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Brief Report

The feasibility of targeted test-trace-isolate for the control of SARS-CoV-2 variants

[version 1; peer review: 2 approved with reservations]
PUBLISHED 16 Apr 2021
Author details Author details
OPEN PEER REVIEW
REVIEWER STATUS

This article is included in the Emerging Diseases and Outbreaks gateway.

This article is included in the Coronavirus (COVID-19) collection.

This article is included in the Max Planck Society collection.

Abstract

The SARS-CoV-2 variant B.1.1.7 reportedly exhibits substantially higher transmission than the ancestral strain and may generate a major surge of cases before vaccines become widely available, while the P.1 and B.1.351 variants may be equally transmissible and also resist vaccines. All three variants can be sensitively detected by RT-PCR due to an otherwise rare del11288-11296 mutation in orf1ab; B.1.1.7 can also be detected using the common TaqPath kit. Testing, contact tracing, and isolation programs overwhelmed by SARS-CoV-2 could slow the spread of the new variants, which are still outnumbered by tracers in most countries. However, past failures and high rates of mistrust may lead health agencies to conclude that tracing is futile, dissuading them from redirecting existing tracers to focus on the new variants. Here we apply a branching-process model to estimate the effectiveness of implementing a variant-focused testing, contact tracing, and isolation strategy with realistic levels of performance. Our model indicates that bidirectional contact tracing can substantially slow the spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants even in regions where a large fraction of the population refuses to cooperate with contact tracers or to abide by quarantine and isolation requests.

Keywords

epidemiology, SARS-CoV-2, COVID-19, contact tracing, bidirectional tracing, backward tracing, B.1.1.7, test-trace-isolate

Introduction

The frequency of the B.1.1.7 variant of SARS-CoV-2 has grown rapidly from its initial detection in October 2020 to become the dominant strain in southeastern England by the start of 2021. Studies have estimated the new strain is between 40% and 80% more contagious1,2. The rapid exponential growth of B.1.1.7, now found in dozens of countries, risks another and potentially higher wave of COVID-19 cases prior to widespread vaccination. Meanwhile, early reports suggest that current vaccines3 and prior SARS-CoV-2 exposure4 may be less protective against the B.1.351 and P.1 variants now common in South Africa and Brazil.

All three variants share an otherwise rare del11288–11296 mutation in orf1ab that can be detected using a single RT-PCR reaction5; B.1.1.7 can also be distinguished with the TaqPath diagnostic test6, twenty million of which are manufactured weekly7. As such, existing COVID-19 testing infrastructure can be used to track the transmission of the new variants. Samples testing positive by other kits can be re-screened8 without an emergency use authorization.

Test-trace-isolate (TTI) strategies have been widely used to mitigate the spread of SARS-CoV-29. Models by the present authors10 and others11 have found that incorporating backwards tracing to identify infector individuals could dramatically increase the efficacy of tracing programs. However, testing delays, mistrust, and low compliance have undermined the confidence of health authorities in the benefits of TTI12,13. Moreover, efficacy sharply decreases when caseloads are high14, as is true for SARS-CoV-2 – but not yet the variants – in many regions.

Given the current low prevalence of the variants in most jurisdictions and the ability to identify cases of the new variant using existing testing infrastructure, we hypothesized that TTI programs dedicated to controlling them could substantially reduce the harm inflicted prior to widespread vaccination of populations later in 2021, especially if vaccine reformulation is needed. Such programs could be enhanced through incorporation of bidirectional tracing10.

However, the effectiveness of TTI strategies varies widely from region to region due to programmatic and population-level differences in variables such as the proportion of cases who share their contact history with contact tracers; the proportion who comply with quarantine and isolation requests; and the overall rate of tracing success. Given this variation, it is unclear whether tracing programs exhibiting realistic levels of performance could feasibly dampen the spread of the new variants.

To evaluate the potential benefits of applying targeted test-trace-isolate to control variants, we applied a branching-process model of COVID-19 contact tracing10 to estimate the change in the effective reproduction number achievable across a wide range of parameters.

Methods

In our branching-process model10, each case generates a number of new cases drawn from a negative binomial distribution according to pre-specified incubation- and generation-time distributions (Table 1). Cases are identified and isolated based on symptoms alone or through contact tracing. Cases either comply with isolation requests or ignore them completely according to some fixed probability of compliance; cases that comply generate no further cases.

Table 1. Parameters of the branching-process model.

ParameterValueSources and Notes
% asymptomatic carriers40%1519
Relative infectiousness of
asymptomatic carriers
45%Informed by viral loads and tracing
results described in 15,1923
% environmental transmission5%24,25
Proportion pre-symptomatic
transmission
38%Informed by 19,20,22,23,2631
Generation time skew parameter (α)0.397Corresponds to pre-symptomatic
transmission rate specified above.
% of symptomatic cases identified
without tracing
50%32
% of cases who comply with
isolation
50%, 70%, 90%Assumed
Test sensitivity70%33,34
Rbase (before test/trace/isolate)1.0 to 2.0Assumes a pre-B.1.1.7 R of ~1.01,2.
Overdispersion0.1135
Number of initial cases 20Assumed
Incubation period6.0 ± 2.1 days
(lognormal distribution)
1,36,37
Delay from onset to isolation3.8 ± 2.4 days (Weibull
distribution)
38
Delay for testing1 ± 0.3 days (gamma
distribution)
Assumed
Delay for manual tracing1.5 ± 4.8 days
(lognormal
distribution); median
0.5 days
Previous reports suggest most
contacts can be traced within one
day, but some take longer39

Successful tracing depends on the identified case sharing their contact history with tracers, and on the contact in question taking place within the time window (measured in days pre-symptom onset for symptomatic cases, and days pre-identification for asymptomatic cases). Environmental transmission is assumed untraceable. Symptomatic cases require a positive test before initiating contact tracing.

Outbreaks were initialized with 20 index cases to minimize stochastic extinction and designated as “controlled” if reaching extinction before reaching 10,000 cumulative cases. Effective reproduction numbers (Reff) were computed as the mean number of child cases produced per case10.

Results

To investigate the potential for TTI to mitigate the spread of variants, we investigated the effective reproduction number achieved across a range of data-sharing and trace-success rates (Figure 1). To account for uncertainty in variant transmissibility, we explored outcomes for reproduction numbers between 1.2 and 2.0; these values assume that non-tracing interventions are already in place.

e29776b2-d3a4-4226-af37-2580a5aa3a57_figure1.gif

Figure 1. Evaluating the efficacy of bidirectional contact tracing for controlling rare SARS-CoV-2 variants.

Neighbor-averaged contour plots, showing Reff achieved by bidirectional manual contact tracing with a tracing window of (a) two or (b) six days pre-symptom onset, under different combinations of trace success probability (x-axis), rate of data sharing with manual contact tracers (y-axis), rate of compliance with isolation and quarantine (row) and base reproduction number (columns). Other disease parameters are specified in Table 1. Isolation of symptomatic cases is sufficient to reduce R even when no traces succeed and/or no cases share their data with contact tracers. “Trace success probability” refers to trace attempts that are not otherwise blocked by environmental transmission or refusal to share data.

In the absence of contact tracing, identification and isolation of symptomatic cases alone reduced Reff by 0.2 to 0.3 even when quarantine and isolation compliance was low (Figure 1, top rows). When identification and isolation left Reff substantially greater than 1 (when base R ≥ 1.4), moderate levels of tracing could have substantial effects.

When contacts were traced up to two days prior to symptom onset, roughly 60–70% data sharing and trace success rates were required to achieve an Reff reduction of at least 0.1, relative to isolation alone. If the window was extended to six days pre-onset to enable more effective bidirectional tracing, roughly 45–55% data sharing and trace success was sufficient. Higher levels of data sharing and trace success could achieve substantially larger reductions: in many scenarios, 85% data sharing and trace success reduced Reff by >0.2 in the two-day case and >0.35 in the six-day case.

Due to the exponential growth of uncontrolled epidemics, small reductions in Reff can have a large impact on the total number of downstream cases arising from a given index case over a given timespan. For example, under a simple geometric series approach, reducing Reff by 0.1 from a starting value between 1.2 and 2.0 reduces the total number of child cases after 10 generations by 37–43%; an Reff reduction of 0.2 results in a reduction in child cases of 61–66%. Given an average generation time of six days, 10 generations equates to roughly two months – enough time, given sufficient delay in the spread of the new variant, to vaccinate a substantial fraction of the population.

Discussion

Our results suggest that regions with even moderately functional contact tracing programs focused on the new variants could substantially slow their spread. Given a two-day window for bidirectionally tracing contacts pre-symptom onset, our model predicts that a program with 70% trace success, 70% data sharing, and 70% compliance with isolation could achieve an Reff reduction of at least 0.1 relative to the no-tracing case. Given a six-day window for efficient bidirectional tracing, regions with just 50% data-sharing, trace success, and isolation compliance could achieve a reduction of 0.1.

Under simple assumptions, such a reduction would reduce the number of child cases produced in two months by roughly 40%, buying time for vaccination to immunize many more people. More effective tracing programs can achieve larger reductions. Higher rates of cooperation might be achieved through home visits by contact tracers; exoneration for anything discovered in the course of contact tracing13; and financial and other support of people in quarantine and isolation40. In principle, concentrating vaccination in communities experiencing out-of-control variant transmission could further impair viral spread and increase the sustainability of TTI for COVID-19 control.

These results assume a high availability of suitable diagnostic tests and a rapid and consistent testing turnaround. They also take no account of any medical, demographic, geospatial or behavioral variation between cases that could influence the spread of the new variants.

Our results suggest that TTI programs could help slow the spread of more transmissible and vaccine-resistant variants in regions where they are currently rare, providing vital time for widespread vaccination. As TTI efficacy is limited at high caseloads14, these findings indicate that tracing programs should immediately prioritize controlling the new variants rather than less transmissible – but currently more widespread – ancestral strains.

Data availability

All data underlying the results are available as part of the article and no additional source data are required.

Software availability

Source code available from: https://github.com/willbradshaw/covid-bidirectional-tracing.

Archived source code as at time of publication: http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.427955741

License: MIT License

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Bradshaw W, Huggins J, Lloyd A and Esvelt K. The feasibility of targeted test-trace-isolate for the control of SARS-CoV-2 variants [version 1; peer review: 2 approved with reservations]. F1000Research 2021, 10:291 (https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.51164.1)
NOTE: If applicable, it is important to ensure the information in square brackets after the title is included in all citations of this article.
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Open Peer Review

Current Reviewer Status: ?
Key to Reviewer Statuses VIEW
ApprovedThe paper is scientifically sound in its current form and only minor, if any, improvements are suggested
Approved with reservations A number of small changes, sometimes more significant revisions are required to address specific details and improve the papers academic merit.
Not approvedFundamental flaws in the paper seriously undermine the findings and conclusions
Version 1
VERSION 1
PUBLISHED 16 Apr 2021
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Reviewer Report 14 May 2021
Tim C. D. Lucas, Imperial College London, London, UK 
Approved with Reservations
VIEWS 16
In this study the authors use established and previously published models of contact tracing to examine whether targeted test and trace systems could suppress novel variants. The premise is sound; contact tracing scales poorly, so while it is not necessarily ... Continue reading
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CITE
HOW TO CITE THIS REPORT
Lucas TCD. Reviewer Report For: The feasibility of targeted test-trace-isolate for the control of SARS-CoV-2 variants [version 1; peer review: 2 approved with reservations]. F1000Research 2021, 10:291 (https://doi.org/10.5256/f1000research.54297.r84410)
NOTE: it is important to ensure the information in square brackets after the title is included in all citations of this article.
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18
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Reviewer Report 04 May 2021
Akira Endo, Department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK 
Approved with Reservations
VIEWS 18
This study considers the effectiveness of contact tracing focused on variants in reducing the reproduction number. Focusing contact tracing efforts on variants is an interesting approach and may be relevant to the current situation of variant circulations worldwide. The model ... Continue reading
CITE
CITE
HOW TO CITE THIS REPORT
Endo A. Reviewer Report For: The feasibility of targeted test-trace-isolate for the control of SARS-CoV-2 variants [version 1; peer review: 2 approved with reservations]. F1000Research 2021, 10:291 (https://doi.org/10.5256/f1000research.54297.r83641)
NOTE: it is important to ensure the information in square brackets after the title is included in all citations of this article.

Comments on this article Comments (0)

Version 1
VERSION 1 PUBLISHED 16 Apr 2021
Comment
Alongside their report, reviewers assign a status to the article:
Approved - the paper is scientifically sound in its current form and only minor, if any, improvements are suggested
Approved with reservations - A number of small changes, sometimes more significant revisions are required to address specific details and improve the papers academic merit.
Not approved - fundamental flaws in the paper seriously undermine the findings and conclusions
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