Keywords
Jakarta Bay Reclamation, Oligarchy, Policy, Political Repositioning, Reclaiming Power
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Yusuf MGS, Solihah R, Rahmatunnisa M et al. How Government Reclaims Power in The Dynamics of Jakarta Bay Reclamation [version 1; peer review: awaiting peer review]. F1000Research 2026, 15:1092 (https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.173054.1)
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Research Article
How Government Reclaims Power in The Dynamics of Jakarta Bay Reclamation
[version 1; peer review: awaiting peer review]
PUBLISHED 06 Jul 2026
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Abstract
Corresponding author:
M. Gde Siriana Yusuf
Competing interests:
No competing interests were disclosed.
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The author(s) declared that no grants were involved in supporting this work.
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© 2026 Yusuf MGS et al.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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How to cite: Yusuf MGS, Solihah R, Rahmatunnisa M et al. How Government Reclaims Power in The Dynamics of Jakarta Bay Reclamation [version 1; peer review: awaiting peer review]. F1000Research 2026, 15:1092 (https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.173054.1)
First published: 06 Jul 2026, 15:1092 (https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.173054.1)
Latest published: 06 Jul 2026, 15:1092 (https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.173054.1)
Background
Contemporary oligarchy studies in the last two decades have gone beyond the classical elite framework, emphasizing how power is concentrated not only in the hands of a handful of individuals (Michels, 2017; Schmidt, 1973), but through strategic alliances between the state and capital (Cooper & Åslund, 2002; Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Winters, 2011). Jeffrey A. Winters (2011), in his work entitled Oligarchy, emphasizes that the core of oligarchy lies in the material power held by super-wealthy actors. Oligarchy is defined as the politics of wealth defense, namely politics aimed at protecting or defending wealth through state instruments, and classifying oligarchies into four typologies based on the political context of each country that is the object of his study (Winters, 2011).
Similarly, Richard Robinson and Vedi Hadiz, in their book ‘Reorganizing Power in Indonesia’ refer to oligarchy in Indonesia as the organization of power by an alliance of political and business elites through the granting of concessions and monopolies. Furthermore, Robinson and Hadiz also explain how oligarchies formed, declined, and adapted to democratization in Indonesia after the fall of President Soeharto. In the same context as Robinson and Hadiz, namely, developing countries also in the democratization phase, Anders Aslund’s study also explains the origins and operationalization of oligarchies in post-communist countries such as Russia and Ukraine (Åslund, 2007).
In his book ‘How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia (2007)’, Alsund even explains that oligarchies in the former Soviet Union emerged as a result of an unbalanced economic transition. The weakness of the rule of law and democratic institutions at the beginning of the democratization process allowed a small group of political elites and bureaucrats to accumulate cheaply privatized state assets and then use them to monopolize strategic sectors such as energy, natural resources, and the financial sector (Åslund, 2007).
Most recently, Shelly Gottfried’s work has made a significant contribution to the discourse on oligarchy by broadening the understanding that previously tended to focus on the context of developing countries or the superiority of material power. Gottfried emphasizes that oligarchy is not simply a collection of wealthy individuals, but rather an informal institution formed through the interaction between the state, pyramidal ownership, and networks known as clubness. The state, from this perspective, is not merely a passive party pressured by oligarchic lobbies but rather an active agent that, through regulatory capture policies such as privatization and financialization, creates the conditions for oligarchy to flourish. Thus, oligarchy is understood not only as the result of extreme economic power but also as a stable political construct within advanced democracies (Gottfried, 2019). This means that oligarchy is not merely a threat in developing or post-transition countries but also challenges democracy in developed countries.
Pepinsky, in his critique of oligarchy scholars such as Winters, Robinson, and Hadiz, argued that oligarchy studies are too totalizing, neglecting variables such as institutional variation, the presence of democratic procedures, and possible political strife within elites that could reduce oligarchic tendencies (Pepinsky, 2013). Therefore, Gottfried’s approach provides an alternative response to Pepinsky’s critique of oligarchy scholars, as Gottfried’s study demonstrates that oligarchy is not always in conflict with democracy or a strong state. Instead, oligarchy can be intertwined with democratic institutions. This makes the historical supremacy of the state crucial in explaining how and why oligarchy develops in certain forms (Gottfried, 2019). In other words, the problem of oligarchy is universal, although its forms and mechanisms vary depending on the strength of institutions and the quality of democracy.
However, despite successfully demonstrating its operationalization in established democracies and the proactive role of the state in shaping or facilitating oligarchies, Gottfried offers little explanation of the internal dynamics among the oligarchs themselves. Competition, conflicts of interest, or fragmentation between clubs are not explored much. The focus is more on the sustainability and stability of oligarchies as institutions, making it appear as if oligarchies always operate as a stable and cohesive group.
In fact, both in established democracies and in countries undergoing democratic transition, elite competition or conflict is inevitable. Furthermore, there is still a lack of attention to the dynamics arising from the conflict of interest between the oligarchy and informal democratic institutions such as the press or civil society. Therefore, these limitations open up space for further research, particularly to see how the state can reclaim its authority from oligarchic domination, both through policy instruments and public support, as illustrated by the phenomenon of the Jakarta Bay Reclamation.
The Jakarta Bay Reclamation case can be seen as a reflection of how oligarchy operates in an urban context. This massive project is not only a matter of physical development but also involves the interest of large corporations and legislative branches, as Gottfried refers to as the institutionalization of oligarchy. The era of Jakarta’s Governor for the 2014–2017 period, demonstrated how the reclamation project proceeded with regulatory support and major investors, but was accompanied by sharp criticism of corporate dominance in determining the direction of urban development. When the next Governor took office, the narrative promoted was to halt reclamation, citing concerns for coastal communities and the environment. However, this political decision was also inseparable from the tug-of-war between oligarchs and public pressure.
This case also highlights important phenomena in which both central and regional governments have attempted to regain their authority. For example, the reclamation moratorium imposed by Former Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Former Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the court ruling in favor of fishermen, and the policy of Jakarta’s Governor for the 2017–2022 is cancelling a draft regional regulation on reclamation and sealing off reclaimed islands. While the results are often partial or temporary, these steps demonstrate the existence of counter-capture or the state’s attempt to regain control over regulations previously dominated by oligarchic interests, which is still absent from Gottfried’s approach.
Therefore, the novelty of this research refers to the operationalization of Gottfried’s oligarchy approach in the context of a developing country like Indonesia and tests it in the complex phenomenon of Jakarta Bay Reclamation because it involves many actors and interest representations. By highlighting the moments of resistance and reclaiming power by the government against oligarchic domination, this study argues that state instruments that were originally used to serve oligarchic interests can actually be used to reclaim their authority. Through the main question: how does the government reclaim power from oligarchic domination, and what factors influence it? This research explains the concrete dynamics amidst oligarchic domination, which are still limited in the existing oligarchic literature.
The study’s theoretical framework is based on Shelly Gottfried's (2019) oligarchy approach, which demonstrates how liberal democratic instruments such as privatisation and financialization influence oligarchy in established democracies such as Israel. According to Gottfried, the state proactively reproduces power relations that benefit a small number of economic and political elites through instruments inherent in state authority. However, this framework has limitations because it emphasises how the state uses these instruments to realise the interests of the oligarchy, neglecting to discuss the potential for the state to use these instruments to counter this domination.
Furthermore, several empirical studies demonstrate that the state can act relatively independently of oligarchic interests (Evans, 2012; Skocpol, 2010). Skocpol and Evans introduced the idea that, through bureaucratic and regulatory institutions, the state can develop interests that differ from those of the dominant group. Evans (2012) even proposed the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ to explain how the state can remain connected to capital networks for development purposes while maintaining institutional distance to avoid complete co-option. Thus, under certain conditions, the state can reject, limit or reverse the dominance of oligarchic actors.
Furthermore, several studies demonstrate that the state is an arena for competing interests. The state comprises different actors with diverse preferences and strategies, which can lead to conflict, resistance or attempts to regain authority seized by oligarchs. Studies from an elite perspective, such as Olson (1982), emphasise that distributional coalitions tend to be fragile, with internal conflicts often leading to shifts in power relations among elites (Olson, 1982). In an oligarchic context, and (Hutchcroft, 1998a) also demonstrate that intra-elite conflict can enable the state to regain authority from the oligarchs.
Other studies introduce the concept of ‘counter-capture’, whereby the state or civil society attempts to reclaim regulatory instruments that have been hijacked. Dubash and Morgan (2012), for example, explain that regulatory agencies in the energy sector can transform from mere servants of business interests to actors that uphold public interests through reform, bureaucratic resistance, or political intervention (Dubash & Morgan, 2012). In other words, although regulatory capture is powerful, there are mechanisms that enable the state to regain control of policy.
This study therefore attempts to highlight the points at which the government tries to limit, reorganise or reclaim the authority previously exercised by the oligarchs and the instruments they used. Based on the above, it can be concluded that the government has the capacity to utilise policy instruments and political repositioning in the interest of the public. Additionally, the Jakarta Bay Reclamation phenomenon demonstrates that factors can influence the government’s capacity for counter-capture or reclaiming power.
First, intra-elite conflict, which shows that differences in interests among political elites and bureaucrats can weaken oligarchic consolidation and create opportunities for the state to reclaim authority. Empirical studies from the Philippines, Ukraine, and Israel illustrate this argument. In the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos initially coalesced with oligarchic factions to consolidate power but later displaced them through martial law and asset seizures, redistributing corporate control to loyalists (Hutchcroft, 1998b; Mendoza et al., 2022). Similarly, in Ukraine, President Yushchenko’s early alliance with oligarchs dissolved due to internal elite conflicts and declining political legitimacy, while his successor, Yanukovych, sidelined old supporters to form new oligarchic alignments (Earle et al., 2019; Pleines, 2016). In Israel, Netanyahu’s populist turn post-2011 social protests involved ousting established oligarchs and elevating new ones with closer political ties (Gottfried, 2019).
Second, democratic institutions such as the courts, the media and civil society can support the state in countering developer dominance. Aslund (2007) shows that in countries like Russia and Ukraine, where such institutions are weak, oligarchs exercise unrestrained political influence. Conversely, in democracies with stronger institutional checks, oligarchic dominance is more constrained. This comparative insight is echoed by Ford and Pepinsky (2013), who assert that while democracy may not eliminate oligarchy, it can condition the extent of its influence through procedural and institutional mechanisms.
Third, electoral politics, where power rotation and candidates’ political promises can create momentum for resistance, even if only temporarily. By discussing these three factors, the study considers oligarchy to be both a stable, entrenched structure and a contestable process. Although Gottfried (2019) treats electoral rotation primarily as a mechanism of oligarchic reproduction—facilitating elite adaptation rather than transformation—empirical cases suggest more complex outcomes. In Ukraine, for example, the Orange Revolution was triggered by public dissatisfaction with oligarchic corruption, leading to a temporary disruption of entrenched elite alliances (Pleines, 2016). Likewise, electoral moments can serve as windows for opposition or populist candidates to challenge incumbent oligarchs, even if only to substitute them with new elite factions. In Israel, Netanyahu’s strategic invocation of populist discourse and realignment of oligarchic partners following mass protests demonstrates how electoral pressures and popular mobilization can catalyze shifts in elite composition (Gottfried, 2019).
Methods
The study uses a qualitative approach with an intrinsic case study design, which allows researchers to examine in depth the phenomenon of Jakarta Bay reclamation as an arena for the struggle for authority between the state and developers. The main focus of the study is on moments when the government or state actors attempt to reclaim power or counter-capture regulations and policies that were previously hijacked by developers. Data were obtained through triangulation of sources, including interviews, analysis of policy documents, public archives and credible media reports. Official documents, such as reclamation permits, ministerial moratoriums, court decisions and gubernatorial regulations, were analysed to identify how regulatory instruments became an arena for competing interests. Additionally, interviews with key stakeholders, including government officials, legislators, and civil society representatives, were conducted to explore the narratives surrounding the political repositioning instruments employed by the state in the face of developer dominance. Secondary data sources, such as media investigation reports and court decisions, were employed to complement and validate the primary findings.
All government stakeholders who participated in this study provided their consent to be interviewed as research informants. Primary informants included Governor of Jakarta for the 2014–2017 period; Governor of Jakarta for the 2017–2022 period; former Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs; member of the Jakarta Provincial Parliament (DPRD); Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/Head of the National Land Agency (ATR/BPN); former Deputy Chair of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK); members of the Jakarta Governor’s Advisory Team (TGUPP); the Head of the Economic Division of Bappeda, DKI Jakarta; the Head of the Legal Division of the North Jakarta Land Agency (BPN Jakarta Utara); and the Secretary of the Jakarta Provincial Parliament for the 2014–2019 period. Supporting informants included the Governor of Jakarta for the 1997–2007 period; the investigative team of Tempo magazine; and the senior economist. Although no informant signed a formal written consent form, consent to participate was obtained verbally or implicitly through established professional and research procedures. Their willingness to participate is substantiated by: (1) the documented receipt of official research request letters submitted to the institutions represented by the informants; (2) interview transcripts demonstrating their active participation; and (3) other relevant supporting documentation.
Data analysis was conducted using thematic analysis techniques, involving open coding and categorisation. The main themes identified were: (1) the use of state instruments to resist developer dominance, for example through moratoriums or permit revocation; (2) how intra-elite conflict can create opportunities for reclaiming authority; (3) the importance of democratic institutions such as law enforcement agencies, the press, and civil society coalitions; and (4) how electoral politics can generate momentum for resistance. This approach enables researchers to map oligarchic relations and explain the conditions under which the state reclaims power from developers, as described in the dataset table attached at the end of the manuscript.
During the data collection process, this study encountered difficulties in conducting direct interviews with the reclamation developers. However, the necessary information and data were obtained through a literature study of documents from the Jakarta Provincial Government, court decisions with permanent legal force, financial reports accessible on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and interview excerpts from several mass media outlets. All information and data obtained from these sources was compiled and compared with the primary data.
Results
The proactive role of the government in facilitating oligarchy through regulatory capture
The Jakarta Bay Reclamation Project began in 1994, when the second President planned the restructuring and development of Jakarta’s north coast. This was followed by the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 52 of 1995, which concerned the reclamation of Jakarta Bay. Subsequently, through Presidential Decree No. 73 of 1995, the President directly appointed the owner of the Chinese conglomerate Salim Group, as the developer of the reclamation project concerning Kapuk Naga Beach. When the President regime fell in 1998, the Salim Group also declined and was unable to continue the project. Nevertheless, the Governor of Jakarta at the time, decided to continue the project by issuing a permit to PT Kapuk Naga Indah. By this time, ownership of PT Kapuk Naga Indah had transferred from the Salim Group to the Agung Sedayu Group.
Under the next governor (2007–2012), the concept of the reclamation project was changed to the construction of 17 artificial islands by nine development companies consisting of private companies and regional/state-owned enterprises (BUMD/BUMN). Five of the companies were subsidiaries of large conglomerates. The first of these, PT Kapuk Naga Indah, is a subsidiary of the Agung Sedayu Group. The next three companies are PT Muara Wisesa Samudera, PT Jaladri Kartika Pakci and PT Agung Dinamika Perkasa, which are all subsidiaries of Agung Podomoro Land (APLN). Finally, there is PT Taman Harapan Indah, a subsidiary of PT Intiland Development, which is owned by the Gondokusumo family conglomerate.
This project continued to face controversy during several periods because it was considered to cause land subsidence and environmental damage, and even threaten the livelihoods of fishermen in the reclamation area. The controversy reached its peak and became public knowledge when Governor of Jakarta for the 2014–2017 period, issued a principle permit and a reclamation implementation permit at the end of 2014. The then Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, stated that the Governor’s issuance of reclamation permits was not in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Criticism also came from academics, who predicted that reclamation would cause environmental damage. This was followed by protests and legal action from civil society groups, particularly fishermen who were directly affected by the reclamation. Nevertheless, the Governor decided to continue with the reclamation project, ignoring the protests, criticism and lawsuits.
As previously mentioned, the aim of this study is to apply Gottfried’s oligarchy approach to a developing democracy such as Indonesia, using the Jakarta Bay reclamation as an example. It proves that, during the terms of Governors (2012–2017), the state, through the Jakarta Provincial Government, not only implemented policies, but also played an active role in shaping norms and legal frameworks that benefited the reclamation developers. This is in line with Gottfried’s approach, which emphasises that the instrument the state often uses to facilitate oligarchy is regulation. This regulatory capture is reflected in the governor’s regulatory products and in regional regulations that tend to accommodate the interests of developers.
Starting with technical regulations governing reclamation, such as Governor Regulation No. 146/2014 and Governor Regulation No. 206/2016, it is evident how policy frameworks that appear neutral and technocratic actually reflect the interests of developers. For example, Governor Regulation 146 of 2014 emphasises the technical aspects of embankment construction, safety, and soil consolidation, yet it lacks any provisions governing the involvement of affected communities or the protection of coastal ecosystems. Furthermore, the mechanism for issuing Infrastructure Construction Permits (IMP) relies entirely on technical studies prepared by developers, with no independent review process or opportunity for public participation. The transitional provisions in this regulation also strengthen developers’ positions by providing a two-year transition period to adjust permits that do not comply with the new regulations. This is consistent with the concept of regulatory capture, whereby public policy favours the smooth running of investment over the protection of social and ecological interests.
Similarly, Governor Regulation (Pergub) Number 206 of 2016 reinforces this bias by directing special spatial planning for Islands C, D and E, which are managed by Agung Sedayu, towards high-end commercial and residential functions. Provisions regarding green open spaces, public facilities and social facilities are only mentioned in general terms without any clear specifications, and their fulfilment can be postponed to a later stage. The developer’s obligations are also left to flexible cooperation agreements with local governments, which opens up room for negotiations that reduce public benefits. Furthermore, the transitional provisions in this Governor Regulation ensure that old permits remain valid, thereby strengthening the position of developers even in the event of changes to the regulations.
The same thing happened during the discussion of the draft regional regulation on reclamation by the Jakarta regional representative council (DPRD Jakarta). Developers lobbied members of the Provincial Representative Council to ensure that their interests were met. This is evident from the Supreme Court’s decision document relating to the bribery case involving a member of the Jakarta Provincial Representative Council (DPRD), and Director of Agung Podomoro Land, the parent company of PT. MWS. From December 2015 to March 2016, several members of the Jakarta Provincial Representative Council actively held meetings with the owners of the development company, PT. KNI, the Owner of Agung Sedayu Group and the Director of Agung Podomoro Land. The Supreme Court’s ruling document explains in detail that the purpose of these meetings was to lobby several members of the Jakarta Provincial Council to ensure the Governor approved a reduction in the additional contribution from 15 per cent to 5 per cent in the draft regional regulation on reclamation (RTR KS), which was to be discussed jointly by the Jakarta Provincial Council and the governor in a plenary meeting. 1
During the next Governor’s administration (2017–2022), his proactive role as a facilitate or for the oligarchy initially appeared to diminish, yet he ultimately still accommodated the interests of the reclamation developers. This Governor won the election with public support by making the cessation of reclamation part of his campaign promises. However, on 13 June 2019, it was revealed that the Governor had issued 932 Building Construction Permits (IMB) for Island D, also known as Maju Island, after halting the reclamation project. The research also found that the Governor had submitted a counter-memorandum of appeal against the civil coalition (KSTJ) lawsuit in December 2017.2 This suggests that, prior to halting the reclamation project in 2018, the Governor had been hesitant, even submitting a counter-memorandum of appeal against the lawsuit filed by civil society groups opposed to the reclamation.
In addition to regulatory capture through governors and regional regulations, the government grants privileges to reclamation developers. This is evident in the National Land Agency’s process of issuing Building Use Rights (HGB). PT. KNI submitted an application for an HGB on 23 August 2017. However, on the same date, the Head of the North Jakarta Administrative City Land Office issued Decree No. 1697/HGB/BPN-09.05/2016 concerning the granting of an HGB to PT Kapuk Naga Indah, along with HGB certificate No. 6226.
However, The Government Regulation No. 24 of 1997 states that a land survey must be conducted before an HGB can be applied for. However, the Kontatering Rapport officer (surveyor) carried out the inspection on 24 August 2017, as stated in land inspection report number 1953–42405/Const-PHT/JU/2017. This means that the land survey was carried out the day after the HGB was issued. Research conducted by the North Jakarta Land Agency revealed that this was not standard procedure, as it usually takes between two and three weeks. Furthermore, the HGB certificate was issued during a central government moratorium and before the RTR KS and RZWP3K draft regional regulations were enacted. The following Table 1 describes the roles of state agents and their policies, which have implications for the fulfilment of oligarchical interests through reclamation implementation.
Table 1. Role of state actors as facilitators of oligarchy.
Considering all the findings, it can be said that the Jakarta Bay reclamation phenomenon shows how the government, through policies and regulations, systematically accommodates certain business interests that conflict with the public interest. Rather than representing the public interest and acting as neutral agents in the development process, state institutions actually serve as instruments that facilitate capital accumulation, as Gottfried argues regarding the proactive role of the state as a facilitator of oligarchy. Conversely, the Jakarta Bay reclamation case also demonstrates moments when certain state actors resist and generate dynamics that disrupt the interests of reclamation developers. These dynamics have not been widely discussed in Gottfried's (2019) approach.
Discussion
The reclaiming of power by the government from developers
During the implementation and suspension of the Jakarta Bay Reclamation project under Governors (2014–2017) and (2017–2022), several important phenomena emerged that demonstrated the government’s intention to reclaim political authority, despite initially acting as a facilitator for the oligarchy. The main instrument that stands out is regulatory intervention. This aligns with the concept of embedded autonomy (Evans, 1995), which explains how the state remains connected to the capital network for development purposes (embedded), while maintaining institutional distance (autonomous) to avoid complete co-option. It also aligns with Dubash and Morgan’s approach to counter-capture. Regulation has become the most strategic arena for the state to delay, limit and even cancel reclamation projects.
For instance, Governor of Jakarta for the 2014–2017 period, introduced a policy requiring developers to contribute an additional 15% of the value of reclaimed land at their discretion. The Governor stated that this additional 15% contribution was calculated by the Jakarta Spatial Planning Agency’s expert staff based on the Tax Object Sales Value (NJOP) and the area of land that could be sold from the reclaimed island. In an interview, the Governor explained that the contribution’s proceeds are intended for developing strategic public infrastructure, such as inspection roads, pump houses, dams, reservoirs, giant sea walls and mass transport projects, including the MRT. According to Governor BTP, without the additional contribution, reclamation would only benefit the private sector; however, with this discretion, the government can secure direct benefits for the people of Jakarta.
Despite the controversy surrounding the discretionary decision, this study concludes that it was an attempt by the Governor (2014–2017) to avoid the political arena of policy formulation, which was dominated by developers lobbying members of the Jakarta Regional Representative Council. The Jakarta Regional Representative Council’s postponement of the plenary session on the draft regional regulation demonstrates the extent to which developers dominated the policy formulation arena to ensure their interests were met. This is particularly true of Agung Sedayu, given that PT KNI is developing more reclaimed islands than any other developer. Consequently, the additional contribution that PT. KNI must pay is substantial. In this context, Governor’s decision can be understood as not merely a technocratic policy, but also a political strategy to reaffirm his authority over the dominance of big capital.
Furthermore, Governor’s assertion that the additional contribution will serve as a source of public financing for urban infrastructure, including mass transit and coastal management projects, suggests that he is leveraging the narrative of public interest to legitimise his decision. In other words, the Governor is using the instrument of repositioning state power in the face of oligarchy, creating the impression that the additional contribution is an effort by the state to return some of the reclamation profits to the community.
The reclaiming of power was also clear when the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs issued a halt to reclamation projects, and when the Minister of Environment, applied administrative penalties and closed off a number of reclaimed islands. These actions demonstrate that the central government can use its administrative authority to halt the reclamation process temporarily. Similarly, the court’s decision to uphold the fishermen’s lawsuit demonstrates that legal channels can be employed as a means of countering the dominance of developers.
Beyond regulations or policies, the Jakarta reclamation phenomenon demonstrates that the government can use political repositioning as an instrument to reclaim authority. This is evident in how the next Governor (2017–2022) used his campaign promise to halt reclamation to gain political legitimacy. This political repositioning is not merely an administrative action, but also a symbolic strategy to gain public support and weaken the dominance of reclamation developers. By withdrawing the draft regional regulation on reclamation and sealing off the reclaimed islands, the Jakarta Provincial Government is attempting to demonstrate that public authority takes precedence over corporate interests. Thus, regulatory instruments and political repositioning demonstrate that the state is not entirely passive, but has the capacity to resist.
Factors affecting reclaiming of power
Although regulatory instruments and political repositioning are the main forms of resistance, their effectiveness is greatly influenced by several important factors. The first of these is intra-elite conflict or resistance. In the context of the Jakarta Bay reclamation project, for instance, differences in the interests of central and regional officials created conflicts that enabled the government to regain control. When elite actors who were originally part of the same power network competed for reclamation-related authority, as occurred between the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and Governor (2014–2017), the reclamation project was ultimately temporarily suspended. Similarly, the differences in interests between the Jakarta Provincial Representative Council (DPRD) and the Governor of Jakarta (2014–2017), regarding additional contributions to reclamation, show that oligarchic agents do not always work cohesively.
The phenomenon of resistance among the elite ultimately revised Gottfried’s approach, which emphasised the proactive role of the state in supporting the oligarchy as a relatively stable framework. Internal conflicts among elites have proven to be an obstacle to the consolidation of oligarchic power. Thomas Pepinsky (2014) reinforces this argument through a critical pluralism approach by stating that oligarchy is not always a cohesive and stable power structure. On the contrary, it consists of actors with different preferences who can compete with each other. Thus, intra-elite resistance in the reclamation project demonstrates that state institutions can become a source of conflict over the distribution of resources between elites, hindering or delaying the realisation of oligarchic interests at a certain point.
The next factor is democratic institutions, both formal and informal. Aslund’s (2005) study illustrates the contrast between oligarchic dominance in Russia and Ukraine and in the United States, where it is influenced by law enforcement and democratic institutions such as the press and civil society. The weak enforcement of laws and the limited influence of democratic institutions in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine have led to the strengthening of oligarchic dominance in both countries compared to the United States, where law enforcement and civil society are more established.
The strengthening of democratic institutions in Jakarta, in the context of the city’s reclamation, has the indirect effect of legitimising the government’s reclaiming authority. This, in turn, limits the oligarchy’s dominance over the Jakarta reclamation project. Law enforcement, as reflected in the arrest of a member of the Jakarta Provincial Representative Council (DPRD) and the Director of Agung Podomoro Land in connection with the bribery case involving the Regional Regulation Draft on Reclamation (Ranperda RZWP3K), as investigated by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), resulted in the reclamation project losing its public legitimacy and legality. Following the exposure of this bribery case, the central government intervened in the implementation of the reclamation project by imposing a moratorium. This was followed by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry enforcing a ban on the reclamation islands.
Moreover, the amount of news coverage devoted to the reclamation issue surged in early 2016, in anticipation of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. As the issue continued to be reported on, public attention to the Jakarta reclamation project also increased. This made policymakers more cautious when discussing and deciding on policies regarding reclamation. Former Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, acknowledged that the extensive media coverage in 2016 pressured the central government to establish a joint committee involving agencies related to reclamation. Furthermore, despite the fact that the mass media is also owned by a number of oligarchs, the press also voiced the protests of fishermen and the wider community against reclamation. The press provided a platform for academic debates among experts, activists, and observers from environmental, social, economic, political, and legal fields on all aspects of reclamation development. These debates shaped public opinion, leading to demands for the cessation of reclamation and ultimately weakening the legitimacy of the Jakarta Bay reclamation project.
The third is electoral politics. The momentum of the 2017 regional elections became a turning point, at which point the issue of reclamation was used as campaign material to gain public support. The next Governor’s commitment to terminating reclamation activities effectively mobilised coastal communities and various civil society groups to offer their support. This support subsequently provided him with the requisite political legitimacy to terminate the reclamation project following his election as governor. This finding aligns with Pepinsky’s (2014) argument that oligarchies are not monolithic entities, but rather consist of actors competing for access to state resources and political legitimacy, which in this context is through the electoral mechanism. The withdrawal of the reclamation draft regulation and the termination of the project by the Governor (2017–2022) indicates that electoral momentum has the capacity to delay or hinder the interests of reclamation developers. Consequently, electoral politics emerges as a critical factor in the reclaiming of authority.
Conversely, the present study demonstrates that, while power rotation can be a significant variable in disrupting the stability of oligarchy, it does not invariably result in structural transformation, a point that has been overlooked by Pepinsky. In summary, the validity of Pepinsky’s hypothesis, which concerns the potential for democratic procedures to mitigate oligarchic tendencies, remains to be empirically substantiated (Ford & Pepinsky, 2013). This is due to the fact that the electoral momentum amid the reclamation polemic has only temporarily hindered the interests of the oligarchy, as evidenced by the Governor’s decision to issue Building Permits (IMB) for all buildings on islands C, D, and E managed by Agung Sedayu.
In other words, electoral factors only temporarily change the direction of power relations without changing the rules that support the interests of the oligarchy. Gottfried characterises this condition as a form of coexistence between electoral democracy and the oligarchic system, in which the state continues to play a proactive role as a facilitator of capital accumulation. This study, consequently, provides a comprehensive analysis by demonstrating that the government’s success or failure in reclaiming power from the oligarchy is contingent not only on the instruments utilised, but also significantly influenced by the broader political configuration. This configuration encompasses intra-elite conflicts, the strength of democratic institutions, and electoral political dynamics. The following essay will provide a comprehensive overview of the relevant literature on the subject.
Conclusion
This research began by operationalizing Gottfried’s oligarchy framework regarding the proactive role of the state as a facilitator of oligarchy in the context of developing democracies such as Indonesia. Gottfried’s approach was chosen because it places regulation (regulatory capture) as the main instrument often used by oligarchies to realize illegal interests that are contrary to the public interest, but become legal within the existing legal framework, as reflected in the case of the Jakarta Bay Reclamation. The policy products drafted and published in relation to the reclamation proved to be largely aimed at serving the interest of the oligarchy, without involving public participation, without consideration for environmental damage, and to the extent that their substance was contrary to the constitution.
Then, by highlighting moments of resistance and reclaiming power by the government, this study also develops Gottfried’s framework, which has not discussed these dynamics much in complex phenomena such as the Jakarta Bay Reclamation because it involves many actors and representations of interest. “Regulatory instruments and political repositioning show that the state is not entirely passive, but has the capacity to resist oligarchic domination, although the effectiveness of these instruments is influenced by three factors” (1) intra-elite conflicts that weaken oligarchic consolidation, (2) the role of democratic institutions that strengthen resistance, and (3) electoral politics that create temporary legitimacy for the government to oppose oligarchic interest.
Therefore, all findings and conceptual frameworks developments in this study enrich the literature on oligarchy, particularly in Indonesia, which has tended to use the perspective of capital domination and weak institutions, by showing that the state has a capacity for resistance that, although limited, has significant potential. The limitation of this study lies in its focus on only one case study, Jakarta Bay Reclamation, so that generalization to other cases still requires caution. In addition, limited access to the developers involved in the Jakarta Bay Reclamation meant that the research relied heavily on documentary and media data, and therefore did not discuss the oligarchy’s adaptive strategies in responding to state resistance. Therefore, future research could explore the oligarchy’s adaptation strategies after encountering resistance, so that the dynamics of the power relations between the state and the oligarchy can be understood more comprehensively.
Ethical considerations
Not applicable, because submitted article is derived from my (M. Gde Siriana Yusuf ) doctoral dissertation, which was conducted at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Padjadjaran University. The research was carried out under an official research permit issued by Padjadjaran University, confirming institutional approval for the study. The co-authors listed in this article also served as dissertation supervisors, thereby ensuring that the research process was conducted under their academic guidance and institutional oversight.
Informed consent was obtained verbally from all interviewees prior to participation. Written consent was not sought because the informants were public office holders and elite political actors, and the sensitive nature of the topic could increase personal or political risk if written documentation were produced. This approach is consistent with established practices in qualitative political research involving elites.
The research adheres to the ethical principles outlined in the Declaration of Helsinki, as well as to the institutional standards of Universitas Padjadjaran regarding research integrity and responsible data use.
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Yusuf MGS, Solihah R, Rahmatunnisa M et al. How Government Reclaims Power in The Dynamics of Jakarta Bay Reclamation [version 1; peer review: awaiting peer review]. F1000Research 2026, 15:1092 (https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.173054.1)
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