Criss-crossing the Sahara: New dangers to the ambitions of West African migrants

Push-pull framework

Whereas there is a litany of theoretical lenses for understanding the numerous gamut of migration and the politics it throws up, the push-pull theory is however preferred. This is in spite of the critique that the models amount to little more than lists of factors that lack a framework to bring them together in an explanatory system (Skeldon, 1990). And that in its original form, push-pull failed to account for changing motivations, altered circumstances or modified decisions en route (De Haas, 2011). In its simplest format, the push-pull model suggests that migrants were pushed by low incomes in their home states or regions and pulled by the structure of better prospects in affluent states or regions (Lee, 1966; Harris and Todaro, 1970). In his seminal study, Ravenstein (1885) presented the first systematic principles that nuance the dynamics of migration. The rationale that underpins migratory processes, as Ravenstein remarks, is an individual rational decision hinged upon calculations of costs and benefits of migration. The economic situation of the place of origin thus constitutes the push force, while the structures supporting affluence and improved living conditions in the destination are the pull factors.

The questions nudging the mind at this juncture thus become: Why do West Africans migrate from the region to elsewhere across the world, particularly Europe? Why would several migrants from the region decide to travel through the Sahara Desert at the expense of life for the purpose of resettling in Europe? They are mostly seeking job opportunities and security. Obviously, the states within the domain have myriads of challenges they are contending with; and of no mean implications are those tied to economic and safety issues bedeviling the citizens. In view of this, the push-pull perspective, according to Ley (2005, 60), serves as a prism through which migrants are regarded as rational economic [wo]men. On the basis of human want, emigrations from the region are patterned on economic opportunities. In turn, the theory remains valid for understanding the thrust of the study. After all, the weather condition of the region is relatively conducive, and not responsible for the ongoing hollowing of people, especially the middle-class. On the basis of time and space of occurrence, this study herein proposes the West African variant of the push-pull theoretical framework. The ongoing mass emigration of West Africans is not only to Europe but rather to several countries in other regions of the world. Any location that provides a modicum of improvement in human security is preferred to West Africa for several of the emigrants.

Human mobility, as expressed by the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (2005), is an inherent and desirable component of development process. For the host society, the immigrant population would introduce new energy and innovation; particularly to the industry and education. This situation would enhance the filling of pension gap, especially for new young workers who would be paying taxes. All these would only be possible since the host states have spaces available to be filled because of their birth rate, relatively low population and demographic pattern. For the countries of provenance, it portends ‘Janus-faced’ situations of (under)development. The underdevelopment is hinged upon how a low-density population may not inspire the remaining citizens to display and actualise many developmental initiatives for their countries. Rather, several others are likely to desire emigration too. The development however would be partly hinged upon the remittances from the nationals of such countries that are in diaspora. In as much as the above is apt, howbeit that West African countries have yet to create conducive spaces that could attract migrants? In lieu of this, more citizens from the zone have consistently berated their home countries, especially as is the case in Nigeria presently, and have been making efforts to emigrate elsewhere across the world. It thus means that the living conditions (standard and cost), security and economic situations in most of the states within the region are appalling, even as the demographic rate is increasing.

The above scenarios thus reveal the essence of and reinforce the need to use the push and pull framework for this study. In addition, the need for people to improve their living conditions substantiates the choice of the framework. For the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2016):

One of the elements of ‘push’ in the theory concerns the deteriorating socio-economic and politico-security-scape of West African states, which started in the late 1970s and 1980s, to the perception of a dismal future in the 1990s; as well as the fast-paced descent into the abyss of untoward circumstances of insecurity and low or no development to mention some. This has caused several citizens to regard emigration as the last hope for improving their living standards. The yawning gap in exchange rates of the several currencies across the world vis-à-vis those of West Africa is alarming. The situation thus trivialises the value of and/or for the effort and labour that several workers within the domain commit to their jobs; thereby demeaning (on the basis of the exchange rate) the contributions of the workers to the national or regional development as irrelevant. The worsening element in this scenario is the fact that the salary of the workers hardly increases as the inflation rate and prices of goods and services increase. Thus, the current pace at which West African states are sinking into irrelevance, and the abyss of underdevelopment and crimes has intensified the resolve of more persons at various strata of socioeconomic status to seek greener pasture and stable residence abroad.

Some other factors responsible for the intentions of West Africans to embark on irregular migration across the Sahara Desert/Mediterranean Sea route to Europe include socio-economic crises of social inequality, market economic challenges, and politico-security challenges like instability, conflicts, wars, discrimination, natural catastrophe, and climate change; as well as the wider processes of transformation. It is to this end that push-pull theory would assist in deepening knowledge of the irregularity of journeys across the sandy-sea route.

Ethical statement

This study received ethical approval from the Afe Babalola University Research Ethics Committee under approval number ABUADBREC 887359. Data protection, objectivity and privacy rights of respondents are all catered for in the study. Efforts were made to make the instrument anonymous as the survey instrument did not require the participant to include their names, telephone number, nor contact details. Effort was also made to protect all the key informants; they were assured that the information provided and identity is protected at the point of collecting and reporting their submission. This process was embarked on to maintain the confidentiality of all participants in the study.

Respondents were informed that there are no direct and immediate benefits for participation in the study. However, the importance of their submission in the study was made clear, including the purpose of the study. The decision to participate was left entirely to the potential participant without any influence. The research was designed to guarantee that all personal data are safe from unforeseen, unintended or malevolent use. The researcher ensures that respondents/interviewees were voluntarily engaged in the study with full knowledge of relevant risks and benefits. This implies that, prior to consenting to participation, participants were clearly informed of the research goals, possibilities to refuse participation or withdraw from the research, at any time, and without consequences. The respondents/interviewees were adults above 18 years, they all understood the information, and were fully aware of the consequences of their consent in relation to the study. However, there was no physical risk associated with the respondents in the study. Written informed consent was obtained using a consent form from all participants, distributed in English (Adesanya and Idowu, 2022c).

Study design

The study falls within the descriptive design. A mixed method of qualitative and quantitative approach in gathering and analysing data was employed. Primary data for the study were gathered through key informants’ interviews with migrants, especially some of those that returned from Libya and Morocco to Nigeria and Benin Republic. Equally, between April 9, 2022 and June 20, 2022, electronic copies of open-ended questionnaire, which was developed in-line with the objectives of the study, were circulated via Google form in English language, amongst the officials of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), for example, Migration Policy and the Mixed Migration Centre, which are focused on the numerous aspects of migration. The participants were contacted through their email addresses, which were accessed on the websites of their respective organisations. 250 copies of the questionnaire were circulated, out of which we received 85 responses (Adesanya and Idowu, 2023a). In addition, the snowball sampling method, also regarded as a chain-referral sampling technique, was employed. To do this, we identified and interviewed some initial responders that suggested other persons that were interviewed using snowball sampling. The interviewee was visited in their various offices. Two of these persons are resident in Lagos, while two other persons are residents of Ogun and Ekiti States respectively. These four people suggested other people that were interviewed for our study (Adesanya and Idowu, 2023b). The study, also, relied on extant literature on diverse dimensions of vertical irregular migration to Europe and the numerous processes involved in it, as well as the horizontal migrations happening within the West African region. These include textbooks, journal and web articles, online news tabloids, and electronic news magazines. This was done between April and June 2022. The data gathered from both primary and secondary sources were subjected to thematic and descriptive analysis and content analysis respectively.

Main findings

A total of 85 persons responded to the questionnaire and 15 persons were interviewed (Adesanya and Idowu, 2022a). We found that the reasons for several irregular migrants’ decision to embark on the illicit journey through the Sahara Desert are economic, serious limitations to obtaining valid traveling documents, and considerations of improved living conditions for families.

Equally, it is observed that aside from challenges such as sexual exploitation/prostitution, organ harvesting, human trafficking, slavery, torture, hard labour, and financial exploitation, the emigrants traveling through the Sahara Desert have new dangers like COVID-19, terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel, and changing topography and environmental conditions as a result of climate change to contend with. In addition, it was realised that irregular migrants possess a huge dose of endurance and are very resilient.

The drivers of and processes involved in crossing the Sahara

In view of Homer-Dixon’s (1999) claim that analysts must trace the long and tangled chains of causation, we believe that Van Hear et al. (2017) made a concerted effort at describing the drivers of migration as factors leading to migration and responsible for the continuity of migration. Drivers, therefore, are limited to factors that may make up the structural elements shaping the decision space for those considering migration (Van Hear et al., 2017). They proposed a drivers’ complex framework which suggests that outflow-migration and inflow-migration are often determined by a complexity of factors encompassing the economic, social and political environment. For Scheffer (2021), five factors account for the movement of people. These include demographic changes marked by growth or decline in population growth, climate change characterised by varying degrees of rising sea levels, famine, drought, etc.; the wealth gap between the North and the South, and the tendency for existing migrant networks to attract those that are still in the home country.

The above analysis suggests that economic factors are not the ultimate reasons for the South-North migration; especially when a majority of those who emigrate fall in the category of middle or higher class. Synonymous with this is the finding of Van Hear et al. (2017) that the poorest of the poor are not typical migrants. Urbanski (2022) further put these factors into categories of economic, social and political factors. The study insists that economic pull factors such as better employment, increased income and standard of living weigh more as the determinant of migration in Poland and Romania compared to the other pull factors. While political push factors such as war, unfair legal system, and bad governance formed a strong determinant of migration in these countries.

This study is consistent with the research of Kirwin and Anderson (2018) who investigated the factors that necessitate migration from West Africa, using Nigeria as a case study. The study affirms that economic factors remain the major pull factor for emigrating, followed by weakness of the political system and lack of trust in the security apparatus. These findings are affirmed by Duru (2021). Using 100 Nigerians as the study population, respondents ranked job opportunities as the leading cause of migration, succeeded by unemployment, wealth prospects, safety and security, and better conditions of living. This clearly shows that economic factors and political factors rank high as the drivers of migration. However, while there is an abundance of research and theoretical backing for economic drivers of migration, Giménez-Gómez et al. (2017) projected human security as another serious driver of migration. These authors used datasets from 51 African countries and 21 European countries between 1990 and 2014 and found that despite the income gap being an important driver of out-migration, it is not the only factor.

Arguably, Europe's proximity to Africa, and the fact of colonial history, make it a target for intending migrants. Substantiating this, IOM (2021) explains that in Q2 of 2021, a total of 35,338 immigrants and refugees were registered arriving through the three Mediterranean routes and the Western African Atlantic route to Europe, which is more than three times higher than the 10,334 arrivals registered in the same period in 2020, and 56 percent more than the 22,626 registered in Q2 of 2019. This reinforces Attali’s remark that:

In turn new factors and events are bound to surface as determinants of these moves. That is more people are bound to risk migration in an attempt to get to safety or a better life. In recent times, the international community has faced several migration challenges ranging from the aftermath of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, influx of immigrants fleeing economic hardship from global south, calls for human right protection of immigrants, refugee crisis, the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic, internal displacement caused by extreme natural disasters, perceived pressure on host countries resources, and many others. What all these suggest is that more people are bound to migrate from their home country in the future. Therefore, despite the fact that most of global south, Africa in particular, are witnessing rapid economic growth, the income gap will continue to widen in the next decades, causing migration to the European Union (EU) to be pushed to a new level. Conflicts and climate change are also significant drivers of migration from Africa to the EU, and it is fair to submit that they will continue to play a role in the future. Environmental reasons may become a larger motivator for migration in the future than they are now (Grieveson et al., 2021).

Notably, as diverse as the drivers of migration are, so also are the routes involved in the migration process. The circumstances surrounding migration might sometimes determine the routes to be taken and the nature of the migration. War, conflict, political tensions and instability often result in increased smuggling of people across land and sea borders, as well as diversification of the migration routes, as seen with migrants from Egypt, Tunisia and Libya as the Arab Spring swept through North Africa (Massari, 2015). Irregular migrants (smuggled and trafficked) often take both land routes to cross the Sahara and then sea routes to get to Europe. As in 2015, among the first five top countries that are taking the sea route to Europe, three African countries - Eritrea, Somalia, and Nigeria - were inclusive (Ogu, 2017).

Adeniyi (2019) identified four major exit points from Nigeria. The first one is the Northern route characterised by less risk and the most commonly used. Migrants would travel either to Kano or Sokoto and then from the border, cross either by arranged vehicles or motorcycles. While the risk of this route is minimal, the financial cost is often humongous as there would be a need to bribe government officials if they do not have the required documents. The second route is a long established route between Lagos and Benin as old as the origin of trade between both countries. Migrants move from Lagos to Benin, even though this is not often a preferred route because more people often enter into Nigeria joining Nigerians who travel north to cross the Nigeria/Niger border into Niger. The north eastern border into Cameroon which is the third exit route is not a regular way for migrants. Only forced migrants like those escaping Boko Haram insurgents follow this route. So, the most prominent route to Europe via the Central Mediterranean is through Niger Republic via North Africa. Niger is home to Agadez, the notorious smuggling city on the African continent, and an integral part of the journey to Europe.

In Agadez, many migrants obtain the services of the intermediaries required to continue the journey. They are often presented with two routes, one through Libya and another through Algeria. The former from Dirkou to Seguidine, Madama, Tummo and often end in Sebhais, according to Benattia et al., (2015), is considered the expensive route involving the use of a vehicle to convey a migrant between $150 and $200. While the latter takes the migrant to Arlit, Assamaka, and Guezzam, and ends in Tamanrasset at $100- $120. This route often involves walking in the desert and mountains and puts migrants at risk of death, robbery and rape.

From Tamanrasset, migrants travel in the company of smugglers through the desert to the Libyan border or up north to Morocco. The journey to Morocco passes through Ghardaia and then Oran, Maghnia and over the border into Oujda and Nador. Meanwhile, the Mali route is a substitute to the popular Niger Republic route. This is the route frequently travelled by Malians and migrants from Senegal, Gambia, and Guinea before Nigerians began to travel through that route. The route runs from Gao to Bor Mokhtar (Algerian border) and ends up in Tamanrasset. Along the transit routes, bandits often waylay the travelers, stealing from them, raping several male and female migrants (Molenaar and Kamouni-Janssen, 2017), and in the process, some are also introduced to crimes for survival. Despite the differences in the travelling routes, the common denominator for these risk takers - majority of whom died or languish in some detention centres in Chad, Niger, or Libya - is the desperation for a better life for themselves and their families (Adeniyi, 2019; Massari, 2015).

Massari (2015) further explains that Khartoum is another route to Libya. Several migrants made it a transit city on their journey to Europe, or a destination, for a while. Like the western route described above, this route involves several alternatives based on how safe they are. Depending on the country of origin, the routes to Khartoum differs for migrant. Once in Khartoum, people are transported out of Khartoum in small cars, and once in Omdurman, they are moved to the edge of the desert where the journey continues in full-sized freight trucks, sitting on top of piles of packaged goods. The initial drivers are generally Sudanese, but when the migrants change vehicles in the middle of the desert, they are usually replaced by Libyans or Chadians. There are two main threats for migrants travelling along this route: one is crossing the Darfur region, where there is the risk of encountering armed rebels or bandits; the second is extortion by the Libyan and Chadian drivers who very often stop in the desert and ask people to pay additional sums of money. Drivers are also known to leave migrants who fall from the trucks to die in the desert (Massari, 2017; Kuschminder et al., 2015).

Flowing from the foregoing, it is evident that safety and conflict along the routes; weather conditions; border surveillance and push-back policies; and changes in countries’ political status or visa regimes, as Kuschminder et al. (2015) insist, are factors that determine the routes that migrants choose to follow.

Dangers to crisscrossing the Sahara

The process involved in crossing the Sahara to the Mediterranean Sea and Europe is often characterised by immense risks, which include sexual exploitation/prostitution, organ harvesting, human trafficking, slavery, torture, hard labour, financial exploitation, boat capsizing and drowning in the Mediterranean Sea; as well as death (Ogu, 2017; Tjaden, 2021). Acknowledging this, Adeniyi (2019) writes perceptively about the dangers of crisscrossing the Sahara and noted that every stage of the journey is fraught with dangers. In spite of these dangers, some new ones are evolving, and getting very sinister; particularly because of their proclivities and the emergency situation they create owing to current realities within the international system. While crossing the Sahara has its dangers, crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Europe poses a huge challenge to irregular migrants. This part of the journey is the most dangerous as the end of it is usually death for some migrants. Notable however is that several irregular migrants are well-aware of the danger involved. What is obvious, as Tjaden (2021) remarks, are the variegated reactions of those involved to the consequences of their actions. While the awareness of risk can affect the decision to migrate, often time it in no way deterred the participants. Irregular migrants often conduct the cost/benefits analysis of travelling through the desert. However, the role of migration risk perceptions may vary depending on the context and the individual or group involved.

Beyond these risk factors, it was discovered that the emergence of COVID-19, terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel, and changing topography and environmental conditions as a result of climate change are serious dangers to those traversing the Sahara. Migrants, from our findings, would rather put themselves in harm's way to get to their safe haven in Europe than remain in their home country. Such is the case of a Ghanaian returnee who spoke about how he and his co-travelers had to add packets of panadol to the gallons of water they had, and because the water was bitter to taste, they drank very little per time. The little water drank however served as medication as they travelled from Mauritania to the Moroccan town of Tagine as reported in literature by Okertchiri and Turlue (n.d.).

The discovery of COVID-19 has since changed how we examine mobility and engage in it. COVID-19 has impacted migration by slowing down the migration process as a result of lockdown and restricted movement in many countries of the world, increased the possibility of stricter immigration regimens, the emergence of rigorous visa processing and issuing, reemergence of vaccine passports, and draconian border control regimes. In that, the spread of the virus was made possible by the process of migration and mobility of goods, services and people. Its continued spread is also made possible by the agents of globalisation. With the nature of irregular migration and no medical check or evidence of vaccination required/requested at the point of crossing or accessing the transit country and/or destination, the risk of contracting and spreading the virus increases. This means that migrants are at risk of dying from undiagnosed symptoms exacerbated by the strenuous journey of crossing the Sahara. This not only creates problems, especially for transit countries, but it also increases the death risk factor and outbreak of pandemics/epidemics in such countries. The restriction brought forth by COVID-19 further creates a situation of heightened desperation among migrants to get to their destination by all means. Thus, Sanchez and Achilli (2020) find that coupling these restrictions and migration enforcement regulations are compounding the challenges and risks already faced by those travelling irregularly.

Border closure initiated as a result of the pandemic, according to Sanchez and Achilli (2020), caused smugglers to use new, less explored and riskier routes as a result of border closures, often putting migrants’ lives at greater risk since many of these routes are beyond the reach of any humanitarian assistance. This change in route as a response to COVID-19 pandemic outcomes means that existing risk factors are heightened. Specifically, 1,442 migrants, as Varrella (2021) explains, lost their lives while voyaging on the Mediterranean Sea in 2020, even as 1,369 died in 2021. The pandemic restrictions also increased the exposure of unaccompanied women and children to trafficking. Notably, traffickers and smugglers have moved with the trend of online business thereby recruiting intending migrants through different online platforms, including grooming and exploitation, particularly of girls, during the pandemic (UNODC, 2021). This, therefore, shows that COVID-19 is not only a new danger, rather, it also exacerbates the existing dangers; hence, making the control of irregular migration difficult.

Significantly, the COVID-19 restrictions at the height of the pandemic in 2020 left migrants stranded. Emigrants who had decided to return to their home countries were unable to do so because of the closure of borders, camps, containing areas or even detention facilities. This led to tension in many of such centres as seen in Niamey, Niger. IOM Niger (2022a) reported increased tensions at its centres in Niamey given the inability of migrants to return home as a result of the closing of borders, even though many of them had tickets to leave the country under IOM's Voluntary Return and Reintegration Assistance Programme (AVRR) (Sanchez and Achilli, 2020). Given this, another factor that presents a new danger for irregular migrants, especially those taking the sea route to Europe, is the prevalence of pushbacks by destination countries. Pushbacks of migrants refer to the apprehension of immigrants after they illegally access the border of a country and were summarily repatriated to a neighbouring country prior to the conduct of individual protection and health screenings. This practice is drastically increasing, especially in the second quarter of 2020. For example, in April 2020, both Italy and Libya announced their ports unsafe for the landing of boats carrying rescued people (Tondo, 2020; Reliefweb, 2020). Libya subsequently prevented the 280 migrants intercepted by the Libyan Coast guards from disembarking from the ship (IOM, 2020). This means that migrants can be sent back to their home country, organised criminal activities are left uninvestigated and assessing the case-by-case protection needs of irregular migrants is avoided. While pushbacks are reported on the basis of the violation of the principle of nonrefoulement, it is expedient to understand that for the irregular migrant, it means back-to-zero point and perhaps starting the rigorous and dangerous journey all over again (UNODC, 2021).

Terrorism within the region poses a serious threat to lives; hence constituting a new danger to the irregular migration through the Sahara. For those who attempt to reach Maghreb countries, just as Micallef (2017) remarked, ongoing conflicts and instability pose serious dangers. In the desert regions across Libya’s South, tribal rivalries, primarily between the Tebu and Tuareg tribes, have been marked by violence and general lawlessness, though smuggling remains prominent. This however remains one of the old dangers since these tribal groups have always had conflicts between them. Nonetheless, their conflict still permits the smuggling of goods, a situation that bespeaks the period of amity and entente cordiale. Terrorism is however graver than the conflict between tribal groups, irrespective of the extent of violence. This is more so since terrorism is spreading across the Sahel, particularly around Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria. Really, terrorist groups in West Africa, as explained on a British page online (Gov.UK, n.d.), have been demonstrating their capabilities and intents by mounting attacks in Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Mali since late 2015 and 2016. In as much as the Sahel where non-state actors of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have their strongholds, is part of the Sahara, it logically follows that the terror groups constitute a major part of the new dangers to the migrants crossing the Sahara. ISWAP is regarded as the deadliest terrorist group in the world, particularly because each of its “numerous attacks took at least 15 lives in Niger; hence taking terrorism deaths from 257 in 2020 to 588 in 2021” (GTI, 2022, pp. 4-5).

Terror groups move from place to place and are likely to pitch tents around migration corridors from West Africa through the Sahel into the Sahara Desert. An instance is the Agadez route in Niger [a spill over-country], which is bounded by countries [excluding Algeria and Benin] regarded as epicentre countries [Libya, Nigeria and Mali] and spill-over countries [Burkina Faso and Chad] of terrorism (GTI, 2022). A similar development is the en masse drift of arms-bearing nomadic Fulani herders and Touaregs, which pose a significant threat to the migrants. Indeed, the bandits, especially in Nigeria, have been labelled as terrorists, while the Touaregs were the ones that sacked Bamako, thus causing grave instability in that country. By and large, the routes for herding cows by the forebears of the Fulani herders and the Touaregs have varied greatly compared to the present routes. Much more, houses have been constructed on such routes. In turn, these routes have been altered significantly. This in part is responsible for the clashes between the herders and the farmers.

In as much as such groups intend to run over or take over the command and control of the states of West Africa, they can seize some of the [irregular] migrants, forcefully integrate such individuals into their operations and deploy them for nefarious activities against their home states or other countries within the domain. The other side of this coin is that such persons get killed or arrested in the process. If killed, an old danger would have been replayed, however, the process of death is different from the previous forms of death in the Sahara, which result from lack of supplies or sickness. When arrested, such individuals experienced so much distress. Either way, however, they would have become victims of circumstances unplanned by them.

Climate change poses a great challenge to the migrants travelling through the Sahara Desert. The topography of the desert constitutes one of the most dangerous topographies in the world. This is because of its features like hard rocky plateaus, rough mountains, extensive plains covered with sand and gravel, salt flats, high dunes, and huge oasis depressions (World Atlas, n.d.). The average depth of the sand, according to an estimate cited by Busiello (2013), is approximately 150 metres, while the top of the dunes can reach a height of 320 metres from the bedrock (170-180 metres high measured from ‘sand-level’). The Sahara Desert, according to Pausata et al. (2020, p. 235):

Thus, in view of the above, the journey must have been very worthwhile for anyone to think of travelling through this route at all. This reinforces economic differences between West Africa and Europe, which entail differences in earnings, livelihoods and living standards defined by the unfolding global political economy and its inequities (Van Hear et al., 2017) as push-pull factors encouraging irregular migration from West Africa.

Created by wind erosion of soil particles (Zender, et al., 2004), mineral dust is the most abundant atmospheric aerosol substance. Whereas aerosol is found in the air that we breathe, the atmosphere in the Sahara is laden with it. Aerosol affects the climate, human health, cloud formation, weather, visibility, corrosion, and the chemistry of the atmosphere in several ways. The Canadian Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (2016) noted that smaller aerosol particles can cause severe health effects, including premature death, aggravation of asthma, cardiovascular disease, and lung disease. Given the sensitivity of mineral-dust emissions in the Sahara to changes in regional hydroclimate and land surface (Pausata, et al. 2020, p. 235), it is very likely that the acute alteration to the climate would cause more dust to be in the air. This is more so because of global warming caused by the depletion of the ozone layer and more sun rays hitting the atmosphere heats up the earth’s surface to the extent that the frozen Arctic and the great ice shield jutting off Antarctica melt; thereby raising the sea levels. As Watts (2018) put it:

Given the above, climate change constitutes another new danger to crossing the Sahara. Global warming is intensifying heat waves. Events worse than the current one, as Carrington (2021) claims, are set to strike every year by the 2040s. The dryness that comes with global warming definitely has implications for the desert where the temperature is up to 56⁰ Celsius (GTC, 2021). With global warming, the Sahara sand is drier; making it easier for the mineral dust to rise as the migrants pass by, either in vehicles or on their legs. Irrespective of how covered their noses and mouth were, dust still entered their nostrils. This often causes severe health challenges for the migrants as they drift in the desert where treatment can never be accessed.

Another issue concerns the drying up of the few oases that used to be in the desert. The environmental condition in the desert has always been an issue, but currently, it has worsened. The Sahara Desert previously periodically witnessed wet durations, mostly regarded as African humid periods (AHPs) (Larrasoañ et al., 2013; Ségalen et al., 2007; Skonieczny, et al., 2019; Ziegler, et al., 2010). With global warming, the oases that ordinarily provided succour in the desert dried up. In Bryce’s (2016) terms, from Morocco to Libya, the oases of the Sahara’s Maghreb region are disappearing as temperatures rise and rainfall decreases.

The threats of climate change that the Maghreb is contending with were the thrust of the United Nations climate conference (UNCC) in Marrakech in 2016 (UN, 2016). In turn, the oases became a major point of discourse on the impacts already playing out within the desert-scape. Although there are collaborations ongoing at the UN, however, the drying up of the oases renders climate alternation to be a new danger to migration through the Sahara. This is more so since some of the conveyors are not so conversant with the route. Indeed, there are conspicuous differences in how the route looks consequent upon sandstorms that change the shape of the desert. In turn, drivers that are not conversant with the route, and their passengers get lost. Whenever this happens, as Mahamadou (cited by Kingsley, 2015) remarked, such a group run out of fuel and water. And if there is no water, you would not survive for more than three days. With the oases gone, the impact of climate change becomes severely biting.

Consequences of the new dangers to irregular migrants’ aspirations

The rapid population growth across West Africa has increased manpower supply, a high percentage of whom are unemployed or under-utilised youths; hence several of the population are living and/or languishing in poverty. Really, as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2021) explains, the “2021 poverty headcount rate is estimated to have increased by three percentage points.” Much more is the growing corruption, which enables the oligarchs within the region to possess much of the commonweal of their respective countries. Most of the socio-economic infrastructures within these states are yet to be fully optimized while several are in distasteful conditions or have fallen into outright disrepair. In turn, several citizens live like scum. Living in West Africa is, as a respondent remarked, living in hell. To live at all, it is better to die trying to exit the region for elsewhere, especially Europe, than to remain in my father’s land (personal communication, April 12, 2022). The growing population creates a pool of [un] skilled labour willing and desperate to emigrate from their countries to elsewhere. This is mostly for better living conditions, while some others are fleeing from political persecution and insecurity. The living condition within their respective home states and the restrictive visa processes pushed some of these people into desperation, hence the choice of travelling through the Sahara Desert. When faced with limitations like restrictive immigration laws within the perimeters of the North African states, the migrants mostly prefer to remain as irregular migrants than return to their countries. This signals that the new dangers in the Sahara and any other limitations to migrants’ ambitions pose dire consequences for the migrants, their families, home countries and West Africa. Subsequent subsections are thus used in explaining some of the challenges thrown up by limitations to migration through the desert.

Psychological distress

By and large, several migrants explored official channels to be on the safe side of the law. The restrictive procedures incorporated into the visa processes of the different European countries however rendered the efforts of some migrants futile. Thus, several persons are routinely denied visas. Given this, several West African migrants explore the alternatives of tourist visas, hiding in vessels without the crew's consent, and false documents when available; as well as travelling through the Sahara Desert - Mediterranean Sea route. As Carling and Schewel (2018) explain: the restrictive immigration policies make it difficult for individuals to access legal migration channels. In turn, this has led several migrants into ‘involuntary immobility’; hence the exploration of alternative migration ‘modes’ such as irregular migration. Despite the herculean efforts, several of these migrants did not make it to their aspired destination. Some of those that made it across the Sahara Desert or through the Sea got arrested, detained, or massacred. For instance, between 23 and 37 persons, who were part of a group of 2,000 irregular sub-Saharan migrants lost their lives in their attempt to enter Melilla, Spain from Nador, in Morocco’s Oriental region (Kasraoui, 2022; Benazizi, 2022; Brito, 2022). There however were reprisals from the migrants. About 140 security officers on the Moroccan side and 60 National Police and Civil Guard officers on the Spanish side, as Brito (2022) claimed, were injured. A situation like this signals that the migrants already have developed suicidal ideation, borne of migrants’ disinterest to continue with prolonged uncertainty in their home states, traumatic experiences and an overwhelming sense of burdensomeness to oneself and others. As a result, the new challenges to migrating through the desert, and/or restrictions to ease of passage by North African governments and southern Europe merely pushed the migrants into psychological disturbance and distress; thus, causing some returnees to witness worsening mental health (Sundram and Lo, 2012).

Because of the desperation that consigned youths to uncertain and highly hazardous journeys through the desert for the confines of very unfriendly North African countries and the Mediterranean Sea, we believe that several migrants must have felt trapped within the confines of their countries. Describing situations synonymous to this, Procter et al. (2017, p. 4) hinted that many people must have experienced “advanced stages of feeling mentally trapped, figuratively boxed in, and especially hopeless and helpless. The picture is one of lethal hopelessness.” Since we are in a world that transcends borders, and the fact that the migrants are seeking, as rational economic persons, to explore the pull factors readily available across Europe for the improvement of their economic status, the risk involved in travelling through the Sahara Desert becomes worthwhile. With interests and intentions so heightened, therefore, the new dangers identified above posed severe psychological challenges to the migrants. Returning to their countries without accessing their el dorado or repatriated shortly after getting into Europe is likely to make the returnees get depressed or become psychologically distressed.

Sustained rate of unemployment/underemployment and poverty

Migration from West Africa to Europe was to be a golden opportunity for the migrants, through which they might accomplish the purpose(s) peculiar to them. This is more so because the “individuals’ ability to act depends’, as Van Hear et al. (2017, p. 3) remarked, ‘on the social milieu in which their action is performed.” The termination of such aspirations however sustained the status quo ante in the home countries of the migrants. This must have had severe consequences on the migrants, their families and communities at large. For these migrants, the necessity of resettling into a ‘living’ pattern they were so elated to depart from while embarking on a Sahara-ward journey and the ‘indignity’ of reverting to prior living conditions and milieu must have been disturbing for their mental health. Getting a job is pertinent to resettlement. The addition of such a marginal population to that of the unemployed citizens might be onerous for West African countries to handle. Such a pool of unemployed youths that have socioeconomic responsibilities to satisfy constitutes a complex recipe for crimes and crises across the region. This is more so as such a population exerts itself on the already stretched job market and socio-economic infrastructures available.

The rate of unemployment in West Africa is a ticking time bomb. This scenario is not farfetched since unemployment is one of the factors responsible for and deepens poverty within the zone; these evil twins were responsible for the efforts made by several persons towards emigrating from their home states. The following table presents the population of West African countries and the percentage of unemployment.

Population of labour force (Population ages 15-64, total), unemployment, total (% of total labour force) (modelled ILO estimate). International Labour Organization (ILO), ILOSTAT database, June 2022. World Development Indicators

From Table 1, it is realised that the population of the unemployed is already overwhelming for each country than for those of the returnees to be added, marginal though, to the existing number. For instance, the population of the unemployed in Nigeria in 2020 and 2021 respectively are 9,835,863 and 9,949,084; while Cote d’Ivoire had 4,203,061 and 4,345,451 for the same years. This situation triggered horizontal migration within ECOWAS for jobs in the informal market and thereby expanded the informal economies across the domain. Over time, therefore, the conventional regional growth poles of the region - Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria, according to Karagueuzian and Verdier-Chouchane (2014), have remained important receiving countries of returning migrants from across the region. An extension to this however is that some of the migrants share ethnic ties with citizens of the host country, thus rendering the identification or categorisation of migrants difficult. In view of this, the host state often found it difficult to identify the population of its citizens that are jobless. An instance of this is a Nigerian Yoruba man repatriated from the US or Canada, who for shame decided to stay in Benin Republic. He definitely must mingle with the Yoruba community. In turn, his identity will become difficult to prove by the Beninoise government. Such a situation has precluded the state from providing adequate job opportunities as necessary. Given the situation of the states within the region, the situation has even served as a guise for the states’ leaders from performing their statutory responsibility of job creation.

Figure 1. Map of mixed migration routes in Niger.

Source: IOM, 2017 (This figure has been reproduced with permission from International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2017).

Increased crime rate

In the bid to cross into Europe, some youthful West African irregular migrants flung themselves against the steel fence surrounding the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco to gain passage (Jones, 2018). This happened because of their desperation for ‘the golden accesses’ to their European ‘el dorado’! This action, however, was necessitated, as a respondent (personal communication, March 15, 2022) claimed, by the push factors of bad governance, rife poverty and insecurity in their home countries, and pull forces like economic empowerment and freedom, secured future, peace of mind and thought of good life in their desired haven. As long as youths in West Africa regard their prospects for securing improved standard of living, work and achieving lives aspirations as slim in their home states, they will continuously seek to migrate to better climes through available means; the alternative to this is crime. A combination of factors: new and old dangers to crossing the Sahara Desert, the prohibitive border policies of North African countries as well as nudges from the host government and IOM encouraged some migrants, particularly irregular and transit ones, to return to their home states through its AVRR and Return of Qualified Nationals (RQN) that entail administrative, logistical or financial support, including reintegration assistance to migrants that voluntarily decide to return to their home country (IOM, 2022b).

Nonetheless, some returnees might take to crime as an alternative to the aborted ambition of residence in Europe. The reasons for this opinion are not farfetched. While the IOM programmes are lofty and indispensable to migration management (Lehmann, 2019), the resettlement of the returnees as the West African governments and their agencies promised is yet to be properly done. In Nigeria for instance, a returnee indicated that the government did nothing towards their reintegration except for unending “promises of assistance and the 5,000 Naira given as transportation fare to the returnees” (Okwuosa, 2019). This is in spite of over €120 million provided by the European Union’s ‘Emergency Trust Fund for Africa’ in partnership with the IOM to Nigeria for projects focused on addressing irregular migration like job creation and conflict prevention (European Commission, n.d.; Adesanya and Idowu, 2022b)

The above perception that irregular migrants might take to crime is borne out of the fact that while abroad, they are mostly employed in the informal economies of the host states. This is because their illegal status hindered them from having their data documented with the host governments. Hence, they have to contend with legal and practical challenges that are not unconnected, as Karagueuzian and Verdier-Chouchane (2014) argued, with access to shelter, health, education, fair income and justice in respective host states in Europe. In turn, their earnings in no way assist them to break away from low income. Thus, they hardly were able to remit many funds to their relatives in their home states for tangible projects that they could rely on at return.

The returnees, like other citizens, have bills to settle, but the opportunity for employment is very constricted; thereby rendering crime a choice. After all, Aristotle (cited in Anon, 2015) insisted that poverty is the parent of revolution and crime. On return to their respective countries, most of the returnees, if not all would, depending on how judicious they are with personal funds and financial assistances from their home governments and any other entity, have had to depend on relatives for daily needs. Such persons might have competed with several other youths for the few job opportunities – formal or informal – available in their countries with very slim chances of getting employed. The relatives they might have been depending on could be stretched beyond capacity, and might put up distasteful and irritable disposition; hence compelling the returnees to decide what to do with the ‘Self’, perhaps go into crime for survival or stay off crime and live abjectly.

The dearth of employment opportunities and increasing cost of basic needs, which were some of the factors responsible for the migrants’ journey through the Sahara Desert in the first place, constitute the vortex pulling the returnees into crime. For example, a respondent explained the case of a Ghanaian returnee that impersonated a certified fabricator/technician of a firm that deals in the construction and/or fixing of Cold Storage rooms. The returnee defrauded a businesswoman of N500,000:00K in Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti State, Nigeria; and subsequently evaded her calls until he was arrested in Atan-Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria, which is 351.7 kilometres away from Ekiti State (personal communication, August 10, 2022). In another instance, as a respondent in Lagos explained, a 27-year-old young man returned from illegal migration to Europe and became dependent on his family since he could not get employed. He subsequently attempted to sell some of his father’s properties at Alagbole, Akute in Lagos State so as to start a business that would take care of his bills. Afterwards, he engaged in the illicit trafficking and usage of psychotropic substances, especially cannabis. He was later arrested with a supposed automobile mechanic in a ‘stolen Toyota Camry’ car and transferred to Police headquarters. After his release from Police custody, he was observed to have become mentally challenged and relocated to Abeokuta (personal communication, August 2, 2022). Another account concerns several female returnees from Italy that became sex workers. The sex workers mostly attempted to steal from their new customers to meet up expectations (personal communication, June 15, 2022). Whereas some cases were the fallouts of unemployment, others were either because of dissatisfaction with the jobs gotten or that the earnings could not satisfy the desired standard of living; while some other cases are habitual.

Crime, particularly the organised type, is complex! Really, state-embedded actors were identified as the foremost group that enabled organised crimes, they however recruit lieutenants that perpetrate numerous crimes within a locale per time. Some of these include cybercrimes, robbery and its variants, terrorism, human and psychotropic substance trafficking, sex work, piracy, gun running, and assassination and its variants. In 2019, for instance, on a scale of one to 10, while Africa as a whole had a crime average of 4.97, only East Africa, with a regional average of 5.51 surpassed West Africa’s 5.29 on the organised crime index. Equally, with 5.22, West Africa had the highest criminal market score (Enact, 2019). With a 7.70 score, Nigeria took the lead among the highest-scoring countries on the criminality index. Cote d’Ivoire ranked eighth with a score of 6.23, whilst Mali ranked ninth with a 6.20 score (Enact, 2019). None of the West African states is on the list of the lowest-scoring countries. In view of the myriad criminal markets, the presence of numerous criminals, and the ample reasons for people to commit crimes within West Africa, we are not in doubt, as the available accounts have shown, that some of the returnees to the region are involved in some of the crimes committed daily.