflected being pro-China even in ASEAN platforms (Minh Vu, 2019; Pich, 2021; Putra, 2025a), which eventually has been embraced by the general Cambodian public as reflected in the results of the State of Southeast Asia survey.

Nevertheless, the question of whether bilateral relations will evolve, worsen, or improve in the coming years also warrants analysis. For this reason, the Cambodian elites have continued to maintain the rhetoric that, in the long run, alignment with China will yield positive results for Cambodia (Jeldres, 2012; Lim, 2023; Vannarith, 2023; Nguon, 2024; Wenbin, 2026). As seen in many of Hun Manet’s favorable perceptions of China in recent years, this discourse aims to establish the perception that, despite facing several development challenges, China can still be trusted as Cambodia’s strategic partner in political and economic terms in the near and distant future. Considering that the general public tends to be unaware of the future orientation of the state’s foreign policy as they focus on the present, the likely interpretation of Cambodian respondent’s positive perceptions can only be explained with the framework of Boucher, in which these introduced perceptions of the elite has been serving as a heuristic shortcut for the general Cambodian public in determining a position.

5. Conclusion

A look at the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey shows that the Cambodian public has leaned toward China’s economic, political, and strategic influence. This comes as puzzling, considering that, after the vast number of BRI-related projects running in Cambodia over the past decade, the public has been increasingly concerned about sustainability, debt, and employment arising from the intensified economic relations. Therefore, when perceptions voiced by the Cambodian public align with those embraced by Cambodian elites, what explains this public opinion structure regarding foreign policy matters?

Acknowledging the significance of the top-down approach within the discourse of public opinions on foreign policy matters, this study perceives that Cambodian elites are actively shaping the perceptions of its people through two means. First, it is argued that the public embraces the elite cues of Cambodian leaders, shaped by the unique political information environment of a semi-authoritarian setting. Second, this study argues that Cambodian elites’ perceptions of China have served as a heuristic shortcut for understanding China’s influence in the present and the prospects of the relationship in the future.

First, this study concludes that there is alignment in perceptions between the general Cambodian public and Cambodian elites. The 2025 State of Southeast Asia report showed that, across questions such as the most influential economic, political, and strategic power in the region, China has consistently received the most votes from a list of considerable powers in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, when asked about the present and future relations, a rather positive sentiment is expressed. The Cambodian respondents welcomed China’s economic influence in the present, and perceived the prospects of cooperation in the next three years positively. Interestingly, this positive sentiment shared among the Cambodian public is also a stance embraced by the Cambodian elites, primarily during the rule of Hun Sen, Hun Manet, and the Cambodian People’s Party over the past several decades. The alignment of the Cambodian state’s interests with China can be seen in intensified economic relations and in political choices Cambodia favors within the context of regional politics.

Second, to understand why an alignment of perceptions has formed, this study considers the relevance of two analytical frameworks within the discourse of public opinion in foreign policy. First, the idea that the structure of the Cambodian public’s opinions is primarily shaped by the political information environment in which the Cambodian public is embedded. This framework allows discussions to examine the unique semi-authoritarian setting in Cambodia and how such a system has made it easier for Cambodian elites to introduce the rhetoric of positive sentiments towards China. Second is the idea that Cambodian elites are actively shaping the perceptions of its people, as the public is assumed to use the Cambodian elite’s introduced rhetoric as heuristic shortcuts. In doing so, Cambodian elites are careful to frame the vast number of cooperations with China within the context of benefiting the Cambodian public, including justifying why unique foreign policy decisions are taken in the context of Cambodia’s future relations with China and its stance in the South China Sea.

Ethical statement

This article does not require ethical approval because it does not directly collect primary data from respondents and is a qualitative analysis of published data from another source. Questions on ethical procedures and informed consent of participants from the utilized published data (State of Southeast Asia survey report) can be obtained from the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute.