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Data Note
Revised

Data Note: COVID-19, social distancing, and pipeline vandalism in Nigeria

[version 2; peer review: 3 not approved]
PUBLISHED 20 Dec 2022
Author details Author details
OPEN PEER REVIEW
REVIEWER STATUS

This article is included in the Sociology of Health gateway.

This article is included in the Coronavirus (COVID-19) collection.

Abstract

We present a dataset of the monthly cases of pipeline vandalism in Nigeria from January 2015 to January 2021. Data used in this study were collated from the Monthly Financial and Operations Reports (MFOR) of the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Each MFOR provides cases of pipeline vandalism during a 12-month span from five key locations; Mosimi, Kaduna, Port Harcourt, Warri, and Gombe. Recorded incidences of pipeline vandalism from these locations were summed and assembled into five groups; namely: historical data, prior-COVID-19, COVID-19 lockdown, and post-COVID-19 lockdown. The data were grouped based on dates. These dates were January 2015 to July 2019, August 2019 to January 2020, February 2020 to July 2020, and August 2020 to January 2021 respectively. The historical data were further sub-divided into four sub-groups based on the deployment (May 2016) of sophisticated weapons, satellite imagery, and geographical information system into the security apparatus to checkmate pipeline vandalism. The four sub-groups are sub-group A (one-year before deployment), sub-group B (the year of deployment), sub-group C (one-year after deployment), and sub-group D (two-years after deployment). The dates span for each sub-group is May 2015-April 2016, May 2016-April 2017, May 2017-April 2018, and May 2018-April 2019 respectively. After the deployment of GIS devices in May 2016, the accumulated national number of pipeline vandalism cases declined from 400 cases in January 2016 to 293 in February 2016, and 259 cases in March 2016 as opposed to 60, 49, and 94 cases in the same months in 2017; but over the years, 2017 to 2021 these methods have proved less effective, and cases of pipeline vandalism have risen once more. Similar changes in the number of cases and patterns were observed during the COVID-19 movement restrictions. From the dataset, it can be seen that COVID-19 influenced incidences of pipeline vandalism.

Keywords

COVID-19, pipeline vandalism, restriction on movement, NNPC pipelines, pipes

Revised Amendments from Version 1

The following are some of the modifications made between version 1 and version 2: the inclusion of further background data on pipeline vandalism's prevalence in Nigeria as well as the study's value and importance. The majority of queries from the reviewers focused on the data source and the validity of the analysis approach. As stated in Version 1, the NNPC is the government organization that provides the data. Since the NNPC is the government agency in charge of the production, exploitation, management, and protection of Nigeria's petroleum riches, all data comes from them. As a result, the NNPC is the best place to turn for any information on pipeline vandalism in Nigeria. This source is the origin of all data.
A second statistical examination of the data was conducted and included in the article to highlight its appropriateness in the second version in order to assess the tool's dependability. One-way ANOVA was employed in the original study's analysis; as a result, version 2 includes the verification of one-way ANOVA assumptions with respect to the underlying data sets. Figures 1a–7 display this. As more figurines were added, the positions of the initial figures from version 1 were changed.

See the authors' detailed response to the review by Alessandro Rovetta

Introduction

Product theft and vandalism of national pipelines are recurring challenges faced by the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).1,2 Oil spillage is associated with oil pipeline destruction. The destruction of pipelines leads to several environmental problems; fresh and seawater pollution, air pollution, chemical pollution, soil and land pollution.1 It also makes most agricultural practices unsustainable with an associated decline in fish population in polluted waters, biodiversity depletion,3 loss of habitat, and loss of ecological and security systems.35

Despite the punishment of 21 years to life imprisonment for pipeline vandalism6 [Section 2 of the Petroleum Production and Distribution (Anti-Sabotage) Act Cap], the practice continues. There are three main aspects of vandalism; that must be acknowledged and addressed if any meaningful sustainable gain against pipeline vandalism can be achieved. One, Nigeria is losing over 300,000 barrels per day (BPD) as a result of crude oil pipeline vandalism.7 Where do these crudes go? Two, there are billions of dollars in losses to the national revenue, environmental degradation, and in some cases loss of human lives.8,9 Where is this money? Thirdly, Pipeline vandalism because of the nature of the criminality, occurs at remote locations.1012 Which “class” of Nigerians are involved in this act? What is the role of accessibility in pipeline vandalism?

In the global fight against the COVID-19, several liberties, such as our freedom of movement, and association were suspended. The pandemics offer a unique opportunity to study the effect of movement restriction on pipeline vandalism. A relationship between access to pipelines and physical vandalism (which involves the destruction of pipes materially) is assumed. This type of destruction is not remote; it implies “accessibility”. Accessibility by its very nature involves two principal factors; access to the pipeline physically and opportunity. These two aspects of the equation were removed during the lockdown.

“Access” involves proximity to pipelines with ample time to destroy or compromised its structures. Legally, at this point, the miscreant is termed a Vandal.

“Opportunity”, on the other hand, entails a longer time duration to enable the fluid to be scooped/removed and carted away by the (Vandals, now termed) thieves. This project aims to provide information on the role of movement in pipeline vandalism. Verification of this, during “peacetime” is somewhat limited in a democracy. The constitution and economic considerations would not permit such complete, absolute prohibition on movement and assembly.

The pipelines pass through vast expanses of land. From mangrove swamps, tropical rain forest, Savanah, and arid deserts. To effectively, physically lock down all routes and passes would be practically impossible during peacetime. However, during the pandemic, much of the considerations (economically, politically, and constitutionally) were removed therefore, the condition (for vandalism) theoretically should be diminished. This project aims to address this hypothesis and assumptions using statistical methods.

In this light, the COVID-19 pandemic and consequent lockdown could be seen as an experiment. The study would therefore reveal the role “opportunity” and “access to pipeline” play in vandalism collectively. The Researchers could test if a relationship exists between observed variables and their underlying latent constructs. To accomplish this, the researchers use empirical research, to postulate the relationship pattern and test it statistically.

Why is it relevant?

This paper examines the nexus between oil pipeline vandalism and public accessibility in Nigeria.

Given the adverse impact of pipeline vandalism as exemplified in loss of life, economic losses, environmental degradation, and pipeline explosions, the paper submits that an evaluation of the impact of anti-pandemic restrictions on the phenomenon is very relevant as pipeline vandalism poses a danger for economic wellbeing and national security. Thus, a study of the effects of anti-pandemic restrictions on pipeline vandalism is relevant.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, movements were restricted in a manner unparalleled in modern living memory. It is desirable to determine if a significant difference exists in the incidence of pipeline vandalism of Nigerian oil pipelines during the COVID-19 pandemic. This dataset provides that information.

Findings from this research would enable a greater understanding of the diverse players involved in these practices. A greater understanding of the nature of the vice would be achieved. This could lead to better decisions to checkmate the vice of pipeline vandalism.

Methodology

The method

Several methods exist to determine the significance and relationship between groups of data; for example, t-test, ANOVA, etc. In recent times, some scholars have challenged the use of a threshold to declare the statistical significance of the p-value.1317 Two main arguments exist. One; research data contain more meaning than is summarized in a P-value and its statistical significance. Two, the concepts are frequently misunderstood and consequently inappropriately interpreted. The abolishment of p-values has been echoed in some articles; an example is Ref. 18.

Traditionally, Researchers examine differences between groups using t-test, ANOVA.17,19-21 In this study the one-way ANOVA was used; and, percentage differences were added as quantifiers. A one-way ANOVA is a statistical test used to determine whether or not there is a significant difference between the means of three or more independent groups.

The assumptions in the one-way ANOVA are:

  • a. Normality (That each sample is taken from a normally distributed population.)

  • b. Sample independence (That each sample has been drawn independently of the other samples.)

  • c. Variance Equality. Homoscedasticity of the dependent variable.

The verification of the assumptions used in the ANOVA analysis

Normality - This can check visually or, by the histogram. Normality checks were carried out on all subgroups datasets (Figure 1), prior-COVID, COVID and post-COVID datasets (Figure 2) and on historical datset (Figure 3). Before data can be analysed statistiscally, it must be shown to be “normally distributed”. “Normal” data are data that are drawn from a population that has a normal distribution. For the subgroups these are:

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure1.gif

Figure 1. Normality check on subgroups.

Normality checks were conducted on the underlying data sets that formed each group and subgroup A-D to determine whether the sample data have been drawn from a normally distributed population (within some tolerance). When sample data are representative; the conclusions drawn from such data are often valid.22 (The Assumption(s) of Normality, http://www2.psychology.uiowa.edu/faculty/mordkoff/GradStats/part%201/I.07%20normal.pdf, Copyright © 2000, 2011, 2016, J. Toby Mordkoff).

Normality check on the group data:

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure2.gif

Figure 2. Normality check on group data.

The data sets in the groups- pre-COVID, COVID and post-COVID, are 6 months before, during and after the COVID lockdown. While the historical data ranged from May 2015-Febuary 2019. These data were also subjected to normality check. A histogram is an estimate of the probability distribution of a continuous variable. The graphs (Figures 1, 2 and 3) approximate the characteristics bell-shape curve23 (Lund Research Ltd. Descriptive and Inferential Statistics. Available http://www.statistics.lard.com).

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure3.gif

Figure 3. Normality check on “historical data” used in the analysis.

Variance

This can be checked with a boxplot. For the subgroups these are:

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure4.gif

Figure 4. Variance check on sub groups.

The check on the group data:

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure5.gif

Figure 5. Variance check on groups.

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure6.gif

Figure 6. Variance check on “Historical data group”.

Independence

There is no formal test to verify that the observations in each group are independent.

The data

The study uses easily accessible and verifiable data. Primary data was collected by the Researchers from first-hand sources. All data used in this study reside in public domains. This is in line with the Authors’ aim to allow ease to the methods, materials, and protocols. It also allows replication. Primary data of the number of cases of pipeline vandalism each month from January 2015 to January 2021were collected and grouped based on date. The names of each group are self-explanatory. The groups are:

  • 1. Historical data –1 January 2015 to 31 July 2019.

  • 2. Prior COVID-19 data – 1 August 2019 to 31 January 2020.

  • 3. COVID-19 data – 1 February 2020 to 31 July 2020.

  • 4. Post COVID-19 data – 1 August 2020 to 31 January 2021.

Under the land use decree, the oil wealth of the country (Nigeria) resides with the Federal Government. All aspect is controlled by the Nigeria National Petroleum Cooperation (NNPC) or its subsidiaries. Incidences of vandalism of pipeline are ascribed in the Monthly Financial and Operations Reports (MFOR) of the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).22 Thus, the integrity and veracity of data used cannot be in doubt. These monthly reports are available for free download by the public from the NNPC website link (NNPC; https://www.nnpcgroup.com).22 This information can be accessed by clicking “NNPC Business” and selecting “Business Information”, then “Monthly Performance Data” on their website (https://www.nnpcgroup.com) or through (https://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPC-Business/Business-Information/Pages/Monthly-Performance-Data.aspx). The underlying data is available for free download by the public, thus; reproducibility of the dataset is facilitated. The information abstracted from the NNPC MFOR was the number of cases of pipeline vandalism per month, the month of vandalism, and the year of vandalism.

Furthermore, we obtained information and dates of major National and International events that may be additional external stimuli in this analysis. This information was collected from national and regional newspapers and web-based publications, and web pages.

These are:

  • May 2016, incorporation and deployment of sophisticated weapons, use of satellite images and geographical information system (GIS) into the security apparatus to ensure vandalism is contained, the setting up of a pipeline security force to stamp out the menace, and the formation of the Trans-National Organized Crime (TNOC) with regional allies to fight against the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.23 This was a welcome development as the area under physical patrol was massive.

  • The onset of COVID-19 in December 2019 and the declaration of COVID-19, on 30th January 2020, as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern by WHO (World Health Organization), and the upgrade to a pandemic by the 11 March 2020

  • In Nigeria, the pre-lockdown commenced from 28 February – 29 March 2020; 31 days duration. The lockdown was 35 days; from 30 March to 3 May 2020. And an ‘easing up’ of 73 days, 5 May – 15 July 2020.

Table 1. The groups and sub-groups in the analysis.

S/NGroupTimeDuration/comment
1Historical data1 January 2015 to 31 July 2019Further subdivided into 4 subgroups, each of 12 months duration

  • Sub-group A

  • Sub-group B

  • Sub-group C

  • And, sub-group D

Analysis of subgroups shall reveal the effect of the use of GIS on pipeline vandalism
2prior-COVID-191 August 2019 to 31 January 20206 monthsComparative analysis of S/N (2) and (4) determines the effect of the lockdown implementation on pipeline vandalism
The slope of S/N(3) is indicative of the rate of effectiveness of the lockdown
3COVID-19 lockdown1 February 2020 to 31 July 20206 months
4post-COVID- 19 lockdown1 August 2020 to 31 January 20216 months

Classifications in group 1, “Historical Data”

“Historical data” span from January 2015 to July 2019, these data represent pipeline vandalism data before the advent of COVID-19 and its restrictions. These data were collected before the outbreak. Consequently, it could be assumed that COVID-19 did not influence the incidences of pipeline vandalism during this time. These data can therefore be used as a “baseline”; a such of “norm”. For in-depth study, this group (spanning approximately 4 years was further divided into subgroups of a year durations each).

The sub-groups are:

  • Sub-group A (one-year before deployment) - May 2015-April 2016

  • Sub-group B (the year of deployment) - May 2016-April 2017

  • Sub-group C (one-year after deployment) - May 2017-April 2018

  • And, sub-group D (two years after deployment) - May 2018-April 2019.

An analysis of the sub-groups would reveal if the use of GIS had any impact on cases of pipeline vandalism.

Classifications in “groups 2-4”

Data from groups 2-4 were arbitrarily set within a duration of 6-months each. Pipeline vandalism during the time frames could be imparted by COVID-19. A comparative analysis of data six months before lockdown (group 2, Table 1) and six months after lockdown (group 4, Table 1) would reveal if COVID-19 had any impact on cases of pipeline vandalism.

To minimize/remove seasonal variations due to the weather (wet and dry season) data were compared only with data from the corresponding seasonal frame. This is logical, in temperate zones, data of pipeline vandalism in the summer should be compared against summer data; winter against winter in the colder zones; similarly data of pipeline vandalism in the rainy season should be compared only against data of pipeline vandalism in another rainy season in the tropic.

Software used in the data analysis

For ease of accessibility, the software used for analysis was the MS office Excel 2013 with the Analysis ToolPak add-in.

Reproducibility and replication of results

The reproducibility of data determines if similar results or conclusions could be attained by a different research team, using the same methods. The results in this study, are not artifacts of the unique setup, therefore any researcher using any statistical tool should lead to the same/similar results.

Replication, on the other hand, refers to the repetition of a research study, usually with different situations and different subjects. This determines if the basic findings of the original study can be applied to other participants and circumstances. It can be considered as a “re-run” study; aimed to confirm results. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (novel coronavirus COVID-19 or SARA-CoV-2) and its associated lockdown offered a unique opportunity that may not be replicable on the same scale.

In all statistical analyses in this project, an alpha = 0.05 as the significance threshold was set. In line with best practice for transparency in data analysis, our research hypotheses were clearly articulated; and null and alternative hypotheses were established. This means that the null hypothesis would be rejected if the p-value is less than or equal to 0.05 and the alternative hypothesis would be accepted.

The programmed MS Excel spreadsheet

The programmed MS Excel spreadsheet was used in the calculation of the time series analysis using a moving average.

The programmed Excel spreadsheet consist of rows and column. Each column was given a unique identifier ranging from 1 to 10 (Figure 7) and a column heading which is the formula used for the calculation in the column (Figure 7).

The third and fourth columns are the date and cases of pipeline vandalism for the period. The fifth column is the moving average. In the excel spreadsheet, the moving average, MA was calculated by:

The moving average, MA=AVERAGEDt:Dt+1

Where Dt = is the cases of pipeline vandalism at time, t

And

D(t+1) = is the cases of pipeline vandalism at time, t+1

In columns 6-9 the seasonal and irregularity components are handled and the data deseasonalized.

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure7.gif

Figure 7. The parts of the programmed MS Excel spreadsheet.

Analysis of the groups (1 August 2019 to 31 January 2021)

For the group data, the total incidences during the time frame covered by the group, average, and standard deviation were established. The grouped data were subjected to an ANOVA analysis, A null and alternative hypothesis were set as followed:

  • Null hypothesis: There is no significant difference between the mean case of pipeline vandalism incidences prior, during, and post COVID lockdown.

  • Alternative hypothesis: There is a significant difference between the mean case of pipeline vandalism incidences prior, during, and post COVID-19.

Analysis of the sub-groups (May 2015-April 2019)

For the sub-groups, the total cases in each subgroup, the mean, and the standard deviation were calculated. A null and an alternative hypothesis were set.

  • Null hypothesis: There is no significant difference between the mean case of pipeline vandalism incidences prior, during, and post the deployment.

  • Alternative hypothesis: There is a significant difference between the mean case of pipeline vandalism incidences prior, during, and post-deployment.

The sub-grouped data were also subjected to an ANOVA analysis, and a time series analysis (after the data were smoothened by moving average).

Dataset validation

Allowances made to control bias or unwanted sources of variability

Seasonal confounds

There are two principal seasons, the wet rainy season and the hot dry season in Nigeria. Pipeline vandalism takes place in remote locations near isolated, rural roads and footpaths; not readily accessible during adverse weather conditions. We, therefore, assume that the rainfall affects the number of cases of pipeline vandalism. However, rainfall patterns are fairly predictable and torrential rainfall occurs in the mid of the rainy seasons. Seasonal confounds were eliminated by comparing data for the same months in each group. This implies that the rainfall season data (in one group or year) were compared only with the rainfall season data (in another group or year); with similar arguments for the dry season data.

Data points in each group or sub-group

For all analyses, the number of data points was of uniform length to reduce any possible bias due to unparalleled data points.

In each group (prior, during, and post COVID-19 lockdown groups) the number of data points was six. In the four sub-groups of the historical data (i.e., sub-group “A”, sub-group “B”, sub-group “C”, and sub-group “D”) each sub-group had 12 data points.

The data was assembled over an even interval and ordered chronologically with equal time-frequency.

Exclusion of data

All cases/incidences of vandalism of pipelines that fall before or after the time frame under review (1 January 2015 to 31 January 2021) as ascribed in the MFOR were removed from the analysis.

Other assumptions made

The destruction of these pipelines has been a scourge on the national petroleum industry in Nigeria since time immemorial,1 two groups of people disrupt pipelines in Nigeria. One; the activists, radicals, and militants, to make political statements, and two, the thieves. Thieves, solely for monetary consideration via illegal possession of the fluids therein.

The former, make political statements before any attempted disruptions, often to inform the government and allow negotiation for the fulfillment of their demands; the latter does not. During the lockdown, no activists, radicals, or militants made any political statement; so, we can assume they also heeded the order to “isolate and social distance”. We, therefore, attributed all pipeline vandalism during the COVID-19 lockdown period to thieves.

Results

The number of cases of vandalism of pipeline as ascribed in the Monthly Financial and Operations Reports (MFOR) of the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC),24 for the years under study is shown on Table 2.

Table 2. Pipeline vandalism 2015-2021.

S/NMonth and year∑ Monthly total
1.YEAR: 1January-2015288
2.February-2015198
3.March-2015145
4.April-2015231
5.May-2015250
6.June-2015287
7.July-2015218
8.August-2015250
9.September-2015236
10.October-2015275
11.November-2015204
12.December-2015275
13.YEAR: 2January-2016400
14.February-2016293
15.March-2016259
16.April-2016214
17.May-2016260
18.June-2016261
19.July-2016311
20.August-2016221
21.September-2016179
22.October-2016101
23.November-201643
24.December-201618
25.YEAR: 3January-201760
26.February-201749
27.March-201794
28.April-201782
29.May-201755
30.June-201786
31.July-2017116
32.August-201770
33.September-201770
34.October-2017126
35.November-2017136
36.December-2017176
37.YEAR: 4January-2018216
38.February-2018148
39.March-2018224
40.April-2018116
41.May-201882
42.June-2018174
43.July-2018204
44.August-201886
45.September-2018125
46.October-2018219
47.November-2018197
48.December-2018264
49.YEAR: 5January-2019230
50.February-2019137
51.March-2019111
52.April-2019125
53.May-201960
54.June-2019106
55.July-2019228
56.August-2019158
57.September-2019186
58.October-201935
59.November-201968
60.December-201940
61.YEAR: 6January-202060
62.February-202032
63.March-202019
64.April-202065
65.May-202037
66.June-202033
67.July-202036
68.August-202037
69.September-202031
70.October-202023
71.November-202035
72.December-202043
73.YEAR: 7January-202127

Other information considered in the interpretation of the data plot of monthly cases of pipeline vandalism vs. time in month/year (Figure 8) include;

  • i. The date of deployment (May 2016) of sophisticated weapons, satellite imagery, and geographical information system into the security apparatus to checkmate pipeline vandalism. Before the deployment, the pipeline security method involved the active patrol in pipeline installation by security agents using patrol vehicles. Another method adopted by past administration was the involvement of local militia leaders in delicate but dangerous and remote locations. After the deployment a combination of the active patrol of pipeline installation by security agents and GIS are used; in addition to a reversal of the policy on the use of local militia.25

  • ii. The date of declaration of public health emergency of international concern.

  • iii. The date of the upgrade of the COVID-19 to “pandemic: status.26,27

  • iv. And the dates of the COVID-19 lockdown narratives in Nigeria.28,29

    The May 2016 event (from a cursory glance of Figure 8) had a great impact on cases of pipeline vandalism.21

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure8.gif

Figure 8. Plot of monthly cases of pipeline vandalism vs. time (month/year) with major events.

Analysis of groups and sub-groups

A comparative analysis of data six months before lockdown (group 2, Table 1) and six months after lockdown (group 4, Table 1) would reveal if COVID-19 had any impact on cases of pipeline vandalism.

Figure 11 compares the cases of pipeline vandalism 6 months after the deployment of GIS and other security apparatus and in the months of lockdown. The total lockdown was observed to yield better results. It was observed that a blanket restriction lowered the cases of vandalism the most; to an all-time low of 19 cases in March 2020 after a start of 32 cases in Febuary 2020 it was observed that cases started to rise (Figure 11), although it never reach pre-lockdown levels. The blanket restriction on movement was most effective (Table 3).

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure9.gif

Figure 9. Comparative analysis cases of pipeline vandalism with renovations of the methodologies used by NNPC.

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure10.gif

Figure 10. Pipeline vandalism analysis by groups.

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure11.gif

Figure 11. The effect of improvement of security apparatus and lockdown on cases of pipeline vandalim.

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure12.gif

Figure 12. The effect of lockdown implementation on cases of pipeline vandalism.

Table 3. Statistical analysis of groups and sub-groups.

ANOVA: Single factor for groups
SUMMARY
GroupsCountSumAverageVariance
Prior-COVID -19 (August 2019-January 2020)654791.166674148.167
COVID (February 2020-July 2020)622237230
Post- COVID (August 2020-January 2021)619632.6666751.86667
ANOVA
Source of VariationSSdfMSFP-valueF crit
Between Groups12750.1111126375.0564.3171610.0330453.68232
Within Groups22150.16667151476.678
Total34900.2777817
SUMMARY
TOTAL cases547222196
Mean case91.237.032.7
Standard deviation64.4115.177.20
ANOVA: Single factor for sub-groups
SUMMARY
GroupsCountSumAverageVariance
sub-group A123136261.33333332796.787879
sub-group B121679139.916666710212.62879
sub-group C121539128.253076.386364
sub-group D121954162.83333333594.69697
ANOVA
Source of VariationSSdfMSFP-valueF crit
Between Groups132038.1667344012.722228.9454479769.67E-052.816466
Within Groups216485.5444920.125
Total348523.666747
SUMMARY
TOTAL cases3136167915391954
Mean (monthly) case261.333333139.9167128.25162.8333
Standard deviation52.8846658101.057655.4651859.95579

Lag analysis

A “lag” is a fixed amount of time. In the lag analysis in this paper, two key observations (number of cases of vandalism) are plotted lagged. These are the time periods after the implementation of the GIS into the security apparatus to checkmate pipeline vandalism before changes could be observed. The six-month lag may be the “learning/training and implementation phase” after the media announcements and deployment.

Notice the declining incidences of pipeline vandalism from August after the installation in May with an all-time low in December (Figure 9). It was noted that after the periods of renovations of the methodologies used to checkmate the activities of vandals.

The uncompromising movement restrictions also favored a reduction in cases of pipeline vandalism, as a similar shift was observed in the groups’ data. These data span from six months before lockdown, the COVID-19 pandemics lockdown group and six months after. The lockdown period and the periods immediately after, presented the fewest cases of pipeline vandalism (Figure 10).

As observed from Figures 11 and 12, short term benefits were observed. The restriction of movement led to a reduction of pipeline vandalism when the number of cases of vandalism for any month are compared. However by December, initial ripples were observed.

The implementation of a different security protocol in May 2016 was found to be followed by a reduction in cases of pipeline vandalism. The restriction during the pandemic was found to be followed by a reduction in cases of pipeline vandalism. These methods could be said to be also effective.

Rate of effectiveness

From a security viewpoint, it was therefore desirous to determine if greater success would be attributed to either the use of GIS or blanket restriction. This would enable the design of a more winning approach to vandalism. For this, the cases of pipeline vandalism 6 months after the incorporation and implementation of the GIS systems and the 6 months of total and comprehensive lockdown were compared (Table 4).

Table 4. Rate of effectiveness calculation.

S/Nthe use of GISblanket restriction
1start of observation periodFebruary 2017February 2020
2end of observation periodJuly 2017July 2020
3Time duration of observation period6 months6 months
4cases at start of observation period4932
5cases at end of observation period11636
6Rate of effectiveness11.170.67

To determine this, the rate of effectiveness was considered. This may be defined as:

Rate of effectiveness, Re=BAt

Where:

Rate of effectiveness = Re

Number of cases at start of observation period = A

Number of cases at end of observation period = B

Time duration of observation period = t

Time series analysis

A time series analysis of the data was undertaken to determine the effect of time vandalism on pipeline and allow forecasting using a moving average (MA) model.

In time series analysis a sequence of data points recorded over an interval of time and collected at consistent intervals over the set period of time at consistent intervals is analysised. the data points are not intermittently or randomly selected. The time series analysis of subgroups A, B, C and D are shown in Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 respectively. In Figures 13, 14, 15, and 16 dataset from each subgroups and generated moving average models are plotted. This shows the degree of fitness of the moving average models in each incidence.

Table 5. Time series analysis subgroup A.

YtBaselineSt ItYt/StTrend component @ time t
tPatternTimeCases of pipeline vandalism (1 year before deployment)
×102
Moving average, MA(2)Seasonal and irregular componentsStDeseasonalizeTtSt*Tt
11May 20152.50.97251862.570644912.4886912472.4
22June 20152.872.6851.0689013041.009951752.8417199182.515720082.5
31July 20152.182.5250.8633663370.97251862.2416023622.5427489132.5
42August 20152.252.2151.0158013541.009951752.2278292042.5697777462.6
51September 20152.362.3051.0238611710.97251862.4266887952.5968065792.5
62October 20152.752.5551.0763209391.009951752.722902362.6238354122.6
71November 20152.042.3950.851774530.97251862.0976462472.6508642452.6
82December 20152.752.3951.148225471.009951752.722902362.6778930782.7
91January 201643.3751.1851851850.97251864.1130318572.7049219122.6
102Febuary 20162.933.4650.8455988461.009951752.9011286962.7319507452.8
111March 20162.592.760.9384057970.97251862.6631881272.7589795782.7
122April 20162.142.3650.9048625791.009951752.1189131092.7860084112.8

Table 6. Time series analysis subgroup B.

tPatternTimeCases of pipeline vandalism (within year of deployment) ×10 2Moving average, MA(2)Seasonal and irregular componentsStDeseasonalizeTtSt*Tt
11May 20162.60.775710623.351765381276.1243447214.192587
22June 20162.612.6051.0019193860.950442162.746090308252.5007127239.987322
33July 20163.112.861.0874125871.069780222.907139188228.8770807244.848174
41August 20162.212.660.8308270680.775710622.849000573205.2534486159.21728
52September 20161.7920.8950.950442161.883333966181.6298166172.628635
63October 20161.011.40.7214285711.069780220.944119158158.0061845169.031891
71November 20160.430.720.5972222220.775710620.554330428134.3825525104.241973
82December 20160.180.3050.5901639340.950442160.189385538110.7589204105.269947
93January 20170.60.391.5384615381.069780220.56086286687.1352883893.215608
101February 20170.490.5450.8990825690.775710620.6316788663.5116563449.2666663
112March 20170.940.7151.3146853150.950442160.98901336739.8880242937.9112599
123April 20170.820.880.9318181821.069780220.76651258316.2643922517.3993251

Table 7. Time series analysis subgroup C.

YtBaselineSt ItYt/StTrend component @ time t
tPatternTimeCases of pipeline vandalism (1 year after deployment)×10Moving average, MA(2)Seasonal and irregular componentsStDeseasonalizeTtSt*Tt
11May 20175.51.098604945.0063492516.4060784837.0
22June 20178.67.051.2198581560.980334258.7725181547.4839944047.3
31July 201711.610.11.1485148511.0986049410.558845698.5619103269.4
42August 201779.30.7526881720.980334257.1404217539.6398262479.5
51September 20177711.098604946.37171722810.7177421711.8
62October 201712.69.81.2857142860.9803342512.8527591611.7956580911.6
71November 201713.613.11.0381679391.0986049412.3793363312.8735740114.1
82December 201717.615.61.1282051280.9803342517.9530604113.9514899313.7
91January 201821.619.61.1020408161.0986049419.6612988715.0294058516.5
102February 201814.818.20.8131868130.9803342515.0968917116.1073217715.8
111March 201822.418.61.2043010751.0986049420.3894951317.1852376918.9
122April 201811.6170.6823529410.9803342511.8326989118.2631536117.9

Table 8. Time series analysis subgroup D.

tPatternTimeCases of pipeline vandalism (2 years after deployment) ×102Moving average, MA(2)Seasonal and irregular componentsStDeseasonalizeTtSt*Tt
11May 20180.820.762270951.075732985145.0591046110.5743
22June 20181.741.281.3593751.146176661.518090589147.7548965169.3532
33July 20182.041.891.0793650791.085779251.87883494150.4506885163.3562
41August 20180.861.450.5931034480.762270951.128207764153.1464805116.7391
52September 20181.251.0551.1848341231.146176661.090582319155.8422724178.6228
63October 20182.191.721.2732558141.085779252.016984568158.5380644172.1373
71November 20181.972.080.9471153850.762270952.584382902161.2338563122.9039
82December 20182.642.3051.1453362261.146176662.303309858163.9296483187.8923
93January 20192.32.470.9311740891.085779252.118294295166.6254403180.9184
101February 20191.371.8350.7465940050.762270951.797261206169.3212322129.0687
112March 20191.111.240.895161291.146176660.9684371172.0170242197.1619
123April 20191.251.181.0593220341.085779251.1512469174.7128161189.6996
ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure13.gif

Figure 13. Time series analysis subgroup A.

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure14.gif

Figure 14. Time series analysis subgroup B.

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure15.gif

Figure 15. Time series analysis subgroup C.

ae037c24-fef8-4acb-8ce3-94bb37534ba7_figure16.gif

Figure 16. Time series analysis subgroup D.

Data availability

Underlying data

Harvard Dataverse. Effects of COVID-19 on pipeline vandalism in Nigeria, West Africa. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8X5KKB.30

This project contains the following underlying data:

Dataset Data for Effects of COVID-19 on pipeline vandalism ingested files:

  • Original data.tab. (Contains the unfiltered data from the NNPC reports, with cases of pipeline vandalism tabulated by month and year.).

  • ANOVA-Historical subgroups.tab. (Two sheets. One; (MasterDataSheet) contains the original data divided into the groups and a second (Historical sub-groups) preliminary analysis on the sub-groups).

  • ANOVA-COVID-19 groups.tab. (ANOVA analysis of COVID-19 group (prior, during, and post COVID-19 lockdown groups)).

  • Graph-subgrpB-and-6-months lockdown.tab. (Comparative analysis of key periods – 1 February-30 July 2017 and 1 February-30 July 2020).

  • Time series analysis -COVID-19 groups.tab. (Time series analysis of COVID-19 group (prior, during, and post COVID-19 lockdown groups) smoothening with moving average).

  • Time-series analysis-Historical subgroups.tab. (Time series analysis of historical subgroups with smoothening by moving average).

Data are available under the terms of the Creative Commons Zero “No rights reserved” data waiver (CC0 1.0 Public domain dedication).

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Onwuachi-Iheagwara PN and Iheagwara BI. Data Note: COVID-19, social distancing, and pipeline vandalism in Nigeria [version 2; peer review: 3 not approved]. F1000Research 2022, 10:604 (https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.54315.2)
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ApprovedThe paper is scientifically sound in its current form and only minor, if any, improvements are suggested
Approved with reservations A number of small changes, sometimes more significant revisions are required to address specific details and improve the papers academic merit.
Not approvedFundamental flaws in the paper seriously undermine the findings and conclusions
Version 2
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Reviewer Report 20 Nov 2023
Rioshar Yarveisy, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands 
Not Approved
VIEWS 4
The article presents a dataset examining pipeline vandalism in Nigeria from January 2015 to January 2021, using data from the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation's Monthly Financial and Operations Reports. The study categorizes the data into historical data, pre-COVID-19, during the ... Continue reading
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Yarveisy R. Reviewer Report For: Data Note: COVID-19, social distancing, and pipeline vandalism in Nigeria [version 2; peer review: 3 not approved]. F1000Research 2022, 10:604 (https://doi.org/10.5256/f1000research.134943.r215749)
NOTE: it is important to ensure the information in square brackets after the title is included in all citations of this article.
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Reviewer Report 11 Jan 2023
Alessandro Rovetta, R&C Research, Bovezzo (BS), Italy 
Not Approved
VIEWS 15
Update note – 16/01/23: This report has been updated on the request of the reviewer to remove the comment, “Concerning point 4, are boxplots built using standard deviation instead of the standard error of the mean in order to show ... Continue reading
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Rovetta A. Reviewer Report For: Data Note: COVID-19, social distancing, and pipeline vandalism in Nigeria [version 2; peer review: 3 not approved]. F1000Research 2022, 10:604 (https://doi.org/10.5256/f1000research.134943.r158466)
NOTE: it is important to ensure the information in square brackets after the title is included in all citations of this article.
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Reviewer Report 11 Jan 2022
Nima Khakzad, School of Occupational and Public Health, Ryerson University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
Not Approved
VIEWS 19
The authors have assessed the influence of satellite/GIS equipment and the COVID-19 lockdown on the number of pipeline vandalism events in Nigeria. In general, the employed technique is oversimplified, and the research outcomes are too obvious to warrant a novel/innovative ... Continue reading
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Khakzad N. Reviewer Report For: Data Note: COVID-19, social distancing, and pipeline vandalism in Nigeria [version 2; peer review: 3 not approved]. F1000Research 2022, 10:604 (https://doi.org/10.5256/f1000research.57792.r115417)
NOTE: it is important to ensure the information in square brackets after the title is included in all citations of this article.
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Reviewer Report 28 Jul 2021
Alessandro Rovetta, R&C Research, Bovezzo (BS), Italy 
Not Approved
VIEWS 38
General comments:

This paper investigates the impact of anti-COVID-19 restrictive measures on the vandalism pipeline by analyzing the time series of the incidence of the phenomenon from January 2015 to January 2021. To do this, an ANOVA ... Continue reading
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HOW TO CITE THIS REPORT
Rovetta A. Reviewer Report For: Data Note: COVID-19, social distancing, and pipeline vandalism in Nigeria [version 2; peer review: 3 not approved]. F1000Research 2022, 10:604 (https://doi.org/10.5256/f1000research.57792.r89908)
NOTE: it is important to ensure the information in square brackets after the title is included in all citations of this article.
  • Author Response 11 Jan 2023
    N Onwuachi-Iheagwara, Department of Petroleum Engineering, Delta state university, Oleh, Nigeria
    11 Jan 2023
    Author Response
    1) Section: Introduction. This section needs some additions to represent a complete background and contextualize the paper in the current scenario. Specifically, I suggest briefly discussing: 1.1. The incidence of ... Continue reading
COMMENTS ON THIS REPORT
  • Author Response 11 Jan 2023
    N Onwuachi-Iheagwara, Department of Petroleum Engineering, Delta state university, Oleh, Nigeria
    11 Jan 2023
    Author Response
    1) Section: Introduction. This section needs some additions to represent a complete background and contextualize the paper in the current scenario. Specifically, I suggest briefly discussing: 1.1. The incidence of ... Continue reading

Comments on this article Comments (0)

Version 2
VERSION 2 PUBLISHED 19 Jul 2021
Comment
Alongside their report, reviewers assign a status to the article:
Approved - the paper is scientifically sound in its current form and only minor, if any, improvements are suggested
Approved with reservations - A number of small changes, sometimes more significant revisions are required to address specific details and improve the papers academic merit.
Not approved - fundamental flaws in the paper seriously undermine the findings and conclusions
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