Keywords
China, Belt and Road Initiative, Central Asia, Connectivity, Energy, Infrastructure
This article is included in the Manipal Academy of Higher Education gateway.
The year 2023 marked the ten-year anniversary of Chinese President Xi Jinping inaugurating the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during his state visit to Kazakhstan. This article discusses China’s approach towards Central Asian countries under the BRI and their responses. While China has evidently profited from expanding connectivity along the ancient silk road and meeting its strategic interests, it is essential to understand whether Central Asian states have equally benefited from this initiative. Furthermore, the concern of debt-trap diplomacy has been prevalent in low-income countries where BRI has been operational. In this context, the article seeks to locate Central Asia in BRI, evaluating its impact on the region to determine if the BRI is a win-win for both the parties involved as touted by China. This article argues that despite differing interests and concerns about potential debt-traps, the BRI has been largely beneficial for both China and Central Asia given that BRI investments and projects remain crucial for the growth and development of these states and the region.
China, Belt and Road Initiative, Central Asia, Connectivity, Energy, Infrastructure
Three of the five Central Asian countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—share a border of 3,000 kilometres with China (Huaxia, 2023). Historically, both sides enjoyed friendly exchanges that date back to Zhang Qian’s mission to the region as an envoy of the Han Dynasty more than 2,100 years ago, which led to the emergence of the Silk Road. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the revival of the ancient Silk Road, which later evolved into a larger policy framework under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) encompassing several infrastructure and connectivity projects across the world (Belt and Road Portal, 2013). Xi’s proposal for BRI in Astana underscores the strategic and geopolitical significance of Central Asia in China’s ambitious initiative. China’s motivations behind placing Central Asia as a pivot in its BRI are driven by multifaceted interests in the region – including economic, security and geopolitical interests.
China’s interests in the region are directly influenced by its security concerns related to the unstable conditions at its borders (Feng, 2019, p. 24). The stability in the region is also crucial for maintaining domestic security in China, particularly the northwestern region encompassing the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), which shares land borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in Central Asia. The region is also crucial for China’s fight against the “Three Evils”—terrorism, ethnic separatism, and religious extremism (DuPont, 2007). Besides, drug trafficking and transnational crimes prevalent in the region also constitute major national security threats for China. In other words, China’s engagements with the Central Asian nations are thus driven by its aim to eradicate the Three Evil Forces and mitigate other non-traditional security threats.
Geographically, Central Asia is situated at the heart of Eurasia and is strategically significant for China’s pivot to Europe. The region is also a land bridge and transit hub from China to Europe. With Central Asia located in close proximity to the major powers, China’s presence and the BRI hold geopolitical significance. By investing in infrastructure and development projects, China aims to strengthen its influence and reduce the dependency of Central Asian states on Russian or Western Aid. China’s increasing presence in the region allows it to challenge the traditional dominance of Russia while expanding its geo-economic influence and tilting the regional balance of power in its favour. However, despite potential geopolitical competition, both China and Russia aim to secure stability in the region, underscoring the complex interplay of interests.
Given the diverse strategic interests in Central Asia, China has made huge investments under the BRI projects across the region. In this context, the paper discusses China’s BRI endeavours in the five Central Asian countries, focusing on key infrastructure projects and investments in various sectors in the last ten years (2013-2023). Furthermore, the paper assesses the impact of BRI on Central Asia in this period.
Central Asia is key to China’s BRI. The idea of the “belt” was officially launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in his speech at Nazarbayev University in Asthana in Kazakhstan on 7 September 2013, stating:
To forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development in the Euro-Asia region, we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an ‘economic belt’ along the silk road. This will be a great undertaking benefitting the people of all countries along the route. To turn this into a reality, we may start with work in individual areas and link them up over time to cover the whole region (Xi, 2013).
In his proposal, one of the five steps proposed by Xi for creating the economic belt included improving road connectivity (Witte, 2013).1 Owing to this ‘connectivity’, in March 2015, China issued the “Vision” document where Central Asia found special mention, stating:
The Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015).
Since its launch, China has funded at least 112 projects in Central Asia- mainly aimed at boosting transportation and connectivity (Imamova, 2023). As noted, on 19 May 2023, at the inaugural China-Central Asia Summit, Xi in recalling the inception of BRI in 2013, Xi stated: Over the past decade, China and Central Asian countries have worked closely together to fully revive the Silk Road and actively deepen future-oriented cooperation, steering their relations into a new era (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2023). They jointly signed the Xi’an Declaration’ and issued a blueprint for the future development of China-Central Asia relations.
Beijing’s tilt towards Central Asia highlights the economic importance of the region in China’s BRI calculus- as a major transit region that connects China to Europe, West Asia, and South Asia. The region is pivotal for the Silk Road Economic Belt, particularly the New Eurasian Land Bridge and the China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor. Besides, the region is also rich in natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons such as oil and gas. Securing energy supplies is one of China’s primary interests in Central Asia. Given the rich energy reserves in countries like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, China has invested heavily in pipelines like the Central Aisa-China gas pipelines to import natural gas from the region to fuel its energy-hungry economy. In 2021, Turkmenistan alone accounted for around 70 per cent of China’s gas imports from Central Asia (Donnellon-May, 2023). China imports approximately 25 per cent of Kazakhstan’s total oil output. Therefore, ensuring access to Central Asian energy resources enhances China’s energy security and also acts as an alternative to the volatile energy supply from West Asia. Central Asia also offers wide investment opportunities for Chinese companies, with a wide range of infrastructure projects, natural resource extraction and manufacturing factories across the region under the BRI framework. The cheap labour and substantial market for Chinese goods further enhance the business opportunities in the region. In this context, it becomes imperative to assess China’s engagement with Central Asian states under the BRI framework.
China and Kazakhstan share a border of more than 1700 kilometres and a 2000-year history of exchanges and shared interests. Given its geographic location, Kazakhstan is a centrepiece in the BRI, which makes it a critical transit state for China’s efforts to increase connectivity to West Asia and Europe (Stronski & Ng, 2018). Xi proposed to build a “Silk Road Economic Belt”, in Astana in 2013, pointing out the historical and cultural ties shared between both countries, underscoring the significance of working together to achieve regional cooperation (Belt and Road Portal, 2013). Xi’s proposal for BRI at a Kazakh university holds immense geopolitical and symbolic significance, underscoring the importance of the country in China’s strategic endeavours. Kazakhstan welcomed China’s initiative with the Kazakh leaders being highly receptive to BRI as it complements the policy of Nurly Zhol (“Bright Path”) (Stronski & Ng, 2018). During his visit to Beijing in 2015, Kazakh President Nazarbayev signed a declaration to promote the coordination between the Silk Road Economic Belt, a vital part of the larger BRI framework, and Nurly Zhol (Hao, 2018, p. 30).
The economic cooperation between China and Kazakhstan has reached a new level, with the signing of investment agreements totalling around USD 54 billion (Dave, 2018, pp. 99-100). China-Kazakhstan relations were further boosted with the election of President Tokayev in 2019 and the elevation of the bilateral relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in the same year (Sukhankin, 2021). China uses various tools to ensure Kazakhstan’s participation in its initiatives, such as large-scale investments in energy and infrastructure, technological cooperation and educational exchanges. In 2023, Kazakhstan received around 5.2 per cent of China’s overall foreign direct investment (FDI), making it the largest recipient of Chinese FDI in Central Asia (Wildsmith, 2024). BRI comprises of 51 projects worth USD 35 billion in Kazakhstan, of which 10 per cent is allocated for the Khorgos dry port. Other remarkable investments made by China in the country include the Shalkar-Beyneu Railways, the Zhezkazgan-Suksanl Railways, the Kuryl Seaport, the Unified System of Management “NOMAD” and Almaty-Sha Railway Line, Almaty bypass railways and so on (Khan, 2022).
Kazakhstan is one of China’s most important energy suppliers (Hao, 2018, p. 30). The crude oil pipeline from Kazakhstan is one of China’s most significant energy-sector investments in Central Asia, with a length of around 2,800 kilometres (Jochec & Kyzy, 2018, p. 71). Although operational long before the BRI was proposed, it was promoted as a success achieved under BRI. The largest investors in China’s energy-related engagements in Kazakhstan include the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Petro China and their subsidiaries (Nabiyeva, 2019, p. 3). As the world’s largest producer of uranium, the supply of nuclear material is another significant component of Kazakhstan’s exports to China. In 2014, Kazakh uranium-producing company Kazatomprom exported around 55 per cent of its uranium to China (Nabiyeva, 2019, p. 4).
Technological and educational cooperation are other key areas of China’s BRI in Kazakhstan. Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, a major provider of digital surveillance systems, has maintained offices in Kazakhstan since 2015 (Sukhankin, 2021). China provides educational and cultural resources by offering scholarships for Kazakh citizens to study at Chinese universities. Of the 13 in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has 5 Confucius Institutes, which aim to teach the Chinese language, culture, and history (Ryskulbekova, 2023). From just 781 Kazakhs studying in China in 2005, the number increased to 15,000 as of 2023 (Stronski & Ng, 2018; Ryskulbekova, 2023).
Establishing special negotiation bodies and new mechanisms and platforms is another important aspect of the growing bilateral coordination between the two countries. Established in 2015, the Kazakh-Chinese Coordination Committee on Industrial and Investment Cooperation (CCIIC) acts as a major body for dialogue. It maintains a list of joint projects and overall coordination (Bitabarova, 2019, p. 14). The Kazakh-Chinese Business Council (KCBC) is another important body that has been established to provide a dialogue platform for the business communities of both countries.
While China depends on Kazakhstan for the latter’s support of its initiatives such as “global initiative on data” and “jointly combatting disinformation, for Kazakhstan, access to affordable Chinese software and hardware is crucial for technological modernisation (Sukhankin, 2021). China is particularly attractive to the local governments in the region given the lack of an overt political agenda, unlike Russia or the West, which try to exert political pressure to impose political reforms (Stronski & Ng, 2018). Table 1 and Table 2 display the list of Chinese engagements in Kazakhstan through investments and construction projects since the inception of BRI.
Given the country’s close proximity to the XUAR, where China battles “evil forces” such as separatism and religious extremism, Kyrgyzstan assumes great strategic significance in China’s Central Asia strategy. Through investments and infrastructure development, China aims to promote regional stability, which is directly linked to China’s domestic security. China’s investments in the country have grown tremendously since the announcement of BRI in 2013 (Jones, 2023). Kyrgyzstan has rich reserves of minerals and natural resources, attracting investments in mining and manufacturing sectors, with the most recent being the deal signed between a Chinese mining company and a Kyrgyz SOE to develop the Kol-Jangak Coal Field (EurasiaNet, 2024). The BRI is also attractive for Kyrgyzstan as it aligns with its National Development Strategy 2040, the country’s first long-term development strategy to diversify and strengthen the economy (Borodyna et al., 2022, p.20). China also emerged as Kyrgyzstan’s top trading partner by replacing Russia with a 35 per cent share of Kyrgyzstan’s annual trade in 2023. Table 3 and Table 4 display a list of Chinese investments and construction projects in Kyrgyzstan since the announcement of BRI.
Year | Investor | Quantity in Millions | Sector | Subsector |
---|---|---|---|---|
2014 | Shaanxi Coal and Chemical | $430 | Energy | Oil |
2014 | Rongsheng Heavy Industries | $280 | Energy | Oil |
2015 | Zijin Mining | $150 | Metals |
As of 2021, under BRI, Kyrgyzstan had 46 active projects, totaling a new worth of US$ 5.4 billion, which included: 17 projects in trade and industrial development, 13 projects related to schools and cultural institutes, 11 projects on rail and road connectivity, and five projects on energy connectivity (Schroeder, 2023). For example, the major rain and road projects are: the Bishkek-Naryn-Torugart, Osh-Batken-Isfana, Bishkek-Osh alternative road projects and China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad projects (Akmoldoev, 2022, p. 5). Furthermore, in June 2024, the Kyrgyz Parliament adopted a new bill on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway2 project, which in Bishkek’s view:
will ensure the delivery of goods from China to Kyrgyzstan, as well as to the countries of Central Asia and the Middle East, including Türkiye and further to the European Union. The project will ensure increased competitiveness in the international transit transportation market by reducing the distance and time of cargo delivery (Huaxia, 2024).
Despite developments attributed to the BRI projects, there are concerns regarding the Chinese debt trap as Kyrgyzstan owes around US$1.7 billion to the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM), which accounts for more than 40 per cent of its external debt (Pannier, 2023).
Uzbekistan – China relations under the BRI were initiated, and Uzbekistan officially joined the BRI in 2015. Uzbekistan was among the first countries to support the Silk Road Economic Belt; however, this cooperation was heightened under the leadership of Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Uzbekistan’s geographical disadvantage as a land-locked country has resulted in road connectivity emerging as a critical pillar of cooperation between Uzbekistan and China under the BRI. The Angren-Pap railway line and the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan transport corridor are evidence of this. In line with this, owing to Uzbekistan’s geographical positioning bordering all other Central Asian Countries, the BRI seeks to transition Uzbekistan from a land-locked country to a land-linked country (Xu et al., 2024).
Furthermore, Uzbekistan also plays a central role in connecting China to West Asia through the China- Central Asia- West Asia Corridor. China and Uzbekistan also cooperate in the energy sector through the Central Asia–China gas line (Xie, 2021). China-Uzbekistan relationship transcends beyond energy and transport into other sectors like telecommunication, chemicals, and agriculture (see Tables 5 and 6). A recent joint declaration by Uzbekistan and China highlights the eight significant steps the countries aim to achieve to support high-quality BRI by focusing on traditional cooperation, expanding trade and investment facilitation measures, infrastructure cooperation and agricultural parks, among others (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2024). Furthermore, Uzbekistan’s new development strategy is viewed as in consonance with BRI, highlighting the expanding areas of mutual interests and development (OSCE Academy, 2020).
The BRI has been welcomed in Uzbekistan and is viewed favourably as Uzbekistan’s President states, “For us, the BRI is not just an infrastructure project. Through the joint implementation of the initiative, the region is becoming an important link in global connectivity, overcoming transport remoteness” (Yin, 2024). However, the risk of this extensive cooperation is viewed as China being the largest bilateral creditor of Uzbekistan, with debt amounting to 17.6 per cent of the total external debt of Uzbekistan (Imamova, 2023).
Tajikistan plays a crucial role in China’s BRI aspirations, with the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor passing through the country. While China and Tajikistan entered a strategic partnership in 2013, both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on constructing the Silk Road Economic Belt the following year. However, Tajikistan officially became part of the BRI in 2018 with an upgrade of the bilateral ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2017 (Belt and Road Portal, 2019).
Tajikistan is geographically an upstream country with untapped hydropower potential and is covered by mountains. As a land-locked country, Tajikistan is disadvantaged without access to sea routes and relies heavily on roadways for transportation. The country has abundant minerals and metals, although they remain untapped due to severe poverty. As such, Tajikistan supports BRI investments from China as a means for poverty reduction and infrastructure development in consonance with the 2016 National Development Strategy for the period up to 2030 (Aminjonov & Kholmatov, 2022).
In line with this, Chinese construction projects under BRI have focused on the energy sector, specifically coal and hydropower (Tables 7 and 8). The TBEA has enabled the operation of the Dushanbe No.2 thermal power plant and the South-North power transmission line (500 kV) to reduce the dependency of the Northern regions on power supply exported from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (Taliga, 2021). Another major area of cooperation has been achieved by signing an intergovernmental transit agreement for Line D of the China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline. Similarly, railways and roadways have been significant areas of focus under the BRI in Tajikistan. Several projects like the Chormazak Tunnel, the Vahdat-Yavan railway tunnel and the Dushanbe-Chanak Highway have enhanced the transportation system in Tajikistan (Xu et al., 2024). Furthermore, investments have been made in the metals sector to tap into Tajikistan’s rich mineral and metal resources, like aluminium.
Year | Investor | Quantity in Millions | Sector | Subsector |
---|---|---|---|---|
2014 | China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) | 600 | Energy | Gas |
Year | Contractor | Quantity in Millions | Sector | Subsector |
---|---|---|---|---|
2021 | China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) | 7070 | Energy | Gas |
The government of Tajikistan welcomes China’s investments and projects as they are beneficial and essential for the country’s growth and development. In light of the 2023-China-Central Asia summit, President Xi highlighted a development plan for the region of which Tajikistan is a major benefactor (Guo, 2023). While Tajikistan receives augmented benefits from Chinese investments and projects, it is also heavily indebted to China.
Accordingly, as of 2022, most of Tajikistan’s external debt accounted for Public and Publicly Guaranteed (PPG) debt, out of which China was the single largest creditor, amounting to thirty per cent of the total PPG debt (International Monetary Fund, 2024). Furthermore, in 2022, of the $ 3.3 billion owed to international creditors, sixty per cent ($1.98 billion) was owed to the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank), a state-run entity (Eurasianet, 2022). While China’s debt agreements are maintained secretly, reports have suggested that Tajikistan has granted concessions and development rights over the state’s gold and silver mines, taking an approach to settling debt in kind.
Turkmenistan – China relations date back to 1992, when China was the first country to establish diplomatic relations after its independence. While China is Turkmenistan’s most significant gas trading partner, the two countries only established a strategic partnership in 2013. The relationship was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2023 with a major focus on energy cooperation. Turkmenistan plays a central role in China’s BRI with respect to the China - Central Asia - West Asia Economic Corridor (Xu et al., 2024). Due to its favourable geographical location, Turkmenistan also seeks to emerge as a major transit hub. However, it is limited by low foreign investments and poor infrastructure development (Makhmutova, 2023).
Furthermore, Turkmenistan plays a central role in fulfilling China’s energy requirements as evidenced by China’s investments and construction projects (Tables 9 and 10). The Central Asia-China gas line, also known as Turkmenistan – China gas line, starts from Turkmenistan and runs through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to reach Xinjiang, China (Xie, 2021). Energy cooperation has been the central pillar of cooperation, evidenced by Turkmenistan’s top exports to China, including Mineral fuel, oils and distillation products amounting to US $ 9.61 billion in 2023 (Trading Economics, 2024). However, both countries have also been focusing on transportation and connectivity projects like the railway linking Kazakhstan and Iran, launched in 2014 (Xu et al., 2024). This cooperation on BRI, with a significant focus on energy and transport and cross-border connectivity, has been highlighted in the joint declaration between China and Turkmenistan in January 2023 (National Development and Reform Commission, PRC, 2023). Furthermore, integrating the Turkmen strategy of “Revival of the Great Silk Road” with the BRI highlights the economic and geopolitical interests overlap between Turkmenistan and China (Turkmenistan: Golden Age, 2023).
Year | Investor | Quantity in Millions | Sector | Subsector |
---|---|---|---|---|
2014 | China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) | 600 | Energy | Gas |
Year | Contractor | Quantity in Millions | Sector | Subsector |
---|---|---|---|---|
2021 | China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) | 7070 | Energy | Gas |
In light of the increasing cooperation between Turkmenistan and China on BRI, China’s debt-trap diplomacy has been highlighted in the case of Turkmenistan. In 2021, Turkmenistan repaid its total debt to China for the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline and developing the Galkynysh Gas field. However, earlier reports on Chinese loans to Turkmenistan indicate that the loans are repaid partially in kind (gas) (Jakóbowski & Marszewski, 2018). While 80 percent of its oil and gas exports are to China (Fitch Ratings, 2024), Turkmenistan’s debt to China amounts to 23 per cent of its GDP, causing debt-trap concerns (Gretsky, 2022).
It is observed that a major portion of China’s BRI engagements in Central Asia are in construction, reflecting the significance of infrastructure development and regional connectivity in China’s strategy (Figure 1). However, taken together, the investments and constructions are largely engaged in the energy sector, which is succeeded by the transport sector (Figure 2). Despite China’s dependence on Turkmenistan for gas imports, China’s engagements in the energy sector in Turkmenistan are significantly lesser than those in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Source: Prepared by the authors with reference to the AEI database (n.d.).
Source: Prepared by the authors with reference to the AEI database (n.d.).
It is understood that BRI in Central Asia demonstrates a multifaceted approach undertaken by China for regional development by emphasising infrastructure development, strategic investments and connectivity. While it is believed that energy security is a major driver of China’s strategy in Central Asia, the predominant focus of BRI projects is developing transport infrastructure, particularly the rail and road projects, which suggests that China’s primary objective lies in facilitating and enhancing regional connectivity (Table 11). Connectivity seems to be the larger goal of BRI in the long term. Therefore, the central role as a transit region precedes China’s drive to secure access to energy sources in its strategy towards Central Asia, particularly with respect to BRI. Of the connectivity projects in Central Asia, more than 90 per cent of the projects are strategic in nature, with few being undertaken for commercial purposes. Of the five Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan stand out with more than 80 per cent of both BRI investments and constructions, underscoring their pivotal role in China’s strategy. Concerns regarding debt sustainability also rise as Chinese loans alone account for more than 20 per cent of the GDP of countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Choudhary, 2023). Despite concerns about the “debt trap” in countries like Kyrgyzstan, the overall impact of the BRI in Central Asia highlights significant economic and strategic benefits for both sides.
China’s exports to Central Asian countries consistently increased while its imports stayed more or less stable, with the exception of Kazakhstan (Figure 3 and Figure 4). This trend reflects China’s focus on securing raw materials and energy resources. China aims to tap into the energy resources in Central Asia through BRI, which is evident as energy-related items are the most imported items from Central Asia (Table 12).
Source: Prepared by the authors with reference to the UN Comtrade database (n.d.).
Source: Prepared by the authors with reference to the UN Comtrade database (n.d.).
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Is the background of the case’s history and progression described in sufficient detail?
Yes
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
Partly
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
Partly
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
Yes
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
Yes
Is the case presented with sufficient detail to be useful for teaching or other practitioners?
Partly
Competing Interests: No competing interests were disclosed.
Reviewer Expertise: international cooperation, migration, financial literacy, sustainability, and economics of education.
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