Human Rights and the ASEAN Smart Cities Network: Covering Unaddressed Civic and Social Concerns

Reviewer 2, comment 2.1.1: Normative approach dominates, lacking balance with empirical analysis;
the paper does not: compare with cases of “illiberal but effective smart cities” (e.g., Singapore, some Chinese cities), consider the perspective of ASEAN’s regional institutionalism, where stability and development are often prioritized over rapid democratization. Academic limitation: The paper has not situated ASCN within the broader debate between liberal governance and the developmental state, which is highly characteristic of Southeast Asia.

Response: In the revised article, I aim to acknowledge the broader debate between liberal governance and the developmental state by directly acknowledging that the ASCN can pose a threat towards a balanced approach taken by these sub-unit variables. In Paragraph 2, Section 1, the revisions focused to acknowledge that the ASCN is a manifestation of ASEAN’s approach of prioritizing stability and development within its policies. The revised paragraph: “The ASCN started with 26 pilot cities across the ten ASEAN member states. As seen in Figure 1 below, these cities significantly differ based on the population, political systems, and current state of development. Nevertheless, the ASCN has emphasized that through the network, normative guidelines will act as the foundation for the member cities’ smart city development. ^{3, 4} Perceiving the importance of city-level and scalable solutions, the ASCN was established at the 32 ^nd ASEAN Summit 2018 and determined 26 Pilot cities, which reflects consistency towards ASEAN’s regional institutionalism that places a heavy emphasis on stability and development. As of 2024, this list has increased to 31 cities, including Sihanoukville City, Sumedang, Rayong, Khon Kaen, and Chiang Mai.” Meanwhile, in the another paragraph (Paragraph 5, section 1), the revisions focused to acknowledge two things: 1) acknowledge that there are cases of illiberal, yet effective smart cities, which should open the case that there are other issues that can be considered within the case presented in this policy brief; 2) to balance between liberal governance and developmental state, ASCN in this case is criticized to potentially declining civic and social concerns. The revised paragraph: “This policy brief identifies two issues that arise from the ASCN. They include the negligence of human rights and imposing a ‘developing’ model from financing stakeholders. The ASCN is geared to establish ‘smart cities’ in Southeast Asia. However, this is a region consisting of states with significant disparities. The diverse social, economic, and political landscapes have already exacerbated human rights protection due to authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rules aiming to maintain their regime legitimacy through greater exertion of power. Introducing information and communication technologies in the ASCN member cities risks increased surveillance and control in the region’s less democratic settings. As past studies have argued, smart cities do not correlate directly to sustainability, ^{6, 7} and the ASCN and the developed city master plans of the member cities are ambiguous in showing how the most disadvantaged would benefit through greater inclusivity from smart cities. ^{8– 11} Therefore, it could represent what a study mentioned as evolving social practices restricting rights. ¹²  This study acknowledges that there are cases of illiberal, yet effective smart cities. However, looking at civic and social concerns, these practices should be carefully approached through the ASCN to ensure that developments in civic and social sustainability does not decline, and can balance between liberal governance and the developmental state.”


Reviewer 2, comment 2.1.2: Lack of clarity on the concept of “human rights” in the ASEAN context; The author uses human rights as an almost universal category, without distinguishing between: civil–political rights & economic–social–cultural rights; In ASEAN, many governments view access to public services, infrastructure, and employment as forms of human rights implementation, sometimes more important than political rights; The lack of differentiation makes the argument overly generalized.

Response: In paragraph 5, section 1, I explain that the human rights concern here relates to the exertion of power by authoritiarian/ semi-authoritarian stakeholders in the Southeast Asian region. Fully acknowledging that the human rights conception differs between ASEAN and the other parts of the globe, I make it clear what the human rights concerns are for this policy brief: “Introducing information and communication technologies in the ASCN member cities risks increased surveillance and control in the region’s less democratic settings.” Furthermore, it is outsides the scope of this study to delve deep on the differences between ASEAN and the universal conception of human rights from a civil and economic perspective, as this opens up a whole different discussion on the suitability of ASEAN’s defined human rights conceptions to that of the West.


Reviewer 2, Comment 2.2.1. Complete reliance on secondary data; The paper uses secondary data from 2018–2024, but: no policy interviews, no urban citizen surveys, no specific case studies of ASCN cities. This results in: assessments of surveillance and privacy violations that are structurally speculative; lack of direct evidence from specific ASCN projects. This is a serious limitation for a policy brief, which requires practical evidence to support recommendations.

Response: I disagree with this suggestion. First, there is no issue with relying on secondary data, whether it be original research articles or policy briefs. In the context of policy brief, the angle taken for this study is one that argues the points based on normative and literature assessment angels, which does help policymakers look at the issue from diverse angles. In the past, this method is also used in multiple published policy briefs (see: https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/aseans-climate-change-mitigation-and-adaptation-measures-abandoni/; https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/the-politics-of-environmental-policy-haze-pollution-asean-and-the/). To emphasize this, I have revised the first sentence of Paragraph 5, section 1: “This policy brief identifies two issues that arise from the ASCN, based on a normative and literature assessment of the direction of the initiative.” Secondly, I disagree that as a result of this approach, the arguments are speculative. The first example of this potential issue has been raised in the Paragraph 6, section 1 taking in the case of Cambodia’s Phnom Penh: “Observing the case of Phnom Penh’s forced privatized lands that disadvantaged people with low incomes, ¹¹ a “top-down” approach thus risks the livelihood of ASEAN citizens⁸ ”. In addition to this, the specific cases that uses the study case of ASCN is on the second recommendation, that recommends ASEAN member states to provide essential public services. In Paragraph 6, Section 2, it is argued the cities that reflect this: “The problem identified with the ASCN’s current model is the acceleration of development under the financing stakeholder’s model. In the past, many of ASEAN’s external partners have partnered with the ASCN pilot cities. ⁴⁰ Japan has been an active nation, aiming to adopt Japanese models of sustainability and smart city infrastructure through its Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which has increased its presence in Siem Reap, Phnom Penh, and Yangon City. ^{10, 11} China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) has also financed many of Southeast Asia’s regional strategic infrastructures. ⁴¹ Some have been under the framework of the BRI, while others have been through partnerships with China’s private and public industries. Huawei, for example, was reported to contribute to Thailand’s digital economy and technological updates. ^{8, 42} The problem with this model is that the intention of constructing this smart city leads Southeast Asian states to be affected by the national interests of the foreign states, aiming to impose their development model on the ASCN members. ^{43, 44} Consequently, it will be difficult for recipient cities of the financing to cater to the needs of their vulnerable groups, as attention would be diverted to accelerating the progress of the development in alignment with the interests of the financing stakeholder.”


Reviewer 2, comment 2.2.2: Mechanical comparison of Democracy Index and HDI Placing Democracy Index and HDI side by side illustrates ASEAN’s diversity, but: the paper does not prove a direct relationship between these rankings and ASCN’s effectiveness; it does not analyze changes over time (before–after joining ASCN). The indices are used more as illustrations of viewpoints rather than causal analytical tools.

Response: The two tables used (Democracy Index and HDI) are utilized to support the arguments made that act as background context in understand the specifics of the recommendations. Table 1 focuses on Southeast Asia’s Democracy Index that solidifies the claim of the lack of democracy within the Southeast Asian state’s social and political landscapes. Table 2 shows the disparity of human development among Southeast Asian states. The keyword here is ‘DISPARITY,’ allowing readers to understand the unique challenges of the Southeast Asian region, and steer clear from making the assumption that all Southeast Asian states are the same.


Reviewer 2, comment 2.3.1. Linear argument “smart city → surveillance → democratic decline” The author constructs a linear chain of reasoning: Technology → surveillance → control → rights violations. However, this approach: ignores the role of institutional design;, does not analyze the potential for technology to be used for transparency, good governance, or improved service access. This makes the paper lean more toward cautionary discourse than multidimensional analysis.

Response: In the revised paragraph 1, section 2, I make it clear that there is the presence of institutional designs that have the capacity to counter the significance of the issue. Nevertheless, it is also important to acknowledge that the fears expressed with the arguments are based on the literature assessment, in which scholars in the past have pointed towards his possibility and fear scenarios. Furthermore, this policy brief is concerned with the human rights violations that could occur from the ASCN, rather than providing a general overview over the pros and cons of the initiative. Delving into the benefits, therefore, is outside the scope of this article. Neverthleless, I acknowledge this in the second paragraph of section 2: “This policy brief acknowledges that smart city development is geared toward economic progress despite the civic and social elements emphasized in the ASCN.” The revised paragraph: “This section argues that to complement the deficiencies of the ASCN’s smart city conception, two recommendations can be adopted. The first recommendation is to acknowledge the vulnerability of the underprivileged, provide personal security, and promote social inclusion for governing smart cities. As seen in Table 1 below, a prominent problem with Southeast Asian states is the lack of democracy within their social and political landscapes. Consequently, when the ASCN echoed the importance of smart cities, there were fears that this would further derail democratic progress in the region. Studies in the past have shown how smart-city developments risk more substantial possibilities of violating privacy rights as high-tech companies have a stronger voice and role in the planning and financing of smart-city-related projects. ^{13– 16} Half of the Southeast Asian states are authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states. Consequently, there is an intense fear of abuse of power and increased surveillance capacities that are feared would be the consequences of smart city conceptions, albeit, the presence of institutional designs that help to counter the intensity. ^{7, 17}”


Reviewer 2, comment 2.3.2: Incomplete assessment of local governments’ active role ASCN is described as a top-down imposed network, but in reality: many ASCN projects are proposed by city governments; the level of technology adoption varies greatly across cities. Treating ASCN as a homogeneous structure reduces the accuracy of the argument.

Response: I have revised the words used in paragraph 6, section 1. The ‘top-down’ terminology used in the article does not reflect the points used for this policy brief. Rather, it is a quotation of how de Jong in 2023 described the ASCN, which reflects a hierarchical system that does not allow ASEAN member states to adapt towards a regionalized system. The revised paragraph: “A second concern identified in this policy brief is the imposing development models by external actors. The ASCN collaborates and links ASCN members’ projects with possible financing from vast stakeholders. The problem with this is that the ASCN eventually aims to achieve accelerated growth for profit, which includes broader privatization processes along the way. Observing the case of Phnom Penh’s forced privatized lands that disadvantaged people with low incomes, ¹¹ a “top-down” (terminology introduced by de Jong in 2023) approach thus risks the livelihood of ASEAN citizens. ⁸ ”


Reviewer 2, comment 2.3.3: Critique of China and Japan’s role is overly politicized The paper warns of major powers (BRI, JICA, Huawei) imposing development models. However: it does not compare loan conditions or policy constraints among partners; it does not analyze ASEAN countries’ capacity to negotiate and choose strategies. This makes the argument appear more like geopolitical suspicion than evidence-based development assessment.

Response: The reference towards China and Japan’s role here is to simply acknowledge that the systems imposed differs to that of ASEAN member states. Therefore, there is a risk of these imposed systems negatively affecting ASCN mechanisms, which has been the case with Japan and China’s development models argued in several studies in the past (see the citations). Nevertheless, I have revised the paragraph to explain that ASEAN member states do have the capacity to negotiate conditions, and therefore, has the ability to partially counter such concerns. The revised paragraph (Paragraph 6, section 1): “The problem identified with the ASCN’s current model is the acceleration of development under the financing stakeholder’s model. In the past, many of ASEAN’s external partners have partnered with the ASCN pilot cities. ⁴⁰ Japan has been an active nation, aiming to adopt Japanese models of sustainability and smart city infrastructure through its Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which has increased its presence in Siem Reap, Phnom Penh, and Yangon City. ^{10, 11} China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) has also financed many of Southeast Asia’s regional strategic infrastructures. ⁴¹ Some have been under the framework of the BRI, while others have been through partnerships with China’s private and public industries. Huawei, for example, was reported to contribute to Thailand’s digital economy and technological updates. ^{8, 42} The problem with this model is that the intention of constructing this smart city leads Southeast Asian states to be affected by the national interests of the foreign states, aiming to impose their development model on the ASCN members. ^{43, 44} Consequently, it will be difficult for recipient cities of the financing to cater to the needs of their vulnerable groups, as attention would be diverted to accelerating the progress of the development in alignment with the interests of the financing stakeholder. Nevertheless, this problem is somewhat countered by the ASEAN member state’s capacity negotiate conditions, which could partially counter these concerns.”


Reviewer 2, comment 2.4.1: Human rights recommendation: well-intentioned but impractical Calling for human rights integration into smart city governance is reasonable. However: the paper does not specify concrete institutional mechanisms; it does not clarify who monitors, who implements, and who is accountable. In ASEAN – where no enforcement mechanism exists – this recommendation is more symbolic than substantive.

Response: I agree that ASEAN does not have any enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, rather than specifying the details on how this recommendation can be made, I opt to make a slight ‘vagueness’ and choose to simply reference the ASCN as the relevant mechanism that is able to clarify and acknowledge vulnerabilities related to human rights in the context of smart cities. This would allow enough room for ASEAN to determine the best way of mentioning this, without risking violating the ASEAN Way. The explanation in the manuscript is slightly revised in paragraph 2, section 2: “Considering the vulnerability of the underprivileged in larger cities of Southeast Asia, it is essential to consider how past studies have concluded the risks of smart city developments to leave the poor and unemployed in isolation. ^{19, 20} This policy brief acknowledges that smart city development is geared toward economic progress despite the civic and social elements emphasized in the ASCN. The problem with this is the strong possibility of social inclusion and participation of the people in governance being further hampered, as shown in the conclusions of past studies on this subject. ^{21– 25} Therefore, this destination to a ‘smart city’ status must be made carefully by the ASCN to ensure that, in the process, local governments do not impede upon the fundamental human rights of its citizens in the name of development.”


Reviewer 2, comment 2.4.2: ASEAN intra-regional support recommendation: idealized view of Singapore’s role The author suggests Singapore and high-HDI countries support others. However: ASEAN is not the EU, it has no common budget; Singapore has no legal obligation to support other countries; national interests may conflict with the role of “regional donor.”
This recommendation lacks assessment of political and economic incentives.

Response: I agree with this. Therefore, as the last paragraph of section 2 explains: “Therefore, the question would be whether Singapore would be openly willing to assist all of its ASEAN counterparts in establishing a balance between smart city status and sustainable development.” This shows that this policy brief acknowledges that Singapore has the strongest capacity to provide assistances, however, there is no mechanism within ASEAN that is able to enforce this to Singapore. Ultimately, the decision to provide the assistances would solely lie on the hands of the Singapore Government, and is outside the scope of this study to argue how best to approach this.