Thoroughness of philosophy and return to religion in Tanabe Hajime

Range of Tanabe’s discussion and religion in Japanese philosophers

Although religion has an important role in Tanabe’s thoughts, he states, “Since the principle of nothingness in the dialectic is the principle of philosophy, philosophy must come to it by negating itself, and must be restored to the philosophy of religion as an occasion of negation as religious faith” (THZ 9, p. 335). In other words, Tanabe’s thoughts focus on the philosophy of religion, not religion itself.¹⁰ When addressing the religious aspect of Tanabe’s work, previous studies have mainly discussed it as a philosophy of religion from the perspective of a study of Japanese philosophy.¹¹ Few authors have examined it from the perspective of religious studies.

The word syūkyō (宗教) was first used in Japan in the early Meiji era as a translation of “religion.” In Japan, religion is the product of various discussions and attempts, mainly by intellectuals with religious backgrounds, such as Buddhism and Christianity, in turbulent circumstances.¹² However, previous studies have not fully clarified the relationship between these debates and the views expressed by Japanese philosophers. The study of this relationship falls between the analysis of Japanese philosophy, which attempts to understand the philosopher’s thoughts from within, and the study of religion, which addresses intellectuals with religious beliefs.¹³

There are several possible reasons why the theory of religion in Japanese philosophers has not been well studied. First, although both Nishida and Tanabe established their scholarly careers at a time when the concept of religion was still being formed in Japan, their use of the word “religion” does not seem very strange from a modern perspective. It is conceivable that this makes it unnecessary for us to be very aware of how their concept of religion was defined. Another possible factor is that Nishida and Tanabe both mainly focused on so-called world religions, such as Buddhism and Christianity, and less on folk religions and practices.¹⁴ Of course, one could criticize this point of view by saying that the two Japanese philosophers overlooked areas that do not belong to world religions or “higher” religions with established doctrines and scriptures. One could also argue that because this is a philosopher’s theory of religion, it is not necessary to discuss religions other than well-established world religions. With Tanabe in particular, compared to Nishida, there is little attempt to take a reflective consideration of religion itself. However, this does not mean that there is no need to examine the theory of religion in Tanabe, but rather that there are still areas that have not been explored by previous studies.

Concerning Tanabe, it seems significant today to consider the religion that he contemplated and attempted to form as part of his practice. This is because, while the religious intellectuals of his time were struggling to establish a new religion for a new era, Tanabe was seeking to do so from a different point of view. Tanabe’s discussion of religion is unlikely to be limited to the acceptance of the religious views of the time but is assumed to be unique. This is because Tanabe’s thoughts, expressed in the symbolic form of the vortex (kadō 渦動), denies being static or fixed, and always places himself as a practitioner in dynamism. This study sheds light on aspects of Tanabe’s unique religion that have not yet been examined from the perspective of how religion is bridged by philosophy.

Tanabe as a “practitioner”

To examine Tanabe’s concept of “religion,” we acknowledge how strongly religion is considered in his theory. If Tanabe considered religion weakly, it would have been difficult to discuss his theory of religion alongside the arguments made by the religious intellectuals of his time.

One of Tanabe’s major characteristics as a philosopher is his emphasis on practice (praxis) rather than contemplation (theōria). His practice does not refer to acts such as Zen meditation in Nishida. Still, it reflects his thorough contemplation of religion dialectically as a practitioner of philosophy¹⁵ rather than a mere scholar. Therefore, even if it does not involve specific religious acts, such as rituals, Tanabe’s way of life and attitude may only be described as praxis. After retiring from Kyoto Imperial University, Tanabe moved to Kita-karuizawa, known for its cold climate in winter. Here, he devoted himself to philosophical research and writing. His disciples were concerned about his health and suggested that he move to a warmer climate, but he disagreed.¹⁶ As an example of his philosophy in practice, Tanabe moved his life to a cold region as a punishment for his former actions. In addition, during Tanabe’s tenure at Kyoto Imperial University, he was criticized by Minoda Muneki and others, who were known as nationalists and attacked many scholars in the humanities. However, Tanabe published his rebuttal in their magazine¹⁷ and engaged in a direct dialogue with Minoda. This episode shows Tanabe’s sincerity, which contrasts with Nishida’s advice¹⁸ not to deal with Minoda. Tanabe put himself at risk by engaging with these aggressors.¹⁹ Hence, although human factors are involved, his response to Minoda and others²⁰ demonstrates the practical side of Tanabe’s speculation.

Tanabe’s thoughts are also oriented toward transforming society. During the war, his insistence on “the logic of species” was fraught with danger, as it could be interpreted as a message that the nation should be respected.²¹ Nevertheless, Tanabe’s pursuit of a thorough practice-oriented philosophy includes religion as an object. Hence, exploring his thoughts as a Japanese philosopher’s theory of religion is of great significance.

Absolute religion in Tanabe

Tanabe’s vision is explicitly expressed in Demonstration of Christianity. As Itō points out,²² this work shows Tanabe’s intention to form a new religion²³ oriented toward social practice by extending Philosophy as Metanoetics, which lacked socially oriented practice. Published in 1948, the book begins with a somewhat distinctive introduction in which Tanabe recollects his entry into high school (the old school system).²⁴ At that time, the First Higher School²⁵ students were confronted with the “inevitable problem” of Christianity, and Tanabe was no exception. This phenomenon was due to the influence of Christian intellectuals such as Uchimura Kanzō (1861–1930), Uemura Masahisa (1858–1925), and Ebina Danjō (1856–1937). Their influence was more significant than those of Buddhist intellectuals such as Kiyozawa Manshi (1863–1903) and Chikazumi Jōkan (1870–1941). Thus, Christianity “responded even better to the humanist demands of the youth” (THZ 10, p. 4). A science student at the time, Tanabe was not convinced by “mythical content that seems to be the product of fantasy, incompatible with scientific attitudes” (THZ 10, p. 6). Even after listening to lectures by Raphael von Koebel (1848–1923) and Hatano Seiichi (1877–1950) in university, he did not become a Christian. However, after his “Metanoetics” (zangedō) lecture in 1944,²⁶ which culminated in Philosophy as Metanoetics, Tanabe “felt as if his eyes had been opened for the first time to the truth of the Christian gospel which I had not been able to see before” (THZ 10, p. 8). He decided to “confront Christianity which had been his longstanding issue” (THZ 10, p. 9) and wrote Demonstration of Christianity.

This work develops from the question “Jesus or Paul?” by William Wrede (1859–1906). The argument that Christianity, Marxism, and Japanese Buddhism, which are dissimilar, mediate and unite as a dialectic is, from today’s perspective, a reflection of the world at the time. Since this study focuses on the development of religion in Tanabe, we begin with “Appendix: Christianity, Marxism and Japanese Buddhism,” in which the theme appears several times. Although Demonstration of Christianity was published in 1948, this appendix was published the previous year, in 1947, and could be considered a stronger reflection of Tanabe’s awareness of the issues. In this appendix, Tanabe’s reference to the second religious reformation and absolute religion²⁷ stands out as a remarkable theory of religion.

Although the second religious reformation that Tanabe discusses has Protestantism in mind,²⁸ it is also mediated by Buddhism through negative occasions, becoming an absolute religion that “is Christianity but is not Christianity.” As Liao points out, the “absolute” in this absolute religion is derived from Georg W. F. Hegel²⁹. Therefore, Tanabe’s absolute religion is based on Christianity, the religion of history, and Christianity’s position as an absolute religion that is a “religious faith through a concrete historical mediation” (THZ 10, p. 322).

Buddhism is not given sufficient significance in Hegel’s theory of religion in the Phänomenologie des Geistes. However, in this quote, Tanabe emphasizes the negative occasion of nothingness that appears in Zen and other forms of Buddhism and tries to give it a role by concretely and universally establishing absolute religion. After pointing out that “it is also clear that, relying on today’s developments in religious studies, Buddhism represents the position of nothingness as opposed to the position of being in traditional Christianity, and is the essential occasion for the mediation of the truly dialectical absolute religion” (THZ 10, p. 323), Tanabe goes on to state:

Tanabe advocates a thoroughgoing absolute religion from the standpoint of a philosophy of religion based on Hegel’s theory of religion by adding the Buddhist concept of nothingness to the dialectic of that philosophy. Tanabe’s absolute religion, with Christianity in mind and Buddhism added to it, differs from Hegel’s view of the history of religions. However, this reference to absolute religion, characteristic of Tanabe’s theory of religion, does not clarify what kind of a universal religion he aims for. Hence, we address Tanabe’s reference to “world religion(s)”³⁰ in our discussion.

World religion in Tanabe

Absolute religion is used in Tanabe as if it were a synonym for world religion. In his lecture, “The Limits of Culture,” for example, Tanabe states, “The question of death forms the central problem in all religions, especially in Buddhism and Christianity, which are called absolute or world religions” (THZ 8, p. 281).³¹ World religions in Tanabe are not based on population or regional distribution but are limited to “Buddhism and Christianity, which today are recognized as two opposing world religions” (THZ 11, p. 447). Previous studies also identify Buddhism and Christianity as world religions in Tanabe.³² Furthermore, Christianity is representative of world religions in his works. Paul superseded Judaism, a tribal religion (THZ 10, p. 66), and became the driving force in establishing Christianity as a world religion (THZ 10, pp. 174, 237).³³ An essential element in this world religion is that it “is not concerned with the comfort of self alone, but intends the comfort and salvation of all humankind” (THZ 10, p. 147), namely, it “advocates the salvation of humanity” (THZ 8, p. 432). Tanabe also states that “all world religions recognize love at the root of existence, and they generally preach love as the principle of spirituality as the highest being of human” (THZ 13, p. 189).

From these assertions, it would seem that Tanabe is simply defining world religions based on Christianity. Passages such as “there can be no religion apart from theology in world religions” (THZ 10, p. 255) seem to confirm this view. However, in his later work, Introduction to Philosophy, Tanabe not only states that theology that “organizes the content of the beliefs of some particular religion into a logical doctrine” is essential for evangelism but also that it is appropriate for “a theology that attempts to logically formulate the absolute universally” to be called a philosophy of religion if it moves beyond the specifics of particular religions (THZ 11, pp. 38–41). Hence, in Tanabe’s view, world religions are defined by the degree to which they reflect his dialectic.³⁴ From the standpoint that “it is essential to clarify the essential differences between Buddhism and Christianity and the point of unity between the two religions from the standpoint of religious philosophy” (THZ 10, p. 451), Tanabe argues the ideal religion as below.³⁵

It is not difficult to imagine that the absolute mediation of Zen, Pure Land Buddhism, and Christianity would result in the aforementioned absolute faith or religion, but one cannot deny the impression that the philosopher Tanabe is creating a religion by cherry picking. Tanabe’s attitude toward including religion in the philosophical discussion became more pronounced after the zangedō period. In “The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview (Bashoteki Ronri to Shūkyō-teki Sekai-kan, 1945),” written shortly before his death, Nishida’s statement that “a philosopher should not fabricate religion based on his system”³⁷ may be considered a reflection of Tanabe’s attitude.³⁸ How can a philosopher form a religion, whether fabricated or not? As noted above, the main theme of Demonstration of Christianity is not the formation of religion by philosophers or the bridge between philosophy and religion. The book is a realization of Tanabe’s long-considered confrontation with Christianity in his unique demonstration. However, this awareness of the problem can be traced back to Tanabe’s earlier writings, which are also discussed at the beginning of Demonstration of Christianity.

Here, “the dialectic of Platonism that I had adopted in the past” is a clear reference to the third article in Existence, Love, and Practice, “Self-Transcendence in Platonism and Faith in Gospel.” In addition, with the “dialectic of good,” he probably has the “idea of good” in Plato’s Republic in mind, extending it to the Christian dialectic of love and Buddhism. As noted earlier, world religions are based on love (THZ 13, p. 189) as a requirement for the salvation of humanity (THZ 8, p. 432). Therefore, Existence, Love, and Practice seems to suggest how philosophy is connected to the formation of world religion and its universality from Tanabe’s standpoint. In the next section, we will examine how his conception of world religion is bridged through philosophy.

Platonism as a framework for world religion in Tanabe

The third article in Existence, Love, and Practice, “Self-Transcendence in Platonism and Faith in Gospel,” is vital for understanding how philosophy is connected to religion in Tanabe. The article opens with a chapter titled “Socrates’ Tragic Death Hymn and Philosophy,” which discusses Socrates’ “practice of death” as depicted in Plato’s Phaedo:

The unity of the point of return of philosophy and religion is presented by Socrates. Then, daemōn’s voice to Socrates is explained as the intervention of the Other-power, which urges repentance as absolute conversion. Tanabe asserts that “philosophy must be the very practice of absolute nothingness” (THZ 9, p. 430). In Demonstration of Christianity, the occasion of absolute nothingness through the death and resurrection of Jesus is pointed out as the reason why Judaism, which remained within the bounds of tribalism, was transcended and became a world religion called Christianity. Zen is also a religion of nothingness for Tanabe, and Pure Land Buddhism is a religion of Other-power salvation. Thus, “Self-Transcendence in Platonism and Faith in Gospel” refers to Socrates in the same way as the world religions in Demonstration of Christianity. Moreover, since Socrates is also regarded as an ordinary man (bonbu 凡夫) who obtains salvation through repentance (zange懺悔) in Other-power religions (THZ 9, p. 29), his practice of death comes even closer to salvation through Other-power religions as the only way possible, even for ordinary people.

“Self-Transcendence in Platonism and Faith in Gospel,” which begins with the death of Socrates, discusses such themes as the development of Plato’s Idealism, the significance of matter as an occasion of self-negation in Plato’s philosophy, its similarity to Buddhism, and the fact that the existential philosophy of the time, including Karl Jaspers, became an overreach of Plato’s dialectics as well as Neoplatonism. Toward the end of the work in chapter six, “The Mediation of Zen of Learning Death in Nothingness as Love,” Tanabe refers to Suzuki Shōsan in the early Edo period to make practicing death possible even for ordinary people. This argument may seem rather far-fetched, but Tanabe sees in it a connection between philosophy and religion that transcends both East and West. Suzuki Shōsan was a Zen monk of samurai origin and was regarded as an advocate of economic ethics due to his insistence that daily life was a Buddhist practice. Tanabe contrasts Suzuki’s experience of constantly facing death with that of Socrates and interprets it as follows:

Furthermore, Tanabe, referring to Suzuki Daisetsu, interprets the emphasis on knowing shame as a characteristic of Zen of learning death as “an emphasis on repentance not normally found in Zen” (THZ 9, p. 474). He praises Shōsan Zen as “deeply committed to the absolute state of religion, without any doubt” (THZ 9, p. 475). However, Zen was a standpoint pursuing absolute nothingness through self-power practice and treating others with love was thin and abstract (THZ 9, pp. 477–478). Here Tanabe states that by applying his dialectic principle to Zen, the Zen of self-power and the Nembutsu of Other-power go together to arrive at the original state of being.

In Tanabe, because repentance by Other-power is the essence of Shinran, Suzuki Shōsan’s Zen practiced by ordinary people who repent may be connected to Nembutsu (THZ 9, p. 476). Hence, with Socrates as a starting point, Zen and Nembutsu are strongly linked, and religious salvation is not limited to self-salvation but is also linked to social practice. This also corresponds to the fact that Plato’s dialectic, which began with Socrates, is oriented toward self-transcendence and necessarily leads to social practice, hence the claim that Platonism is completed by the Christian gospel.

This statement also seems to be an assertion that world religions, including philosophies, are unified under Christianity as the standard. However, as discussed in Demonstration of Christianity, the element of dialectic mediated by the negative occasions allows Christianity to break away from the tribal religion of Judaism to become a world religion. In the same book, Plato is indicated as the founder of that dialectic (THZ 10, p. 28). Plato’s later philosophy establishes the dialectic common to Christianity that practically mediates individual existence toward the social organization (THZ 10, p. 29). Although one cannot deny the impression of Christocentrism, Platonism can be seen as the framework for the world religion that Tanabe calls for in the second religious reformation, in which Christianity and Buddhism are linked. In other words, Platonism, as the root of dialectics, is the mediator between philosophy and religion and the condition for forming what Tanabe calls a world religion.

This insistence on moving from Platonism as a dialectic philosophy to a world religion that must include a dialectical occasion is also found in Dialectic of the Logic of Species, published in 1947. However, there are few references to religions other than Christianity. In this work, published slightly earlier than Existence, Love, and Practice, Plotinus is frequently mentioned critically for his emphasis on contemplation. In contrast, Plato is mentioned positively for his emphasis on practice. However, Tanabe also noted that the person who best understood and succeeded Plotinus was Meister Eckhart, known as the Christian mystic of medieval Germany, who overcame Plotinus by emphasizing practice (THZ 7, p. 310).⁴⁰ As in “Self-Transcendence in Platonism and Faith in Gospel” from Existence, Love, and Practice, when Platonism is correctly and thoroughly implemented in Tanabe’s dialectic, we observe a structure that leads to a world religion with Christianity as its main axis.